

REGIME CHANGE AND THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE: IS THERE AN EXPLANATORY MODEL?

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The purpose of this paper is to examine some of the literature on international regimes and regime change to see if it has any explanatory strength with reference to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the Olympic Movement, and the corresponding regime for world-wide international sport. In order to accomplish this, a definition for regimes must be shown to apply to the issue area. Then it must be shown that the IOC is at the centre of this regime and that there is a definite relation of states to the IOC. There are a couple of reasons for this approach. First, it would be useless to speak of regime change if it could be shown conclusively that a regime does not exist in this issue area. Secondly, regime literature focuses on the state to the exclusion of almost all other international actors. Accordingly, it would be illogical to use a theory which focuses on the state in a case where states are only involved on the periphery. Thus, a clear link between the IOC and states strengthens the reasoning behind the attempt to explain this issue area by using international regime literature.

The IOC and the Definition of Regimes

Stephen Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, in a recent review article, have denoted three prominent definitions of regimes that are currently in use.¹ A review of these definitions will permit their application to the IOC, and establish that, in fact, a regime is being dealt with.

The first, taken from a paper by Donald J. Puchala and Raymond F. Hopkins, has several key features. Firstly, regimes are attitudinal phenomena which have "...tenets concerning appropriate procedures for making decisions"² In addition, when describing regimes, a characterization must be made of the major principles and norms. Then there is the set of elites 'who are the practical actors' within each regime. The final, and most controversial, point is their assertion that "...a regime exists in every substantive issue-area in international relations where there is discernably patterned behaviour"³ This final point ensures a broad definition for regimes since it is clear that there are many examples of patterned behaviour in international relations.

¹Stephen Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of international regimes," *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 3, (Summer 1987), pp. 493-496.

²Donald J. Puchala and Raymond F. Hopkins, "International Regimes: lessons from inductive analysis," *International Regimes*, Stephen Krasner, ed. (Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983) pg. 62.

³Ibid., pg. 63.

Stephen Krasner's instrumental definition is the second reviewed by Haggard and Simmons. He states succinctly that regimes are,

...implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.⁴

This definition is less encompassing than that of Puchala and Hopkins in that it is less concerned with inducing regimes from any patterned behaviour. This makes it more conducive to acceptance by theorists of the realist and neo-realist traditions.

The third definition sees regimes as "multilateral agreements between states which aim to regulate national actions within an issue-area."⁵ This is similar to a formulation of Oran Young in which he states that: "Regimes are social institutions governing the actions of those interested in specifiable activities."⁶ Thus, this definition is more restricted than the previous ones. With this interpretation, the focus is more upon the explicit aspects of the agreements between participants. It allows for less dispute over the existence of the regime because of the tighter formulation. However, it restricts regimes to a narrow range of situations and may be accused of being formalistic. Conversely, due to its focus on agreements, it may also indicate the presence of a regime where one does not exist.

Using these variations of regime definitions, it will be possible to show that the IOC is the central actor in a regime. To do this effectively, brief descriptions of the IOC and the other actors in this issue area are needed.

The IOC, NOCs and IFS

The IOC has become one of the most well-known nonstate actors in the world today. While its aims promote the Olympic Games as competitions between individuals and not nations,⁷ it is clear that the nation component is an integral part of the system. At present, the nations of the world send competitors to the Games under the auspices of their respective National

⁴Stephen Krasner, "Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables," International Regimes, pg. 2.

⁵Haggard and Simmons, pg. 495.

⁶Oran Young, "International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation," World Politics, (New Jersey: Princeton University), Vol. 32, April 1980, pg. 332.

⁷International Olympic Committee, Olympic Charter, (Lausanne: International Olympic Committee, 1971) pg. 12.

Olympic Committees (NOC). A recent count has shown that 167 NOCs are recognized by the IOC as being eligible to send competitors.⁸

In reference to the actual sport competitions, the IOC has delegated responsibility to the International Federations (IF) for the various sports to provide standardized rules, regulations and equipment.⁹ This makes it possible for there to be fairer competitions than if the IOC had one set of regulations and the IFs had others. It is one of the cooperative measures within the Olympic Movement (cooperation being one of the major aspects of regimes).

Thirdly, the IOC has developed a rigorous charter which states clearly the goals of the organization as well as all the rules and regulations concerning the Olympic Games outside of the rules of the actual competitions just mentioned. It also encourages the celebration of cultural events at the time of the Games in order to help them retain more of a festival atmosphere.¹⁰

The IOC and Regime Definitions

If the first definition of regimes is applied to what is known about the IOC and the Olympic system, it may be seen that there is congruence. Obviously, there is a clear pattern of behaviour when the interactions of the NOCs, the IFs, and the IOC are observed. Each of these organizations has a specific role to play within the system and there are clear expectations as to what these roles entail, as well as the principles and norms of the Olympic Charter that guide them. These organizations and their members also constitute a set of elites that are the primary actors. The whole movement is international in scope, while the charter lays out the tenets for decision-making. This fits easily with Puchala and Hopkins' account.

Krasner's definition is also applicable. In this case, the regime is an explicit one in that there are guidelines covering the workings of the component organizations. In addition to rules and regulations, the Olympic Charter sets out the fundamental principles of the Olympic Movement.¹¹ Decision-making procedures are codified in the charter as well. This leaves only the question of norms. If norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations as per Krasner's definition, then they may be seen as the right of any state with an accepted NOC to send athletes to the Games provided they adhere to all relevant rules. There are also the obligations of the NOCs and the athletes to subscribe to the Olympic Movement's concepts of honourable competition and fair play.

⁸Union of International Associations, Yearbook of International Organizations, (New York: K.G. Saur Publishers), 25th edition, Vol. 1, 1988/89.

⁹International Federation is the term used to denote the various bodies that administer specific sports internationally. They are non-governmental bodies usually composed of multiple national sports federations with the purpose of standardizing rules and regulations for the sport.

¹⁰Olympic Charter, pg. 23.

¹¹Olympic Charter, pp. 11-12.

This leaves the third definition of regimes which defines them as regulatory multi-lateral agreements between actors which are usually states. While the primary actors in this regime are non-state, the role of the state cannot be seen as insignificant. That is, NOCs are formed so that persons from specific states may be eligible to compete in the Olympics- This gives the state indirect representation at the Games. Thus, indirect national actions take place at the Olympic Games through the NOCs. In addition, boycotts of Olympic competitions are often national actions as governments force NOCs into non-participation.¹² It may be argued that the IOC and the Olympic Charter are the instruments which regulate these national actions within the issue area. (The issue area being the celebration of the Olympic Games as a international sports event.) However, this appears to be stretching the third definition somewhat.

It seems obvious that an international regime exists in this issue area. By extension, the IOC is the most significant component of it since it coordinates the actions of the other organizations and makes all charter amendments. Thus, all three of the definitions cited by Haggard and Simmons can be applied in some fashion.

However, the strongest variation in this case is Krasner's. There are several reasons for this. First, the other two definitions are lacking in certain ways. Although the IOC fits well, Puchala and Hopkins' definition is too broad; patterned behaviour can occur in many cases where a regime does not exist. (Arguably, most collective human behaviour is patterned. Thus, if all patterned behaviour indicated a regime, then regimes would pervade all aspects of our lives. This seems to overstate the matter somewhat.) The third definition, on the other hand, is too restrictive and does not account for many of the IOC's more symbolic aspects which are important. An example of this would be the status a state achieves when it has its own National Olympic Committee recognized by the IOC. This variation also seems to focus on the state too much to be applicable to this case. By contrast, Krasner's definition is stronger. His terms are well-defined which permits a more concise and accurate application to the various components of the IOC. Finally, this definition is a good compromise between the more general and specific definitions.

Having established the validity of speaking of the IOC as being at the centre of a regime, it should now be possible to move to some of the literature on regime change to test its explanatory power. However, as stated at the outset, regime change literature is focused almost exclusively on states and their relation to regimes. Thus, a final question exists that must be answered before moving into the discussion of regime change. That is, the relationship between the IOC, this regime, and states. If there is no connection between the IOC and states, the efficacy of attempting to apply models that work explicitly with states may be questionable.

States and the IOC

What, then, is the link between the IOC and states? The basic relationship between the NOCs, states and the IOC has already been noted. Upon a cursory perusal of the Olympic Charter, it would appear that there is a tenuous link at best. The charter states that all members of the IOC are to be representatives of the IOC in their countries and not vice

¹²For example, the United States government pressured the United States Olympic Committee strongly to boycott the 1980 Moscow Games.

versa.¹³ This is a measure which has been taken by the IOC in an attempt to maintain its autonomy in the face of the possible attempted influence of individual states and governments. At this level, the interaction between the parties appears to be minimal.

However, upon closer examination of the IOC, it can be seen that states are very much a part of the regime. There are two major areas. Firstly, we may return to the question of the National Olympic Committees. As shown, these bodies represent the IOC and the Olympic Movement in various countries. Individual states are allowed to form their own NOCs based on the specifications of the IOC.¹⁴ Once these specifications have been met, the IOC admits the NOC to the Olympic Movement and the country becomes eligible to send athletes to the Olympic Games. This recognition by the IOC has become a highly significant, if predominantly symbolic, issue with the states of the world. The significance becomes more obvious if one considers that the majority of nations that send athletes to the Olympic Games never win medals.

The second area of states' relationships to the IOC occurs at the actual competitions. The Games have been structured on nationalistic lines since their inception. For example, at the opening ceremonies the athletes enter the stadium behind the flags of their respective countries; athletes have increasingly started to wear uniforms with emblems of their country on them; and at awards ceremonies the flags of the top three finishers are raised and the national anthem of the first place athlete or team is played. All of these actions promote the symbol of the state (as opposed to the athlete who is supposed to be the main focus of the competitions). Because the Games have become such a world-wide phenomenon, states have begun to attribute significant importance to them. For those countries with the capacity to do well at the Games, the prestige of having top finishers in many sports is a major policy goal of the government.¹⁵ In the case of countries that have little chance of winning medals, the mere presence of their flag at the opening ceremonies provides international exposure and recognition.

Types of Regime Change

It seems apparent that there is a definite link between the IOC and the states of the world. Hence it may be assumed that the various models of regime change should have some explanatory power when it comes to this regime. However, before moving to the models of regime change, a brief note on the concept of exactly what regime change entails is proper. Haggard and Simmons suggest that there are four ways that regimes may change. They may change in: strength, organizational form, scope and allocational mode.¹⁶

¹³Olympic Charter, pg. 13.

¹⁴The specifications and criteria necessary for creating a NOC are laid out in the Olympic Charter.

¹⁵Baruch Hazan, Olympic Sports and Propaganda Games: Moscow 1980, (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers Inc., 1982), pp.84-85, notes that sport and physical fitness are enshrined in the Soviet constitution.

¹⁶Haggard and Simmons, pp. 496-498 provide a brief explanation of these four dimensions that the following discussion is based upon.

The strength of regimes is usually studied by measuring compliance with regime rules when there are significant reasons for alternate self-interested actions by the participants. That is, a high level of compliance indicates a strong regime whereas a breakdown in compliance implies a weakening regime. It is difficult to cite examples for this case from the IOC. There is only one real area in which non-compliance with this regime is common and that is in the use of performance-enhancing drugs by competitors. While this is non-compliance and undoubtedly regime-weakening, it is not an open challenge to the principles of the regime since it is a covert action that has competitors using elaborate methods to avoid being caught.¹⁷

Organizational form is quite straight-forward. There are a variety of regimes in the international system that are organized in different fashions. Changes in organizational form may occur when regimes become more explicit in their injunctions which generally means an increase in administrative functions. The IOC provides an example of this in its establishment of a Court of Arbitration for Sport to deal with “non-technical disputes of a pecuniary nature” within the Olympic Movement that do not fall under the rules of the charter.¹⁸

The scope of a regime is a simple concept as well. All regimes have a certain area of interest and expertise. On occasion these areas may change in size for one reason or another. Quite often a regime’s scope changes when the issues that it addresses become no longer relevant or new issues arise that must be dealt with.¹⁹ The IOC’s continuing attempts to deal with the South African situation provides a case in point. While the IOC attempts to avoid the internal political affairs of sovereign states, it has become a barometer of the changes in the South African system since the South Africans started making overtures to rejoin the Olympic Movement. Since South Africa has been allowed back into the Olympic Movement, the acceptance of its NOC by the IOC will provide a level of international legitimation for the state of South Africa.

Finally, the fourth area is that of the allocational mode of regimes. This refers to the mechanisms a regime endorses for the allocation of resources. This mechanisms can be market-oriented or authoritative.²⁰ A market-oriented regime would be in favour of the basic tenets of the conception of the liberal state with its few national controls over resources, the protection of the private individual, and so on. An authoritative allocation mechanism in a regime would entail the IOC allocating the right to join the Olympic Movement to various NOCs. (This is based, of course, on the understanding that the right to compete may be seen as a resource that is much sought after by states in the international system.)

¹⁷Krasner, pg. 5, notes the same thing with regard to the covert misuse of the regime protecting diplomatic envoys but states that, because of the covert nature, the principles of the regime are not being directly challenged.

¹⁸International Olympic Committee, The Olympic Movement, (Lausanne: the International Olympic Committee, 1984), pg. 114.

¹⁹Haggard and Simmons, pg. 497, refer to the international trade regime governed by GATT and how the issues that it has had to deal with have changed of over time.

²⁰Ibid., pg. 498.

In sum, there are several different ways that regimes change. By looking at some of the models of regime change it will be shown that they offer differing explanations for the types of change and that some are better than others in their explanations of that change.

Models of Regime Change

The first model to be inspected is that of structuralism. This account posits that regimes change primarily as a result of changes in the relative power position of regime participants. More broadly speaking, the structure of the international system determines the manner in which states inter-relate and thus how regimes are formed, change, and disintegrate.

This approach is the most traditional and is compelling because of its ease of application to the relations between states. In most cases it is a simple matter to make a determination of power capabilities between states on a military level and from thence to deduce relative capabilities to influence international relations. At the purest level, this approach downplays regimes and their importance.²¹ Keohane and Nye have suggested, nonetheless, that there is room for the theory of regimes in this approach. They posit that: “The basic dynamic is provided by the assertion that as the power of states changes (that is, as the structure changes), the rules that comprise international regimes will change accordingly.”²²

The reliance of the structuralist account on the role of the hegemon and the structure of the international system limits its explanatory power in situations where power ratios are undetermined, such as when a clear hegemon does not exist. However, the appeal of this model remains because of the continued predominance of the state in international relations and the universal value attached to the concept of sovereignty. As long as this remains, the explanatory value of interests and power when speaking of states will endure.

Functionalism provides a second school of thought and an alternate model in explaining regime change. A functionalist approach to regimes denotes their facilitating role in the achievement of the common interests between participants. As with the structuralist approach, functionalists “...also assume rational actors, but introduce market imperfections, transactions, and information costs and uncertainty.”²³ This provides an expansion on the structuralist concept since the functions of the system are posited to have an effect on regimes, rather than just the considerations of power and interest.

²¹Susan Strange advances this argument in “Cave! Hic Dragones,” in International Regimes, pp. 337-354.

²²Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, (Boston: Little Brown, 1977), pg. 43.

²³Haggard and Simmons, pg. 499.

Keohane introduces a functional theory of regimes in *After Hegemony*.²⁴ He posits that regimes are mostly “responses to problems of property rights, uncertainty, and transaction costs. Without consciously designed institutions, these problems, will thwart attempts to cooperate in world politics...”²⁵ Thus regimes are formed because of the anticipation that the above problems will be addressed. But what exactly is meant by property rights, uncertainty and transaction costs?

Property rights (or legal liability for compliance) are unenforceable between states because of sovereignty, but regimes tend to organize relationships and create expectations of conformity to principles. Uncertainty exists between potential regime participants because of information inequalities, “moral hazard” (agreements may alter behaviour so that there is less incentive to cooperate), and irresponsibility (participants making commitments they are unable to carry out). Finally, the third problem is transactions costs. As Keohane states: “International regimes reduce the transaction costs of legitimate bargains and increase them for illegitimate ones”²⁶ That is, regimes provide guidelines for legitimate bargains thereby making it obvious when illegitimate ones take place.

Overall, Keohane posits that regimes perform better than individual, *ad hoc* agreements when it comes to addressing these problems. The most significant difference between this approach and the structuralist is that the need for a hegemon is removed. This approach is also able to explain the continuance and strength of regimes when there is no hegemon because of the problems participants can avoid through compliance. However, due to the focus on the functions of regimes, it is weak in explaining why regimes form in some issue-areas and not in others.²⁷

Strategic approaches provide the focus of a third model for explaining regimes. This approach falls under the broad category of utilitarian models. The model focuses “on the behaviour of rational utility maximizers and typically assume[s] that actors of this type will reach agreement on the content of mutually beneficial institutional arrangements, including international regimes.”²⁸ Accordingly, the theory behind this model is rooted to a significant extent in microeconomics and game theory.²⁹ Because of the bargaining nature of this

²⁴Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: cooperation and-discord in the world political economy*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), ch. 6, pp.85-109.

²⁵Keohane, pg. 88.

²⁶Keohane, pg. 90.

²⁷Haggard and Simmons, pg. 508.

²⁸Oran Young, "The politics of international regime formation: managing natural resources and the environment," *International Organization* 43 (Summer 1989) pg. 350.

²⁹*Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation*, Oran Young, ed., (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1975). This volume presents some of the major models in this vein of theory including: game theory, economic models, prospects for a unified theory, and manipulative models of bargaining.

model, there are some assumptions about the actors involved which should be mentioned briefly.

There has to be a range of possibilities (or contract zone) within which the potential members of the regime feel that the optimal manner of proceeding is through mutual agreement. Outside of this range, some or all of the potential participants will feel that an agreement is not optimal and the regime will not form. Secondly, each of the actors has to have a clearly defined position that will not change due to internal or domestic pressures. Thirdly, the issue area should optimally be free from exogenous influences (such as issue-linkages). Finally, the potential participants should have a level of trust that all future members will be prepared to comply with the regime.

This sort of construct is quite capable of explaining the rise of regimes under restricted conditions. (Restricted conditions keep unwanted externalities to a minimum.) It has been a popular model, thus deserving mention in any discussion of regime literature. However, it is probably weaker in explaining regime change than regime creation because of its primary focus on conditions for the latter.

The final model to be addressed may be called a cognitive model of international regimes. As Haggard and Simmons argue: “The core cognitive insight is that cooperation cannot be completely explained without reference to ideology, the values of actors, the beliefs they hold about the interdependence of issues, and the knowledge available to them about how they can realize specific goals”³⁰

This model allows for learning amongst regime participants which is something the other approaches ignore. The regime itself may contribute to the learning process so that actor perceptions change over time. If the result of this learning is increased cooperation in the regime (or even the inverse), the end product is the same for our case; the regime changes.

The question of ideology, values and beliefs is interesting as well. These factors all will have an effect on the interests of regime participants, and the link between them is important. Indeed, more correctly, ideology, values and beliefs may not be separated from interests since interests are constructed, in large part, from these very factors. Consequently, the link with power is altered. This model allows for interests to shift without needing a shift in power. Interests change “as a result of learning, persuasion, and divine revelation. Knowledge and ideology may then become an important explanation of regime change.”³¹ Thus, this approach goes “inside” the other models in an attempt to deal with the “baggage” that the participants bring with them.

In addition, this approach also allows for the realization that different actors may understand the same regime in different ways even though they are comparable on the structuralist account. Ernst Haas has stated that this is due to the fact “..that how one thinks about regimes is a function of how one thinks about learning, about the growth of human

³⁰Haggard and Simmons, pg. 409-510.

³¹Haggard and Simmons, pg. 513.

consciousness, about social evolution.”³² Therefore, different people and cultures will have differing conceptions of how to talk about regimes (or anything else for that matter). Clearly, this is an important concept to note for a case like the IOC and the Olympic Games because of the multitude of actors involved.

This concept is a protest by cognitivists such as Haas against what they have seen as a propensity by regime participants to construct “wholes”. A whole is simply the concept that a regime is explainable through the use of one over-arching construct.³³ The use of broad constructs allow for the avoidance of extraneous problems or concerns and the regime may be de-linked from other issues. However, a whole will inevitably lead to problems because of the differing perceptions of the actors. As Haas states: “If we are to have politically acceptable master constructs they must be fashioned out of parts which are based on a consensus shared by scientists and laymen, not wholes deduced from the order of nature, whether derived from personal knowledge or from scientific epistemology.”³⁴ This may equally be applied to the IOC issue area.

Regime Change and the IOC

What potential do these four models have for explaining regime change with reference to the IOC? Without going into case studies it is difficult to say exactly how much explanatory power each model possesses. However, it should be possible to make some basic conclusions based on what is known about the general characteristics of the IOC and these models.

The structuralist account is difficult to apply to the regime in question here. Since the role of the hegemon is so important for this model, the predominant actor in the regime has to be examined to determine whether changes in its relative power position affect the outlook of the regime. The IOC is clearly the only actor that could be considered hegemonic in this regime. Changes in its relative power position would certainly affect the overall regime, thus inducing change. At present, it is the “final authority on all questions concerning the Olympic Games and the Olympic Movement”³⁵, except in the areas where it delegates authority to other bodies. If some of this authority were to shift to the NOCs, for example, there would be a change in the manner that the regime functions due to the decrease in hegemonic authority over the movement.

However, a more fundamental question arises concerning the application of the hegemonic role to the IOC-which is a non-state actor. Structuralists focus primarily on the power of the hegemonic state and to a lesser extent on other states in the regime. Practically

³²Ernst B. Haas, “Words can hurt you; or, who said what to whom about regimes,” *International Regimes*, pg. 23.

³³Ernst B. Haas, “Is there a hole in the whole? Knowledge, technology, interdependence, and the construction of international regimes,” *International Organization*, Vol. 29, (Summer, 1975) pg. 828.

³⁴Haas, pg. 828.

³⁵*Olympic Charter*, pg. 17.

no attention is given to non-state actors. Therefore, it stretches the structuralist approach by trying to apply it to the IOC. In fact, it may be argued that it is a fundamental distortion of the structuralist model to refer to non-state actors as occupying the same position as a state 'normally does. Therefore, on this account, the applicability of the structuralist model to this regime is suspect.

The functionalist model may have a greater level of explanatory strength. It is clear that the celebration of a sporting event with world-wide participation would not be possible without the coordinating capabilities of an institution such as the IOC. In terms of Keohane's theory, the IOC certainly provides the codification of property rights through its authority over the entire process. Because of its central position it is able to reduce levels of uncertainty amongst the participants. That is, all the NOCs are aware of the conditions that govern participation in the Olympic Games, as well as their roles between the competitions. Finally, the IOC serves to reduce transaction costs by providing the framework for the cyclical celebration of the Games. It would be very costly to negotiate anew an international competition on the scale of the Olympics every four years.

As stated, this model posits that there are problems of coordination in any issue area in international relations and that a regime is the best instrument for dealing with them. By extension, it is implied that certain actors want to accomplish coordination in an issue area but the problems impede them. In the case of the IOC, it seems to be the best instrument for coordination in this issue area and there is no doubt that there is a large amount of interest in maintaining the IOC as the key instrument.

Thus, overall, the functional approach seems to offer a good approach in explaining what this regime does. However, what does it have to say about regime change? Keohane feels that the problems and barriers to cooperation in world politics make regimes difficult to construct in the first place, thus once they are in place, participants would rather maintain them rather than create new ones.³⁶ He also notes that regimes have what may be called "sunk costs", which are unrecoverable costs incurred when the regime is created. He hypothesizes that regimes will continue to persist under these conditions even when the members would prefer "different mixtures of principles, rules, and institutions."³⁷ For all of these reasons regimes tend not to disappear, but rather, go through evolutionary change. This may be applied to the IOC as it has weathered some major shocks, but has changed in an evolutionary fashion without significant changes to its fundamental principles.³⁸

As mentioned earlier, the strategic approach to regime change is lacking in terms of explanatory power. The game theory which is a major part of this model tries to explain the process that takes place during negotiations by looking primarily at the actors as they attempt to form a regime. As Haggard and Simmons note: "Game-theoretic approaches are strongest

³⁶Keohane, pg. 100.

³⁷Keohane, pg. 102.

³⁸For example, the Munich massacre and the boycotts of the 1980 and 1984 Olympic Games presented major challenges to the IOC.

when they reveal the conditions which enable cooperation and stability...”³⁹ Inevitably this leaves little room for hypotheses on how regimes will eventually change other than to describe how the negotiations to change them proceed. In the case of the IOC, the “conditions which enable cooperation and stability” have long been established, thus limiting the strategic approach to a descriptive role at best in covering regime change. In sum, the causal factors for regime change are weak on this model.

Finally, there is the cognitive approach. It becomes indisputable very quickly that the role of knowledge, ideology, beliefs and values play a major role in the IOC and the Olympic Movement. Simply because of the sheer number of countries involved, there are bound to be differing conceptions of what the regime means. It is clear that Olympic competitions have been a place for some nations to compete against one another as they have in other areas. The Cold War was carried onto the playing field at some Olympic competitions. The conception of the Games by these athletes and nations would be very different from those of a nation that knew before the competition that none of its athletes stood a chance of winning a medal.

Knowledge is important in this definition of regimes. As the IOC has grown and matured, it has had to deal with many difficult issues that it was not really designed to focus on. As the international system has grown more complex and the size of the Olympic competitions has grown, the IOC has had to adapt its rules to fit changing situations. The codification of rules is much more explicit now than it used to be. For example, the criteria surrounding the formation of NOCs is tightly defined because of the problems of determining whether a state actually exists in some instances.

It appears that the role of beliefs and values will be of importance in explaining the role of the IOC and the question of South African participation in the Olympic Movement in the 1960s. Because of the beliefs of a significant number of states and of the members of the IOC, a change of position on South Africa was taken. These beliefs were a reflection of the predominant values held by the participants in the regime at that time.

Overall, the cognitive approach provides some interesting insights into the workings of this regime. Because of the complexity and number of perceptions of the regime, the tenets of the cognitive approach provide a cautionary note to remember that there are variables outside of the ones usually considered in the other models.

Conclusions

This paper has shown that there are problems to be overcome when attempting to apply regime literature to the IOC issue area. Because of the state-based approach of most models, it is difficult to find a niche for a non-state actor such as the IOC. A preliminary paper such as this that does not have the benefit of case studies cannot make concrete judgements on the strength of the different models in this issue-area.

However, it would appear that the cognitive model offers the most flexibility for this case. By contrast, the other models all have fundamental weaknesses when they are applied to this issue. Firstly, the structuralist account is so state-centred that it is improper to try to

³⁹Haggard and Simmons, pg. 506.

apply it to the IOC. The strategic approach, in turn, is incapable of dealing with the number of issues involved. Finally, the functionalist account, which offers a stronger model than structuralism or the strategic approach, tends to centre too much on describing what regimes do. This means that it does not have as much flexibility in explaining changes in regimes as the cognitive approach.

Because of the multitude of actors involved in the Olympic Movement, the possibility of providing one definition for what it is will be difficult if not impossible. Functionalism may provide some insights into changes in the scope and allocational mode of this regime. However, it is the cognitive approach and the idea of constructing temporary “wholes” from the sum of the various parts that seems, at this point, to offer the most hope for explaining more precisely what this regime is and thus how and why it changes-

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