

# Regime Themes and Institutional Dreams: On the Origin of the Relationship Between the International Olympic Committee and International Sports Federations

Gordon MacDonald  
Centre for Olympic Studies,  
The University of Western Ontario

## Introduction

On their one hundredth birthday, the Olympic Games are now the technical product of a number of types of organization. The IOC, National Olympic Committees (NOCs), International Sport Federations (IFs), and Olympic Organizing Committees (OCOGs) all play a part in the production of the quadrennial event. These organizations have 'codified their relationships with each other and zealously guard their established roles. With the number of people now involved with the staging of the Olympic Games, a veritable international sport bureaucracy has evolved. Where did this bureaucracy come from and how did it evolve?

This paper seeks to examine the origins of two of the organizational types noted above - the IOC and the IFs - in order to explain the emergence of what is now a complex system of interorganizational relationships. Drawing on insights from international relations theories and institutional approaches to organizational analysis, I argue that the IOC and IFs took a period of more than three decades to establish themselves and their relationships with each other. Scholars from each of the fields mentioned have some compelling ideas about the manner in which organizations form, evolve, and relate to one another and their broader environments. Their thoughts are, I believe, useful in explaining the evolution of the relationships between the IOC and the IFs.

Before the First World War there were only a few IFs, and those that existed played a limited role in the organization of the Olympic Games. Hence, their

relationship with the IOC was minimal. At the same time the IOC itself was involved in establishing its own status as a bona-fide international sports body. The decade following the First World War saw much more organizational activity. New IFs were formed, and those that already existed became more vocal about their role in the Olympic Games. By the late 1920s, the IOC, realizing the importance of the IFs to the smooth running of the Games, attempted to accommodate some of their requests, while still maintaining its preeminent position. The interactions between the IOC and the IFs during this decade, and the outcomes thereof, laid the foundation for the regime still in place today.

The rest of the paper is divided into several sections. First I review the concept of regimes (institutions) commonly found within international relations literature. Second, I look at the sociological concept of institutions and their impact upon organizations. Third, I compare the two concept in the hopes of reconciling their positions and providing a guideline for interpreting a history of relations between the IOC and the IFs. Fourth, I give an overview of important organizational events during the Olympic Games' first three decades and try to interpret them in light of the theoretical ideas presented.

## Institutions and International Relations

International relations theorizing has, for the past fifteen years, been increasingly preoccupied with the role of certain types of institutions in international society.' One concept of institution which has undergone considerable scrutiny is that of the international regime. An international regime is considered, using the most cited definition, to be:

...implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices

for making and implementing collective choice.<sup>1</sup>

This definition has been the starting point for much discussion on the nature of international cooperation. It has also been subject to debate and interpretation. Indeed, a key critical question is how an agreement (a treaty) for example, differs from a regime. Hence, because the definition lends itself to both formalistic and substantive interpretations, Robert Keohane argues that it is "...more sensible to define *agreements* in purely formal terms (explicit rules agreed by more than one state) and to consider *regimes* as arising when states recognize these agreements as having continuing validity."<sup>3</sup>

Given this general definition, there are a number of differing approaches used to explain the formation, persistence, and change of regimes. Not surprisingly, these approaches emphasize different variables in international regime analysis. Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons have reviewed the literature and postulate four theoretical approaches to regime study.<sup>4</sup> Their categories, which are not mutually exclusive, include what they call structural, game-theoretic, functional, and cognitive approaches. Structural approaches as defined by Haggard and Simmons fit a realist, power-based model, while game-theoretic and functional accounts are arguably utilitarian in nature. Hence, these latter two assume that institutions such as regimes form as a result of a bargaining process.<sup>5</sup> The cognitive approach, then, may be added to the list as a more distinct category. It stresses the importance of knowledge and ideology on the part of actors who are involved, for example, in regime creation. As such, the cognitive approach privileges variables too; in this case those variables which other approaches only just acknowledge.<sup>6</sup> Incidentally, this latter approach is closer in some ways to the sociological approaches to the study of institutions. Accordingly, I will examine it in further detail.

Cognitive approaches to regime theory are less prominent than those cited above, and, in fact, have been questioned by some scholars working in the area.<sup>7</sup> Christer Jönsson, in a contribution to a recent volume, attempts to answer some of these criticisms and to elucidate ways in which cognitive approaches could complement the more dominant streams of analysis.

Jönsson argues that this approach, contrary to the opinion of some theorists, "...does not assume irrationality but explores the *limits* of human rationality. It rests on a conception of man as selectively responding to and actively shaping his environment."<sup>8</sup> (This conception clearly is closer to sociological ideas that give great importance to the shaping effects of the environment.) It is also in accord with Stephen Krasner's comment on the ability of regimes to take on 'lives' of their own, in which he states that: "...once a regime is actually in place, it may develop a dynamic of its own that can alter not only related behaviour and outcomes but also causal variables."<sup>9</sup> Hence, the regime will be able to influence actors' ideas, beliefs and interests. Rational decisions made in this context are rational only in that they are based on the knowledge available. This knowledge stems, in part, from that very same institutional environment of which the regime is a part.

Given these underlying assumptions about the importance of cognitive factors, Jönsson examines the role this approach can play in explaining regime creation, persistence and change. He accepts, as per other regime theory approaches, that most regimes arise out of bargaining situations of some sort, but argues for the primacy of trust as the factor which tips the scales in favour of cooperation over conflict. He adopts a definition of trust that is, not surprisingly, cognitively based. Hence, "[t]rust can be understood as an agent's theory of how another agent or group of agents will behave in the future, based on the target agents' current and previous claims, either implicit or explicit, about future behaviour."<sup>10</sup> He goes on to make several additional observations on the concept, noting that it is based on uncertainty about others' behaviour, that it is a belief predicated "...not on evidence but on the lack of contrary evidence..." and that it implies a willingness to increase vulnerability to others.<sup>11</sup>

In addition to trust, Jönsson argues that the actors must have, at some level, a shared perception of the problem. Only then can a formula be created and applied to the bargaining process. He goes so far as to suggest that formulae can be metaphorical in nature. Here, he draws on the work of another theorist, Mary Douglas, who argues that 'generative metaphors' are important in the formation of institutions. Jönsson concludes that 'generative metaphors' - which may be based on

## Olympic Perspectives

historical analogies - used as a way to frame and focus the bargaining process are a second critical prerequisite to the formation of regimes.<sup>12</sup>

Regimes persist, from a cognitive perspective, because of a number of factors. Jönsson, too, makes the general claim that regimes may take on lives of their own. Regimes, "...establish selective principles that highlight some kinds of events and phenomena and obscure others."<sup>13</sup> Hence, a regime may, over time, come to influence the thinking of those who are party to it, thus making it more difficult for change to occur and making its persistence more likely.

If regimes do have an impact on actors' thinking and beliefs, this makes it seem unlikely that they would change very often. Yet, analysts argue that change does occur. Jönsson believes that learning may account for changes in regimes. He states that it is possible to extend the concept to social situations and proposes two levels of learning - 'simple' and 'complex'. Simple learning can best be described as leading to changes in regimes, while complex learning leads to changes of regimes. Substantive regime change would only occur after the latter because it signifies a more profound shift in perceptions of values and principles. However, simple learning, which is seen as leading to incremental change, is much more likely to occur in a regime or institutional setting. Complex learning is likely to occur only under certain conditions. The most likely of these being, "...a widespread dissatisfaction with the old regime and a dramatic crisis..."<sup>14</sup> This is not likely to happen often and so regimes may be stable for fairly long periods of time and then undergo shorter periods of disequilibrium and readjustment after a major shock.

This approach is valuable because it sees the object of study as being more dynamic than the essentially static historical views offered by more realist-based approaches. Jönsson, however, offers the caveat that it should not be viewed as a competitor to other approaches. Rather, he considers it a complement to them. In the end, cognitive theories start where the others leave off. That is, "...whereas the strict rationality criterion of these theories assumes a relatively unambiguous reality, ambiguity is the point of departure for cognitive theory. What is real, is ultimately what human beings perceive to be real."<sup>15</sup> Hence, this

## Centre for Olympic Studies

approach calls for a focus on the political processes surrounding regimes. In doing so, it offers the tools to provide a more historically relevant explanation of the evolution of international regimes and/or institutions.

Finally, then, in terms of the study of institutions, as regime theory is closer to sociological approaches than international relations theory in general, so, at another level, are certain approaches to regime theory closer than others to sociological conceptions of institutions. Cognitive theory, as expounded by Jönsson, does seem closer to some sociological analyses than some of the other approaches.

At this point it may be useful to reconsider the definition of international regime outlined above. It is significant because, as Keohane says, it 'meshes well' with the sociological concept of an institution, which he defines as "...persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations."<sup>16</sup> Here again, like international regimes, the concept of institutions is somewhat vague and the word is often used in a variety of contexts. The next section deals with sociological definitions/concepts of institutions and institutional analysis.

### Institutions and Sociology

Because of the broadness of the sociological literature, I wish to confine this discussion to the works of theorists within a small sector of the field. Specifically, I refer to those sociologists who use what is called an institutionalist approach to organizational analysis. As the descriptor indicates, this area of study posits that social institutions play a major role in influencing formal organizations (on a number of levels), and only recently has begun to consider that the reverse may also be true.

Writing in a recent volume devoted to organizational analysis, Ronald L. Jepperson attempts to clarify the concepts of institution and institutionalization as used by sociologists examining organizations:

*Institution* represents a social order or pattern that has attained a certain state or property; *institutionalization* denotes the process of such attain-

ment. By *order* or *pattern* I refer, as is conventional, to standardized interaction sequences. An institution is then a social pattern that reveals a particular reproduction process. When departures from the pattern are counter-acted in a regulated fashion, by repetitively activated, socially constructed controls - that is, by some set of rewards and sanctions - we refer to a pattern as institutionalized.<sup>17</sup>

He goes on to argue that the reproductive procedures "...support and sustain the pattern, furthering its reproduction - unless collective action blocks, or environmental shock disrupts, the reproductive process."<sup>18</sup> (This comment is particularly telling as it provides a mechanism to explicate changes in institutions (or regimes).

But given that institutions exist, how do theorists explain their formation? Walter Powell argues that in some cases the institutionalization process can be summarized in the following way: "...organizational actors making rational decisions construct around themselves an environment that constrains their ability to change further in later years."<sup>19</sup> Here, then, as suggested by regime theorists, states or organizations may consciously construct institutions. The rational decisions would, as noted previously in reference to Jönsson's work, be based on the knowledge available, which, in turn, would be contingent on the broader institutional environment.

However, the constraint that Powell speaks of does not mean that change becomes impossible, indeed, constraints in some areas may actually open possibilities in others. Thus, organizations may not be as passive and their environment may not be as constraining as other accounts suggest. Powell goes so far as to argue that "...actors may use institutionalized rules and accounts to further their own ends, seeking legitimation for changes that enhance their prestige and power."<sup>20</sup> This last statement fits well with international relations ideas in that it considers a certain level of power and interests on the part of organizational actors to be valid areas of concern even if they are an outgrowth of the actors' perceptions of their environment.

Change may be explained several ways. Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell suggest that organizations adapt to their institutional environment and to the forms of other organizations around them. For example, one key assumption is that organizations in rationalized bureaucratic societies evolve to become more and more alike, particularly those organizations whose activities are closely connected by the tasks they perform. They argue that these groups of organizations form 'organizational fields'. Once a field is in place, it may constrain further change in the organizations.<sup>21</sup> DiMaggio and Powell's examples are best seen as pointing to the influence of broad institutions on organizations, which leads the latter to change.

Similarly, John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan argue that institutional environments have a major influence on organizations' structures. In fact, the organizations incorporate what society considers to be standard organizational structures and, in doing so, gain a measure of legitimacy and stability. In other words, the structures are adopted because they have become, societally, what Meyer and Rowan call, "...institutional rules which function as highly rationalized myths."<sup>22</sup> Of course, an obvious question at this point is, where do these 'institutional rules as rational myths' come from? Interestingly, Meyer and Rowan suggest that organizations may actually play a role at this level. (Hence, the influence is not necessarily all one way.) They postulate that one of the origins of rational myths is as a result of the leadership efforts of local organizations. This latter origin is interesting because it reverses the process of influence to a certain extent. Meyer and Rowan state that organizations can have an effect at two levels. "First, powerful organizations force their immediate relational networks to adapt to their structures and relations second, powerful organizations attempt to build their goals and procedures directly into society as institutional rules."<sup>23</sup> Here, then, powerful organizations may be active in the construction and change of institutions, at least at the level of their specific institutional environments.

Jepperson also addresses institutional change. However, he categorizes it into several distinct types, three of which are called: development, deinstitutionalization, and reinstitutionalization. Institutional development refers to changes within the form of the institution (much the same way as Nye argues for change *in* a regime). Deinstitutionalization is an 'exit'

from the institutional form, and finally, re-institutionalization is a shift from one institutional form to another (as noted, Powell, and Meyer and Rowan have offered some explanations for this processes, much as Nye argues for change of a regime). Jepperson claims the three processes can occur as a result of contradictions with other institutions, with elementary social behaviours or with the broader institutional environment. Interestingly, in returning to his earlier point, Jepperson also argues that exogenous shocks can force institutional change by affecting its reproductive processes.<sup>24</sup>

Finally, he then distinguishes between what he calls three types of institution carriers - namely formal organizations, regimes and culture. The three categories each describe a slightly different focal point for the process of institution-building. Hence, the process of institutionalization itself may be categorized and then located within one of these three 'zones', which, incidentally, are not mutually exclusive.<sup>25</sup> If placed on a continuum, though, these categories do seem to describe specific, formal situations at one end, and general, informal situations at the other.

In sum, these sociological approaches do not share quite the same focus that regime analysts take - i.e. the evolution of the interrelationships (regimes) which guide the behaviour of organizations. Yet the two areas appear to me to be closely related. The sociological accounts examined here privilege the regimes (to use the international relations term) with respect to analyses of the organizations which are intimately connected to them. Hence, the object of analysis in international relations (regimes) becomes the major variable influencing the evolution of organizations - which are themselves the object of analysis in the institutionalist approach to the study of organizations. However, the closeness of the approaches deserves comparison.

### Reconciling the Approaches

The latter part of Jepperson's definition of an institution is obviously quite similar to Keohane's even though they are worded differently. Clearly, on both accounts, a social pattern or institution appears less rigidly defined than a regime. In essence,

sociologically, a regime, in its early stages, would be created by actors whose own preferences had been shaped by prior, broader societal institutions. The regime would only take on 'a life of its own', or become institutionalized, after a period of time. This interpretation stems from the tendency to privilege the environment in the construction of institutions. Human actors are given little credit as being agents in the construction of institutions, whereas international relations theorists generally talk about international regimes being constructed by actors.

But upon closer examination, perhaps there is some congruence between the approaches. Consider Jönsson's argument for the role of cognitive features such as trust, ideology, and knowledge in the construction and growth of regimes. Knowledge and ideology can be reconciled with a position which argues that these features are socially constructed by a broader institutional environment which precedes the formation of a regime. The 'generative metaphors' that Jönsson refers to could originate within an institutional environment which creates common histories, memories and myths. At this level, the two approaches do not appear mutually exclusive.

Furthermore, while DiMaggio and Powell as well as Meyer and Rowan argue for the influence of institutional environments on organizations, both teams have postulated that organizations can have an effect on their immediate environments. This position seems to accord organizations the somewhat constrained actor status used by international relations theorists such as Jönsson. His discussion of the limited rationality of actors and how they selectively respond to and shape their environments appears remarkably similar to the sociological accounts. In addition, consider Powell's contention that organizational actors construct their surrounding environments. He does not say how they do this, but Jönsson offers the argument that a bargaining process is one possibility and that some level of trust is necessary for this to occur. Again, there is convergence of the approaches.

Clearly, the concept of international institutions is fairly broad. At the same time, however, Keohane offers a useful categorization that is remarkably similar to that suggested by Jepperson. That is, he argues that international institutions exist in a variety of forms

which include international regimes, international or transnational organizations, and conventions. The differences between these types of institutions, obviously, rest within their respective levels of formality and structure.<sup>26</sup> In contrast, it will be recalled that Jepperson called his three categories 'carriers' of institutions. The difference between the two theorists lies, then, in Jepperson distinguishing between the institution and its carrier whereas Keohane does not. This does not seem to be a critical difference since, while it may be useful to make the distinction in some cases, the two do seem to be logically dependent upon each other. That is, an institution may need its 'carrier' to exist, and likewise, the 'carrier' would lose its relevance without the institution.

In sum, international relations theorists are interested in examining the regimes which are constructed by actors, be they states, organizations or otherwise. They argue that these regimes may eventually be considered as institutions which form over a period of time. Sociologists argue that the actors who construct the regime were influenced by the broader societal institutions surrounding them. The nascent institution (regime) nested inside of larger prior institutions would then, over time, become more embedded so that it could eventually have an influence on the organizations/actors which originally constructed it. With increased embeddedness of the institution (and the organizations as well) substantive change would come only after major shocks, be they either from an external source or from an internal contradiction within the institution or organizations.

Thus, given the ideas of the theorists cited above, this process of organizational growth and institutionalization of a relationship can be examined in light of the power and interests of the IOC and IFS, while, at the same time, noting the influence of the institutional environment in which they operated. The melding of theoretical ideas should provide a stronger explanatory base than either international relations or sociological approaches taken individually.

### **Key Events in the Creation of the IOC/IFS Relationship**

It is only possible here to examine a few of the critical events that contributed to the creation of the IOC - IFS'

relationship. I will simply point to those that seem to me to be the most important. As noted in my introduction, there was little contact between the International Olympic Committee and the International Sport Federations prior to the First World War. With a couple of exceptions, what contacts there were revolved around the five Olympic festivals celebrated before the War. Even then, the 1896, 1900 and 1904 Games show little evidence of contact between these nascent organizations. Not until the Olympic Games attained a level of maturity and independence in London 1908 did sporting authorities begin to consider more formal relationships between the bodies. When the IOC was created in 1894, there **were** only a few International Sports Federations in existence. Gymnastics, Skating and Rowing were the only sports with official IFS, and they were not particularly cohesive bodies. Furthermore, the IOC itself was, for the first decade of its existence, barely recognizable as an organization. The founder, Pierre de Coubertin, was responsible for the bulk of its activities. Even though the IOC went through a period in which its form was nascent, we may see some enlightening events occurring.

The story behind the formation of the IOC in 1894 is well known to most Olympic scholars. Coubertin's orchestration of the program and events is well documented.<sup>27</sup> Yet, if we consider again these very details, they are in accord with some of my earlier suggestions. Coubertin knew that holding a congress with the sole theme being the renovation of the Olympic Games would not receive much support. Hence, he appended this theme to another one that was considerably more legitimate to sports-minded persons. Once he had their attention, he was able to present his idea in a setting that was conducive to the delegates' acceptance of the plan. His appeal to the ancient Greek ideals may be thought of as a 'generative metaphor' in form of an historical analogy that most of the delegates to the congress could grasp and use as a common starting point.

There is little evidence to suggest that any of the existing IFS played a role at the inaugural Olympic Games in Athens. A couple of authors have suggested, however, that Coubertin consulted the USFSA (Union des Sociétés Françaises des Sports Athlétiques) for guidance on the rules for competitions.<sup>28</sup> This latter

body was also responsible for most of the rules and regulations of the contests held in Paris in 1900, even though they were not denoted as 'Olympic' at the time. By 1900 though, international sport had reached sufficiently important status that the USFSA, aided by some other sport leaders, attempted, abortively, to usurp the IOC's authority by forming an international athletic union. This body would presumably have been concerned with the administration of a number of sports (track and field) internationally. However, its architects were not able to garner enough support for their efforts and the attempt failed.

As in Paris four years previously, the St. Louis Olympic Games of 1904 were consumed by an International Exposition. These games were organized primarily under the direction of the AAU of the United States, and again, the IFs appear not to have been involved. Indeed neither was the IOC. It was much more active the following year in Belgium, when it organized an international congress that was attended by sports persons from a variety of backgrounds. At this Congress Coubertin impressed upon the delegates the importance of international sports meetings and called for a unification of rules and regulations.<sup>29</sup> Beyond this wish though, little concrete action was taken by the Congress. Nevertheless, all these events were steps in establishing an international sporting environment that was fertile ground for the organization of more IFs.

The 1908 Games in London showed that uniform international rules were increasingly needed. Again, the acrimonious disputes between the British and Americans during these Games are well documented.<sup>30</sup> And this, in spite of the fact that the organizers had attempted to ascertain the most common rules of competitions by writing to various national sport organizations, and then actually writing a rule book for the Games.<sup>31</sup> The IOC, too, had consulted with national organizations in several sports prior to the Games.<sup>32</sup> Finally, in a move that was a harbinger of things to come, the newly formed FINA (Fédération Internationale de Natation Amateur) asked the IOC to include women's events in the swimming program for the next Olympic Games.<sup>33</sup> (Requests by IFs for the inclusion of more events in their sports has continued ever since.)

With the 1912 Stockholm Games, the Olympics came of age. As it had done before the London Games, the IOC had consulted with several IFs before the festivities in Stockholm commenced. In doing so the members acknowledged the growing level of authority of these latter bodies. Indeed, as the Olympic Games had struggled to maturity during the first decade of the twentieth century, the number of IFs had grown concurrently, from three to ten.<sup>34</sup> Several more were added in 1912, including the IAAF (International Amateur Athletic Federation). IFs were becoming more common and would soon demand a more significant role in the growing Olympic Movement. Yet, the main question at the time remained how, exactly, the IFs would fit into the system. Most sports persons realized that standardized rules would be needed to reduce disputes at international contests (including the Olympic Games), and that the fairest way to establish those rules would be through a representative IFs. Coubertin was not at all opposed to the formation of IFs which he considered to be the technical experts for the sports. The IOC, in contrast, was to be concerned with the broader goals of the Olympic Movement. His ongoing difficulty, though, was convincing the IFs and even some members of the IOC that this should be the case.<sup>35</sup>

The twentieth anniversary of the IOC was celebrated in Paris in 1914, and an Olympic Congress took place at the same time. At this Congress, the IOC members discussed the role of the IFs in the Olympic Movement. They had not, however, thought to invite the IFs to the proceedings. Nonetheless, the Congress made several decisions that had a direct impact on the role of the IFs in the Olympic Movement. First, the existing IFs were given the responsibility for defining who within their sports were amateurs and, thus, eligible to compete in the Games.<sup>36</sup> Second, for sports without an IF, the various national bodies were asked to meet to form an amateur definition in time for the Berlin Games in 1916.<sup>37</sup> This Congress marked a turning point because the IFs now entered the Olympic Movement in a formal way, having been asked to provide specific information and services. However, any further changes to the new situation were curtailed by the First World War.

After the War was over, the Olympic Movement went through a period of uncertainty. Because the Paris Congress seemed so distant, the IOC decided that it

should hold another in 1921 to clarify the roles the various organizations should play in the Olympic Movement. For the first time, the IFs were formally invited to participate even though the IOC members were less than certain about the motives of the sports federations. Indeed, some IOC members were concerned that the IFs might still try to usurp their prerogatives if the former were given too much freedom in the Olympic Movement.<sup>38</sup> There was some justification for their fears. Just prior to the Congress, a number of the IFs met and formed a Permanent Bureau of Documentation and Information. In essence, this body was a 'watered down' version of what its main proponents wanted, a Union of IFs. It failed to be as forceful as it might have because of a lack of interest amongst the IFs in general and because a number of IOC members, who also held IF positions, discouraged the formation of a union.<sup>39</sup> The real fear for the IOC members was that the IFs might ask, en masse, for representation on the IOC. This was something the IOC would never accede to. However, in 1921, the IFs were not yet united enough to make such a request.

Several years later the situation had changed. The changes put in place by the 1921 Congress were applied during the Paris Games of 1924. Despite this, some of the IFs were not happy with their new relationship with the IOC. The IOC had agreed to hold another Congress in Prague in 1925, and conflicts with the IFs came to a head with the decisions of this Congress. The Congress passed a resolution that forbade payment to athletes for time they spent away from work at competitions.<sup>40</sup> This irked several IFs, including the FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) and ILTF (International Lawn Tennis Federation) and led the IOC into serious confrontations with these bodies. The IFs also requested that they be allowed to appoint their own representatives to the IOC. This, of course, was absolutely anathema to the IOC members. However, they did realize that the IFs had, by this time, become indispensable to the success of the Olympic Games. Eventually, the IOC set up regular meetings between its Executive Commission and the representatives of the IFs.<sup>41</sup> This action was enough to appease most of the IFs, and an equilibrium was established.

Of course, this did not mean that disputes with individual IFs ceased. The FIFA was able to convince the Executive Commission to ignore the Prague rule on payment for 'lost time' for the Amsterdam Games in 1928. This action by the Executive Commission did not sit well with the general membership of the IOC, and the position was reversed at the 1928 meeting. Soccer subsequently did not appear on the program in Los Angeles in 1932. In addition, the ILTF, a particularly forceful critic of the IOC, refused to give up its demands for representation on the Olympic body, and would not comply with the rulings on lost time. Tennis, as a result, disappeared from the Olympic program, not to return for sixty years. Shooting was also excluded from the 1928 Olympic Games because of that IFs' record of going against amateur rules by providing valuable prizes to winners of competitions.

Though the IOC's confrontations with individual IFs would continue, by 1930 the mechanisms for dealing with disputes had been created. Berlin hosted an Olympic Congress in 1930 in which the decisions made in 1925 were ratified with the exception of the decision on 'lost time'. The Congress goes decided to have the IOC Executive Commission and the newly constituted "Council of Delegates" (of the IFs) deal with this issue.<sup>42</sup> The institution of regular meetings with the IOC Executive Commission also meant that the IFs had a forum in which to air their grievances when they arose. By supplying this forum, the IOC managed to avoid further concerted requests for IF representation on the Olympic body. The IFs' role as the technical experts for the Olympic competitions had been cemented as well. The form of the relationship between the IOC and the IFs had been established, and it has not changed significantly since that time.

### Conclusions

In terms of the IOC and the IFs, it appears that institutions were created and evolved on at least two levels. First, the creation of the IOC and IFs established organizations which would evolve over time. Their respective forms and structures were, arguably, a result of influences from their surrounding institutional environments. The subsequent process of negotiation between these organizations created an institution at another level, namely, the relationship between them. This relationship did not spring full-

blown from initial contacts. The IOC and IFs went through a long period of uncertainty before relations between them could be said to be institutionalized. Furthermore, the IOC was not able to dictate the nature of the relationship with impunity. Its concessions to the IFs both singly, in the case of the FIFA, and collectively in the case of the Council of Delegates indicate that the IFs were able to influence the shaping of their sport environment. Arguably, the IFs were able to make a collective demand on the IOC because of their similarities to each other and in their goals with respect to the Olympic Games. The establishment of the Permanent Bureau was another indication of their similar outlooks - 'watered down' though it was. The Bureau may in fact point to the IFs existing as an 'organizational field'. But, at the same time, as new IFS formed, they looked to the IOC for the recognition that would give them a level of legitimacy. They would then be able to enter the 'organizational field' of legitimate international sport organizations.

If the language of international relations is used to describe the IOC and IFs, the following might result. Consider, for a moment, the IOC and IFs as international actors which made agreements on certain issues of importance to each party. Their agreements may be seen as the result of a bargaining process in which the negotiators acted upon their interests and the power available to them. Their interests would, arguably, be based upon the knowledge available to them at the time of the negotiations. (Again, that bargaining could take place at all indicates the presence of at least a basic level of trust.) On Keohane's account, formal agreements between the IOC and IFs reached the regime stage when these organizations accepted the agreement's continued validity even if not all of its points were strictly observed. At this point, sociologically speaking, an institution will have formed. The formal agreement will have 'taken on a life of its own' so that many of its points may be taken for granted.

Had this, in fact, happened by the end of the 1920s? Arguably the answer is negative because the structures in place to guide the relationship were so recent. However, the foundation had been laid, and it subsequently proved to be extremely durable. Hence, in the decade following the establishment of the regular meetings between the IOC Executive Commission and

the Council of Delegates, the regime between the organizations took on 'a life of its own'. Furthermore, in terms of the organizations themselves, their forms had indeed become standardized by the end of the period in question, so that, at the level of the individual organizations - the IFs and the IOC, institutions had indeed formed.

### Endnotes

1. This is not to imply that all international relations theorizing has been concerned with this issue. In effect, a particular sector of theorizing holds certain ideas about the process of doing international relations has been concerned with the study of institutions. For a description of the various 'self-images' of international relations theorizing see Steve Smith's, "The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory," in *International Relations Theory Today*, Ken Booth and Steve Smith, eds. (Oxford: Polity Press in association with Blackwell Publishers, 1995), pp. 1-37.
2. Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," in *International Regimes*, Stephen D. Krasner, ed. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 2.
3. Robert O. Keohane, "The Analysis of International Regimes - Towards a European-American Research Programme," in *Regime Theory and International Relations*, Volker Rittberger, ed., assisted by Peter Mayer (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 28.
4. Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of international regimes," *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 3, (Summer 1987), pp. 491-517.
5. Oran Young, "The politics of international regime formation: managing natural resources and the environment," *International Organization*, Vol. 43, No. 3, (Summer 1989), p. 350.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 509.
7. Christer Jönsson makes reference to the various criticisms of the cognitive approach in his chapter, "Cognitive Factors in Explaining Regime Dynamics," in *Regime Theory and International Relations*, p. 203.
8. *Ibid.*
9. Stephen Krasner's "Regimes and the limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables," in *International Regimes*, p. 358, as cited in *ibid.*, p. 204.

10. Jönsson, p. 206. He cited the works of D. Good, "Individual, Interpersonal Relations, and Trust," and D. Gambetta, "Can We Trust Trust?" in *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations*, D. Gambetta, ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 33 and 217.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., pp. 209-211.
13. Ibid., p. 214.
14. Ibid., p. 219. Jönsson is drawing here upon the work of Joseph Nye and Ernst Haas, both of whom he cites. Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes," *International Organization*, Vol. 41, (1987), p. 398, and Ernst Haas, *When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations*, (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1990), p. 27f.
15. Ibid., pp. 221-222.
16. Ibid.
17. Ronald L. Jepperson, "Institutes, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism," in *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 145.
18. Ibid.
19. Walter W. Powell, "Expanding the Scope of Institutional Analysis," in *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, p. 194.
20. Ibid.
21. Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter Powell make these points in "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," in *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, pp. 63-82.
22. John W. Mayer and Brian Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony," in *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, p. 44.
23. Ibid., p. 49.
24. Jepperson, pp. 152-153.
25. Ibid., pp. 150-151.
26. Keohane, pp. 28-29.
27. John MacAloon covers the founding congress in *This Great Symbol: Pierre de Coubertin and the Origins of the Modern Olympic Games*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981).
28. This point is made by Richard Mandell in his *The First Modern Olympics*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 95, and 101. Yves-Pierre Boulouge states the same in "The presidencies of Demetrius Vikelas (1894-1896) and Pierre de Coubertin (1896- 1925)," *The International Olympic Committee - One Hundred Years - The Idea - The Presidents - The Achievements*, Vol. I, (Lausanne: The International Olympic Committee, 1994), p. 67.
29. Norbert Müller culls this observation from the minutes of the Congress. "Discours de Pierre de Coubertin," *Congrès International de Sport d'Éducation physique*, 16, as cited in Norbert Müller, *One Hundred Years of Olympic Congresses, 1894-1994*, translated from German by Ingrid Sonnleitner-Hauber, (Lausanne: International Olympic Committee, 1994), p. 63.
30. See George Matthews, "The Controversial Games of 1908 as Viewed by the *New York Times* and the *Times* of London," *Journal of Sport History*, Vol. 7, No. 2, (Summer 1980), pp. 40-53.
31. The rule book was entitled, *The Rules of Sport: Being the International Code for All Competitions in the Olympic Games*, (London, 1908).
32. Wolf Lyberg, *IOC General Session Minutes, Vol. I, 1894-1919*, Copy held by the Centre of Olympic Studies, at the University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada, p. 43. (Note: These are summaries of the minutes only.)
33. Allen Guttmann, *The Olympic: A History of the Modern Games*, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1992), p. 31.
34. Cycling, Football (soccer), Weightlifting, Shooting, Yachting, Ice hockey, and Swimming federations had been created by the time of the Stockholm Olympic Games.
35. Coubertin noted as much in his memoirs. He complained that the IOC should stay away from the technical areas of the Games and let the competent organizations do their jobs. Unfortunately, few people outside or even inside the IOC seemed to realize this. Pierre de Coubertin, *Olympic Memoirs*, (Lausanne: International Olympic Committee, 1976), p. 46.
36. *Reglement Des Congrès Olympiques qui en lieu de 1894 à 1930 (Sofia: Comité Olympique Bulgare, 1970)*, p. 44.
37. Ibid.
38. The anxiety of the IOC members is clearly revealed in the minutes of the 1920 session in which the role of the IFS was discussed extensively. *Minutes of the IOC General Session, Antwerp, 1920*, International Olympic

Committee Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland, [hereafter referred to as the IOCA] .

39. Minutes of the meeting of the IFs re: the formation of a union of IFs, May 31-June 1, 1921, IOC File on the Bureau Permanent des Fédérations Internationales, IOCA.

40. *Minutes of the Technical Olympic Congress - Prague, May 29 - June 4, 1925,* ) Prague: Czechoslovak Organizing Committee, of the Czechoslovak Olympic Committee, State Printing Office, 1925), p. 29. A copy is available at the IOCA.

41. At its annual session in 1926, the IOC first agreed to meetings between the IFs and the Executive Commission. The form of the meetings was restructured several years later. Wolf Lyberg, *IOC General Session Minutes, Vol. II, 1920-1947*, pp. 131 and 158. Copy held by the Centre for Olympic Studies, The University of Western Ontario, London, Canada.

42. Karl Lennartz, "The Presidency of Henri de Baillet-Latour, (1925- 1942)," in *The International Olympic Committee, One Hundred Years - The Idea - The Presidents - The Achievements*, (Lausanne: The International Olympic Committee, 1994), Vol. I, p. 238.

