
Problemizing Arguments of the Opponents of Olympic Games

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The experience and enthusiasm of spectators and participants for Olympic Games seem to be impossible to measure in money. While the Games are a fantastic spectacle for most of the people all over the world, the people living in a host city have mixed feelings. Most recent economic research has been mainly based on microeconomic aspects focusing on an Organizing Committee's revenues in selling television rights and sponsoring. The macroeconomic aspects of the Games which are less obvious and rarely examined are ignored. These aspects, in particular, affect the citizens of a host city.

A review of a bid city's press-releases reveals the concerns of the citizens. Their fears show how little is known about the true economic effects of Olympic Games. The general conditions and special reasons against or in favor of staging the Games in a certain city must be considered. Despite the differences of the bid cities, the arguments against hosting the Olympics are recurring. Among the opponents there seems to be a global critique on the Games which requires a closer look of their arguments. This investigation will focus on five key arguments put forward by the opponents of Olympic Games.

Firstly, there seems to be the risk of an over-indebtedness of the host city; secondly, the money invested in the Games could be used for other, "socially better" projects than Olympic Games; thirdly, the Games are beneficial to the upper class while they are not to lower social stratifications; fourthly, the Games create only temporary, and no lasting jobs; and fifthly, there is the high risk that prices in the city will rise during the Games and remain high afterwards.

Method

The method of this investigation is based on document research combined with interviews of economic and Olympic experts. To invalidate the arguments of Olympic opponents OCOGs frequently order cost/benefit analyses or economic impact studies. However, they show two decisive disadvantages. On the one hand, they are easy to manipulate and the result which the client favors can be produced.¹ On the other, they must deal with many uncertain quantities which makes it difficult to truly assess the Games. This investigation uses another method. The superordinate theory is the nomothetic method to find the general effects of Olympics. Previously, the special, nation-dependent differences were analyzed using the common ideographic method. The following results must be checked against the corresponding nation-specific conditions before deriving statements for a certain bid city.

The arguments of the opponents examined for this investigation mainly concern the bids of South Africa 2004, Berlin 2000, Atlanta 1996 and Barcelona 1992. Generalized arguments of the Olympic opponents are assessed by reviewing the effects of the Olympic Games from Munich 1972 to Atlanta 1996. This includes mainly publicly financed Olympics (Munich, Montreal) as well as privately financed Olympics (Los Angeles, Atlanta). Cities which experienced major changes in their infrastructure resulting from the Olympics (Munich, Seoul, Barcelona) and cities which focused less on infrastructure changes than on prestige (Los Angeles, Atlanta) are considered.

Regarding the data comparison of the host cities from Munich 1972 to Atlanta 1996, a formula was developed to homogenize the data from different national economies using the purchasing power parities. The homogenization for the different years of the Games was achieved using the gross domestic product deflator of the USA. This methodology allows comparison of the economic aspects of different host cities.²

Argument 1: The Over-indebtedness of a Host City

The first thesis one can often read is: "Olympic Games lead to an over-indebtedness of the respective host city and tax payers have to pay for it."³

Assumingly, this opinion is primarily based on two facts. Firstly, the substantial investments necessary to host the Olympics. Secondly, the experience of Montreal 1976 when the costs of the Games exceeded the calculations because of unexpected investments, strikes, wrong calculations, etc. Montreal's tax payers will have to pay off their share for a yet undetermined period of time. Until today, there is a special tobacco tax to balance the deficit.⁴ The fact that the Canadian state did not provide any financial security to the city of Montreal for the Games is readily ignored. Due to a "written guarantee that the federal government would not be called upon to absorb the deficit nor to assume interim financing for organization,"⁵ the OCOG had to finance the hosting of the Olympics by itself - with only the support of the city. In the end, the private revenues of the OCOG amounted to a mere 5% of the means required. The remaining 95% were provided by special financing funds and the public sector⁶ The city of Montreal alone as official guarantor had to cover the deficit of US\$ 2,029m.⁷

Before talking about debts a city incurs because of hosting Olympic Games, two basic distinctions must be made. The Olympic revenues must be opposed to the operative costs in order to determine whether the city or the tax payers must pay for organizing and hosting the Games. The investments necessary to host Olympics must be divided into Games-related and not Games-related. This will show in general whether a city is suited as a host city.

There have always been arguments as to the positions directly related to Olympic expenditures. The divisions between Games-related and not Games-related investments in sports facilities and infrastructure greatly differ. Therefore, each cost-benefit analysis of Olympic Games can be influenced in a way to bring out the desired results.⁸ In the preparatory phase of Olympics, there must be a general distinction between operative costs and investments. Operative costs are always Games-related, but investments are more difficult to decide.

Ignoring the investments in the final balances of OCOGs and opposing the operative costs to the OCOG revenues reveals that all OCOGs under review achieved a financial surplus.⁹




Fig. 1: Revenues and operative expenditures of OCOGs (Munich '72 to Atlanta '96)

Source: Preuss (1998, 278)

Without claiming to have completely re-calculated the balance of the respective Games the chart shows that an OCOG can host Olympics using only the means they receive due to the award of the Olympics. The organization and staging of the Olympics do not incur costs for the city or the tax payers. On the contrary, they have earned revenues of US\$500m₉₅ in average.

Apparently, this fact has not been recognized in the past. The media, bulletins of Olympic opponents, even official reports of OCOGs and the IOC published different final balances of the Olympics.¹⁰





Fig. 2: Profit/deficit of Olympic Games - published results and new results

Sources: German Bundestag (9 January 1975, 5) / Organizing Committee Montreal (1976, 58) / Reich (1986, 87) / Kim (1990, 285) / NN (11 November 1992) / Organizing Committee Atlanta (1998, 222) / Preuss (1998, 279)

The critical issue is boiled down to the question of whether the investments cause an over-indebtedness of a city when it is awarded the Olympic Games.

So far, the OCOGs have financed sports facilities partly by their own funds. After the Games, they have mostly handed them over to the host city free of charge.¹¹ This corresponds to a depreciation of the sports facilities in 17 days. Business enterprises investing in a facility used over a longer period would depreciate it over the actual life cycle in their balance. It becomes obvious that all Games-related investments in the infrastructure of the host city strongly influence the expenditures of an OCOG or the host city - all the more if they are to be depreciated virtually in the few days of the Olympics. A different evaluation of this single position completely changes the surplus/deficit of Olympic Games making each balance void.

A unique distinction between costs for Games-related and not Games-related investments is required. It is indispensable in order to verify or falsify the thesis posed by Olympic opponents mentioned in the beginning. Using the following flow chart (Fig. 3) the decision-making process to plan sports facilities for Olympic Games is explained in order to find a distinction between Games-related and not Games-related investments.



* There might be costs for renovations pulled forward. Due to reasons of clarity they are ignored.

Fig. 3: Flow chart to distinguish between Games-related and not Games-related sports facilities

According to Fig. 3, all sports facilities which would have been built even without the Games¹² because there is a general need, are not Games-related. They do not burden the OCOG and the city remains within the limit for investment activities planned anyway. All other costs are Games-related and charged to the OCOG. If the expected “surplus” which in the period under review amounted to approx. US\$ 500M does not suffice, the fear of Olympic opponents of an over-indebtedness of their city is justified. It must also be considered whether the changes in the structure and image of the city caused by the Olympic Games can be integrated into the concept of urban development or whether the bid was merely triggered by political aspirations.

Many problems arise for cities where an Olympic hall or stadium does not yet exist and where there is no follow-up demand. The OCOG would have to erect a temporary sports facility¹³ which, in general, will exceed the financial limits of an OCOG. It shows whether a city is suited as host city. Cities having neither adequate sports facilities nor an appropriate follow-up demand should be warned against hosting Olympics.¹⁴

The results could be summarized in the following hypothesis: “Olympic Games only lead to an over-indebtedness of the city if sports facilities and traffic infrastructure required to stage the Games are hardly existent and if there is no follow-up demand for such a structure.”

Argument 2: Abuse of Public Resources

The thesis of Olympic opponents regarding this topic is as follows: “The public funds to be used for the Olympic Games could be better spent on other projects.”¹⁵

Assumingly, this attitude is primarily based on two opinions. Firstly, it is generally assumed that the city alone bears all necessary investments. Secondly, there is the wide-spread opinion that the Games-related changes in the municipal structure could not satisfy the social demands placed on the structure of the city.

Regarding the first argument of Olympic opponents, two charts shall show where the largest part of the financing sources for the Games stems from. Fig. 4 shows the concentration of resources from all over the world in the host city. Fig. 5 distinguishes between public and private means.




Fig. 4: Concentrating money of consumers from all over the world in the host city

Olympic Games concentrate world-wide consumer expenditures in the host city in the same way that sponsors, TV stations, etc., spend money in the host city when buying rights, paying rents, etc. These concentrated autonomous expenditures supplemented by public funds from the federal government and state make up the largest portion of the investments necessary in the host city. The funds stem from the consumers and hence the tax payers, but only to a small ratio from that of the host city.




Fig. 5: Models to finance Olympic Games (Munich'72 to Atlanta'96)

Sources: German Bundestag (9 January 1995) /Organizing Committee Montreal (1976, 58) / Kim et al. (1989, 42) / Park (1991,133) /Organizing Committee Los Angeles (1984, 308,313) /Hill (1992, 157) / Brunet (1993, 16) / Weber (1994, 55,57) /Organizing Committee Atlanta (1998,222)

Disregarding the financing model of past Olympic Games, the largest portion of the funds was provided by private industry. They decide on investments according to cost-benefit aspects. The social component of the investments plays a minor role. The remaining portion is financed by the public sector. The funds provided by the federal government and state are frequently linked to the fact that the city hosts the Olympics.

The reproach of Olympic opponents that the funds could have been used “more sensibly” for other projects instead of the Olympics is not justified because most of the funds would not flow into the host city without the Games and because private investments and public subsidies are project-related.

Regarding the second argument of the Olympic opponents, the following question arises: Whoever has the right to judge which individual or group shall benefit from Olympic Games? This question shall not, and cannot, be answered. Independent of a decision as to who should benefit from Olympics, Table 1 shows the sectors of a city which are changed due to the Games.

Table 1: Games-related changes of sectors in a host city

Sector	Changes caused by the Olympics
Transportation	The transportation system is changed by an improved infrastructure and new concepts of public transportation. In Munich’72, the subway was expanded, ^a in Seoul’88, many major roads were improved ^b and in Barcelona’92, ring roads were built. ^c
Telecommunication system	A high standard in telecommunications is another important location factor to keep existing or attract new enterprises. ^d In this sector, the Olympics bring the latest technology into the city to satisfy the demand in telecommunications services during the Olympics. After the Games, the systems remain existent.
Sports facility structure	Olympics have the strongest influence on the sports facilities structure in the city. There must be adequate and sufficient sports and training facilities for all sports at an international level. After the Games, these facilities are often available for leisure sports.
Housing	In most host cities, Olympic villages are newly constructed. The question of the social distribution of the newly created housing units is reviewed. In Munich’72, the Olympic village was constructed for socially deprived groups of the population. ^e In other cities, the Olympic villages were mostly sold to the middle and lower-upper classes. In Los Angeles’84 and Atlanta’96, the villages continued to be students’ homes. In general, the construction of the villages frequently leads to a gentrification (see Argument 3) compared to the former usage of the site. However, the respective investor must be taken into consideration before talking about an “abuse” of public funds. ^f
Urban culture	The general embellishment ^g of the city, an improved transportation system, additional leisure time facilities, and numerous ecological projects frequently led to a revival of the city center by improving the “city atmosphere”.

- a. BRÜGGE (24 July 1972, 33) / GEIPEL/HELBRECHT/POHL (1993, 289-293).
- b. GOLDSTAR (8 September 1988a, sp.) / RICQUART (1988, 82). In Seoul’88, the modernization of the infrastructure caused by the Olympics e.g. was used to show the world their creed in national economy (GREISING 29 July 1996, 35).
- c. MILLET (1995, 192-195) / GARCIA (1993, 268f.).
- d. „By renewing its traffic system [...] and telecommunication network Barcelona prepared itself for the future.“ (GARCIA 1993,263).
- e. DAUME (1976, 154).
- f. In Munich, Montreal, Seoul and Barcelona, the villages were financed by private enterprises. However, the public sector was involved in almost all villages (cf. ORGANIZING COMMITTEE MONTREAL 1976, 91 /Woo 1988, 281-287 / MCBETH 7 April 1988, 44 / KIM et al. 1989, 47 / BRUNET 1993, 17 / RETH 23 July 1993 / MEDIALDEA 23 July 1993 / HERZOG 22 September 1993).
- g. In Atlanta’96 e.g., about US\$ 64m,⁹⁵ were invested (HISKEY 21 August 1994, E6)

It has become obvious that the changes in a host city are not limited to the construction of sports facilities but improve the location factors for industry. The alleged discrepancy between changes socially necessary and those triggered

by Olympic Games is not very large. The fact that the largest portion of the means need not be financed by the host city and its tax payers could make the Olympics a suitable occasion to ignite social urban development.

Nevertheless, a host city must bear the investments an OCOG cannot finance (see Argument 1) and the investments not carried out by private industry, federal government or state. The share the city must provide could be regarded the “price” to be paid in order to receive the autonomous funds and those of private industry (Fig. 4 and 5). Over-capacities in individual areas must be avoided where tourism and sports facilities are especially threatened. The investments only pay off and the resulting follow-up costs can only be financed if the expanded capacities are used after the Olympics.¹⁶ Otherwise, the Games would lack their political justification.¹⁷

Olympic opponents are only right if the Games do not fit into the overall concept of urban development because of their mere size making the investment share of the host city “senseless.”¹⁸ The results can be summarized in the following hypothesis: “Olympic Games attract considerable autonomous funds to the host city, leading to an improved infrastructure of the city. Thus, a possible abuse of the funds is limited to the share the city itself must provide.”

Argument 3: Games for the Upper Classes

The third thesis of Olympic opponents to be read again and again runs as follows: “Olympic Games are only for the upper class, the lower social stratifications do not benefit from the Games but finance them by their tax payments.”¹⁹

This argument is based on various facts. Four of them are discussed in this paper: Obviously, Olympics involve a gentrification.²⁰ Industry and dealers are the ones to earn most in the Games. The expensive giant sports facilities cannot be used for leisure sports after the Games. The prices for the entrance tickets are too high.

In view of inconsistent inequality structures, the notion of social awareness becomes diluted. However, it receives a contour if the notion of “awareness of inequalities” is used for individual arguments. Inequalities which are considered legitimate (e.g. higher income for those working harder) are accepted. Inequalities which are considered illegitimate are regarded as distributive inequality by those concerned. This is the case for many Olympic opponents which see an unequal distribution of tax funds to the benefit of the “upper” stratifications caused by the Games.²¹

Regarding the gentrification of a city caused by the Olympics, it is not surprising that the “lower” stratifications are affected.²² If the demands of this social stratification are noted as “socially necessary basic structures” of a city, the prerequisites for job, housing, adequate medical care and social integration must be fulfilled. If the changes caused by the Olympics in a host city are compared to these requirements (Table 1) it can be stated that the gentrification primarily provoked by the Olympics hardly improved the housing situation of this group.²³ The argument of the Olympic opponents is valid for some areas but must not be generalized.

The extent of Games-related activities differed strongly among the host cities reviewed here, but the improved structure, the better image, and the higher expenditures led to higher income and employment in all host cities.²⁴ Members of all social stratifications of a city benefit from these changes. The criticism frequently mentioned that additional income and employment primarily affected members of the “upper” social stratifications must be rejected. Even if e.g. unskilled workers were underpaid, they did have work and their basic income was improved - disregarding their employment duration (see Argument 4). Often, the benefit of the Games to indirectly create new employment or securing existing jobs is overlooked since it is not directly obvious.²⁵ The argument of the Olympic opponents on this point must be rejected.

Concerning the giant sports facilities, Olympic opponents are right in arguing that enormous sums are invested, being in large part, autonomous funds. Despite the obvious promotion of a gentrification, two consequences must not be ignored. Some of the follow-up events will increase the leisure time value for the “lower” stratifications alike and the existence of the giant sports facilities as such only allows to stage follow-up events. The city receives additional economic impulses without requiring extensive investments. Today, about 100 training facilities are required for the Olympics which can be used for leisure and school sport after the Games.²⁶ The argument of the Olympic opponents must be qualified. The “lower” stratifications do not directly benefit from the giant facilities. Indirectly, the facilities secure jobs and bring additional income through follow-up events and the construction of numerous smaller sports facilities.

If Olympic opponents criticise the high cost of entrance ticket prices, they apparently refer to the development of prices for opening ceremonies.




Fig. 6: Prices for opening ceremonies from Munich '72 to Sydney '00
Sources: Preuss (1998, Appendix)

The prices for opening ceremony tickets develop in a unique direction, Independent of the host country and the prosperity level of the population, there has been a permanent increase. In this case, the Olympic opponents are right. The OCOGs have realized the rigid price elasticity with regard to this unique event.²⁷ The growing gap between the lowest and highest price is striking. It reveals a stronger price differentiation.²⁸ The reason could be of political origin. Offering some relatively cheap tickets, the OCOG justifies the high prices to offer tickets for almost all residents of the city. Regarding the remaining entrance tickets, the development is different.

Fig. 7 shows that the average ticket prices for the Games investigated differed.²⁹ The bottom curve represents the average prices as stated by the press.³⁰ The deviation to the average prices as calculated by the author could be caused by the fact that the press ignored the revenues from renting the luxury boxes. The prices for the Olympics in the USA (1984, 1996)³¹ strongly differ from those of the other Western countries (1972, 1976, 1992)³² and Asia (1988)³³. The average prices give a clear insight into the different buying readiness in the various economic areas of the world. The basic factor for the OCOG to determine the price has been the buying readiness combined with the prosperity level of the host country population. The fact that at least 75% of the tickets were sold at any Olympics³⁴ confirms this statement. Differentiated price strategies (e.g. high or low price strategies) have hardly been applied. So far, OCOGs have tried to sell as many cheap tickets as possible.³⁵ The Olympic opponents are wrong in claiming the “lower” stratifications cannot afford tickets for the Games.




Fig. 7: Average ticket price from Munich '72 to Atlanta '96
Sources: Own calculations, Preuss (1998, Appendix)

Although the arguments of Olympic opponents were partly invalidated, hosting the Olympic Games bears the risk to deepen the social polarization in the city. In the future, the city could and should be integrated into the financing of the Olympics to use the positive economic potential of the Olympic Games for socially weaker stratifications. It will not be easy to realize this goal since the structures of power generally are such that the positive effects of the Olympics are primarily to the benefit of the prosperous social levels. Finally, the following hypothesis is put forward: “Olympic Games are to the benefit of all citizens in the form of jobs and additional income. Nevertheless, the Games bring about a gentrification which is primarily to the benefit of the upper stratifications.”

Argument 4: No Lasting Jobs Are Created

The thesis put forward by Olympic opponents regarding this topic is: “Olympic Games create only a few transitory jobs.”³⁶ It must be assumed that this claim is mainly based on the fact that the opponents only focus on the jobs created by the OCOG.

Not only the jobs created by the OCOG, but all jobs created by the economic impulse of the Olympic Games must be considered. To calculate the employment effect, the primary effect (all autonomous expenditures caused by the Olympics) of the respective Games is used. The income resulting from the primary effect should first be divided into the components “Profit” and “Salaries and wages”. Subsequently, it is related to the average income of free-lance work.³⁷ The “profit” is not regarded as income-effective. The units are “Person-Years” to counterbalance the differences in job duration and number of weekly working hours/employee.

Table 2: Jobs through Olympic Games from Munich’72 to Atlanta’96

	Primary effect in mio. nat. currency at prices in Olympic year ^a (A)	Wage ratio in host country in Olympic year in percent (B)	Average wage/year in host country in Olympic year (C)	Person-Years by primary effect (A*B/C)	Jobs (40 years) (A*B/C/40)
Munich’72	1,691	54	39,361	23,199	580
Munich’76	1,328	57	19,960	37,924	948
Los Angles’84	952	60	19,948	28,634	715
Seoul’88	1,891,875	41	4,053,848	191,341	4,784
Barcelona	845,575	46	1,383,166	281,213	7,030
Atlanta’96	2,917	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Despite the susceptibility of the calculations to errors, Table 2 shows that Olympic Games lead to considerable employment effects. They would be even larger if the induced effects and the “profit” which has a long-term effect on the income were included.³⁸ It need not be mentioned that most jobs were created or ensured in the host cities with the strongest economic impulse. Even if wage ratio³⁹ and average wage⁴⁰ were not exactly included as units which influence employment, the general statement that Olympics lead to a considerable employment growth in the host city remains valid.

These positive effects can hardly be backed by statistical data since the employment in a city also depends on factors like the current economic situation and the carrying out of other projects.⁴¹ In general, investigations exclusively concentrate on Olympic Games. When examining the Olympic Winter Games which are hosted in much smaller cities the

proof is much easier because the economic impulse to the host city is comparatively larger. For the Lillehammer'94 Winter Olympics e.g., there are statistical data which prove the employment effect. The result could not have been falsified by other large projects (did not exist at the time) or general changes in the economy.




Fig. 8: Unemployment change Lillehammer'94 acc. to index

Sources: Spilling (7-8 July 1997, 19) derived from the data provided in Statistics Norway

The chart shows a temporary unemployment decrease. A deviation from the national employment situation develops two years before the Games.⁴² A year after the Games, the statistics no longer show an effect of the Olympics. Eventually, employment statistics cannot prove the amount of the positive effect by which the Olympics created new jobs since the respective "case without the Games" is not known. Undoubtedly, Olympic Games induce additional work as calculated above. It can ...

- (a) lead to new jobs;
- (b) secure existing jobs;
- (c) increase the stress of employees for safe jobs;
- (d) displace other jobs.

A unique interpretation is difficult as the following examples will show: Case (a) could counterbalance the simultaneous dismissal of workers in another sector, keeping the unemployment rate on the same level as before the Olympics. Case (b) could lead to an unemployment rate increase without the Games. Cases (c) and (d) could not have any effects on the employment rate.

It is sure that the Olympics create or ensure employment. Regarding the duration, all jobs required to host/organize the Olympics are limited in time from the start. Their duration directly depends on the schedule to prepare and stage the Olympics.⁴³ Even the bidding phase (phase I) leads to additional work⁴⁴ which is increased in the preparatory phase (phase II). During the Olympics themselves most of the work must be done, shortly afterwards it diminishes harshly (phase III). During the first three phases, the jobs are directly linked to the organization of the Olympics.⁴⁵ In the fourth phase after the Olympics, jobs are created which are induced by the Games-related economic impulse. The following considerations focus on these jobs because Olympic opponents do not see these jobs. There are four phases (Fig. 9) to be distinguished.




Fig. 9: Influence of Olympic Games on the long-term job offer
Source: Preuss (1998, 78)

The average employment duration in the OCOG management should be approx. four years. For administration assistants during the days of the events, they amount to only a few days.⁴⁶ In sectors which expand through the Olympic Games like the building sector⁴⁷, tourism⁴⁸ and leisure time industry,⁴⁹ long-term jobs are created.⁵⁰ Strictly speaking, the jobs are no longer related to the Olympic Games once they are over. If capacities in the sectors previously mentioned remained high after the Olympics, the same influences which caused the capacity not to fall after the Games would have led to their expansion even without the Olympic Games.

To a host city, it is of special interest to see how the number of jobs will develop in phase IV. Four cases are offered which strongly depend on the size of the economic impulse. Following long-term employment, effects (Fig. 9) are possible, causing the number of jobs ...

- (a) to return to the level before the Games. It cannot be excluded that there might have been a further fall without the Olympics. However, this situation is typical for the tourism branch with periodically recurring events.⁵¹ This situation is also probable for Olympic Games without large investments (e.g. Los Angeles'84). Neither are long-term jobs nor follow-up investments (maintenance, etc.) induced.
- (b) to permanently rise because the structural changes in the city lead to further investment and the settling of businesses (growth center concept). Planners of Olympics and analysts most frequently (and most preferably) predict this case.⁵² It cannot be stated for sure whether such an effect was triggered by the Olympic Games.
- (c) to remain on a lower level than before the Olympics. It could be caused by a bad image of the Games or by displacements during the Olympics and the related demand migration.⁵³ Of course, the level can also fall due to factors which are independent of the Games.
- (d) to remain on a higher level than before the Games. This case is very probable because long-term jobs are primarily created in leisure industry and tourism sector caused by the improved tourist infrastructure.

It was proven that the creation of numerous jobs is directly connected to the Games. Lasting jobs depend on the benefit of the economic impulse triggered by the Olympics. There is the following hypothesis: “Olympics create many short-term jobs and, in certain sectors, they create the prerequisites for stimulating permanent employment.”

Argument 5: Rising of Consumer Price Index and Rents

Finally, one of the theses most frequently mentioned should be checked. It runs as follows: „In the host city, Olympic Games lead to an increased cost of living and increased rents.”⁵⁴

It must be assumed that this claim is mainly based on two assumptions. Firstly, on the increased demand in goods during the Olympics and, secondly, on speculations that the Olympics will increase the demand. The basis for possibly higher prices caused by Olympics lies in the increased demand which could lead to displacements. The differentiation is as follows:

Table 3: Matrix of possible displacements by Olympic Games

	Public expenditures displace . . .	Private expenditures displace . . .
. . . public expenditures.	(A) Re-distribution	(B)
. . . private expenditures.	(C) Crowding out	(D) Crowding out

Source: Preuss (1998, 51)

- (A) For the Olympic Games, the public sector mainly spends on investments in the traffic infrastructure and sports facilities. Possible displacements affect the building sector and depend on the respective economic situation of the host city. Effects on the cost of living are not to be expected. Rents would be affected indirectly if public housing construction were to be displaced by other projects (e.g. construction of sports facilities).
- (B) The displacement of public demand by private demand is not to be expected since private economy has larger price elasticities. It is a theoretical case.
- (C/D) The different forms of crowding out are: 1. Substitution of private expenditures by public expenditures (direct crowding out). 2. Changed expectations of the private sector regarding interest rates, resulting in a low readiness for private investments (expectations crowding out) and a Games-related expected increased demand can lead to rising prices. 3. Change of prices, interest rates, etc. (price crowding out, etc.) .

If possible, the market first increases productivity to react towards the increased demand caused by the Olympics. The second reaction are price changes followed by investments in case of apparently long-term demand. Increase in productivity or capital fund can satisfy the increased demand. A regulation through price is not required. Limited capacities result in price increases leading to displacements. The non-elastic public demand displaces the price-elastic private demand (price crowding out). It is worth mentioning that the Olympics only lead to an increased demand in individual sectors (e.g. services, tourism, construction). It is difficult to judge in advance whether the market will react to the increased demand with price increases only or also with investments.




Fig. 10:Effect of price crowding out at different supply
 Source:Preuss (1998,53)

Fig. 10 shows three cases where the demand is increased by (dY) each. For N1, supply is elastic enough to avoid a price increase. All additional goods and services can be delivered from stocks or produced by sufficient capacities. For N2, only a part of the demand can be satisfied without a price increase. For N3, the increased demand can only be regulated with the price, i.e. the price is increased to the point where the demand displaces the amount of the additional demand.

Olympic opponents only aim at case N3 and fear an increase in the consumer price index (CPI). To verify or invalidate this fear the price level⁵⁵ must be analyzed using various price indices before and after the Olympics. Olympic Games mostly lead to a temporary increase in demand resulting in price changes (crowding out) but not necessarily price level changes. If the individual prices of especially heavily demanded goods and services rise before and during the Olympics it must be asked whether they will fall again after the Games. Referring to the argumentation of Olympic opponents the question must be further limited to a possible increase in the cost of living.

Theoretically, price increases are caused by three reasons: First, the Games-related demand exceeds supply (price crowding out). Second, there are Games-related speculations.⁵⁶ Third, there is a general inflation. To the citizens of a host city, the reason for price increases is not obvious. Games-related speculations mainly concentrate on the acquisition of real estate and the short-term renting of flats.⁵⁷ It must be distinguished whether a price increase (index increase) is due to a Games-related increase in demand or to the general inflation.

Statistics of the individual host country can be used as a basis since these figures cannot be falsified to back a bid. It cannot be determined whether Olympic Games changed the prices in a way but it can be determined whether the host city population suffered from negative effects of price level changes. Comparing the CPI (Table 4) and the rents (Table 5) to the corresponding indices of the country and other major cities, differences become obvious.

Table 4: CPI development in the years before and after Olympic Games

	Comparing CPI to . . .	Interpretation
Munich'72	<i>Germany, Berlin</i>	Price increase since 1967
Montreal'76	<i>Canada, Halifax, Saint John, Quebec, Ottawa, Toronto</i>	No price increase compared to other cities and Canada
Los Angeles' 84	<i>USA, San Francisco</i>	No price increase compared to other cities and USA
Seoul'88	<i>Korea, Pusan, Taegu, Inch'on</i>	No price increase compared to other cities and South Korea
Barcelona'92	<i>Spain, Catalonia</i>	Price increase since 1991
Atlanta'96	<i>USA, New York, Chicago</i>	No price increase compared to other cities and USA

Source:Preuss (1998, 83-86)

With the exception of Munich and Barcelona, it can be proven that the CPI development did not differ from that of other cities or the host country. The exceptions could be due to the general development or the increased significance of the host city. The price increase felt in the host cities must be solely related to the general inflation.

Table 4: Rent development in the years before and after Olympic Games

	Comparing rents to...	Interpretation
Munich'72	Germany	Price increase since 1969
Montreal'76	Canada	Price decrease since 1971
Los Angeles'84	USA	No price increase compared to USA
Seoul'88	<i>Korea, Pusan, Taegu, Inch'on</i>	No price increase compared to other cities and South Korea
Barcelona'92	Spain	Price increase in the 80s

Source:Preuss (1998, 83-86)

The rents rose only in Munich and Barcelona. It cannot be assumed that lasting rent increases are linked to Olympics. It could only be true if the increased demand in rented housing was assumingly caused by the Olympic Games. If at all, the increase in the demand in rented flats is only transitory during the Olympics. Olympic opponents cannot refer to these resulting high rents for Olympic visitors when they talk about negative aspects of distribution.⁵⁸

It was basically proven that Olympics do not increase the cost of living or the rents. In sectors like the building industry, a temporary price crowding out or in tourism, an expectation crowding out could be expected due to the strong demand. The following hypothesis is put forward: "Olympic Games do not lead to lasting increases in the cost of living or the rents."

Conclusion

The investigation of the essential arguments of Olympic opponents revealed that the arguments are mainly based on economic aspects. Frequently, they are not carefully reflected and contain simple phrases. This could be due to the lack

of economic knowledge or to the fact that the public can be best addressed with arguments like these. However, the statements of those in favor of Olympics also reveal little knowledge about previous Games, or their forecasts are so exaggerated that they offer a basis for new opponents' arguments.

The Olympic opponent arguments focus on their awareness of inequality. Their argumentation refers to the socially unjust distribution of the funds to the disadvantage of the "lower" stratifications. Olympic protagonists argue that the Games offer the chance for accelerated urban development. It involves a - not unwanted - gentrification as well as extensive structural improvements which eventually can trigger an economic upswing.

It should be avoided to invalidate the arguments of the Olympic opponents in the stereotypical way used for this paper. The corresponding general conditions of a bid city must be taken into consideration. Serious fears of Olympic opponents are e.g. right if the economic environment of a bid city is so weak that the vast impulse originating from the Games cannot be used or is even harmful (crowding out, strong imports, over-indebtedness, etc.), or if the city structure is far away from the one required to host the Games. Fears like that of the Olympic opponents against Cape Town⁹ must also be considered. They thought the high criminal rate would create a bad image both for the city and the country, leading to a decline in tourism or standstill of investments.

In general, it can be stated that a real over-indebtedness of a host city is only to be feared if extensive investments in the infrastructure are required. A host city receives a large sum of autonomous means when hosting the Games, which it could use for structural changes. The reproach of the opponents, the money invested for the Games could be better used for socially sensible projects is wrong because investment money would not flow into the city without the Games. It was stated that Games-related projects changing the structure of the city are to the benefit of all citizens and not only of the "upper" class. It is right that the OCOG itself can only create jobs for a short period but the economic impulse of the Games induces lasting jobs. It was shown that the price index will only rise in sectors with a very high demand. Those sectors will not affect the citizens by influencing the CPI or rent price index. In the host cities since Montreal 1976, the CPI has not changed - with the exception of Barcelona 1992 - compared to other cities in the respective host country.

It is sad to see that in the entire argumentation, sport as such and the invitation to the "youth of the world" falls far behind the economic reasons. The Olympic idea with its universal ideals, the chances offered by the educational aspect or eurythmics are completely ignored. Many Olympic opponents only include possible economically negative effects in their analysis and overlook the chances the Olympics could offer to their city. It should have become clear that the arguments of the Olympic opponents were not always unjustified since not all cities are suited to stage Olympic Games. Nevertheless, the argumentation could be carried out on a qualitatively higher level than it has been offered during the last decades.

Endnotes

- 1 Cf. PREUSS (1993, 15f.).
- 2 Cf. PREUSS (1998, 20-26). The figures are presented in US\$ based on 1995 prices (e.g. US\$ 500m.₉₅).
- 3 Cf. i.a. NN (13 March 1995) / STANDER (25/26 March 1995) / VERNON (20 October 1996) / PLESSIS (21 August 1997) / NEW UNITY MOVEMENT (September 1997).
- 4 KIDD (professor at Toronto University) declares that the tax payers had paid their share in 1993 but ASSELIN (Canadian Olympic Association) disputes this. Letters from 18 July 1997 and 19 August 1997. On the 20th anniversary of the Olympic opening ceremony, HA (18 July 1996, A4) wrote the tobacco tax would have to be paid until 2005/2006.
- 5 ORGANIZING COMMITTEE MONTREAL (1976, 55).
- 6 ORGANIZING COMMITTEE MONTREAL (1976,59).
- 7 The deficit was calculated by multiplying with the purchasing power parities and with the gross domestic product deflator (PREUSS 1998, 22).
- 8 Cf. PREUSS (1993, 14,61,122).

- 9 UEBERROTH calculated that until 1984, each organizer of Olympic Games who was not urged to erect costly facilities could achieve a surplus (KOAR 24 May 1993).
- 10 It is difficult to determine a value to be used for Fig. 2 from the number of publications of a host city declaring differing profits. The ORGANIZING COMMITTEE BARCELONA, e.g., officially declared to have closed with a profit whereas HOLSA had to balance invoices totaling US\$ 213.4m,⁹⁵ after the Games (NN 16 October 1992).
- 11 The ORGANIZING COMMITTEE Atlanta, e.g., handed over 13 Olympic facilities to the city or state (C.H. BATTLE, dialog of 18 July 1997 / cf. also ORGANIZING COMMITTEE ATLANTA 1996a, 25).
- 12 Cf. „With/without principle“ HANUSCH (1992, 6).
- 13 The costs for temporary facilities strongly depend on the climatic conditions.
- 14 Cf. e.g. the bid of Cape Town 2004 in ROAF, V./DEVENTER, K./HOUSTON, C. (1996,23).
- 15 Cf. i.a. DEMBA 12 September 1991 / NN 13 March 1995 / GOSLING 14 March 1995 / NEW UNITY MOVEMENT September 1997 / EULALIE STOTT 15 September 1997 / KRÜGER 1997, 73.
- 16 Referring to sports facilities cf. DAUME (1976, 155), dialog with W. TRÖGER (President of NOC for Germany) from 20 April 1998.
- 17 Cf. GERMAN (1993, 59).
- 18 According to LEE (1989, 4) and ROAF, V./DEVENTER, K./HOUSTON, C. (1996, 25), the construction of Games-related facilities should be linked to the economic and social development plan. As shown, the revenues of OCOGs exceed their operative expenditures to host the Olympics. If the city uses the surplus for projects which are necessary for the Olympics and which fit into the economic and social development plan it is very likely that the Games are an economic success for the city.
- 19 Cf. OLYMPIC WORK GROUP (March 1992) / NN (14 February 1996) / VERNON (20 October 1996) / CASSERE (2 May 1997) / EULALIE STOTT (15 September 1997) / NEW UNITY MOVEMENT (September 1997) / OLYMPIC WORK GROUP (s.d.) / STOP 2004 OLYMPIC BID FORUM (s.d.).
- 20 Gentrification means to become nobler.
- 21 WISWEDE (1991,303).
- 22 Cf. the “Development Action Group” study which investigated eight host cities and other bidders on certain topics with reference to the bidding of Cape Town 2004 (NN 14 February 1996).
- 23 In Atlanta, they had to realize that the Olympics hardly affected focal points of social problems: “Perhaps it was unrealistic to expect that an event like the Olympics would motivate people to tackle deeply embedded social ills” (FRENCH/DISHER summer 1997,391).
- 24 Cf. PREUSS (1998, 71-80).
- 25 Cf. PREUSS (1998,290).
- 26 Cf. i.a. MAENNIG (1992, 16).
- 27 Cf. CATHERWOOD/VAN KIRK (1992, 88f.) . This trend also applies to other frequently demanded events, such as gymnastics, swimming, track and field (cf. KIM 1990, 252). Seoul gained the largest portion of the revenues from the opening ceremony ticket sales. A year prior to the Games, this share was estimated at 60% (cf. NN August 1987, 9).

- 28 A popular way to increase revenues is to sell luxury boxes in the stadium (HOWARD/CROMPTON 1995, 148-150).
- 29 The top curve of Fig. 7 shows the average prices calculated by the overall revenues/number of tickets sold.
- 30 Data from ORGANIZING COMMITTEE MONTREAL (1976, 80) / CATHERWOOD/VAN KIRK (1992, 88) / ORGANIZING COMMITTEE BARCELONA (1992,395) / NN (14 March 1995) /IOC (1996a, 13).
- 31 Apart from the leading position in the financing source of TV rights and marketing, the USA adopt a leading role in the ticket prices, too. With the ACOG revenues, it must be mentioned that the entrance fees included transportation costs to and from the sports facilities for the first time (NN 14 March 1995).
- 32 For Western countries, the average price seems to level off at 15 to 25 US\$,₉₅.
- 33 For poorer and developing countries, the average prices are even lower.
- 34 Cf. PREUSS 1998, 182).
- 35 Munich'72 applied the "principle of social pricing" (ORGANISATIONSKOMITEE MÜCHEN 1974, 305). In Barcelona'92, 66% of the tickets under US\$ 17.65.₉₅ and in Atlanta, 95% of the tickets under US\$ 75.₉₅ were sold (NN 15 March 1995a).
- 36 Cf. NN (14 February 1996) / NEW UNITY MOVEMENT (September 1997).
- 37 EWERS (1993, 33-35) also uses this method. BRUNET (1993,101) does not differentiate between „profit“ and „salaries and wages“ but directly calculates the additional employment from the overall effect. This is possible under the assumption that the total „profit“ is spent income-effective in the host city. Here, this is not assumed. An estimate differentiating between the sectors would be even more precise but it is not possible because an input/output matrix which is necessary to calculate the run-up performance relations for the regions investigated is not at hand and probably does not exist at all.
- 38 The wage ratio would be always 1.0. The induced jobs cannot be calculated because the multipliers of the individual regions are unknown. The multiplier variation in the various analyses and the possibility to considerably influence the analysis results by this multiplier make the author refrain from calculating the total effect (cf. PREUSS 1998, Appendix).
- 39 To be precise the wage ratio would have to be weighted with a weighting factor representing the additional demand the Olympics caused in the various sectors. As stated above, most Games lack of a detailed list of the sectors affected by the Games. (For Atlanta'96, cf. HUMPHREYS/PLUMMER 1996, s.p.) .
- 40 To be precise the wages should be weighted by sector and included in the calculation. However, data are missing, too.
- 41 BRUNET (1993, 100-103) wanted to prove employment effects by Olympic Games based on statistical data. In general, this is to be doubted. In view of the very high investments in Barcelona and the relatively small city, the effects he explained could have been truly triggered off by the Games.
- 42 Cf. also RÖNNINGEN (1995, 19-13).
- 43 Cf. PREUSS (1998,262).
- 44 Cf. also RIGAUD (1 March 1997, 22).
- 45 Employment which is created during phase I-III outside the OCOG is not considered. These are e.g. jobs in the building industry or in agencies.

- 46 In Los Angeles'84 e.g., 16,250 persons worked only 30 days for the OCOG (ERA 1984, 49). Seoul'88 was similar. 300 persons worked 90 days, 700 persons 60 days, 12,100 persons 30 days, 3,350 persons 20 days and 33,550 persons 10 days (LEE 1989, 152 / cf. also ORGANISATIONSKOMITTEE MÜNCHEN 1974, 351 for short-term staff / BRUNET 1993, 101). NN (s.d. c, 1) / NN (s.d. d, 2) / SALTZMAN (6 May 1996).
- 47 In this area, strong competition from enterprises outside the region must be assumed (EWERS 1993, 29) since building enterprises are increasingly more mobile. Nevertheless, the local building industry seems to be in a more favorable position to receive the orders because of their political relations (cf. WRIGHT 1978, 14,17 and anonymous letter on the Atlanta building industry). The increase in employment in the shadow industry should not be underestimated in this sector.
- 48 The new image as host city, the expanded tourist infrastructure and follow-up events in the sports facilities are likely to lead to higher tourist figures.
- 49 This mainly includes jobs related to the follow-up usage of Olympic facilities.
- 50 BRUNET (1993, 101) states the number of lasting jobs at 20,000. Opposed to a primary effect of only 7,000 jobs, the figure seems too high.
- 51 GETZ (7-8 July 1997, 13).
- 52 Cf. similar considerations in GETZ (7-8 July 1997,13) on the demand in tourism as consequence of a mega-event.
- 53 Olympic tourists which pay higher prices e.g. displace recurring guests who do not return to their former accommodations after the Games (cf. on Atlanta'96, FRENCH/DISHER summer 1997,380).
- 54 Cf. DEMBA (12 September 1991) / OLYMPIC WORK GROUP (March 1992) / NN (14 February 1996) / PLESSIS (21 August 1997) / NEW UNITY MOVEMENT (September 1997).
- 55 The price level identifies the average change of all individual prices. A rising price level indicates an open inflation. It must not be ignored that the flexibility of the individual prices has an important function in the market economy to balance supply and demand. If prices in a certain sector rise due to a lack of goods in the host city it is not an inflation. If the price level (of all individual prices) rises permanently it is an inflation.
- 56 In Munich, the rents for housings in the Olympic village increased by 130% immediately after the Games (NN 1972a, 36).
- 57 Cf. to speculative price increases in the period before the Games MAENNIG (1997, 174).
- 58 MAENNIG (1997, 174f.).
- 59 STOP 2004 OLYMPIC BID FORUM (s.d.).

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