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# *Conflicting Agendas: Monique Berlioux, Ahmed Karabegovic and U.S. Television Rights Negotiations for the 1984 Sarajevo Olympic Winter Games*

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## **Introduction**

“Over a period of twenty years,” observed David Miller, “[Monique] Berlioux not only had her feet effectively under the [IOC] President’s table, but could and did lay her hand upon every doorknob, every appointment, every contract, every single decision that was made.”<sup>1</sup> During the latter stages of the tenure of IOC President Avery Brundage (1969-1972) and throughout the subsequent term of Lord Killanin (1972-1980), IOC Director Monique Berlioux brought a sorely needed degree of efficiency to the operation of the organization’s Lausanne headquarters.<sup>2</sup> Berlioux acted as the IOC’s link with the world’s media, established agendas for IOC sessions, prepared presidential speeches, and constructed an effective and unique position of influence within the IOC’s patriarchal administration. Along with Jean de Beaumont, chairman of the IOC Finance Commission (1972-1988), Berlioux also spearheaded the IOC’s efforts to improve its troubled financial status in the 1970s through a more informed and conscientious approach to monitoring Olympic television rights negotiations.<sup>3</sup>

In this role, Berlioux’s fierce advocacy of the IOC’s financial interests and those of its affiliated organizations, the International Sport Federations (IFs) and National Olympic Committees (NOCs), often conflicted with the goals of Olympic Games Organizing Committee leaders faced with burgeoning budgetary demands. In the years before the development of the IOC’s sophisticated and successful corporate sponsorship program (The Olympic Partners, formerly The Olympic Programme) in 1985, the organization’s budget was almost wholly underwritten by television money.<sup>4</sup> Organizing Committees in the pre-Los Angeles (1984) era, too, were highly dependent on television money, and government support. Both parties had a vested interest in the size of the television contracts and the manner in which the funds were dispersed.

Television rights negotiations conducted by Munich, Montreal, Lake Placid and Moscow Olympic organizers often placed the tandem of Berlioux and Beaumont at loggerheads with those entrusted to stage the Olympic festivals<sup>5</sup> Most disturbing for the IOC were those occasions when the Organizing Committees signed preemptive agreements with television networks, especially those in the highly competitive and lucrative U.S. market. Such preemptive agreements maximized OCOG shares of the contracts at the expense of the IOC, NOCs and IFs. The standard method of enhancing OCOG shares of the major contracts involved side-stepping the IOC’s policy for the allocation of television revenue known as the “Rome Formula.”<sup>6</sup> Realizing that the “Rome Formula” mandated the receipt of one-third of the television rights fee by the IOC (shared equally with the NOCs and

IFs), the Organizing Committees, following the lead of Munich's Willi Daume (1972 Games), consummated some contracts with two revenue components - (1) the rights fee shared by the Organizing Committee and the IOC, and (2) a technical services payment retained exclusively by the Organizing Committee.<sup>7</sup> The IOC, argued Organizing Committee personnel, did not understand the magnitude of the costs involved in establishing the technical infrastructure required to meet the needs of the world's television broadcasters. The IOC, expecting to receive one-third of the gross value of the contract, resented what was an obvious means of compromising the amount of money due the Olympic family.

In 1977 the IOC abandoned its "oversee at a distance" approach to television rights negotiations and passed legislation by which it became a full partner in television rights negotiations for the 1984 Olympic festivals (Winter and Summer).<sup>8</sup> This earlier approach was a vestige of Avery Brundage's presidency. Brundage, an arch-conservative, rationalized that while television money might further the promotion of Olympic ideals throughout the world and assist in the expansion of the IOC's operation in Lausanne, the appearance of chasing revenue through conducting negotiations with commercial television networks could tarnish the image of the Olympic movement.<sup>9</sup>

Organizing Committees, which had been allowed to negotiate contracts subject to the IOC's final approval, now sacrificed a degree of autonomy over revenue generation for future Olympic organizers as a result of signing preemptive agreements prejudicial to the IOC's interests. In addition to the decisions of some Organizing Committees to sign contracts incorporating technical services payments, the 1976 Montreal and 1980 Lake Placid Organizing Committees consummated deals with the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) in the absence of an open bidding process.<sup>10</sup> Embittered officials at the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) and the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) threatened legal action as a means of redress. The sense of frustration in Lausanne resulting from these negotiations and the organization's determined effort to improve its knowledge base concerning television in the 1970s, heralded changes in negotiations policy.

### **Sarajevo: Joint Negotiation is put into Practice**

Fast approaching the zenith of her influence in Olympic affairs in the late 1970s, Berlioux anticipated an opportunity to wield an increased measure of authority in the negotiations arena. However, the IOC soon relaxed its new policy governing television negotiations with respect to the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, although it did retain final approval of all contracts. This decision was prompted by the Los Angeles Olympic Games Organizing Committee's (LAOOC) request for sole authority in this area of its business operations because of (1) its status as a privately-funded organization bereft of government funding, and, (2) adverse media reports concerning the financial deficit debacle of the 1976 Montreal Olympics.<sup>11</sup> Berlioux, however, maintained a close watch on the work of the LAOOC, even attending some negotiation sessions while at the same time attempting to work in collaboration with Ahmed Karabegovic, Secretary-General of the Sarajevo Olympic Organizing Committee (SOOC), the primary individual who represented SOOC in television negotiations.

U.S. television rights negotiations had long been established as an early priority for fledgling Organizing Committees. The contract provided the largest single infusion of operating capital to Organizing Committees' coffers. From a revenue standpoint, the U.S. contract was also central to the IOC's budget process, and provided both the Organizing Committees and the IOC with a reference point for initiating financial discussions with the world's other television networks. Throughout the negotiation process concerning the U.S. television contract for the Sarajevo Games, Karabegovic struggled to deal with SOOC's fiscal requirements and the various layers of bureaucratic control of the IOC's interests - (1) Berlioux, (2) the Finance Commission guided by Jean de Beaumont, and (3) the Executive Board that possessed final decision-making authority. The IOC, which had in the past made many concessions to Organizing Committees concerning the distribution of television money, envisioned joint negotiation as a means of levelling the playing field in its dealings with the Organizing Committees. Ahmed Karabegovic preferred the status quo. Monique Berlioux soon realized that joint negotiation was not the panacea envisioned for alleviating frustration concerning Olympic television rights negotiations.

### **Setting the Table for Negotiations**

Before initiating discussions with the U.S. television companies, two major issues needed to be addressed by the IOC and its co-negotiator, SOOC. An agreement with respect to the date and site for the negotiations and the manner in which the money would be apportioned was required. An early December 1979 date for holding the U.S. negotiations was discouraged by SOOC. Ahmed Karabegovic informed the U.S. companies that negotiations to determine the successful bid would be held in Sarajevo between the 17th and 20th of December. Karabegovic's announcement assumed that

IOC representatives were able to attend the sessions in Sarajevo.<sup>12</sup> A conclusive meeting with the successful bidder was planned for Lausanne. While the decision to begin negotiations in Sarajevo and conclude them in Lausanne was in keeping with her wishes, Berlioux, expressing a degree of agitation, indicated that IOC representatives could not travel to Sarajevo at Karabegovic's proposed time. She also noted that a final decision on the winning company could not be made without the approval of Killanin and Beaumont.<sup>13</sup> Later, Berlioux maintained that she had been clear in discussions with Karabegovic that representatives of all three U.S. companies would have to proceed to Lausanne for the final phase of discussions.<sup>13</sup> Both parties agreed that negotiations would be held in late January.

Berlioux indicated that the same method of dividing the money from the U.S. contract established with the LAOOC would be recommended by Killanin and Beaumont to the Executive Board.<sup>15</sup> According to this agreement, 5/9th~ of the contract's value would be reserved as the technical services component and 4/9ths of the revenue would be considered the rights payment to be divided according to the IOC's formula. Berlioux noted that the IOC expected a minimum share of \$13 million.<sup>16</sup> While Berlioux was clear that the formula was a recommendation only, as events unfolded, Karabegovic evidently assumed that the IOC Executive Board would "rubber stamp" the recommendation. The lack of a firm agreement in this matter proved problematic.

In early January 1980, Karabegovic informed Berlioux about the schedule of discussions to be held in Sarajevo on 22nd-24th January. Each U.S. company was afforded three hours on the 22nd to present their respective telecast plans and financial proposals to SOOC and IOC representatives. A one-hour follow-up discussion with each group was scheduled for the 23rd. Karabegovic planned to announce the results of the competition for U.S. television rights on the 24th with the successful U.S. television delegation proceeding to Lausanne.<sup>17</sup> In her reply, Berlioux concurred with the agenda set for the 22nd and 23rd in Sarajevo, but raised concerns about the 24th. "As for the 24th" wrote Berlioux, "I think we need to have a meeting among ourselves to review the matter and to take a decision prior to any kind of announcement."<sup>18</sup> It is implied that all interested parties would have to be present in Lausanne because the decision was to be made on the 24th. Karabegovic responded favourably by noting that SOOC accepted "the 24th of January for the finalization of discussions in Lausamie."<sup>19</sup>

On the other side of the Atlantic, U.S. television executives at CBS and NBC struggled with the proposal dates for far different reasons. CBS successfully appealed for a one-day postponement for their initial presentation because high-ranking executives needed in Sarajevo would be delayed in the U.S. due to the networks coverage of the Super Bowl.<sup>20</sup> NBC, however, was unsuccessful in its petition for a 30-60 day moratorium until the unsettled situation involving U.S. participation in the 1980 Moscow Olympics became clearer.<sup>21</sup> SOOC, likely due to its troubled financial situation, would not accept any further delay. Subsequently, Arthur Watson (President, NBC Sports) and Geoffrey Mason (Executive Vice-President, NBC Sports) travelled to Sarajevo, but received orders to return to the U.S. prior to presenting a formal offer.<sup>22</sup> It was at this time, on 23 January, that Yugoslavian negotiators, led by Karabegovic, hijacked the negotiation process.

### **Karabegovic and Berlioux on a Collision Course**

Karabegovic's action should neither have startled Daniel Mortureux and Alain Coupat, the IOC's representatives attending the meetings in Sarajevo, nor Monique Berlioux, who remained in Lausanne occupied with other IOC affairs. When Mortureux and Coupat arrived on 22 January they were given a document entitled "Programme of Visit" that had been sent to the competing networks, but not to the IOC.<sup>23</sup> The most contentious element of Karabegovic's plan involved the determination of the successful bidding network in Sarajevo and a succeeding formalization of the agreement in Lausanne.<sup>24</sup> When Mortureux and Coupat dissented, Karabegovic held firm. In their report to the IOC, Mortureux and Coupat wrote that Berlioux "was kept informed, so as not to harm the relationship between the IOC and the OCOG and not to jeopardize the negotiations at this stage. After consultation, it was agreed, as a courtesy, to proceed with preliminary negotiations."<sup>25</sup>

When Arthur Watson and Geoffrey Mason, on behalf of NBC, appealed on 22 January for a one-day extension, Karabegovic demanded that NBC proceed with its presentation or he would postpone all network presentations until the next day. Watson and Mason lobbied NBC executives in New York for permission to proceed with negotiations. However, they lost the debate with their fellow executives and hence withdrew from the discussions on the morning of 23 January. Mortureux and Coupat reiterated that they had no authority to approve a contract on behalf of the IOC and cautioned Karabegovic that NBC's withdrawal greatly complicated the negotiation process.<sup>26</sup>

Mortureux and Coupat, frustrated by Karabegovic's dismissive attitude towards their concerns and their inability to deal with him except through an interpreter, pressed SOOC. They asked for SOOC's anticipated share from the U.S.

contract based on its budget projections and the manner in which negotiations, in the absence of NBC, would proceed “on the understanding that the final stages of the negotiations had to be held in Lausanne, so as to obtain the advice of the Finance Commission and the President’s approval.”<sup>27</sup> Karabegovic admitted that SOOC expected approximately \$67 million, but refused to modify his position about where the final decision on the contracting network would be rendered. “The negotiations were then resumed with the question of the final procedure up in the air.”<sup>28</sup> CBS and ABC made their presentations and tendered initial offers.

Mortureux and Coupat were not impressed with CBS’s (\$52.7 million) and ABC’s (\$70 million) offers. Deeming these offers unacceptable, they pressed Karabegovic to proceed to Lausanne because they [Mortureux and Coupat] “had no power, even in principle, to take a decision, and that the final decision had to be taken by the IOC in Lausanne.”<sup>29</sup> Karabegovic proved defiant and stated that “the Games were to be held in Sarajevo, not in Lausanne, and that, as long as he was in charge of the OCOG, he would not accept any order from the IOC.”<sup>29</sup>

Karabegovic’s recalcitrance was in tune with attitudes exhibited by key officials of past Organizing Committees and with those that would champion the interests of local organizers in the future. IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch has characterized the period of time spent by a prospective Organizing Committee chasing the privilege of hosting an Olympic festival and the brief afterglow of success as the “Yes, Yes, Yes” phase of the IOC’s relationship with an Organizing Committee.<sup>31</sup> Compliant and cooperative local organizers, still basking in the celebratory mood that grips a newly appointed Olympic host city, work together with IOC officials towards mutual goals. Conversely, when the organizers are forced to translate their Olympic vision into reality, and the magnitude of their responsibilities become known, local officials most often prove far more protective of local concerns and therefore less conciliatory during the “No, No, No” stage in IOC/Organizing Committee relations.

Upon learning of the impasse, Berlioux informed Karabegovic, Mortureux and Coupat that unless SOOC complied with the IOC’s negotiation policy, the latter two individuals would be recalled.<sup>32</sup> Karabegovic was resolved to present the matter directly to Killanin, but Berlioux warned Killanin of SOOC’s uncooperative attitude and the hazard of yielding to Karabegovic.<sup>33</sup> The IOC, concluded Berlioux, should not permit SOOC to dictate policy. Unfazed by Berlioux’s threat to recall Mortureux and Coupat, Karabegovic, following an evening meeting (23 January) of the SOOC Executive Board, called for a second round of offers for the following morning.<sup>34</sup>

Any semblance of formality soon disappeared from the proceedings. ABC representatives sought to negotiate directly with the Organizing Committee and stated that they would better any offer forwarded by CBS. Mortureux and Coupat reported that after they announced their withdrawal from the process, Karabegovic reduced the procedure to an auction and simply approached the ABC and CBS delegations with the other’s most recent offer.<sup>35</sup>

A flurry of communication provides an indication of Berlioux’s frustration. Apprised of Karabegovic’s decision to negotiate an agreement without IOC counsel, she directed a second telex to Lord Killanin. Berlioux also warned Karabegovic that the IOC would not approve any contract negotiated contrary to IOC policy.<sup>36</sup> When Anto Sucic, President of SOOC, implored Killanin to authorize a trip to Lausanne by representatives of the U.S. company offering the most money or invite SOOC representatives to Dublin for face-to-face discussions, one can imagine Berlioux’s agitation.<sup>37</sup> SOOC was going over her head. The unsettled political situation vis-à-vis Afghanistan and the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games, argued Sucic, dictated the consummation of an agreement. “I strongly believe,” wrote Sucic, “that quite more important for the Olympic movement is the date of signing the TV rights contract [than] the way it was done and what were the funds in question.”<sup>38</sup> Berlioux was wedded firmly to the belief that the IOC had to defend its interests forcefully. Resenting this challenge to her authority, she telephoned the IOC President in order to emphasize her concerns about the process.<sup>39</sup> With direction from Berlioux, Killanin sent a telex to Sucic, emphasizing that SOOC had pledged to abide by IOC rules when it signed the host city/IOC contract in 1978. He then cited an element of Rule 49 which read: “Contracts concerning television may only be negotiated jointly with the Organising Committee and to the IOC’s benefit.” Killanin advised Sucic to reconsider SOOC’s approach, an approach undoubtedly advocated by Karabegovic, which represented a breach of contract. Killanin did not sanction either request forwarded by Sucic and advised him that the matter would have to be resolved through consultation with Berlioux.<sup>40</sup>

SOOC’s actions confirmed that the IOC and SOOC had progressed to the “No, No, No” phase of its relationship. SOOC solicited an offer of \$91.5 million from ABC, one that exceeded CBS’s final offer by \$1.5 million.<sup>41</sup> Sucic complained to Killanin that SOOC had proceeded according to procedures agreed upon by Berlioux and Karabegovic and that Berlioux’s demand that all networks send their delegations to Lausanne was not acceptable to the networks. He also believed, and one cannot argue with his conclusion, that Berlioux’s attitude and the withdrawal of the IOC representatives from the process, implied that the IOC did not trust SOOC.<sup>42</sup> Mortureux and Coupat, disgusted by Karabegovic’s conduct, advised the IOC to take a firm hand in its future dealings with SOOC. Specifically, they recommended that the IOC send

procedures for future negotiations to SOOC and the television networks and that the IOC host all future negotiations in Lausanne. They also noted that SOOC anticipated receiving \$78 million from the contract, while \$13.5 million was payable to the IOC. While this was an accurate reflection of the prospective distribution if the LAOOC/IOC distribution key was applied, they observed that if the arrangement used in the case of Lake Placid was employed the result would be more favourable to the IOC.<sup>43</sup>

The IOC's Finance Commission, under the leadership of Jean de Beaumont, met during the course of the Lake Placid Olympic Winter Games to consider the Sarajevo situation. The minutes of these meetings reveal reports submitted by Berlioux concerning two meetings held between Berlioux and Karabegovic in Lake Placid. Berlioux reported that Karabegovic sought \$45 million from the U.S. contract to cover the anticipated cost of supplying the international signal to television broadcasters. This was an element of the \$102 million required to satisfy the physical space and technical requirements for television broadcasters. Karabegovic proposed that the remaining \$46.5 million be divided according to the Rome Formula, thus resulting in the receipt of \$15.5 million by the IOC.<sup>44</sup> While ABC representatives confirmed that the offer had been \$91.5 million if the basic feed was provided, Berlioux and Killanin believed that the \$91.5 million stood alone as the rights payment and expected the receipt of a full 1/3 share, or \$30 million by the IOC.<sup>45</sup> While Beaumont opined that the receipt of 28% of the U.S. contract by the IOC, as had been the case with respect to the ABC/Lake Placid agreement, might prove acceptable, Berlioux's opinion held sway during discussions.<sup>46</sup> The Finance Commission members, if judged by Marc Hodler's call for accepting CBS's offer in light of SOOC's recent antics, were easily convinced to adopt a hard line.<sup>46</sup>

When informed of the Finance Commission's decision, Karabegovic responded firmly. He repeated that the method used to distribute the LAOOC/ABC/IOC contract would translate into \$13.5 million for the IOC. Having understood that the IOC expected a minimum of \$13 million from the U.S. contract, he believed his counter offer of \$15.5 million to the IOC to be generous. He repeated this offer and asked that it be forwarded to Killanin.<sup>48</sup> He also claimed that Berlioux had agreed to extending the same treatment accorded to LAOOC with respect to the distribution of U.S. television money to SOOC.<sup>49</sup> If the IOC did not accept this offer, stated Karabegovic, the SOOC would cancel the previous negotiations and renew discussions with the U.S. networks. Berlioux advised Karabegovic that this approach placed SOOC in a precarious position and that ABC might take legal action.<sup>50</sup>

Karabegovic, understandably, felt slighted. On 7 December 1979, Berlioux had informed him that Beaumont and Killanin would recommend to the Executive Board that 5/9ths of the U.S. contract would be reserved as a technical services payment in keeping with the agreement reached between the IOC and LAOOC. The remaining sum would be subject to the "Rome Formula." Granted, no firm accord had been reached, but Karabegovic, considering Beaumont and Killanin "on side," expected this formula to be accepted with little discussion. He pressed Berlioux on this point. Berlioux, in her report to the Finance Commission and the Executive Board, engaged in revisionist history when she "denied having accepted the formula mentioned by Sarajevo and added that she had only stated that the said proposal would be reported to the Finance Commission and to the President."<sup>51</sup> The evidence indicates that Berlioux overstepped her authority and did not clear the proposal with Beaumont and Killanin before stating that the LAOOC/IOC formula would be recommended to the Executive Board. Her reversal seems linked to Karabegovic's conduct during the U.S. negotiations, SOOC's attempt to undermine her authority through direct appeals to Killanin, and the advice of Mortureux and Coupat that the IOC needed in order to exert an enhanced measure of authority over the negotiations process.

A lull in developments regarding the U.S. contract ensued, but Berlioux was not inactive with respect to future negotiations. After having consented to jointly negotiate all future contracts, Karabegovic was miffed by Berlioux's unilateral decision to send copies of negotiation procedures to international television executives, along with a stern reminder that "contracts concerning radio and television may only be negotiated and concluded by the IOC jointly with the Organising Committee and to the IOC's benefit."<sup>52</sup> She did not want a repeat of the U.S. contract negotiations, which had spun out of control. Berlioux's letter, stated Karabegovic, reflected her intent to "expropriate the OCOG all [sic] its competences [sic]" with respect to television negotiations.<sup>53</sup> Karabegovic must have regarded Berlioux's reply as disingenuous, particularly when she expressed confidence in his abilities and denied his charge.<sup>54</sup> Berlioux, in fact, took a very prominent and personal role in negotiating contracts with Canadian, Australian, European and Japanese television executives in the ensuing months.<sup>55</sup> This approach had been advocated by Mortureux and Coupat after their experience in Sarajevo in January.<sup>56</sup> Karabegovic also expressed concern that the U.S. contract situation was not resolved and expressed his desire for a meeting.<sup>57</sup>

Berlioux and Karabegovic met in Lausanne in May to discuss the impasse. Bolstered by the infusion of money from the U.S. television rights deal contract for the Los Angeles negotiations, the IOC was in a position to play hard-ball. The delay in resolving this outstanding matter, noted Karabegovic, was troublesome and impaired SOOC's financial plan-

ning. Berlioux replied that “the case was identical for the IOC and that this would not have arisen had the organising committee accepted the IOC’s rules emphasising that it was not for the IOC to bow to the rules of the Sarajevo OCOG.”<sup>58</sup> Of course, Berlioux also realized that Karabegovic had previously stated to Mortureux and Coupat in Sarajevo in January that SOOC anticipated \$67 million from the sale of U.S. television rights. He should not have shown this card. Berlioux once again stated that the Executive Board had accepted the Finance Commission’s recommendation that the IOC retain a full one-third share.<sup>59</sup>

Karabegovic, reiterating that he could not accede to this arrangement, provided a counter-offer. While he was confident that he could lobby the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina for \$22.5 million, SOOC required a technical services component of \$22.5 million in the contract which would leave \$69 million for distribution according to the “Rome Formula.” Karabegovic had, in effect, presented a proposal that would elevate IOC revenue from \$15.5 million to \$23 million. SOOC would collect a total of \$68.5 million. Karabegovic stated that if the IOC dissented, he would be forced to reconvene U.S. companies for another round of negotiations because the IOC had recanted on its prior agreement for the distribution of U.S. television revenue. The Finance Commission and Executive Board, stated Berlioux, would consider Karabegovic’s “new” plan in early June.<sup>60</sup>

On 6 June, in Essen, the Finance Commission deliberated on the means of resolving the financial issues concerning the ABC contract. Berlioux presented Karabegovic’s proposal, but Beaumont, seeking a similar distribution applied to the U.S. contract for Lake Placid, indicated that the IOC should receive \$25 million.<sup>61</sup> A worried Karabegovic queried Berlioux on 9 June about the IOC’s response.<sup>62</sup> Berlioux, unable to respond until the Executive Board considered Beaumont’s proposal, subsequently replied with the following message:

On account of the answers given by the city of Sarajevo as a candidate city and in consideration of the terms of the contract signed between the IOC and the city of Sarajevo on 18th May 1978, the IOC shall receive its share amounting to 1/3rd (one third) of the total sum i.e. 30 million U.S. dollars as it has already been reported to you. However, the Executive Board of the IOC agrees to restrict its share to US dollars 25 million. Out of the first instalment [\$20 million] US dollars 10 million shall be paid by ABC direct to IOC 30 (thirty) days after the signature of the contract.<sup>63</sup>

The formal tone of the message, in keeping with Berlioux’s writing style, reflected her desire to place Karabegovic on the defensive. She also confirmed her planned meeting with Karabegovic on 12 June in Lausanne.

During the meeting on 12 June, Berlioux was intent on wresting Karabegovic into a submissive position. “The Executive Boards decision was final - the Games belonged to the IOC and this should not be forgotten,” intoned Berlioux.<sup>64</sup> Karabegovic was concerned about the IOC’s demand for one-half of ABC’s initial \$20 million payment. His colleague, SOOC’s Director of Marketing, Mirza Kulenovic, was dismayed that SOOC was not afforded an opportunity to discuss the distribution key, and that the IOC Executive Board was simply imposing its will.<sup>65</sup> Berlioux did offer SOOC a loan of part of the IOC’s portion of the \$20 million payment. Karabegovic, in desperate need for an agreement to assist SOOC’s flagging resources, asked for a \$10 million loan and a reduction to \$24 million of the total due the IOC.<sup>66</sup> Beaumont’s position remained unchanged with respect to the IOC’s total share (\$25 million), but he indicated through Mortureux, subject to Executive Board approval, that the Finance Commission would lend SOOC \$10 million at 8% interest to be repaid in 1984. The \$10 million was to be loaned to SOOC over four payments between 15 October 1980 and 15 February 1983.<sup>67</sup> Despite significant haggling, and Karabegovic’s position that SOOC required the loan in 1981, the two sides could only agree that the IOC’s total share would remain at \$25 million and that the first payment would be shared equally. Loan arrangements were placed in abeyance. While an agreement had been reached some five months after Karabegovic had signed the ABC deal, joint negotiation had provided little satisfaction for SOOC and the IOC.

While joint negotiation had been conceived as a means for the IOC to protect its financial interests and alleviate past friction with OCOGs concerning television negotiations, U.S. television rights negotiations for the 1984 Sarajevo Olympics revealed that the prospect for problems remained. Karabegovic was opposed to sacrificing the degree of autonomy enjoyed by previous Organizing Committees in leading negotiations. He realized the central importance of U.S. television revenue to SOOC and sought to retain control over the negotiations process. Joint negotiation, in this case, was not the factor permitting the IOC to protect its financial interests. Karabegovic was forced to yield because the IOC’s need for money was not as acute as SOOC’s in light of the IOC’s earlier windfall from ABC’s contract for the Los Angeles Games. The four layers of IOC bureaucracy involved in the process also proved troublesome and contributed to the escalation of the problem. Mortureux and Coupat, acting as Berlioux’s representatives in Sarajevo, were unable to influence Karabegovic’s decision to proceed with negotiations. Berlioux’s presence in Sarajevo might well have tempered Karabegovic’s

conduct. However, Berlioux's status as a negotiator on behalf of the Finance Commission also caused a problem. She had given Karabegovic reason to believe that the IOC Finance Commission, more specifically Jean de Beaumont and Lord Killanin, favoured extending the same distribution method for U.S. television money as that accorded to LAOOC without first obtaining their approval. Karabegovic approached the U.S. negotiations with this formula acting as a guide for the contract value sought and was thus embittered by the subsequent decision of the Finance Commission and Executive Board to forego the formula employed for the distribution of U.S. television money for the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics.

These difficulties prompted short-term and long-term action on behalf of the IOC. With respect to future Sarajevo television contracts, Berlioux took the lead role as spokesperson at joint IOC/SOOC negotiation sessions with Canadian, Australian, Japanese and European television executives. For the long-term, the IOC refined its approach by placing the joint negotiation policy in the contracts signed by the IOC and the host cities for the 1988 Winter and Summer Olympics at the time of the award of the right to stage the festivals.<sup>68</sup> It was no longer limited to inclusion in the Olympic Charter. The IOC also established distribution keys for U.S. television money with Calgary and Seoul representatives before negotiations with the networks were opened.<sup>69</sup>

### **Some Further Observations and Concluding Thoughts**

On the surface, protracted discussions about the \$8 million loaned by the IOC to SOOC in two installments (1981 and 1983) appear to be a mere footnote to the tangled U.S. television rights negotiations process. Yet, when reviewed in concert with other issues unfolding concerning the IOC's management of financial issues and its new initiatives in revenue generation, it speaks to the rapidity with which Juan Antonio Samaranch established himself as a "hands-on" leader, and that Berlioux's and Beaumont's days as the IOC's power brokers in this arena were numbered.

Ahmed Karabegovic understood that the IOC Finance Commission would recommend to the Executive Board that the IOC extend a \$10 million loan to SOOC over the course of the next 2 1/2 years. Daniel Mortureux had delivered this information to Karabegovic when the two sides concluded a final agreement with ABC in June, 1980. With no firm loan terms established, Karabegovic pressed the IOC for \$10 million in the fall of 1980.<sup>70</sup> Documents reviewed are unclear whether Karabegovic was asking for the entire sum "up front", or the staggered payments in line with the proposal tendered by Mortureux in June.<sup>71</sup> Between October and June 1980, Beaumont must have had a change of heart concerning the wisdom of loaning SOOC this substantial sum. Instead, he recommended, and the Executive Board approved, a \$3 million loan contingent upon the receipt of a bank guarantee. Samaranch played an integral role in convincing Beaumont of the wisdom of extending this loan.<sup>72</sup> Still it was another bitter disappointment for Karabegovic who believed, once again, that he had been misled.

However, Samaranch moved quickly to shore up financial aid for SOOC and exert his authority over IOC financial policy. Samaranch dismissed Beaumont's concerns about the risks involved in extending a second loan of \$3 million to SOOC in 1982 and ensured that the Executive Board approved such a policy in principle.<sup>73</sup> This loan was eventually extended in 1983, but it was increased to \$5 million.<sup>74</sup> By the end of 1981, Samaranch had also engineered the movement of substantial IOC financial reserves from a bank owned by Beaumont in Paris to two Swiss banks, making it abundantly clear to Beaumont and members of the Finance Commission that they were sitting on an advisory, rather than a decision-making body. Samaranch also shifted responsibility for investigating new sources of revenue from the Finance Commission to a "working group" headed by Louis Guirandou N'Diaye that reported directly to him.<sup>75</sup> While Beaumont retained the post of chairman of the Finance Commission until 1988, he did not enjoy the same degree of latitude with respect to decision-making that he had possessed under Brundage and Killanin. Samaranch also convinced the Executive Board that Berlioux and Lance Cross, a member of the Executive Board and the chairman of the IOC's Television Commission, should attend negotiations for television rights to the Calgary and Seoul Olympic Games.<sup>76</sup> Cross's role was eventually filled by Canada's Richard Pound. When the presence of IOC Presidents Avery Brundage and Lord Killanin infrequently occurred in the corridors of the Chateau de Vidy, Berlioux's influence had grown. Few would have predicted at this time that a breach between Samaranch and Berlioux would result in her resignation four years later. While historians have identified the 1981 Baden-Baden session as a watershed with respect to the IOC's outlook on eligibility, and an early indicator of Samaranch's philosophical approach to this issue and his diplomatic acumen, it was not the only signal that Samaranch was pressing forward on his agenda in the early months of his presidency.

U.S. television rights negotiations for the Sarajevo Olympic Winter Games marked the beginning of a transitional phase in the continuing corporatization of the IOC. The IOC's increased profile in the negotiations process averted some of the earlier difficulties encountered, but it by no means eliminated frustration in Lausanne. The experience gained by IOC personnel during the Sarajevo negotiation process, and those dealing with the Los Angeles, Calgary and Seoul

Olympics, fostered the confidence needed to assume complete control of the negotiation process for the 1992 Olympic festivals and beyond. While the IOC exerted greater control over this revenue stream during the early 1980s, Juan Antonio Samaranch also presided over the IOC's marriage to the corporate world through the development of TOP, and hence, the establishment of a second revenue stream. Samaranch and members of the Executive Board recognized the need to address the organization's dependence on television revenue. This marriage, the immense growth in the IOC's financial reserves, and the financial security the IOC enjoys as a result of its sophisticated marketing program in the 1990s, and expanding television rights fees, remain hallmarks of the Samaranch presidency.

Some observers dismiss the Olympic Games as a glorified series of world championships trapped in a vortex of commercialism resulting from the nexus of sport and business in the 1990s. Yet, it must be recognized that without the support of the corporate sector and the money accrued from the sale of television rights, the grandeur and spectacle of Olympic festivals enjoyed on a biennial basis by thousands of athletes, spectators, and a television audience in the billions would be greatly diminished. "Take away sponsorship and commercialism from sport today and what is left?" asks Richard Pound. "A large, sophisticated, finely-tuned engine developed over a period of 100 years - with no fuel," he concludes.<sup>77</sup> One must admire the IOC's sophisticated, skilful and profitable management of sponsorship initiatives and television rights negotiations in the 1990s. It is an organization less than a generation removed from "shoe-string budgets."

Still, Olympic historian and enthusiast John Lucas believes that the Olympic movement is "on the knife-edge of catastrophe" in light of the challenge to Olympic ideals posed by the prospect of unarrested commercialism.<sup>78</sup> Olympic leaders can point to international surveys indicating public acceptance of the IOC's relationship with commercial interests, but complacency is not in order.<sup>79</sup> The success of the Olympic movement has resulted from its distinctiveness, the spectacle and pageantry, its message, and the energy of young people pursuing a dream. These features must be nurtured by Olympic officials and not overshadowed by the designs of corporate executives who are, regardless of their appreciation of Olympic ideals, using the link with the Olympic rings to enhance their companies' presence at Olympic sites. Above all, they seek to utilize the riveting drama telecast to the world's television audience as an avenue to increase sales figures.

## Endnotes

1. David Miller, *Olympic Revolution: The Biography of Juan Antonio Samaranch* (London: Pavilion Books Ltd., 1992), 33.
2. Her workaholic tendencies, and her demands for a similar degree of commitment from IOC employees alienated some staff members and resulted in a high degree of turnover in personnel.
3. For Berlioux's influence, see Allen Guttmann, *The Olympics: A History of the Modern Games* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 114-115, 142; Lord Killanin, *My Olympic Years* (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1983), 79-80; Miller, *Olympic Revolution*, 33-35; and Peter Ueberroth (with Richard Levin and Amy Quinn), *Made in America: His Own Story* (New York: William Morrow and Company Inc., 1985), 68. With respect to her involvement in Olympic television rights negotiations in the 1970s see Stephen R. Wenn, "Television Rights Negotiations and the 1976 Montreal Olympics," *Sport History Review* 27 (November, 1996): 111-138; and Wenn, "A Turning Point for IOC Television Policy: U.S. Television Rights Negotiations and the 1980 Lake Placid and Moscow Olympic Festivals," *Journal of Sport History* 25 (Spring, 1998): 87-118.
4. "Notes on the Work of the Television Sub-Committee," 23 June 1974, "TV Divers 1974-1975" Binder, Olympic Museum, Lausanne [hereafter cited as OM]. At this time, the IOC drew 98% of its operating revenue from its share of television rights money.
5. Stephen R. Wenn, "Growing Pains: The Olympic Movement and Television, 1966-1972," *Olympika: The International Journal of Olympic Studies* IV (1995): 1-22; Wenn, "Television Rights Negotiations and the 1976 Montreal Olympics"; and Wenn, "A Turning Point for IOC Television Policy: U.S. Television Rights Negotiations and the 1980 Lake Placid and Moscow Olympic Festivals."

6. For events leading to the establishment of the "Rome Formula" (at the IOC's Rome Session in 1966), see Stephen R. Wenn, "An Olympian Squabble: The Distribution of Olympic Television Revenue, 1960-1966," *Olympika: The International Journal of Olympic Studies* III (1994): 27-47.
7. The Munich Olympic Organizing Committee, led by Daume, signed a \$13.5 (U.S.) million contract with ABC. While \$7.5 million was identified as the rights payment subject to the Rome Formula, Daume reserved the remaining \$6 million as a technical services fee payable to the Organizing Committee. While the IOC successfully discouraged Sapporo organizers from adopting the same policy, Innsbruck and Montreal officials proved eager to capitalize on this precedent. See Wenn, "Growing Pains," pp. 8-10; and Wenn, "Television Rights Negotiations and the 1976 Montreal Olympics," pp. 114-117, 134. Through some sleight of hand tactics with documentation, Montreal officials obtained IOC approval to include a technical services payment in all television contracts.
8. The IOC Session passed a legislative change to Rule 49 in the Olympic Charter mandating this new approach. Minutes of the 79th Session of the International Olympic Committee, 15-18 June 1977, Prague, pp. 35, 99-103.
9. The key document in this regard is a letter sent to the Executive Board in 1955. While Brundage made numerous pronouncements concerning this belief at IOC Executive Board meetings in the ensuing years, his approach did not waver from sentiments expressed in this letter. Avery Brundage to the IOC Executive Board, 3 August 1955, Avery Brundage Collection, 1908-1975, Box 114, University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana. Although the original collection is located at the above location, the author has employed the microfilm copy housed at the University of Western Ontario (D.B. Weldon Library).
10. Wenn, *op. cit.*, "Television Rights Negotiations and the 1976 Montreal Olympics," pp. 114- 117; and Wenn, "A Turning Point for IOC Television Policy," pp. 93-99.
11. Los Angeles organizers and the IOC encountered some difficulties in establishing a contract between the two parties concerning their respective responsibilities. During the early stages of discussion, Los Angeles officials sought complete control of the television negotiations process. The following excerpt details the opinion of Georges Straschnov, the IOC's television advisor, expressed after he had read the first draft of the IOC/LAOOC contract proposed by LAOOC: "In the first draft, the television broadcasting and distribution rights were assigned completely to the Organising Committee world-wide with the equivalent radio rights assigned only within the United States, though in the second draft these too were accorded throughout the world. This permitted the Organising Committee to negotiate all contracts freely, with the IOC allowed to attend negotiations and approve the contracts, though such approval could not be withheld 'unreasonably.' This meant that the IOC would be relinquishing all rights to the Organising Committee without any control and supervision over negotiations, which was extremely dangerous and infringed Rule 49." Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 13-14, 16, 18 May 1978, Athens, p. 17, OM. The eventual resolution of this issue involved granting LAOOC some latitude in negotiations, but the IOC was to be informed completely and it retained the right to approve contracts. Berlioux "stated that the Organising Committee for Los Angeles had signed an agreement with the IOC wherein it had agreed to inform the IOC of all negotiations." Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 26-29 June 1979, Puerto Rico, p. 8, OM. Concerned about media reports detailing LAOOC's early discussions with television networks interested in acquiring U.S. television rights, Berlioux reminded Peter Ueberroth of the IOC's rights. LAOOC had solicited a \$500,000 deposit from interested networks in order to guarantee them an opportunity to bid for the television rights. In her letter of 30 April, Berlioux wrote, "Under an agreement concluded with the IOC the Organising Committee has undertaken to observe the IOC rules and regulations. These prescribe among other things that no television contract will be negotiated without the IOC (Rule 49)..." Monique Berlioux to Peter Ueberroth, 30 April 1979, "Los Angeles TV - General 1984 1978-1979-1980" File, OM. Killanin's correspondence also indicates that LAOOC possessed more authority than SOOC in negotiations. A few days later, Killanin asked, LAOOC's Paul Ziffren to "keep us advised when you have any negotiating meeting in case we want to send an observer as provided in our contract." Lord Killanin to Paul Ziffren, 4 May 1979, "Los Angeles TV - General 1984 1978-1979-1980" File, OM.
12. Ahmed Karabegovic to Monique Berlioux, 11 December 1979, "Sarajevo TV - General 1978-1979" File, OM.
13. Monique Berlioux to Ahmed Karabegovic, 13 December 1979, "Sarajevo TV - General 1978-1979" File, OM.

14. The best support for Berlioux's version of discussions on this matter is found in, Monique Berlioux to Ahmed Karabegovic, 7 January 1980, "Sarajevo TV - General Janvier/Mai 1980" File, OM.
15. Monique Berlioux to Ahmed Karabegovic, 7 December 1979, "Sarajevo TV - General 1978-1979" File, OM. "The agreement above mentioned will be recommended by the President of the IOC, Lord Killanin, and the President of the Finance Commission, Count de Beaumont, to the Executive Board for ratification at its next meeting."
16. *Ibid.*
17. Ahmed Karabegovic to Monique Berlioux, 7 January 1980, "Sarajevo TV - General Janvier/Mai 1980" File, OM.
18. Monique Berlioux to Ahmed Karabegovic, 7 January 1980, "Sarajevo TV - General Janvier/Mai 1980" File, OM.
19. Ahmed Karabegovic to Monique Berlioux, 8 January 1980, "Sarajevo TV - General Janvier/Mai 1980" File, OM.
20. MW (Vice-President, Programs, CBS Sports) to Monique Berlioux, 10 January 1980; and Monique Berlioux to Vice-President, Programs, CBS Sports, 14 January 1980, "Sarajevo TV - General Janvier/Mai 1980" File, OM.
21. Arthur A. Watson (President, NBC Sports) to Monique Berlioux, 18 January 1980, "Sarajevo TV - General Janvier/Mai 1980" File, OM; and "Report by the IOC Representatives on their Visit to Sarajevo Regarding Television Negotiations with the American Broadcasting Companies 21st - 24th January 1980," p. 2, "Sarajevo TV - General Janvier/Mai 1980" File, OM [hereafter cited as "Mortureux/Coupat Report"].
22. "Statement Given on January 23, 1980, at 9 A.M. by the NBC Representatives, According to the Priory Established Order," "Sarajevo TV - General Janvier/Mai 1980" File, OM.
23. "Mortureux/Coupat Report," p. 2.
24. "Tentative Programme of American TV Companies' Visit to Sarajevo, January 19 - 25 1980," p. 4, "Sarajevo TV - General Janvier/Mai 1980" File, OM.
25. "Mortureux/Coupat Report," p. 2.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
28. *Ibid.*
29. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
30. *Ibid.*
31. This description was provided by Richard Pound, IOC Vice-President, during commentary at a session at the 1998 North American Society for Sport History Conference at the University of Windsor, May 1998. The author was present.
32. "Mortureux/Coupat Report," p. 5.
33. Monique Berlioux to Lord Killanin, 23 January 1980, "Sarajevo TV - General Janvier/Mai 1980" File, OM.
34. "Mortureux/Coupat Report," p. 5.
35. *Ibid.*

36. Monique Berlioux to Lord Killanin, 24 January 1980, "Sarajevo TV - General Janvier/Mai 1980" File, OM.
37. Lord Killanin to Monique Berlioux, 24 January 1980, "Sarajevo TV - General Janvier/Mai 1980" File, OM.
38. *Ibid.*
39. "Telephone Conversation between Lord Killanin and Monique Berlioux, 24 January 1980, "Sarajevo TV - General Janvier/Mai 1980" File, OM.
40. Lord Killanin to Anto Sucic (President, SOOC), 24 January 1980, "Sarajevo TV - General Janvier/Mai 1980" File, OM.
41. John Martin (Vice-President, Programming, ABC Sports) to Ahmed Karabegovic, 24 January 1980; and Frank Smith (CBS Sports) to SOOC, 24 January 1980, "Sarajevo TV - General Janvier/Mai 1980" File, OM.
42. Lord Killanin to Monique Berlioux, 25 January 1980, "Sarajevo TV - General Janvier/Mai 1980" File, OM. Killanin supplied Berlioux with a verbatim copy of Sucic's telex in this communication.
43. "Mortureux/Coupat Report," p. 6.
44. "Discussion on TV Rights with the Sarajevo OCOG," 15 February 1980, Minutes of the Meeting of the Finance Commission, 11, 14, 16 February 1980, Lake Placid, p. 3, OM.
45. Minutes of the Meeting of the Finance Commission, 11, 14, 16 February 1980, Lake Placid, pp. 5-6.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 6; and "Discussion on Television Rights with the Sarajevo OCOG," 20 February 1980, Minutes of the Meeting of the Finance Commission, 11, 14, 16 February 1980, Lake Placid, p. 7.
47. Minutes of the Meeting of the Finance Commission, 11, 14, 16 February 1980, p. 2.
48. "Discussion on Television Rights with the Sarajevo OCOG," 20 February 1980, Minutes of the Meeting of the Finance Commission, 11, 14, 16 February 1980, Lake Placid, p. 7.
49. Monique Berlioux to Members of the Finance Commission, 23 February 1980, "Sarajevo TV - General Janvier/Mai 1980" File, OM.
50. "Discussion on Television Rights with the Sarajevo OCOG," 20 February 1980, Minutes of the Meeting of the Finance Commission, 11, 14, 16 February 1980, Lake Placid, p. 7.
51. Monique Berlioux to Members of the Finance Commission, 23 February 1980, "Sarajevo TV - General Janvier/Mai 1980" File, OM.
52. See, for example, Monique Berlioux to CTV Network (Canada), 28 March 1980; and for Karabegovic's reaction, Ahmed Karabegovic to Monique Berlioux, 2 April 1980, "Sarajevo TV - General Janvier/Mai 1980" File, OM. Karabegovic had confirmed his intent to "jointly conduct [future] commercial discussions." See Ahmed Karabegovic to Monique Berlioux, 21 March 1980, located in the same file. Brackets mine.
53. Ahmed Karabegovic to Monique Berlioux, 2 April 1980, "Sarajevo TV - General Janvier/Mai 1980" File, OM.
54. Monique Berlioux to Ahmed Karabegovic, 16 April 1980, "Sarajevo TV - General Janvier/Mai 1980" File, OM.
55. Key documents in support of this conclusion are: "Television Negotiations with the Australian Broadcasting Companies for the XIVth Winter Games in Sarajevo 1984 - Lausanne, 17th June 1981," "Sarajevo TV - General Juin/Decembre 1981" File, OM; Johnny Esaw to CTV Television Network (Canada), Internal Memo, 16 March 1982,

- “Sarajevo TV - General Janvier/Juillet 1982” File, OM; “Report of the Meeting IOC/OCOG-Sarajevo/EBU Friday June 18 1982,” “Sarajevo TV - General Janvier/Juillet 1982” File, OM; “Summary of the Meeting IOC/Sarajevo/NHK-Japan, Lausanne 11.08.82,” “Sarajevo TV - General Aout/Decembre 1982” File, OM; Monique Berlioux to Masaji Kiyokawa (IOC Member, Japan), 12 August 1982, “Sarajevo TV - General Aout/Decembre 1982” File, OM; and “Summary of the Meeting IOC/Sarajevo/OIRT, Lausanne 23.09.82,” “Sarajevo TV - General Aout/Decembre 1982” File, OM.
56. “Mortureux/Coupat Report,” p. 6.
57. Ahmed Karabegovic to Monique Berlioux, 2 April 1980, “Sarajevo TV - General Janvier/Mai 1980” File, OM.
58. “Report on the Meeting Between the IOC and the Representatives of the Sarajevo OCOG, Lausanne, 20th May 1980,” p. 5, “Sarajevo TV - General Juin/Decembre 1980” File, OM.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
60. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-13.
61. Minutes of the Meeting of the Finance Commission, 6 June 1980, Essen, pp. 2-3, OM.
62. Ahmed Karabegovic to Monique Berlioux, 9 June 1980, “Sarajevo TV - General Juin/Decembre 1980” File, OM.
63. Monique Berlioux to Ahmed Karabegovic, 9 June 1980, “Sarajevo TV - General Juin/Decembre 1980” File, OM. For the Executive Boards decision, see Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Board, 9-10 June 1980, Lausanne, p. 12, OM.
64. “Minutes of a Meeting of the IOC, Sarajevo OCOG and the ABC Television Network Held at the Château de Vidy on Thursday, 12th June, 1980,” p. 2, “Sarajevo TV - General Juin/Decembre 1980” File, OM.
65. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
67. “Minutes of a Meeting of the IOC, Sarajevo OCOG and the ABC Television Network Held at the Chateau de Vidy on Wednesday, 18th June, 1980,” pp. 1-2, “Sarajevo TV - General Juin/Decembre 1980” File, OM.
68. The author has not reviewed the final contracts; however, confirmation of this change appears in Minutes of the IOC Executive Board, 2, 4 December 1981, Sarajevo, pp. 20-21. During his recent honor address to the North American Society for Sport History (May, 1998), Richard Pound also noted the timing of this change to the host city contract.
69. William Pratt (President, Calgary Olympic Organizing Committee) to Juan Antonio Samaranch, 23 July 1983; William Pratt to Monique Berlioux, 3 August 1983; Danny Russell to Monique Berlioux, 28 November 1983, “Calgary ‘88 TV-General Novembre/Decembre 1983” File, OM; and “Text of the Agreement Regarding Television Concluded Between the IOC and the SLOOC,” 26 September 1983, Minutes of the Meeting of the Meeting of the IOC Finance Commission, 16 November 1983, Lausanne, pp. 37-41.
70. Ahmed Karabegovic to Monique Berlioux, 29 September 1980, “Sarajevo TV - General Juin/Decembre 1980” File, OM.
71. In his letter to Berlioux, Karabegovic wrote, “Since we have not yet defined [sic] in written form, the IOC/OCOG agreement on the financial [sic] transaction of US do1 10 mil of loan [sic], where accordingly the IOC should assign to the OCOG on October 15, 1980 US do1 3 mil., we kindly ask you to determine as soon as possible the date and mode of realization of this agreement.” However, the minutes of a meeting of the Executive Board in late October lead one to make a different conclusion. “The Sarajevo OCOG were now requesting an immediate loan of US\$ 10 million, but

the Comte de Beaumont pointed out that it was dangerous to lend large sums of money to an organisation facing financial difficulties.” Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Board, 30-31 October 1980, Lausanne, p. 10, OM.

72. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Board, 9 April 1981, Lausanne, p. 1, OM.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

74. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Board, 24-25 November 1983, pp. 36-37, OM.

75. Minutes of the Meeting of the Finance Commission, 24 March 1981, Paris, p. 2; , 9 April 1981, Lausanne, pp. 1, 7-8; Minutes of the Meeting of the Finance Commission, 3 June 1981, pp. 1-3; Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 4 June 1981, Lausanne, pp. 67; Minutes of the Meeting of the Finance Commission, 16 December 1981, pp. 3-4, OM; and Richard Pound to the author (e-mail), 24 July 1998.

76. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Board, 2, 4 December 1981, Sarajevo, p. 21, OM.

77. Olympic Marketing: 1998 Fact File (IOC: Lausanne, 1998), 7.

78. CBS Sunday Morning (TV Show), 8 February 1998.

79. Olympic Market Research Analysis Report (IOC: Lausanne, 1998).

