

TO WHAT EXTENT DID SPORT IN LATE NINETEENTH AND
EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY BRITAIN BECOME MORE OF A
BUSINESS AND LESS OF A SPORT?

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The so-called moral values that are traditionally associated with sport in Britain in the late nineteenth century are often seen to be opposed to the supposedly more commercial values of the business world. The origins of modern sport, however, can be said to have been a product of the industrial 'revolution' (or evolution) and its impact on British, and especially English, society. The economic changes which occurred in eighteenth and nineteenth century England, can be seen as the preconditions that led to the emergence of the political and economic dominance of the middle classes in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The development of organised sport was mainly the product of this middle class hegemony: however, the impact of older traditions must also be considered. To the extent that the middle classes are traditionally identified with the business and entrepreneurial sector, it could be expected that there would have been a cross over of business practices into the sport and leisure areas.

The issue at the base of this essay can be seen as the extent to which sporting bodies acquired or aimed to adopt the perceived practices of business. There are, however, difficulties with this idea. Firstly, were sport and business antiethical to each other, and if they were, why? Secondly, there is also the problem of deciding why a sporting body adopts a perceived business practice: if, for example, a football club adopted company status and limited liability was this an economic move to attract new investors or perhaps simply the application of a useful business form to safeguard existing supporters? Thirdly, assuming that it is possible to define and document the takeover of sport by business, there is still the problem of generalising from specific examples. It is a question of how far down the sporting scale the influence of the profit motivated individual, club, or sport reaches.

Areas where the impact of business practices can be considered include labour relations, organisational structure, and competitive performance in economic terms. It is necessary to evaluate the extent to which those involved in sporting activities perceived themselves to be involved in a business venture. Hence, was sport operated in the way that other businesses were controlled?¹

The sports of late nineteenth century England covered a wide spectrum, as did the social backgrounds and motivations of those who were involved in their conduct. The differing orientation of various sports may be reflected in their organisational and business methods. Consider, for example, the differences between football, cricket and

and horse-racing.

The nineteenth century saw the codification of most sports in England and, although the commercialisation of sport was not uniquely a product of industrialisation, much of the origins of commercialised sport lay in the development of amateur coded sport. It was the amateur sportsmen and women who first set up organised structures. These governing bodies set up by the middle classes were aimed at standardising rules, promoting 'healthy and controlled' competition, handling disputes and moulding the future development of 'their' sports.² This rationalizing of sports may have originated with business skills.³ It should be considered also, however, that such skills could also be learnt through involvement in other organisations that developed concomitantly with industrialization such as unions, friendly societies and the like. The governing bodies that were developed initiated strategies that organised the functioning of sports, for example, fixture lists, national calendars, international matches, co-ordination of fixtures and so on. The efficiency with which they did this may be open to debate. and it has been suggested that the emergence of the Football League was due in part to the inefficiency of the Football Association: the Football League brought order to the system where there was 'little fixity about fixtures'.⁴ In cricket and horse racing central authorities also developed: the Marylebone Cricket Club assumed the dominant role in cricket and the Jockey Club achieved a monopolistic control of respectable racing.

The organisational structure, functions, and competency of these bodies could be considered in terms of cartel theory in the case of the Football League and the county cricket system, and some form of monopoly theory for the Jockey Club. The membership qualifications and the ease of access to influence decision making processes would be of interest in evaluating their organisational capacity. In the case of the Jockey Club

Membership of the Club was a jealously guarded heirloom: social position determined election to the Club not administrative ability... The Jockey Club, like the magistrates bench, was not for the industrialist or businessman...⁵

The origins of the Jockey Club lay very much in the pre-industrial society and the values of this period of hereditary political legislators, influenced the Club into the late nineteenth century. The activities of the Jockey Club seemed mainly to have been in the areas of maintaining the image of horse racing, a sort of aristocratic 'father knows best' and the level of activity seemed to have been dependent on the whims of the 'turf dictators'. The Jockey Club seems to have been more concerned about how racing was conducted rather than with ensuring that it was profitable. The business importance of the Club lay with the fact that it established a degree of respectability and conformity in racing which probably attracted more spectators and hence encouraged the investment of capital into racecourses and their facilities.

In cricket the Marylebone Cricket Club (M.C.C.) had by the 1870s established a moral, if not Legal, sanction over the game and its conduct, especially in the administration and organisation of the form of county cricket. The fluctuating fortunes of the county administrations that had supplanted the independent touring companies, may have allowed the M.C.C. to gain its undoubted influence. The M.C.C., like the Jockey Club, was in many ways a non-economic authority, concerned primarily with how the game was played.

In football, however, although the Football Association was the legal and moral authority of the sport, the Football League was established as a second central authority specifically to have control over fixtures, the distribution of revenue, wage and mobility restraints on players, and so on, although the clubs had voting rights to influence such issues. The formation of the Football League can perhaps be seen as an attempt to form a cartel to provide a reliable product to satisfy market demand. The Football League was made up of twelve prominent clubs which were expected to play at full strength, hence providing an above average quality of play.⁷ The problem as regards the subject of this essay is that, although the Football League exhibits entrepreneurial behaviour, the activities of both the M.C.C. and the Jockey Club seem much less market orientated. They also took longer to control the economics of their sports and did not exhibit the same degree of formalised structures and regulation. The greater economic authority of the Football League may have reflected the fact that it was set up for a specific purpose to organise a professional football competition. The authority of the Jockey Club and the M.C.C. did not have this specific push towards economic control. In the case of the M.C.C., the country cricket clubs retained greater independence of action in terms of fixtures, for example, than did the member teams of the Football League.

If we are to consider the sports cartel as similar to the usual concepts of cartel behaviour then we need to know if there were other cartels in operation in Britain at this time and how they functioned. Their operations could be considered to see if they were more 'business like' than the sporting cartels or more efficient. Another factor that could be considered is the longevity of the sporting cartels for, in general, cartels are expected to be unstable.⁸ The need of individual teams for competition due to the peculiarities of the nature of the product that the teams combine to create⁹ may provide an incentive to form cartels. We would then be interested in the extent to which the cartels attempted to maintain their position; for example, what were the barriers to entry and were they natural or artificial. In the case of the Football League twelve prominent teams were committed to the concept of a well organised competition and this may have prevented serious rivals from emerging, particularly as the Football League was alert enough to form a Second Division within its structure so as to limit organised competition for players from non-League teams such as those in the Southern League.¹⁰ This can be contrasted with the situation in county cricket where an alternative game did emerge with the development of League Cricket, although this was limited geographically. This created competition for labour and the response was to impose sanctions on players who chose to play League cricket. To

consider whether League cricket was in competition with county cricket in areas other than the demand for players, is essentially a question of to what extent it competed for spectators and hence for gate money. The contrasting structures of the two forms of the game suggests that they were not aimed at the same audience and to this extent may have been non-competing. The introduction of Saturday starts by Leicestershire, however, indicates an awareness of the appeal of League cricket to the working classes.¹¹ At the county level, the ease of entry to the initial competition plus the existence of the Minor Counties competition meant that there was no reason to set up or attempt to set up a rival structure. In horse racing the links of the Jockey Club with Parliament¹² and the status of its members as the racing elite ensured them the dominating role, with the Parliamentary connection helping them to eliminate alternative racing. The imposition of sanctions on those who participated in racing events not recognised by the Jockey Club¹³ shows that other racing existed but it was starved of elite support.

The most important impact of the cartels on the business aspects of sport was in the employment sector. Labour controls were successfully imposed on the 'player-workers' of cricket and football. The contrasting nature of the central authorities in sport was reflected in their approaches to labour regulation. The Football League adopted formal legislation to Limit wages and other income to players from football; they also removed the rights of the player to sell his services as he could. In cricket, county players were able to transfer freely to other teams, but the cost of such an action was a two year period out of the game due to the residency requirements. Wage limits in cricket were imposed by convention rather than by regulation. In horse racing labour was not regulated this way; in fact the Jockey Club found it necessary to guarantee a minimum riding fee for jockeys paid in advance. The differing approaches to wage and mobility controls reveal the attitudes towards the position of the cartel's members. One of the arguments in favour of labour controls was that they would ensure the long run survival of the clubs and encourage equality of competition. This concern to maintain the clubs could be seen in terms of the need to sustain a competing group, but it can also be seen as a non-business action as the clubs so maintained could not survive in a free market situation. If the ambition of the cartels was to maintain the existing membership, however, which is a logical assumption, then the attempt to minimise labour costs was a sound move to their own benefit.

The organisation and operation of sport at the level of the cricket club, the cricket ground companies, the football clubs and companies, race course companies and so on reflected a variety of motivations and practices. When the individual clubs and companies are considered it would be sensible to expect a diverse mixture of responses to their operation, some of which would have been more businesslike than others. The image of the individual sport also needs to be considered as some are seen to have been more commercially orientated than others.

The commercialisation of sport due to industrial change meant that investment in sport increased in the period under consideration. So that by the latter part of the nineteenth century, sport had been changed by the impact of

...rising incomes and increased leisure time [which] encouraged the emergence of gate money sport, the adoption of company status by sports clubs, heavy investment in grounds and other facilities, the organization of events on a regular basis so as to cover these overhead costs.¹⁵

The composition of the groups involved in the production and the provision of sporting events, which were purchased and consumed by the audience, was diverse. The organisation of sport, both amateur and professional, probably meant the adoption of at least some business practice was inevitable. Amateur organisations would have needed to have used book-keeping methods and so on; however, it may be reasonable to conclude that they did not have business objectives. Presumably there is no need to question that the amateur sports aimed to keep themselves as 'pure sports'. What we are really concerned with is whether the adoption of business methods by the commercial sporting sector meant that 'sporting values' were lost. The common basis of commercialised sports was the enclosure of events and the charging of entrance money. Given the diverse nature of professional sports such as cricket, football, and horse racing, I think that it is most useful to consider them separately.

The more commercial sports such as boxing and professional cycling seem to be seen as events with no other justification than making money for their entrepreneurial promoters. The problem is deciding why the fact that they are business activities makes them less a sport. Perhaps the problems of racing such as race rigging and result fixing were more permanent than in other sports. What can be said is that the profit motive was less diluted with other ambitions than in sports such as cricket or even other aspects of horse racing such as breeding the winner of a 'classic' race.

The sport most often quoted as an example of the adoption of business methods is professional football. The case for the essentially pure entrepreneurial approach has been put by Steven Tischler:

Sensing the possibilities for profit, entrepreneurs invested in football grounds, players, and all the paraphernalia necessary to field a team and to provide a modicum of facilities for spectators.¹⁶

If we wish to see professional football in such purely commercial terms as this then it might be logical to expect there to be evidence of a rash of new teams. Liverpool Football Club, for example, was formed by John Houlding after he had been ousted from the board of the Everton Football Club.¹⁷ This can be contrasted with examples of clubs which

evolved into companies where members either became, or were replaced, by shareholders and boards of directors replaced the committees.¹⁸ The goals of those who invested in both types of clubs may have had different ambitions; it might be possible to compare annual reports etc. and see whether there was a greater emphasis in profit in the case of the former.

A sample of shareholders from twelve English football teams, four of which were from the Southern League showed that the majority of shareholders held only a small number of shares.¹⁹ The percentage of shareholders who held less than 10 shares ranged from 62.4% (Portsmouth Football Company) to 92.6% in the case of the Stoke Football Club, although it should be noted that the case of this club in 1908, which is the year of the sample, may have been abnormal as in that year the club left the Football League for several seasons. The percentage of shares held by these small shareholders varied greatly, from a low of 19.5% up to 78.8% so that the influence of these shareholders varied greatly among clubs. It is difficult to see these shareholders as being anything other than fans with the added bonus of a free season ticket. The Preston North End Football Club, for example, had 108 shareholders who owned a single share only and another 122 people who held two shares each. Even if the club paid a dividend these people could hardly have expected a significant return: on a one pound share a 5% dividend, which was the maximum allowed, the yield would have been only one shilling per year.²⁰ Also, considering the risk involved in such a transaction, a much safer alternative investment may have been the Government backed Consols which averaged a dividend of between 3 and 4 per cent in this period, but there may have been a minimum purchasing requirement.²¹ The existence of such an alternative investment opportunity suggests that the investments made in the football club shares should be seen as consumption rather than investment in the conventional sense. It cannot be said that football clubs were purely business enterprises when we consider factors such as the profile of the shareholders which suggests many investors were essentially fans.

The case of the large shareholders in football clubs may not be comparable as we would expect them to have had an interest in the economic performance of the club, although exceptions would occur such as the Hills family shares in the West Ham United Football Club which they allowed to be controlled by a board of directors on which they were unrepresented.²² Large shareholdings were not a prerequisite for membership of a board in every case, for example Derby County required only a single share and Everton only three. Nevertheless, large shareholdings increased the influence of a small group. The returns for the directors were unlikely to have been directly from their football club shares³⁰: the suggestion is that the entrepreneurially-minded director could make indirect gains. These could supposedly be made in two ways. fame by association and profits from contracting to the club. In the latter case we would need to examine club records and be able to show that most contracts were let internally and secondly that they were costed at market rates, that is, a supplier was not expected to do 'their' club a favour and supply at a reduced price.

The idea that football was an important business was realised at the time by some of those involved. William McGregor, the founder of the Football League, stated that "football is big business. The turnover of some of our clubs is considerably larger than the turnover of many an important trading concern."²³ His seemingly straight forward approach is complicated by the fact that he hoped that the 'right sort' of people would become involved in football management.²⁴ The development of the football club in business terms may be reflected by the adoption of company status and limited liability which begins to happen in the mid-1890s. The reason for the adoption of this business practice may have been to attract investment by the limiting of the risks and liability incurred; this could for example have occurred in the case of building a stadium where there was a risk of loss. This was the situation with Celtic and Rangers where the adoption of company status was to facilitate the raising of funds to build new stadia and hence increase spectator capacity: Rangers new ground was meant to hold up to 80,000.²⁵

Finally what football clubs did with any profits that they managed to accrue would be of interest. It may be possible to examine whether over time football clubs paid shareholders a return or whether any profit was ploughed back into buying better players, equipment, etc., or building better facilities to attract more spectators.

In the case of county cricket the organizational structure was somewhat different as few cricket clubs owned their own grounds. The reason for this may have been a lack of entrepreneurial leadership. If it could be argued that, in the case of football clubs, ground ownership was a part of commercialization, then the lack of ownership by cricket clubs was a lesser degree of business orientation. A comparison of shareholders in football companies and the shareholders in the cricket ground companies could be useful. If there was a degree of social distinction between the two groups of shareholders it may indicate that the cricket ground companies were at least partially a form of patronage.²⁶ In support of this, it has been suggested that the cricket ground companies did not expect to receive market rates of return as "some counties leased their grounds from companies formed by the county committees, but they did not press the clubs for money."²⁷ It needs to be considered that some of these companies paid satisfactory dividends, for example 6% by Warwickshire and 3¼% by Hampshire, though these have been seen as rentier rather than risk taking returns.²⁸ Be that as it may, these returns compare favourably with the supposedly more commercial football club companies.

The functioning of the cricket clubs themselves suggests that the trappings of commercialization were grafted onto the amateur ethos. Gate money cricket and professionalism were not new developments in cricket but it has been noted that 'as a profit making enterprise, first class cricket was a signal failure.'²⁹ The main point here is the possibility that the social values of the game retarded the responses to market signals. The development of the Saturday League Cricket was one indicator of the establishment game's failure to respond.

There is, however, the need to consider whether the 'powers-that-were' in cricket were concerned with cricket's spectator appeal. The lack of response to the declining interest reported to be due to the number of drawn and one-sided games, for example, suggests that they may not have been.

The general situation of cricket clubs being loss-making enterprises suggests that investors should be considered as patrons rather than businessmen. Dependence on commercial practices may have been less necessary if patrons could arrange finance for expansion and other activities. If that was the case, then the clubs were divorced from the market place in obtaining funds and it may follow that they were thus less interested in selling themselves. The development of country-house cricket could be seen as an indicator that some people felt that cricket had become too commercial.

In the case of horse racing there are a number of different groups to be considered. and there is no reason to believe that their ambitions were the same. The motives of those who were involved in 'unsanctioned' racing are likely to have to have been closer to the extremes of pleasure and profit. In the racing mainstream, controlled by the Jockey Club, the groups least likely to be interested in profits and business were the owners and breeders, though this is a generalization and there were some profit-oriented breeding companies. The uncertainties involved in owning and breeding successful horses and the fact that an unsuccessful horse was as expensive to keep as a winning one suggests that this would have been a consumption area.

The major business areas of horse racing lay in the ownership of race courses, enclosure and the charging of entry fees. The originator of gate money racing was reputedly Sandown Park in 1875 and the concept expanded through the 1880s and 1890s with the formation of racing companies.

The executives of the gate-money meetings laid great emphasis on attracting spectators: they were in racing to make money.³⁰

These innovators can be compared with the older meetings which found it necessary to enclose to maintain the quality of their racing and hence their level of support. Enclosure led to innovation in the styles of racing to make them more interesting, such as the introduction of shorter races. This in turn led to the racing of younger horses and hence meant returns from racing could possibly be recovered sooner. The extent to which racing styles were determined by the owners of the race course companies is not clear, but the response to commercialization was a business one and the style of racing was permanently altered. So the nature of horse racing was altered with some areas becoming more of a business but not less of a sport.

The employment sector in sport consisted of two groups. the increasingly professionalized officialdom and the professional sportsmen.

The former are also a product of commercialization, though this is not necessarily in terms of wages but in the degree of proficiency that was exhibited. Specialization occurred in areas such as handicapping and judging in horse racing and umpiring in other sports. This can be seen as a business response in that perceived competence and impartiality would encourage spectator attendance and hence increase gate takings.

The increase in business influence in the organization of sports should be reflected in labour market relationships. Thus an employer-employee situation should have developed that closely resembled that of industrializing Britain. This could be shown in terms of comparisons of wages, career lengths, employment conditions and so on. In considering to what extent playing sport could have been seen as work it might be useful to consider the 'workforce' as being made up of two groups that are quite distinct. Firstly those who only worked/played in professional sport for a short period and secondly those who made longer term careers in their sport. A study of career lengths in professional sports by Wray Vamplew has shown that for the majority of would be professional sportsmen their career as such was very short.³¹ It also seems logical to assume that even those players who had longer professional careers had at least some experience of other work. In the off season professional sportsmen had to find other work, and there were difficulties in finding reasonably paid seasonal work.³² Therefore it is very likely that the majority of professional sportsmen saw themselves as "---highly skilled and for a time highly paid workers who would one day return to more mundane occupations."³³ There is one difference about the skills of the professional sportsman. In that his skills did not gain him the respect that other types of professionals received. This Lack of status may have been due to the brevity of sporting careers "---the typical professional sportsman's career was so short - most were never really in the game long enough to call it a career ---."³⁴

The question of whether professional sportsmen were seen as workers is debatable. Although the relationship between players and management has been characterized as that of employer and employee,³⁵ this seems to have been offset by values carried over from the pre-industrial society. If a generalization must be made then the relationship in sport seems closest to that of the over-personalized nature of domestic service. The professional sportsman was expected to know his place and was subject to a degree of observation not endured in most other work situations. The imposition of wage and mobility controls on some professional sportsmen removed the right of the players to sell their skills as they could and in a sense transferred the ownership of such skills to the clubs. This, and other aspects of contracts, placed the player in a different position than other workers but can be seen as a logical business action to keep wages down. In a period of union activity in the labour force at large, the sports sector was mainly quiescent. The lack of union activity, partly as the result of the nature of the labour market, may have also meant that players did not perceive their activities as work in the general sense. Whether or not they saw themselves, or were seen by others, as workingmen, sportsmen

were employed in increasing numbers in sport in the latter part of the nineteenth century. In this sense at least sport could be said to have become more of a business, as professionals played for money as well as for enjoyment and those paying the wages were interested in more than just how the game was played.

There is a miscellany of issues which, while they were not directly connected to commercialized sport as a business, showed how business was influenced by sport. In the area of sports equipment manufacturing, firms should be conventional profit maximizers; their expansion should be influenced by the popularity of the game. To some extent, however, traditionalism in sports such as cricket with the demand for hand made balls retarded the application of new technology. In other areas, however, such as cycle manufacturers, professional sport was a way of promoting their wares. The use of advertising may also be a useful indicator of entrepreneurial activities in sport. The Scottish Football Association Annuals for example carried team advertising mentioning the proximity of railways, trams etc., to their facilities. Such transport facilities increased the catchment areas of spectators although it would also increase the competition for them. Other advertising for turnstiles, admission tickets and so on also shows the development. The development of specialist sporting media and newspapers selling their sports coverage was another business based on sport.

In conclusion it is clear that in the period between 1870 and 1914 many business procedures were adopted and adapted for use in sports competitions. Sporting entrepreneurs applied business practices learnt elsewhere to the organization of sports. The style of games were changed to make them more attractive to spectators and players were paid wages for their services.

Just as the wage system actualized player-owner relationships, so too did the payment of admission to football grounds create consumers out of spectators.³⁶

It cannot be said, however, that business practices became the sole *raison d'être* for sport. Many of the traditional concepts about sport having the ability to inculcate moral values remained. In the case of cricket it can be argued that the game was felt to have intrinsic qualities which made it a necessary part of society. It should be remembered that amateur sports continued to be played and that, while their formal associations may have adopted business practices, they cannot be said to have been businesses. In the case of professional-commercial sport, the continued debate about whether or not those involved in the organization of such sport were profit or utility maximizers, indicated that they did not clearly become simply business enterprises. Finally it is not clear to me why the assumption is made that because a business structure has been adopted a 'sport' becomes somehow less 'sporting'.

NOTES:

1. Perhaps the goals of other firms should be considered and evaluated to see how well they conformed to neat theories of the firm and entrepreneurial behaviour.
2. Peter Bilsborough, *THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPORT IN GLASGOW, 1850-1914* (M.A. Thesis, University of Sterling, June 1983) p. 182.
3. *IBID.* p. 181.
4. C.E. Sutcliffe, J.A. Brierley, F. Howarth (comp.) *THE STORY OF THE FOOTBALL LEAGUE 1888-1938* (*The Football League 1938*) p. 1.
5. Wray Vamplew, *THE TURF: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY OF HORSE RACING* (Allen Lane, Penguin Books Ltd., London 1979) pp. 99-100.
6. *IBID.* Chapter Six esp. pp. 94-100.
7. Sutcliffe et.al., *op. cit.*, pp. 2-7.
8. Walter Nicholson, *MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS* (The Dryden Press, 2nd ed. 1978) pp. 381-383.
9. W. Neale, "The Peculiar Economics of Professional Sports." *THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS*, Volume LXXVIII (February 1964 No. 1) pp. 2-3.
10. Sutcliffe et.al., *op.cit.*, p. 8.
11. Keith Sandiford and Wray Vamplew, *THE PECULIAR ECONOMICS OF ENGLISH CRICKET BEFORE 1914* (mimeo) p. 10. It would be interesting to examine the organization of League Cricket in terms of who did the organizing and who watched the matches.
12. Wray Vamplew, *THE TURF* (*op. cit.*,) see p. 36 on 'metropolitan meetings organized by local publicans and bookmakers' and on legislation on racing itself - contrast the fact that legislation was avoided on child jockeys but legislation was passed limiting speculative racing. pp. 98-99.
13. *IBID.* p. 45.
14. see for example W.I. Bassett, "Big Transfers and the Transfer System" in Anon, *THE BOOK OF FOOTBALL* (Amalgamated Press 1906).
15. Wray Vamplew, *LATE KICK-OFF: ECONOMIC HISTORY AND SPORTS HISTORY* (mimeo) p. 1
16. Steven Tischler, *FOOTBALLERS AND BUSINESSMEN: THE ORIGINS OF PROFESSIONAL SOCCER IN ENGLAND* (Holmes and Meier 1981) p. 39.

17. *IBID.* see pages 74 and 78.
18. Wray Vamplew, "Borderline Differences? A Comparative Analysis of Shareholders and Directors in English and Scottish Football Before 1914" *FLINDERS UNIVERSITY OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN ECONOMIC HISTORY NO. 2* (Feb. 1984) p. 1.
19. Based on shareholders' registers for Blackburn Rovers, Blackpool, Burnley, Derby County, Everton, Preston North End, Stoke and Woolwich Arsenal (of Football League) and Plymouth, Portsmouth, Queens Park Rangers and Southampton (of Southern League).
20. The 5% limit on dividends payable was imposed by the Football League, informally in 1890 and formally from 1896 (Wray Vamplew, "Borderline Differences..." *op. cit.*, p. 10).
21. *IBID.* p. 11.
22. Charles Korr, 'West Ham United Football Club and the Beginnings of Professional Football in East London, 1895-1914', *JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY HISTORY* (April 1978, Volume 13 No. 2), p. 223.
23. William McGregor, "The L.S.D. of Football" in Anon, *THE BOOK OF FOOTBALL* (Amalgamated Press, 1906) p. 60.
24. *IBID.*
25. Peter Bilborough, *op. cit.*, p. 220.
26. Wray Vamplew suggested for Warwickshire and Hampshire this was the case.
27. Keith Sandiford and Wray Vamplew, *op. cit.*, p. 16.
28. *IBID.*
29. *IBID.*, p. 1.
30. Wray Vamplew, *THE TURF*, *op. cit.*, specifically p. 42 and the following discussion also pp. 38-47.
31. Wray Vamplew "Close of Play: Career Termination in English Professional Sport 1870-1914" *CANADIAN JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF SPORT* (May 1984 Volume XV No. 1).
32. Fred Root, *A CRICKET PRO'S LOT* (Edward Arnold and Co., London 1937) p. 43
33. Steven Tischler, *op. cit.*, p. 95.
34. Although the economic factors whereby a professional cricketer often paid his own transport, food, and lodging bills would have

encouraged separation.

35. Steven Tischler, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

36. *IBID.*