

THE IOC AND THE WORLD OF INTERDEPENDENCE¹

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Through most of its history, the IOC insisted that sport was apart from the world of politics, and that the Olympic Games should not be used by sovereign states to further their political goals.

Lord Killanin, the IOC president through most of the 1970s reflected this position well when defending the IOC's decision to take no action against New Zealand when the Black African nations boycotted the 1976 Montreal Olympics in protest over that country's continued sporting contacts with South Africa. Killanin stated that "the full IOC session ... unanimously agree that this is not a matter within its competence" (IOC, July 1976: 70).

Juan Antonio Samaranch, however, brought a much different view to the IOC presidency in the 1980s. His diplomatic experience had taught him that the Olympic movement could not stand in isolation from international politics, and that the IOC must take measures to counter the political machinations that have surrounded the Olympic Games for most of the century (see Kanin, 1981, for a history of these incidents). That these political "interferences" with the Games have become so much more prominent recently is a testimony to the great increase in importance and significance attached to sport since World War II (see Macintosh et al., 1987: chaps. 2 and 4). Consequently, the Olympic Games have become an international spectacle of proportions that could not have been imagined by Pierre de Coubertin.

The world of international politics has changed dramatically in the last few years. Recent political turmoil in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are testimony to this radical upheaval. The world can no longer be understood solely in terms of "Cold War" politics, or "realist" theories of international relations. Economic and social factors as well as ethnicity and religion have become much more important aspects of international affairs. It is our contention that in order to comprehend how the IOC will function in this new world of interdependence, it is necessary to conceive of the IOC as a transnational organization, and to put it into the perspective of transnational relations theory.

To this end, we first review some of the major encounters with international politics that the IOC has experienced over the last two decades, and put them into the context of the traditional realist theory of international relations. We then present a brief overview of transnational relations theory. Next, we examine the IOC as a transnational organization and assess the extent to which the IOC has been able to influence the policies of sovereign states. Finally, we speculate on future developments in the new world of interdependence, and try to anticipate what impact these might have on international sport in general and the IOC in particular.

The Cold War and the IOC

There have been numerous political disruptions of the Olympic Games since World War II. Among the most prominent of these were the struggles over the status of South Africa and Rhodesia in the Olympic movement, and the student massacres and the Black athlete protests at the 1968 Summer Olympics in Mexico City. But perhaps the most vexing political problems that faced the IOC in the last two decades were those that were rooted in Cold War politics. First, the IOC became entangled in a struggle with the Canadian government over the right of Taiwan to compete in the 1976 Montreal Olympics. Then the IOC had to face a determined effort by US President Jimmy Carter, first to try to change the site of the 1980 Summer Olympics from Moscow, and then to engineer a massive boycott of those Games. Finally, the IOC endured what some saw as an inevitable counter-boycott of the 1984 Los Angeles Games by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. To the extent that these incidents were analyzed by sport scholars, they could be best understood in the perspective of realist theories of international politics.

Political realism, and the preoccupation with the politics of power and security, emerged in the pragmatic and nationalistic period that followed World War II. This perspective characterizes the international system as an anarchic environment in which independent sovereign states are in constant competition for power and influence. In this formulation, the central goal of every state is the pursuit of its national interest and the maximization of its power “relative” to the other states in the system. The underlying premise here is that human society is inherently evil and that individuals (and socially constructed institutions like the state) will attempt to enhance their relative position whenever the opportunity arises.

Realism portrays the international system as one comprised of similar states, in which balancing the power or finding a systemic equilibrium is the main task of diplomatic activity. Balance of power theory, backed empirically by the lessons of international relations in nineteenth century Europe, goes hand in hand with the fundamental principles of realism. As Bull notes, “the very institutions of international society [are] the balance of power, international law, the diplomatic mechanism, the managerial system of great powers, and war” (Bull 1977: 74). For realists, the international system has to be understood as a system of sovereign states which are in constant competition for scarce resources and political influence. From this perspective, international politics must be perceived as anarchy or, at the very least, as organized violence. The conflict over the distribution of power within the system will inevitably lead to war -- the ultimate arbiter -- the means by which the balance is restored. Nowhere is this point made more clearly than in Morgenthau’s classic Politics Among Nations, where he states that “all history shows that nations active in international politics are continuously preparing for, actively involved in, or recovering from organized violence in the form of war” (Morgenthau 1948: 36).

While this synopsis of the realist position is very brief, it is possible to summarize this perspective quite neatly by defining realism as an intellectual perspective which makes three interrelated assumptions. First, it assumes that states are the dominant actors, if not the exclusive actors, in international relations (the state-centric principle) and that states act as coherent units (the state-as-actor principle). Second, it assumes that force is a usable and effective instrument of foreign policy and that states will use force to enhance their relative position in the international system. Finally, it assumes that there is a clear hierarchy of issues in world politics, headed by the military-security issue. In short, it asserts that “high

politics” (military security issues) dominate “low politics” (economic, social, and technical issues).

Clearly, realist theory can easily be used to explain the IOC’s clash with Canadian government and the respective boycotts by the two super-powers of the 1980 and 1984 Summer Olympics. In the case of the Taiwan issue, Prime Minister Trudeau used it to assert his new “Foreign Policy for Canadians” (Canada, 1970). One part of this policy was the “Third-Option,” which set out what Trudeau considered to be a proper balance in Canada-US relations. It was an attempt to wean Canada away from excessive dependence on the United States by developing closer economic and political ties with other countries (Radwan ski, 1978: 136-37). Part of the thrust of this new direction was Canada’s recognition of the Peoples’ Republic of China, or the “One-China” policy. In support of this position, Canada was not prepared to allow Taiwan to compete in the 1976 Montreal Olympics unless it agreed not to display its national flag and not to play the so-called Chinese national anthem.

As for the successive boycotts of the Summer Olympics in 1980 and 1984, they were clearly a reflection of the Cold War reality that had reemerged between the Soviet Union and its allies and the United States and the NATO alliance. In the first instance, the United States used the 1980 Olympics in Moscow as part of its protest against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, which the US saw as a threat to its sphere of influence in the Persian Gulf. The United States, as the leader of the “free” world, put pressure on its NATO allies and other non-aligned countries to boycott these Games. As for the Soviet Union’s boycott of the 1984 Los Angeles Games, it can probably best be seen as a move by the opposing superpower to frustrate the United States in its efforts to use the Games as a showcase to demonstrate the superiority of the free enterprise system.

Transnational Relations

The classical realist interpretation of world politics is both elegant and straightforward. Political and diplomatic interactions between sovereign states constitute the core of international relations. However, the most compelling feature of the realist perspective -- its profoundly simple and parsimonious explanation of international political behaviour -- proved in time to weaken its appeal. The classic realist view seemed far too limited in a world characterized by a general relaxation in East-West tensions, a dramatically expanded level of international economic activity, the prominence of non-state actors, the increasing permeability of national boundaries, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system (the post-war system of trade and payments), the decline of U.S. hegemony, and the increasing focus on non-security issues.

Consequently, practitioners of international relations began to look for alternatives to the dominant realist view. The “world politics paradigm” of Keohane and Nye (1972) emerged as a direct paradigmatic challenge to the logic of realism. It focused on the importance of transnational society, rather than interstate relations. The world politics paradigm was not designed to replace the realist perspective or to deny the relevance of interstate relations or the notions of power and national interest. Rather, this competing paradigm set out to extend the realists’ understanding of contemporary international politics. It attempted to accomplish this task by introducing three specific amendments to realist theory. First, it maintained that states were not the only significant actors in world politics; various transnational actors (i.e., nongovernmental actors that operate across national boundaries) are also important in world politics. Second, the world politics paradigm added

transgovernmental relations (i.e., direct interactions between agencies of different governments, where those agencies act relatively autonomously from central government control) to state-to-state relations. Finally, this perspective suggested that there is a multiplicity of issues on the global policy agenda, and that the military security issue no longer dominates that agenda.

By relaxing the state-centric assumption, the transnational relations perspective was successful in directing our attention to one of the most important structural problems in world politics -- the extreme asymmetry of global actors. Where realism assumed a system of relatively equal actors (all of which were states) the world politics paradigm contends that the relations between the principal actors in world politics (both states and non-state) are highly unequal. Transnational business activity, for example, has traditionally been distributed very unevenly, with virtually all important activity originating in (or providing disproportionate benefits to) the developed market economies. The myth of full state sovereignty and the emphasis on security issues (which were perpetrated by the realists) make the world seem less imbalanced than it is.

In addition to the assertion that states are not the only important actors in world politics, the world politics paradigm also relaxed the "state-as-actor" assumption, or the idea that national governments behave as single, unitary actors. The implication here is that international politics would include not only state-to-state relations and transnational relations but transgovernmental relations as well. Transgovernmental relations involve an increase in communications among governments. In particular, they draw attention to bureaucratic contacts which take place below the apex of power -- pointing to the existence of a network of cooperative interactions among like-minded sub-units of different governments. Moreover, transgovernmental relations involve considerably more than simple transgovernmental policy coordination. According to this argument, regularized policy coordination often leads to changes in attitudes, where governments cease to be seen as closed decision-making units, and to the creation of transgovernmental elite networks. The resulting networks or coalitions amount to an alliance of sub-units of one government with like-minded agencies of other governments. International organizations, international regimes, economic summitry, and other forms of joint decision-making have strengthened and legitimized this practice.

The transgovernmental dimension lends additional credence to some important features of the transnational relations perspective. The practical realization that conflict exists among various sub-units of national governments in the foreign policy decision-making process challenges the realists' claim that national governments make decisions unitarily and rationally. In fact, the world politics paradigm is more in keeping with the bureaucratic politics model of decision-making which suggests that national decisions are the result of a policy process characterized by conflict, compromise, and confusion among the constituent units of a national government. Some scholars see this connection as the crux of the transnational relations perspective.

In sum, the paradigmatic challenge posed by the world politics paradigm introduced a number of important new factors to the study of world politics. These factors, which include the introduction of transnational and transgovernmental actors, the realization that bureaucratic politics applies in situations where interactions are transnational, and the notion of asymmetry, constitute an entirely new way of looking at world politics. The single largest point of departure between the two perspectives resides in the fact that the realist perspective

focused on the rhetoric of national security whereas the transnational relations perspective is noted for its direct association with the notion of economic interdependence.

The contrast between a realist image and an interdependence image has been a powerful theme in international relations scholarship since the late 1970s. The emergence of the transnational relations perspective and the rebirth of the historically conditioned dependence perspective have proven to be both workable alternatives to the logic of classical realism and important tools in understanding a world which is increasingly characterized by rapid change and by structural uncertainty. Interestingly, given recent events in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the Persian Gulf, some work in the field has returned to more traditional forms of realist thinking. An increasing number of students of world politics have come to believe that the preoccupation with transnational and global concerns may have obscured some of the more important and more enduring elements of the realist position (Holsti 1990).

Interdependence and transnational relations are especially useful in understanding extra-state, sub-national and other relationships while traditional realist analysis is still useful with respect to the role of states, questions of leadership and the like.

We contend that the IOC can best be understood within this transnational framework -- as a transnational organization that is both influenced by governments and other transnational and transgovernmental organizations, and which itself plays a role in influencing the behaviour of governments and other transnational organizations.

The IOC as a Transnational Organization

We have argued elsewhere (Macintosh and Hawes, 1990) that the IOC is a transnational organization in its own right. An overview of these arguments follows. A transnational organization, according to Huntington (1981: 198), is characterized by: (1) being a "relatively large, hierarchically organized, centrally directed bureaucracy"; (2) performing "a set of relatively limited, specialized, and, in some sense, technical functions"; and (3) performing these "functions across one or more international boundaries and insofar as is possible, in relative disregard of those boundaries". Clearly, the IOC possesses these three characteristics. First, the IOC (with its ties to its "family"), represents a relatively large, hierarchical, centrally-directed body. Second, it carries out a relatively simple, specialized goal -- that of promoting the Olympic movement and staging the Olympics. As we will see, the IOC has also been most successful in transcending national boundaries.

In order to further characterize transnational organizations (TOs), Huntington contrasts them with international organizations (IOs). In the first place, IOs require "the identification and creation of a common interest among national groups." On the other hand, a TO "has its own interest which inheres in the organization and its functions, which may or may not be closely related to the interests of national groups." Second, IOs, according to Huntington, "are designed to facilitate the achievement of a common interest among many national units. In contrast, TOs are designed to facilitate the pursuit of a single interest within many national units." Third, the IO "requires accord among nations; the TO requires access to nations. These two needs, accord and access, neatly summarize the differences between the two phenomena" (ibid., 200). Once again, the IOC can be clearly classified as a transnational organization. The IOC has its own agenda and pursues a single purpose that is not necessarily in accordance with that of individual nations.

The question of access is central to the success of the IOC. Its product, the Olympic Games, is widely sought after. Despite the financial risk associated with hosting the Olympics, there is now fierce competition among cities (and, in reality, between governments) to win the bid. The payoff is not often in immediate monetary terms; rather, it is in more intangible and long-range rewards. In the case of the Winter Olympics, the motivation for hosting them has often been the legacy of winter sport and ancillary facilities and accommodation that can be subsequently used to attract a lucrative tourist trade. For many developing industrialized nations, the Olympics represent a chance, through world-wide television, to attract world attention. Tokyo, and then Seoul, successfully exploited the Olympics to prove to the rest of the world that they were, indeed, world-class cities and nations. In the case of Japan, hosting of the 1964 Summer Olympics was coincident with its “full rehabilitation after the Second World War into international life” (Taylor, 1988b: 192). The subsequent increase in business and tourism justified the immense expenses incurred by these two countries in staging the Olympics; the Japanese expenses were estimated to be around one thousand million pounds (*ibid.*).

The hosting of the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow offered the USSR an opportunity to exploit its athletic triumphs to propagate socialist ideology, both abroad and at home. The US-led boycott of these Games detracted somewhat from this enterprise, but in many Third-World and socialist countries, the absence of the United States and some of its allies was hardly noticed. In contrast, the 1988 Los Angeles Games became a showcase for private enterprise. The first-ever profit from an Olympic Games was widely touted as a victory for the “American” way of doing things.

The attractiveness of the Olympic Games, then, has made it possible for the IOC to successfully cross national borders, or, in Huntington’s (1981) words, to gain access to countries. The line-up of cities that bid for the 1996 Summer Olympics certainly is a clear indication that this appeal is not diminishing. The competing cities, including Toronto, each spent millions of dollars to prepare bids, to send delegations to various international sport meetings, and to wine and dine as many IOC members as possible.

One further important hypothesis about transnational organizations is that they are capable of influencing both the foreign and domestic policies of sovereign nations. Such evidence is often difficult to gather because access to classified documents is limited. But there is much in the public domain to show that transnational sport organizations have had an impact on the policies of governments.

One good example of the IOC’s influence on policies of sovereign governments was evident in the IOC’s acrimonious clash with Canada over Taiwan’s eligibility for the 1976 Montreal Olympics. The IOC used all of its resources to make Trudeau back down from his “One-China” policy, including bringing diplomatic pressure to bear from the United States and its Western allies. At the last minute, Trudeau relented, allowing the Taiwanese team to fly whatever flag and play whatever anthem it wished, but stuck to his condition that it could not participate under the name of “Republic of China.” Although Taiwan refused to abide by Trudeau’s condition and stayed away from the Montreal Games, the IOC had fought Canada to a standstill on this issue.

Similarly, in 1980, the IOC brought pressure to bear on the Canadian government to ignore the US-led boycott of the Moscow Olympics. Both of the Canadian members of the IOC, James Worrall and Richard Pound [who at that time was also President of the

Canadian Olympic Association (COA)], met with Canadian cabinet ministers to convince them to support sending a team to Moscow. But this time, the IOC's efforts were to no avail. The pressure to stand by its neighbour and ally was too great, and Canada put its weight behind this US foreign policy initiative.

But perhaps the most vivid example of the IOC as a force in international politics had to do with the efforts of Juan Antonio Samaranch, President of the IOC, to avoid the political boycotts that had damaged both the 1980 and the 1984 Summer Olympics and the disruptions that plagued earlier Games. When it was announced in 1981 that Seoul, Korea, would be the site of the 1988 Summer Olympics, there were dire predictions about the future of the Games. Given that there were no formal relations between North and South Korea, and the volatile situation at the border between these two countries, it was hard to imagine that these Games could be carried off without a major political incident. Samaranch, however, was the consummate diplomat. He kept the North and South Koreans negotiating over the matter of holding some Olympic events in North Korea until immediately before the Games were to commence. Samaranch had to break the IOC rule that the Games must be held in one country to even commence these negotiations. More important, he was able to get assurances from both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China that they would not boycott these Games, even though they both had difficult political roles in the Korean peninsula. The importance of this political coup could be seen when the Soviet Union formally accepted the invitation to participate in the Seoul Olympics in January of 1988. One day later, the Seoul stock exchange soared to an all-time high (Taylor 1988b: 192).

There never was a realistic chance that any part of the Games would be hosted in North Korea. The IOC had no intention of allowing this to happen, and any careful observer knew that it was virtually impossible. In this, the IOC was aided in that the conditions set by both sides doomed the negotiations from the start (*ibid.*). Richard Pound, an Executive Vice-President of the IOC, had aptly coined these negotiations as a "dialogue of death" (personal communication with Richard Pound, 2 July 1991).

Samaranch was the first president of the IOC to acknowledge (at least publicly) that sport could not remain apart from international politics, and that the world of sport must work in consultation with the world of states (Taylor 1988a: 553). The breakdown of the Cold War in the late 1980s one of the most important events that signaled the effective end to adversarial, state-centered, world politics, aided his cause greatly. This new world of interdependence, along with his considerable diplomatic skills, allowed Samaranch to bring off the Seoul Games without political incident. Over 160 nations participated. Only six nations, including Albania, Cuba, and North Korea, turned down their invitations (Taylor 1988b: 194). The Seoul Games went forward without external political protest and the South Korean government was able to get opposition parties and student radicals to call off their demonstrations during the Games. As a result, the Seoul Games were seen around the world to be a great success and world confidence in the Olympic movement was restored. This gave South Korea a tremendous opportunity to promote itself.

South Korea also made political capital from the Games. A number of Eastern European countries extended diplomatic recognition after the Games. Although the Soviet Union did not, it established a trade office in Seoul. Indeed, South Korean officials were encouraged in renewed efforts in 1989 to be admitted to the UN four decades after its first application by the success of the Seoul Olympics (Howe, 15 October 1989: 15). Finally, the

negotiations between the respective Korean governments that were instigated by the IOC marked the start of a limited dialogue between the two countries over other matters, and in particular, about access to North Korea by citizens of the South.

International Sport in the New World of Interdependence

Of the consequences which result from the greater level of transnational and transgovernmental transactions, perhaps the most important (and admittedly the most general) is the increasing national sensitivity to external decisions. We suggested in the previous section that national governments are more and more constrained in their actions by the decisions taken by the IOC. This is in part due to the fact that the IOC has become a much more wealthy, and therefore, independent, organization as a result of its revenues from television contracts, and in part, to the tremendous attraction to governments and business of hosting the Olympics. Another related consequence of the increasing importance of transnational relations is the increasing inability of national governments to use the Olympics to promote national goals or achieve national purposes. In the post World War II, Cold War era, nation states were in a position to use international sporting events to identify and exalt their particular ideological positions or national priorities. Now, in a world where ideological differences are less obvious and where market forces play a larger role in the "sponsorship" of international sporting events, the latitude for state action has been reduced considerably. It is most unlikely that we will see again the type of "bloc" political boycotts of the Olympics that the superpowers were able to muster respectively in 1980 and 1984, although in the rapidly changing international political environment, anything is possible.

On the other hand, transnational organizations such as the IOC are also constrained in their actions by the positions taken by individual states and coalitions of sovereign states. For instance, what will the IOC's position be on supplications from the many would be break away republics in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia? Although the Baltic State nations' right to participate in future Olympic Games seems now to be secure, what will the IOC's position be on applications, for instance, from the Ukraine or Croatia? There will be sympathy from some quarters both within and from outside the IOC membership to readmit such breakaway republics. But this would be a brave move indeed, given the support most Western industrialized nations are giving to Gorbachev in his efforts to prevent anarchy from breaking out in his many rebellious republics, and to build a new "market economy." The European Common Market countries are also most concerned about civil war breaking out in Yugoslavia, and any move by the IOC to encourage independence for any of its republics would not likely be welcomed in the rest of Europe. In these circumstances, the IOC will probably adopt a "wait and see" attitude, and such applications will be deferred. This is in direct contrast to the lead that the IOC took in welcoming South Africa back into its fold. Here, the political risk of being out in front of the rest of the world was much less than in the volatile political situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. As Taylor (1988a) notes, organizations such as the IOC seek to act independently of government. In doing so, they run the risk of "the erosion or collapse of their own authority and significance" and they must keep in touch with the changes in the modern world and adapt to them (*ibid.*, 547-48).

Several other implications arise from transnational relations theory. First, it seems clear that both "rational choice" (domestic interests) and the planning function have been severely inhibited by the increasing prominence and independence of the IOC. The balance of power among the IOC, the National Olympic Committees, the International Sports

Federations (ISFs), and national governments (in Canada's case, International Sports Relations section in the Department of External Affairs, and the more recently created International Relations Directorate in Fitness and Amateur Sport), is clearly shifting in the direction of the IOC and the ISFs. In the past, national governments, as we have seen in the case of the Moscow Olympics boycott, could take draconian measures aimed specifically at national non-participation. However, it seems to be increasingly difficult today to garner public support for such a position, and it clearly has adverse effects on strong domestic pressure groups, such as the television networks and the large sport television audience. Governments are, in short, becoming increasingly unable to control the activities of transnational actors such as the IOC. Strict compliance to the rules of membership and steadily increasing reliance on television rights and other royalties make the IOC especially impervious to the pressures of national governments. Before the Seoul Olympics, for example, the IOC took over from the Korean Games Organizing Committee the responsibility for issuing official invitations to these Games. At the same time, the IOC instituted a rule which stated that if a country accepted its invitation and then withdrew, the officials of that country would be banned from future Games. In Los Angeles, officials from Eastern Bloc nations attended the Games in spite of the absence of their athletes (Taylor 1988b: 193).

Although the IOC's influence in international politics is ascendant, and it will be less likely to be subjected to the political influence of powerful blocs of nations, its future is not without peril. Certainly, it will come under increasing pressure from its international sponsors, the television industry and other transnational business concerns, to adapt to their wishes and requirements. This will include more demands to adjust playing schedules, the timing of events, and the rules of competition to make them more attractive to a large viewing audience, and to put less emphasis on, or even eliminate, those events which do not meet this criterion. The IOC will also face demands from its sponsors to allow them advertising access to the Olympic venues themselves, a practice that is commonplace at virtually all other national and international sport competitions. The present prohibition on commercial enterprises and sponsorships on Olympic sites is one of the last vestiges of the IOC's resistance to the complete professionalization and commercialization of the Olympic Games. According to Richard Pound, this prohibition means that the IOC "leaves millions of sponsorship dollars 'on the table'" (Pound 1990: 7).

Another commercial threat to the IOC is likely to come from high profile ISFs, who will want to take a greater share of the television and sponsorship revenues from the Olympics. The IOC will find these demands hard to deny, because in sports such as athletics (track and field), football (soccer), gymnastics, and aquatics, the international sport federations hold the threat of withdrawing from the Games, decreasing their attraction to television networks and sponsors. The absence of these sport federations from the Olympics would make their own world championships even more attractive to television and commercial sponsorship than they are at present.

The Ben Johnson scandal and the subsequent Dubin Commission of Inquiry raised questions about current values in international sport. Indeed, Chief Justice Dubin decried what he saw as a moral crisis in sport. This has generated a renewed interest in restoring the values that Pierre de Coubertin envisaged for the Olympics when he conceived them in the late 19th century. Bruce Kidd (1991) has written eloquently about integrating athletic, artistic, cultural, and intellectual activities into an Olympic "festival of sports, intercultural exploration, and service" (ibid., 370). For the many reasons we have outlined in this and the

previous paper, we see little hope of this occurring from within the IOC. In fact, Kidd himself cites IOC executive vice-president Richard Pound as saying in 1990 that the Olympic Games are now more successful than ever before and that “no new orientation is necessary” (ibid., 373). The laudable changes that Kidd enunciates in his article, in our opinion, will have to come from outside the established sport structure. Some political scientists (for instance, Watts 1991), see a counter pressure to the inevitable alienation of further political and economic integration in the new world of interdependence. This counter pressure will manifest itself in a search for “smaller political units more sensitive to their electorates and capable of expressing regional distinctiveness and ethnic, linguistic or historically derived diversity” (ibid., 16). It is from this development that we see the greatest hope for a reorientation of today’s dominant sport values of record and performance coming. Television magnate Ted Turner’s promotion of the Goodwill Games in Seattle in 1990 indicated that he perceived there was some public interest in a different orientation to international televised sport spectacles.

Regionalization may also have an impact on international sport. The effort on the part of the United States to develop a North American trading bloc with Mexico and Canada in order to blunt the growing economic power of the European Common Market and the rapidly expanding Pacific Rim trading consortium is a case in point. The leaders of these economic blocs, who will be intent on gaining international media attention and building regional allegiances, may decide to use sport to their ends. The use of sporting events to promote national unity was commonplace in the post-war era -- for instance, the Canada Games, and Spartakiad, the all-Soviet Republics Games. Perhaps there will be an increase of attention and importance attached to regional sport events in the 1990s. This tendency could be seen in the 1980s -- European championships grew in number and importance, and the Asian Games that were staged in Beijing in 1990 assumed major proportions. The Pan-American Games might well be used in a similar way by any new North (and South) American economic consortium. Certainly, the 1991 Pan-American Games in Cuba were used to good advantage by Fidel Castro in his attempts to stave off the collapse of communism in his country.

Joseph Nye has suggested, in his book Bound To Lead (Nye 1990), that the United States, faced with its declining economic and military hegemony, will attempt to use culture to maintain its place of primacy in the world. Certainly, the influence of US “low culture” is increasingly being felt around the world. Perhaps the United States will move more formally to use sport in this way. Global interest in sport by North American professional cartels is increasing. The start-up of the World Football League in 1991 by the National Football League, with franchises in Canada and Europe, is one such example. Developments such as this one and those outlined in previous paragraphs could pose additional threats to the IOC’s hegemony in international sport, and cause new problems and concerns for sovereign states.

Finally, the whole business of interdependence is self-perpetuating. At the systemic level, as status hierarchy declines, interdependence grows. At the national level, as national governments lose the leverage of ideological consensus to support the formulation and predisposition of their foreign policies, interdependence grows. At the level of the organization, as more organizations operate across national borders rather than between them, interdependence grows. At the same time, national governments and national organizations will attempt to retain their authority.

It is not at all clear today whether increased communications, cultural convergence, and what appears to be the end of the post-war great power rivalry will lead to reduced levels of international conflict. It is just as plausible to assume that decreased stability (order) will result from the "pluralization" of the international system. The break-away of Baltic States and other republics in what was the Soviet Union and the political chaos in Yugoslavia suggest that a reduction of international conflict may be too optimistic a view. What we do know, however, is that the world cannot be understood in terms of simple state-to-state models, and that the foreign policy of sport must be understood in terms of this new transnational world -- despite the fact that, on the surface, it is still clearly organized along territorial lines.

Note

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