

# **From Old Soldiers to Old Youth: Political Leadership and New Zealand's 1981 Springbok Rugby Tour**

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## **Abstract**

The campaign against the 1981 Springbok Rugby Tour can be seen as a metonym of Aotearoa/New Zealand's post-war change driven by and contributing to the disruption of the certainties of nation. Analyses that see the 1981 tour as a struggle for political leadership between the depression/war generation and the baby boomers or 68ers are flawed. The model is both monocultural and ahistorical. The image of the 68ers (old) youth, as revolutionary was made possible by a crisis of legitimacy experienced by the generation of old soldiers struggling to keep control where the old certainties of nation and masculinity had been weakened in the world of identity politics.

This paper employs a historicised analysis of youth and investigates protest leadership and participants to argue that the generation that took control of Aotearoa/New Zealand in 1984 were isolated from the popular movements of the 1970s and 1980s and exploited the language of identity politics to protect and ensure their social power and status.

Political analysts and commentators have a tendency to dramatise their chosen subject, to make it crucial. In New Zealand, 1984 is seen as a vital time in contemporary political history which Boston and Holland see as 'a crucial turning point in the style, character and content of the politics of the post war era'.<sup>1</sup> Colin James agrees, calling it the time of the 'quiet revolution'.<sup>2</sup> But then James has a tendency to dramatic depictions, the 1993 election was, for him, a 'turning point'.<sup>3</sup> The changes since the 1984 general election in New Zealand have been so widespread that it has become a commonplace to depict 14 July 1984 as the beginning of a crucial shift in New Zealand politics when a new generation of political leaders took over. The youth and relative inexperience of the new leadership was stressed at the time and still invoked by way of partial explanation.<sup>4</sup> John Roberts, in 1986, argued that 'not being in any sense hostages to the past they [the new Cabinet] embraced the future with equal measures of intelligence and blithe ignorance'.<sup>5</sup> To be sure, the contrast of age with the outgoing Muldoon Cabinet was significant. The average age of the incoming Cabinet was in the 40s while the average of Robert Muldoon's Cabinet was nearly sixty. Yet somehow the age and other personal characteristics or outlooks of the new government's members seems an unconvincing explanation for the

extent of change and lack of opposition they encountered. This generational reductionism will be investigated through consideration of the 1981 Springbok rugby tour of New Zealand as a means to read through generation as a factor in the political changes of contemporary New Zealand.

Rugby union has long been held to provide some of the defining characteristics of New Zealand.<sup>6</sup> Along with racing and beer it has been popularly associated with all that is masculine about New Zealand. Yet during the late 1970s, rugby imagery was increasingly questioned as New Zealand adjusted to new social movements, especially those influenced by feminism and others within an anti-colonial tradition. These movements are popularly seen as youthful. This seemingly unproblematic popular identification belies the complexity shrouding the notion of youth as an analytical category. Predominant analytical models derived from deviance theory in sociology or expressed in the British model of cultural studies prioritised a notion of youth that coincided with an image emerging from the invention of the teenager in the 1950s to mutate through studies of sub-culture and lead to the apotheosis of all stylistic rebellions - punk. Yet as the political and economic crises of the late 1970s and 1980s developed, the category 'youth' 'ceased to be a metaphor for change and stylistic innovation, and became victims of social and structural change instead'.<sup>7</sup> Despite both this popular understanding and the profound changes in the actual lives and intellectual understanding of 'youth', generation is rarely used as an analytical category in New Zealand history - there is only one major study to prioritise generation, and [hat deals with social security systems.<sup>8</sup> It is therefore necessary to look wider and draw material from sociological, political science and cultural studies debates. In the New Zealand context, writers in these fields tend to be either ahistorical in their analyses or use history when it suits. If this weakens the case here then it also points to the need for New Zealand historians to address both generational questions and the contemporary in our work.

The campaign against the 1981 tour was not a discrete event and must be positioned within a context of growing political and cultural discontent. Before doing so, however, a sketch of New Zealand's contesting political cultures will be provided and the role and place of rugby in New Zealand's national imagining will be discussed. Finally, these strands are combined to argue that generation is not a sufficient category for analysing political change and that the idea of 'youth' has been appropriated and applied to a particular age cohort.

The centrality of rugby in New Zealand's national imagining is a fundamental component of the maintenance of the national meritocracy. By stressing success based on equality of opportunity - after all, anyone (well, man) can become a top notch rugby player if only he shows the commitment - the idea that New Zealand is characterised by egalitarianism is granted legitimacy. Significantly, success within this meritocracy is based on both individual and

collective effort: a bloke can be the finest rugby player there is, but if he isn't a team player then he is of no use. So, at the same time that rugby exhibits an intensely individualistic strain within New Zealand, it also points to collectivism.

This tension between collectivism and individualism is at the heart of New Zealand's struggles over national identity formation, the traits of that identity and meanings attributed to specific events. Writing in 1966, Sutch characterised New Zealand's history as 'the quest for security'.<sup>9</sup> While Sutch is not a major player in New Zealand's academic history he can be seen to have tapped a widespread and popular structure of feeling. At the core of this quest was the maintenance of an effective collective identity. The hegemonic identity that resulted from this emerged in the early part of this century. Unlike other colonies of settlement in Britain's empire, especially South Africa and Australia, New Zealand successfully incorporated its indigenous people into the dominant national imagining. Like the other colonies of settlement, the hegemonic national image was profoundly and almost exclusively masculine. Just as the rugby motif points to a tension between individualism and collectivism, the national hegemonic identity suggests a number of areas of contention centred primarily on the contradiction between hegemonic masculinity as incorporating Maori and colonial relations that exclude Maori. Each of these sites of tension then also sits in an uncomfortable relation with divisions centred on class as New Zealand's capitalist form developed.

Social democracy and the welfare state became the cornerstone of the post-World War Two political consensus: compulsory trade unionism existed between 1936 and 1983 despite a conservative government for twenty-nine of those years and universal social security applied from 1938 to the late 1980s. Neither was seen as antithetical to individualism (although communists were driven from strategic positions in the trade union movement during the 1950s and politicians regularly mounted assaults on welfare fraud). It was almost as if the individualistic basis of liberal social thought at the core of New Zealand's political culture recognised that there were constant threats requiring support from mates to overcome. Phillips has argued that since the early colonial period this notion of mateship has been the core of the pakeha male identity achieving clear expression by the 1880s.<sup>10</sup> Although he shapes the dominant characteristics of New Zealand identity to a form other than that proposed by Sinclair, like Sinclair he sees the solidification of identity formation in the inter-war period. This is at odds with Fairburn's analysis that posits a highly individualistic atomised identity sourced from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.<sup>11</sup>

The first half of this century was a troubled time for New Zealand. The century opened with New Zealand at war in South Africa. Two wars followed: in the first New Zealand was threatened by German raiders who mined the Cook Strait; in the second widespread rumours of Japanese invasion existed and the

Battle of the Coral Sea is seen as the nation's saviour. Between these traumas was the economic uncertainty of the 1920s and the horrors of the 1930s. Sutch's image of a quest for security is in many ways convincing as the predominant goal of those coming to adulthood in the first half of the century. During the 1960s and 1970s the New Zealand political elite was a group that had formed during and just prior to World War Two. Keith Holyoake (Prime Minister 1960-1971) entered parliament in 1935, the same time as Arnold Nordmeyer (opposition leader 1963-65). Nordmeyer and Holyoake were replaced by post-war MPs. Both Muldoon, Holyoake's effective replacement, and Norman Kirk, had been raised during the 1930s and seemed to carry childhood memories of the difficulties their middling income families endured.<sup>12</sup> Accepting that security was at the core of New Zealand social policies and outlook, this younger component of the elite was little different from those MPs elected before war began. In particular their social and cultural outlooks had been formed at a time when security was scarce. The key point here is that Muldoon was the last of the political leaders to have grown up in a context of insecurity.

It is common that insecurity be combated through appeals to the known, the way things were. Leaders from conservative political parties are more likely to see things this way: the New Zealand National Party placed great emphasis on the relationship with the UK and positioned New Zealand as British. As late as 1982, Muldoon justified military support to Britain during the war with Argentina stating that 'I suppose around our Cabinet table you've got a lot of fellows like me who were brought up to believe that the term "British" means something'.<sup>13</sup> Muldoon's views were not isolated. In the early 1970s a keystone of New Zealand trade policy was to negotiate a special relationship with Britain as they moved towards membership of the EEC.

By the late 1970s and early 1980s a new set of views had begun to emerge on the political landscape. Despite close links with Britain, there was a growing focus on the Asia-Pacific region intensified by ongoing French atmospheric nuclear testing, the war in Indochina, and labour migration from New Zealand's Pacific dependencies, especially Samoa. Both James and Jesson point to an intensifying economic crisis in New Zealand emerging between 1967/68 and 1973.<sup>14</sup> The security conscious elite sought to protect the country from economic trials by spending and borrowing, and by erecting policy barriers to international economic impact. A younger group was entering the elite - a group shaped during the relative boom times of the 1950s and early 1960s. Culturally, they can be characterised as individualistic and independent: these traits straddled the National and Labour Parties, but during the 1970s and 1980s presented a significant problem for National-in-Government. National's Parliamentary leadership was challenged by younger members such as Marilyn Waring, Derek Quigley and Michael Cox. Although bringing different manifestations of

individualism to the house, each of these younger MPs was a problem for Muldoon's maintenance of discipline. They were assisted by key Party activists such as Party President Sue Wood, Muldoon's *bete noire* at many a Party conference. Labour suffered similar tensions, with a neo-liberal coup replacing Rowling in 1980 with a new elite such as Lange, Douglas, Caygill and other New Right adherents. The major tensions for Labour were not so much within caucus as between the caucus and the Party with its strong trade union base, professed commitment to a form of socialism and greater party control over policy than that seen within National. Party President, and later MP, Jim Anderton was in regular conflict with the Parliamentary Party, finally leaving the Party in 1989 to form the New Labour Party. James points to clearly unravelled strands along the axes of collectivism/individualism and security/independence.<sup>15</sup>

What is left unresolved by James, however, is the extent to which this is a generational conflict. He argues that in part this is the case claiming that the younger members of the elite have 'tended more towards the individualist and independence ends of the scales'.<sup>16</sup> James' entire case is based around the need to show great tension within the New Zealand polity as a way to account for the enormous changes brought about during the first two years of the Fourth Labour Government. He sees the new entrants into the elite as 'Vietnam generation big-changers' and suggests what even though the antiwar movement included only a small portion of the post war generation, it affected many more.<sup>17</sup> James paints a picture of a widespread, deep rooted attitudinal shift that began in the late 1960s and promised major change when this generation took political power.<sup>18</sup> In this analysis, James is guilty of an undifferentiated assumption of generational desires. His idealism must be contrasted with other, more cautious identifications of the impact of generation. O'Regan, for instance, is careful to distinguish the impacts of youth contrasting the ageing total population with an increasingly youthful Maori population as the significant demographic issue in New Zealand.<sup>19</sup> Yet despite James' weak generational attribution he is right to identify a shift in political cultures. A more accurate assessment of the reasons for this shift can be seen in Jesson's argument that a shift from economic dominance by manufacturing and agricultural capital to finance capital is responsible.<sup>20</sup> Despite the different causes, both point to increasing individualism and independence as characteristic of neo-liberal political cultures.

These emerging tensions, however, were of political culture and did not necessarily impact directly on national self-image, although they did provide new icons to feed into that imagery. There are a number of trends that feed into that hegemonic self-perception, even as modified by neo-liberalism. Rugby union is an integral part of New Zealand's national identity situated at the nexus of strands involving the maintenance of colonial power, a sustained hegemonic masculinity operating through both patriarchal and fraternal sites, commonsense capitalist

rationality and generational dominion. Rugby union is imbued with traits valued by the discursive codes privileged by these modalities. As a form of auto-typification, it is held to unite the disparate social groupings within the territory around characteristics that are specifically seen or constructed as New Zealand national: these traits are held to mark out New Zealand's uniqueness. Furthermore, rugby also fulfils the hetero-typifying function of asserting New Zealand's position in the British sphere of (cultural) influence. Both these typifying functions are integral to rugby's hegemonic role within patterns of New Zealand social power, serving to assert the way things should be.

The social relations of rugby continue to assert this hegemonic role in such a way as to make both rugby and the nation sacred. Despite its ambiguous relationship with other identities of both modernity and post-modernity, the nation exercises considerable moral and emotional sway over self-imagining. There is a security about nationality that facilitates and permits these other identities without threatening to disrupt the accepted social fabric. In permitting the adoption of hyphenated nationalities, the assertion of indigeneity, a gendered community association, or any other claim to commonality the nation is able to persist: Maori may be able to assert their separate identity, but New Zealand retains its claim to be a bicultural nation. The identification of the All Blacks as nationally representative in all ways when combined with rugby watching as a scopophilic activity serves to fetishise both the nation and the characteristics with which rugby is imbued. The All Blacks, in this way, become both totemic and fetishistic. This fetishism manifests itself in both Freudian and Marxist senses.<sup>21</sup> In the former, the All Blacks come to stand in for the whole, while in the later the characteristics produced within or attributed to rugby by the hegemonic national imaginary are granted independent existence and thus naturalised. Both these fetishistic processes conflate to grant rugby in general and the All Blacks in particular a sacrosanct position in the iconography of New Zealand.

Rugby's significant role in New Zealand's received hegemonic national identity combined with the traditional importance placed on competition with South Africa to make attendance at All Black-Springbok matches akin to visiting the temple.<sup>22</sup> As such, these contests needed to be isolated from the profane world of politics and the clutches of those who would weaken or change those identities. By the end of the 1970s these identities were not so much under attack as exposed to questioning: the doubters who had always been present had been granted voice and were being listened to. The defence of rugby contact with South Africa, therefore, took on two primary functions. It protected the highest manifestation of national, totemic identity assertion, and restated the value of the received version of national imagining against those agnostics and heretics who would challenge its veracity. It was the strength of the conviction of those who would defend the traditional that made the 1981 tour protests so intense. Tour opponents had made

the tactical decision that the tour could be stopped so they set out to do just that, while tour defenders saw it as the last stand against blasphemy. It was the polyvalent nature of that tradition, and the deeply ingrained place rugby within the national and masculine imagining, that allowed that political struggle to stand in for a much wider set of social and political changes. Simply stated, in seeking to stop the tour the anti-apartheid movement was perhaps unwittingly striking a blow at the core of New Zealand's hegemonic identities.

Despite this anti-hegemonic role and the conventional view of youth as cultural challengers, the anti-tour campaign must be uncomfortably positioned alongside the youth-as-protesters image. It has become a veritable truism that the capitalist world saw the rise of an intensely politicised popular protest movement during the 1970s. It is a myth (in the Barthesian sense) premised on the centrality of 1968 as a turning point in modern world history. It is associated with the invention of youth as a political rather than social entity and perpetuates a notion of prosperity and economic well-being. This myth invests a student rising in Paris and a party convention in Detroit with an impressive array of consequences around the world.

New Zealand has not escaped this fable. The question of ongoing sporting contact with South Africa gave rise to the biggest mass political movement of the 1970s and 1980s in New Zealand. Accompanying the anti-apartheid protests were other issue-based protest movements. These campaigns included protests against New Zealand involvement in the Vietnam War, around environmental causes, and for a nuclear-free New Zealand. By the later 1970s, more widespread campaigns and struggles had developed around issues of colonisation and the status of Maori, and as a result of the women's movement, notably around issues of reproductive rights and violence against women. Significant protest movements developed around unemployment and a raft of other social policy concerns. Increasing state power attracted broad based public opposition movements. Only the campaign around the Homosexual Law Reform Bill in 1984 and 1985 provoked a sense of social division comparable to the question of sporting contact with South Africa. This, in itself, is telling: masculinity's wagons were secure in their circle.

The anti-apartheid movement took many years to develop shifting focus from the 1960 'No Maoris No Tour' campaign to a position completely opposed to any contact with apartheid by the mid 1970s. These shifts mirrored changes in the international campaign, and in New Zealand represented a change from the position that saw apartheid a threatening good domestic race relations to one that saw ongoing colonial oppression as well as the need to support the Southern African liberation movements by isolating apartheid. A planned tour of New Zealand in 1973 had been cancelled by Kirk's Labour Government, and 'sporting freedom' had become key part of Muldoon's successful populist election

campaign in 1975. The All Black tour of South Africa coinciding with the 1976 Soweto rising saw the re-emergence of an anti-tour feeling that was able to draw ever widening support. By 1981, when it was clear that the increasingly unpopular Muldoon government was using the tour as an election tool it seems that wide ranging frustration had laid the basis for a well supported protest movement.

Despite the idea of mass protests, it appears that very few people were regular protesters. A survey of 714 anti-tour protesters in Wellington towards the end of the tour showed that for 64 per cent the tour was only first or second issue they had marched over, while only six per cent attended more than five demonstrations, with 40 percent of that group (only 2.4 per cent of the total sample) citing anti-Vietnam war protests.<sup>23</sup> Despite a context of political protest, this suggests that the anti-tour campaign must in some ways be seen as exceptional. This relative lack of experience was not universal. Some of those surveyed pointed to long-standing opposition to sporting contact with one writing on a survey form: 'Took part in No Maoris No Tour 1960 and remember being angry in 1928 when Nepia and Mill were not allowed to go to South Africa'.<sup>24</sup>

This same survey also points to an unexpected age distribution with the largest single group being between 30 and 34. This is a higher than their proportion of the total Wellington population. Furthermore, those under 25 were significantly under-represented although King and Phillips admit that transience may be a factor in those replies from the anti-tour movement's mailing list. Significantly, however, older age groups (over 40) were more highly represented than might be expected, given the age profile of Wellington's population, even among those who replied to survey forms distributed at a march. This is ironic, given the impression of the anti-tour movement as dominated by students and the rent-a-crowd mob.<sup>25</sup> When asked about their reasons for protesting, every respondent said they were there because of their opposition to apartheid, while only twenty per cent specified their dissatisfaction with the New Zealand government, and a mere twelve per cent were concerned about international image. A common theme among women was hostility to rugby, while there was also a widespread animosity towards Muldoon.

Although we should be careful about basing too much on a single survey, and note that this survey is flawed in many ways, there is sufficient evidence here to draw some conclusions. Overall, the dominant image of the anti-tour movement does not hold true except in one sense. A disproportionate group was drawn from those whose previous political experience was related to the campaign against the war in Vietnam, but with little experience in between. It should be noted, however, that the group with previous political experience was a small part of the anti-tour movement. It should also be noted that as a major centre, Wellington had a longer history of protest campaigns, including regular

demonstrations at Parliament Buildings, not shared by other regional and smaller centres. As such, Wellington's anti-tour movement was significantly more experienced than most other centres being on a par with Auckland.

Can 1981 therefore be seen as a crisis of hegemony for the state and its well crafted hegemonic identities? Did, as James argues, the big-change Vietnam generation rise up through the constraints of Muldoonism and its collectivist security base to install a regime based at the individualist and independent ends of the continua? The answers to these questions rely on the understanding of youth and resistance that is played out through these assertions,

Youth did not do well as an analytical category in the 1980s. The ravages of Thatcherism in the UK made other contradictions more important, as youth seemed to embrace the new way and simply ceased to perform their resistive rituals. Similarly, in New Zealand the crisis of Muldoonism followed by the ravages of Rogernomics made youth a relatively insignificant category (except in matters of unemployment). Youth had not been a significant component of New Zealand social analysis except through deviance theory in criminology and the moral panics of the 1950s.<sup>26</sup> For most, youth remained either a social threat or victims. Yet during the mid-1980s a commonsensical ideology emerged that youth of the Vietnam War era - a youth invented in 1968 - had led the challenge to the old ways and performed a revolutionary transformation in New Zealand society.

This deviance-theory based interpretation of youth is valuable in politically inert periods such as the 1950s and 1960s in that it allows the socially critical analyst to identify resistance, and through the subculture model to assert the existence of class. During the politically charged 1970s and 1980s, however, such an assertion was no longer necessary. Resistance was said to be clear in the growing women's, Maori, environmental and other challenges. These new resistive modalities are largely isolated from class based resistance. Opposition to apartheid was strongest among educated, non-employed fractions of the middle class.<sup>27</sup> In 1981 the (pro-Soviet) Socialist Unity Party took an ambiguous line regarding the Springbok tour with some members allegedly arguing that rugby had a strong working class following so strong opposition to the tour would undermine the Party's work in the class struggle.<sup>28</sup> With opposition becoming more widespread, with the hegemony of state under attack from the new social movements, youth no longer kept the revolution alive in the way they had in earlier decades.

Yet the commonsense view was that the campaigns of the 1970s were the result of the politics of 1968. In this view, 1968 has become a signifier of the crisis of the state, of authority and of hegemony. In New Zealand the campaign against the Vietnam War became the model of political protest as well as a nostalgised era marking a fundamental disjunction with the politics of

complacency of the post- 1951 era. Stuart Hall and others have argued that 1968 was 'the year of a remarkable cataclysm: a parting of the waters . . . Its seismic impact reverberated outwards from its principle terrain and political life; its eddies are not yet fully spent'.<sup>29</sup> In this view, all subsequent revolts are held to derive from the events of 1968 - the actions of the Vietnam generation. This generation is seen, in this framework, to embody all that is youthful and to represent an authentic youth culture. Accordingly, younger people may be of the age group 'youth' but are not real 'youth' because they had neither the authentic experience of youth culture or the political rebellion of mass action that led to the 1981 protests or of style that resulted in punk - the last great shock. They should therefore be seen as 'post-youth'.<sup>30</sup> This is the ideological framework that James employs.

The predominant image in this framework is one where youth are hailed into existence in a fundamentally different way in the early 1970s. It is not a new notion of youth however. It is still premised on the notion that youth is a stage in life that each individual passes through on their way to the restraint and responsibility of adulthood. This conception was challenged by those of the age 'youth' at this time where, as a result of changes such as the major increase in tertiary education, they gained a louder social voice and became more obvious: 'youth' in New Zealand became 'student'. This group were able to assert, and have accepted, their claim that they represented an authentic and independent youth culture. This culture of individual 'freedom', of indulgence, of hedonism became authentic youth culture. It was a culture of spectacle that did not so much critique the hegemonic cultural mores as withdraw. It was a culture that said 'Hey that's not me man, it's too uncool'. It was not the big-change culture that James saw, but a small change micro politics. In the women's movement, it saw the emergence of the 'personal is political' slogan with its potent individualism. In the anti-racist Pakeha (white, non-Maori New Zealand) world it was about changing attitudes rather than colonial institutions.

The anti-tour movement was not led by these people. Key activists were drawn from a number of political sites. On the organised left the (pro-Soviet) Socialist Unity Party and the (Trotskyist) Socialist Action League (SAL) were almost non-existent in leadership position, although the SAL played a key role in some direct action elements of the protest. In Wellington, and to a much lesser extent Auckland, the (until recently pro-China, but increasingly independent) Worker's Communist League (WCL) were a significant component of the leadership. To a degree, the WCL fits the generational mode] having grown out of a predominantly student group formed as the result of an early 1970s split in the Communist Party but even here the number of activists is too small to be seen as a ground swell. Despite this, the organised left was small and remained relatively insignificant in New Zealand. By 1981, the anti-tour movement was

lead by people who had emerged from a range of sites including the student movement, church groups and elsewhere in the early and mid 1970s, but significant new perspectives and leadership was provided from the growing Maori political activist bloc. Maori leadership did not fit the 1968-as-youth profile either. Some of this group, such as Donna Awatere, Ripeka Evans and others associated with groups such as Nga Tamatoa, had developed their initial public profile during the early 1970s. Other, however, such as Herewini Kaa, Penny Poutu and Paul Barcham in Palmerston North either predated that rise in public Maori protest or were recent activists independent of those early 1970s groups. Furthermore, Maori protest and discontent followed a significantly different trajectory to Pakeha protest movements suggesting a significant monocultural tendency in the models used to analyse the politics of the 1970s and 1980s.<sup>31</sup>

This element of the anti-tour campaign is crucial to understanding the debates around the tour. The anti-apartheid movement came under attack from a government anxious to manufacture a law and order crisis. That was to be expected. What was not expected in the shape and to the extent it was mounted was the criticism from the new group of Maori political leaders emerging in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The analysis of the new generational politics advanced by writers such as James simply omits this group. They were different from the earlier Maori leaders in that although they sought many of the same tactical objectives, there was a clearly different strategic goal. This was articulated in 1982 and 1983 by an Auckland anti-tour leader and Maori activist Donna Awatere in a series of articles in the feminist magazine *Broadsheet* where she argued in favour of Maori sovereignty rather than full and equal incorporation into the Pakeha state.<sup>32</sup> Awatere's case is that the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi under which Britain claimed New Zealand as its own had not been honoured, that Maori had never ceded sovereignty and that the appropriate goal of Maori politics was the reassertion of Maori sovereignty. In Auckland, activists from the circle that included Awatere played a crucial role in the anti-tour movement. Hegemony works in strange ways: by the late 1980s New Zealand was proclaiming itself to be bicultural, and in 1996 Awatere became a Member of Parliament for the neo-liberal Alliance of Consumers and Taxpayers.

The campaign against the 1981 Springbok tour was the last major activist campaign that can be said to be primarily altruistic. Subsequent activism dealt with New Zealand social policy concerns, the campaign for a nuclear free New Zealand, and in 1985 the campaign against the planned tour of South Africa was in direct competition for activists with the campaign to support the Homosexual Law Reform Bill. Each of these was directly linked to a domestic concern. Perhaps then the 1981 tour campaign should be seen as the end of a period of politics dominated by international concerns - as the end of the concerns of the

Vietnam War era.

The Labour Party that won the 1984 election benefited from these changes, but in 1981 it had done little to advance the cause of the anti-tour movement. This is not to say that party members were not active in the campaign. They were, especially in provincial New Zealand where many Labour Party activists played leading roles in local anti-tour groups. The Party as a whole, however, was less useful. In August 1981 they joined a call for a 'peace summit to consider shortening the tour if the protest movement would curb its actions. The summit achieved nothing.<sup>33</sup> The Party's 1951 election slogan 'Bringing New Zealand Together Again' was reminiscent of the anti-protest organised in Auckland before the third test with the slogans: For a United New Zealand, All Against Apartheid and All Against Racial Discrimination.<sup>34</sup>

The crucial roles played by Maori in the leadership of the campaign against the 1981 tour, and the opposition of the parliamentary Labour Party to the objectives of many key elements of both Maori and organised Left leadership undermines the idea that Labour in 1984 latched onto a sea change in mass political outlook. Frustration at the Muldoon government was certainly high, and it is almost a truism of political science that governments lose elections. It is unlikely that many who voted Labour in 1984 really expected the neo-liberal programme they received. The tour was followed by a downturn in support for rugby, but in recent years that seems to have been overcome. Despite its claims to green biculturalism, the iconography of rugby still plays a crucial defining role in New Zealand's national self identity while successful reconfigurations have come from Maori and, to a lesser extent, feminist challenges. The Vietnam generation seem to have done very little other than occupy the seats of government and in an increasingly deregulated world acted in the interests of those with social power who are being unfettered by the decline of social democratic state.

## NOTES:

1 Jonathon Boston and Martin Holland, 'The Fourth Labour Government: Transforming the Political Agenda' in J. Boston and M. Holland (eds) *The Fourth Labour Government: Radical Politics in New Zealand* (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1986). p. 1.

2 Colin James, *The Quiet Revolution: Turbulence and Transition in Contemporary New Zealand* (Wellington: Allen and Unwin/Port Nicholson Press, 1986).

3 Cohn James and Alan McRobie, *Turning Point: The 1993 Election and Beyond* (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 1993).

4 Roger Douglas was the only member of Labour's 1984 Cabinet with previous Cabinet experience having been Minister of Broadcasting in the Labour governments of Norman Kirk and Bill Rowling, 1972-75. Other members of the caucus with Cabinet experience, such as Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan, were passed over for Ministers more in keeping with the dominant neo-liberalism of Lang and Douglas.

5 John Roberts, 'Ministers, the Cabinet and Public Servants in Boston and Holland', *The Fourth Labour Government*, p. 96.

6 See Keith Sinclair, *A Destiny Apart: New Zealand's Search for National Identity* (Wellington: Allen and Unwin/Port Nicholson Press, 1986) and J.O.C Phillips, *A Man's Country? The Image of the Pakeha Male. A History (2ed)* (Auckland: Penguin, 1996).

7 David Harris, *From Class Struggle to the Politics of Pleasure: The Effects of Gramscianism on Cultural Studies* (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 92-3.

8 David Thompson, *Selfish Generations? The Ageing of New Zealand's Welfare State* (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 1991).

9 W.B. Sulch, *The Quest for Security in New Zealand: 1840-1966* (Wellington: Oxford University Press, 1966).

10 Phillips, *A Man's Country*.

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13 quoted by Colin James, *National Business Review*. 19 April, 1982, cited in Bruce Jesson, *Behind the Mirror Glass: The Growth of Wealth and Power in New Zealand in the Eighties* (Auckland: Penguin, 1987). p. 57.

14 Jesson, *Behind the Mirror Glass*, p. 57; Colin James, *The Quiet Revolution: Turbulence and Transition in Contemporary New Zealand* (Wellington: Allen and Unwin/Port Nicholson Press, 1986). James' case is continued and expanded in *New Territory: The Transformation of New Zealand, 1984-1992* (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 1992), see pp. 99-140.

15 James, *The Quiet Revolution*, pp. 73-76.

16 James, *The Quiet Revolution*, p. 74.

17 James, *The Quiet Revolution*, p. 74.

18 James, *The Quiet Revolution*, pp. 29-32.

19 Tipene O'Regan, 'A wave that reshaped our coastline', *The Dominion* (Wellington), 18 May 1991. p. 7.

20 Jesson, *Behind the Mirror Glass*.

21 A useful overview of the ideas underlying these points and a good introduction to these understandings of fetishism can be found in Linda Williams, *Hard Core: Power, Pleasure and the 'Frenzy of the Visible'* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). pp. 93-119, while a more general review of feminist psychoanalytic film theory from which these arguments are developed exists in Screen (ed), *The Sexual Subject: A Screen Reader in Sexuality* (London: Routledge. 1992). A useful critical evaluation of his approach is Jean Bethke Elstain, 'The New Feminist Scholarship', *Salmagundi* (Spring-Summer, 1986), pp. 3-26.

22 There is little that adequately deals with the significance Of All Black-Springbok rugby in New Zealand. The best, if flawed, treatment is Spiro Zavos, *Winters of Revenge: The Bitter Rivalry Between the All Blacks and the Springboks* (Auckland: Viking, 1997). A early and more satisfying treatment can be found in Richard Thompson, *Retreat from Apartheid: New Zealand's Sporting Contacts with South Africa* (Wellington: Oxford University Press, 1975). A nostalgic reminiscence of the 1956 Springbok tour and its meaning is Warwick Roger's, *Old Heroes: The 1956 Springbok Tour and The Lives Beyond* (Auckland: Hodder and Stoughton, 1991). Phillips, in *A Man's Country?*, covers these issues in some detail. There is a raft of books looking at the 1981 tour although none is particularly satisfying. For South African perspectives, more on rugby than the All Black-Springbok question, see Albert Grundlingh, Andre Odendaal and Burridge Spies, *Beyond the Tryline: Rugby and South African Society* (Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1995), see Albert Grundlingh's 'Responses to Isolation pp. 90-135 and 'Playing for Power: Rugby, Afrikaner Nationalism and Masculinity in South Africa' pp. 106-35. 'Playing for Power' appears in a slightly different form in John Nauright and Timothy J.L. Chandler (eds), *Making Men: Rugby and Masculine Identity* (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 181-204. See also Robert Morrell, 'Forging a Ruling Race: Rugby and White Masculinity in Colonial Natal, c1870-1910', in Nauright and Chandler. *A Making Men*, pp. 91-120. and John Nauright and David Black, "'Hitting them where it hurts": Springbok-All Black Rugby, 'Masculine National Identity and Counter-hegemonic Struggle, 1959-1992', in Nauright and Chandler, *Making Men*, pp. 205-26.

23 Peter King and Jock Phillips, 'A Social Analysis of the Springbok Tour Protesters' in David Mackay, Malcolm MacKinnon, Peter McPhee and Jock Phillips (eds), *Counting the Cost: The 1981 Springbok Tour in Wellington*, (Wellington: Victoria University History Department Occasional Paper No 1. 1982). pp. 3-14. This survey is flawed in many ways, clearly acknowledged in the report. It is, however, the only statistical analysis of protesters that I have been able to find.

24 King and Phillips, 'A Social Analysis', p. 11.

25 Former Police Officer Ross Meurant focuses on alleged Communist involvement in the protest movement alleging that university students in Auckland had been paid \$35 to protest while people in Wellington had been offered \$10 to protest. Auckland has long had a reputation for greater wealth. This money, according to Meurant, 'was to be paid by a communist group', *The Red Squad Story* (Auckland: Harlen Publishing, 1982). pp. 164-72, and pp. 169-70.

26 See Bob Gidlow, 'Deviance' in Paul Spoonky, David Pearson & Ian Shirley (eds), *New Zealand: Sociological Perspective* (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1982); Redmer Yska, *All Shook Up: The Flash Bodge and the Rise of the New Zealand Teenager in the Fifties* (Auckland: Penguin, 1993); Roy Shuker, Roger Openshaw and Janet Soler, *Youth, Media and Moral Panic in New Zealand* (Palmerston North: Delta Research Monograph 11, Education Department, Massey University, 1990).

27 King and Phillips, 'A Social Analysis'.

28 This may be sectarian scuttlebutt, although the allegation was made in Wellington during the campaign in 1981. Meurant however claims that SUP leader Bill Anderson was regularly seen at anti-tour protests, *The Red Squad Story*, p. 168.

29 Stuart Hall, Chas Critchcr, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke and Brian Roberts, *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order* (London: Macmillan, 1978). p. 240.

30 see Steve Redhead, *Post-Fandom and the Millennial Blues: The Transformation of Soccer Culture* (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 1-9.

31 Ranginui Walker, *Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou Struggle Without End* (Auckland: Penguin, 1989).

32 Donna Awatere, 'On Maori Sovereignty', *Broadsheet* (June, 1982), pp 36-42; Donna Awatere, 'Maori Sovereignty, Part 2', *Broadsheet* (October, 1982), pp. 24-29; Donna Awalere, 'Te Mana Maori Motuhake: Beyond the Noble Savage', *Broadsheet* (January/February, 1983). pp. 12-19. Also published as Donna Awatere. *Maori Sovereignty* (Auckland: Broadsheet, 1984).

33 Geoff Chapple, 1951: *The Tour* (Auckland: A.W. & A.H. Reed, 1981). p. 162-3.

34 Chapple, 1981: *The Tour*, pp. 276-7.