

# *The Antinomies of Multicultural Sporting Nationalism: A Case Study of Australia and South Africa*

Douglas Booth, University of Otago, New Zealand

## **Abstract**

A nation emphasises cultural homogeneity; multiculturalism sanctions ethnic diversity. Thus, can a state nationalise its social formation and simultaneously promote multiculturalism? Despite the inherent contradiction in the concept of multicultural nationalism, this is precisely what many liberal democratic states do attempt. This article compares the political histories of multiculturalism and multicultural sport in Australia and South Africa in the context of predominant nationalising forces. The bulk of evidence presented here suggests that multicultural sport in Australia and South Africa has not engendered ethnic and racial tolerance. Yet, some evidence suggests that a legal commitment to multiculturalism will at least encourage debate about how citizens might recognise themselves as members of their polity. In this sense, multiculturalism can dilute more extreme nationalising forces. Support for this position appears in the Australian Football League's racial vilification law and the South African National Olympic Committee's rejection of the South African government's draconian sports and recreation bill.

[T]oday we live in pluralistic societies that are moving further and further away from the model of the nation-state based on a culturally homogeneous population. The diversity of cultural forms of life, ethnic groups, religions, and worldviews is constantly growing. . . . multicultural societies can be held together . . . only if democratic citizenship pays off not only in terms of liberal individual rights and rights of political participation, but also in the enjoyment of social and cultural rights. The citizens must be able to experience *the fair value of their rights* also in the form of social security and the reciprocal recognition of different cultural forms of life. Democratic citizenship can only realise its integrative potential – that is, it can only found solidarity between strangers – if it proves itself as a mechanism that actually realises the material conditions of preferred forms of life (Habermas 1998: 117-19).

'No nation possesses an ethnic base naturally', writes Etienne Balibar (1991: 96). Rather, all states face problems of cohesion and must draw together disparate political, ideological, religious, ethnic and racial interests in a process Balibar calls 'nationalisation'. States 'nationalise' their social formations in the sense that they 'represent [them] in the past or in the future as *if* they formed a natural community, possessing of itself an identity of origins, culture and interests which transcends individuals and social conditions' (Balibar, 1991: 96). But what about those states that subscribe to multiculturalism and acknowledge the nation as a plurality and a network of relationships and associations, rather than a set of culturally homogeneous members; how do they achieve cohesion? What role does sport, a well used tool of nationalisation, play in a multicultural plurality? This article attempts to answer these questions by locating sport in the political history of Australian and South African multiculturalism. In so doing it evaluates Jürgen Habermas' (1998) notion of constitutional patriotism as a solution to the problem of social coherence in multicultural

countries. Habermas (1998) argues that multiculturalism based on solid constitutional and legal foundations will forge a nation of citizens – a real nation – that supplants the imagined ethnic-cultural nation.

### **From Assimilation to Multiculturalism: Nationalism in Post-war Australia**

The origin of Australian multicultural nationalism lies in a bipartisan policy of mass immigration adopted after the Second World War. In 1947 the Labor government began to recruit migrants in the belief that national security and economic prosperity depended upon a large work force and eager consumers. But Labor also had to reassure Anglo-Australians that mass immigration posed no threat to the cherished, century old, white Australia policy. Dubbed 'new Australians', the 2.5 million migrants living in Australia in 1971 (the total population was 12.75 million [Price, 1987: 9]) were expected to assimilate into the pre-existing society and adopt its language, beliefs and customs. Announcing the initial program in 1947, Labor's minister for immigration, Arthur Calwell, promised that all arrivals would be 'Caucasian' and that ninety per cent would come from Britain. When a shortage of Britons forced the government to recruit displaced people from eastern and central Europe, Calwell cheerily noted that they would be either 'red-headed and blue-eyed' or 'natural platinum blondes' (Martin, 1987).

The conservative coalition government that won office in 1949 continued Labor's mass immigration policy. Assimilation also guided the conservatives. When the coalition extended assisted passage to Turks, Greeks, Italians, Spaniards and Portuguese in the mid-1960s, the minister for immigration, Billy Snedden, swore that Australia was, and would remain, 'a monoculture, with everyone living in the same way, understanding each other, and choosing the same aspirations' (Rickard, 1988: 225, 227). Aboriginal policy also rested on assimilation. In 1951 the minister for territories, Paul Hasluck, announced a policy whereby 'all Aborigines . . . will attain the same manner of living as other Australians and live as members of a single Australian community . . . observing the same customs and influenced by the same beliefs, hopes and loyalties as other Australians' (Tatz, 1964: 13-15). Assimilation was a credible option for Aborigines in the interwar years; when pressing for full citizenship they 'suppressed' notions of cultural difference. But after the Second World War 'Aborigines increasingly made political claims on the dual basis of equal citizenship and cultural differences' (Stokes, 1997: 159). Ironically, assimilation heightened Aboriginal political consciousness: assimilation was 'politically powerful because it appealed to the notions of fairness and national unity' and thus helped remove many 'formal obstacles to equality' (Rowse, 1987: 137-8).

Aborigines became politically active in the 1960s. In 1963, Charles Perkins led a group of university students on the so-called 'freedom rides' to break the rigid colour bar in social amenities – particularly swimming pools and cinemas – in several northern New South Wales' towns. Aborigines also aired major grievances: the fate of those at the Maralinga nuclear test site; the prohibition on alcohol in the Northern Territory; forced removal from Mapoon Mission in Queensland; ongoing repression in Queensland; and subsistence wages in the cattle industry. They staked the first major land rights claim, at Yirrkala in Arnhem Land. Conservatives, however, considered land rights taboo: they were contrary to assimilation and, in the words of Peter Nixon, the minister for the interior, would lead to the 'separation and segregation of Aborigines [sic]' (Rowse, 1987: 140). Undoubtedly the most 'eloquent challenge to complacency about assimilation' came from those Aborigines who set up an Aboriginal embassy on the lawns in front of parliament house on Australia Day in 1972. They remained there until forcibly removed by the police several months later (Rowse, 1987: 143-4).

Few policies have sat more at odds with human social organisation than assimilation. Not surprisingly assimilation failed, although patterns of settlement initially disguised its effects. Some migrants sought the fruits of prosperity and the trappings of success by moving into the expanding web of suburbia where they appeared to 'blend'. But few could afford this option. Most required cheap accommodation close to places of work, and this meant living in inner city suburbs – and ethnic enclaves. By 1971 sizeable European minorities, including some 130,000 Yugoslavs, 300,000 Italians and over 160,000 Greeks, occupied virtually entire suburbs where they created, and recreated, their own social and cultural institutions (Jones & Moore, 1994; Mosely, 1994; Price, 1987; Rickard, 1988). Similarly, Aborigines moving to cities in search of jobs congregated in notable enclaves including Redfern (Sydney), Port Adelaide (Adelaide), Fitzroy (Melbourne), South Brisbane (Brisbane).

If spatial segregation was, in the first instance, an economic strategy, it was also a social strategy to deal with Anglo-Australian xenophobia and to maintain a sense of cultural connection. Paradoxically, attempts by new Australians and Aborigines to maintain pre-existing cultural connections also perpetuated disconnection: Anglo-Australians showed little willingness to accommodate new Australians and Aborigines who refused to discard the cultural institutions – religion, language, customs, folklore – that simultaneously bound them together and differentiated them.

A 'mass movement of dissent' ended 23 years of conservative government rule in Australia in 1972. A fresh Labor government promised to replace the old Australian way of life with a 'new nationalism'. Although never explained precisely, the new nationalism 'related to a general pride in Australian achievement, and an increasing disquiet at the extent of foreign investment' (Clark, 1995: 307; see also White, 1981: 169). Advocating ethnic and racial pluralism, Labor terminated assimilation, something Al Grassby, the minister for immigration, called a 'mindless process'. Grassby's version of multicultural nationalism advocated 'respect' and 'preservation' of migrant cultures and customs (Jupp, 1997: 134). In the case of Aborigines, Labor supported self-determination and land rights in the Northern Territory.

Labor's social reforms, in areas such as education, family welfare, family and criminal law, sport and opportunities for women, helped reconstitute the notion of citizenship: Labor alerted Australians to the priority of basic rights – 'of the priority that the real nation of citizens must maintain over the imagined ethnic-cultural nation' (Habermas, 1998: 119-20, 146). The promise of basic rights, which was accompanied by tangible material benefits as a part of Labor's social reform package, significantly weakened the threat of cultural difference that many Anglo-Australians felt immigration posed.

Despite a general opposition to many of Labor's social reforms, the coalition that regained office in 1975 sanctioned ethnic pluralism and passed the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act of 1976 (Rickard, 1988). The coalition government considered migrants 'vital for economic recovery and . . . broader national strategies'. A review of policy, commissioned by prime minister Malcolm Fraser and headed by lawyer Frank Galbally, concluded that 'ethnic cultures must be preserved, not repressed'. Galbally also proffered some important general principles: everyone 'must have equal opportunities to realise their full potential and must have equal access to programs and services', everyone 'should be able to maintain their culture without prejudice or disadvantage', and everyone 'should be encouraged to understand and embrace other cultures' (Jupp, 1997: 133).

Most commentators attribute Australia's official policy of multiculturalism to Galbally's report (Martin, 1987: 72; Jupp, 1997: 135). Successive Labor governments, under Bob Hawke (1983-91) and Paul Keating (1991-96), endorsed and declared their support for 'the cultural, social and economic implications of a multicultural Australia'. In 1983 Labor's minister for immigration, Stewart West, said that 'ethnic groups must be free to express their ethnic identity if they wish to do so' (Martin, 1987: 72).

By the mid-1980s bipartisan support for multiculturalism and Aboriginal land rights had vanished. Increasingly they became topics of controversy as conservative opponents claimed that they undermined the principle of the indivisible nation and the nation as a unity of equivalent individuals. In 1988, John Howard, then parliamentary leader of the opposition conservative Liberal Party, argued that Labor's multicultural and Aboriginal policies threatened national unity. He demanded 'loyalty to Australia at all times and to her institutions and her values and traditions'. Such loyalty, he said, should 'transcend . . . any other set of values'. Prime minister Hawke responded to these attacks and launched the 'National agenda for a multicultural Australia'. But the new agenda imposed a number of caveats on Labor's position, the most far-reaching of which was that 'all Australians should have an overriding and unifying commitment to Australia, its interests and future first and foremost' (Jupp, 1997: 135-6).

Prime minister Keating, Hawke's successor, lent more positive support to multiculturalism which he called a creative force for a rich, diverse and tolerant society (Archer, 1997). Keating also became the first leader to publicly admit white Australia's tainted history and to urge reconciliation with Aborigines:

it was we who did the dispossessing. We took the traditional lands and smashed the traditional way of life. We brought the diseases. The alcohol. We committed the murders. We took the children from their mothers. We practised discrimination and exclusion (quoted in Tatz, 1999: 41).

Under John Howard, conservatives in the late 1990s still spoke the language of multiculturalism and racial tolerance. Recently the government established a national multicultural advisory board. Yet, there is no escaping the conservatives' preference for a culturally homogenous nation. Soon after their election in 1996 the conservatives abolished the office for multicultural affairs and they have actively opposed the Mabo judgement, the *Native Title Act*, the Wik judgement, and the stolen generations issue. Deputy prime minister Tim Fischer claims that Aboriginal land rights will 'break up' Australia while Howard believes that a treaty would imply two nations (Tatz, 1999: 43, 46).

Multiculturalism and race relations in Australia have been subject to a number of shifts in official policy over the last fifty years. But to what extent have these new policies nurtured cultural tolerance in the sphere of sport? I explore this question after outlining the history of multiculturalism in South Africa.

### **Multiculturalism: A National Formula or Apartheid Antidote?**

Just as a racist white Australia policy persuaded Aborigines to suppress their cultural identity, so Afrikaner nationalism and apartheid encouraged South Africa's main political group, the African National Congress (ANC), to dilute exclusive Africanist feelings and tendencies. These had existed in the ranks of the ANC since

its launch in 1912 and they gathered momentum in the 1940s with the formation of the Youth League (Lodge, 1983). However, when confronted by a virulent, violent and racially exclusive Afrikaner nationalism, political mobilisation and unity took precedence over any notions of cultural homogeneity. In 1955 the ANC convened a 'congress of the people'. Africans, Indians, Coloureds and whites attended the congress, which Albert Luthuli, the president-general of the ANC, called 'the first really representative gathering in the Union's history' (Karis & Gerhart, 1977: 61). The delegates formed an anti-apartheid united front known as the Congress Alliance. The Alliance spelled out its manifesto in the Freedom Charter, the key clauses of which reaffirmed the multicultural character of South Africa (Karis & Gerhart, 1977).

Although a 'deeply felt universalism' grounded in the 'rational Enlightenment tradition' inspired Charterist leaders of the Congress Alliance, who generally 'welcom[ed] anyone who shared their ideological convictions', the Freedom Charter primarily served a strategic function as a 'platform for a broader unity of anti-apartheid and democratic forces'. Against a brutal, ethnically exclusive and divisive ruling National Party, it was politically imperative that the Alliance water down ethnicity and paint itself as an 'ideologically heterogeneous liberation movement'. Unity was critical and anything that might have divided the ANC had to be avoided (Filatova, 1997: 49, 51; Adam & Moodley, 1993).

Africanists in the Congress Alliance opposed the Freedom Charter on the grounds that references to national groups 'multiplied racism'. Africanists called themselves 'non-racialists' and rejected the notion that individuals could belong to racial groups (Karis & Gerhart, 1977: 65). In 1959 they left the ANC and formed the Pan-Africanist Congress, although their departure did not mean the end of Africanism within the ANC. As evidence of the presence of an Africanist philosophy, Irina Filatova (1997) refers to the debate on the admission of non-Africans to the ANC at its third consultative conference in 1969 and the pre-1985 prohibition on non-Africans joining the national executive (see also Lodge, 1983).

Although most members of the Congress Alliance in the 1950s regarded the terms 'non-racial' and 'multi-racial' as synonyms, with some dismissing as semantic the debate over terminology (Karis & Gerhart, 1977: 94, n. 203), non-racialism emerged as the popular nomenclature. Non-racialism, however, was neither a nationalising philosophy nor a nationalising strategy. It was a linguistic strategy, the objective of which was to suppress racial identities in the face of a common enemy.

Just as black power and pride emerged among Australian Aborigines in the 1960s so too did they surface in South Africa. Like their Africanist forefathers, a new generation of leaders, including Steve Biko, the intellectual father of Black Consciousness, saw their role as raising political awareness and consciousness. They urged blacks to remove the shackles of inferiority and dependency engendered by generations of white oppression and paternalism. Hence the slogan, 'black man, you are on your own'. They argued that self-understanding, assertion of black values and the creation of a separate black social identity were the keys to psychological liberation. (Ironically, the ruling National Party initially interpreted the Black Consciousness movement's introspection as being consistent with its policy of separate development!) Strategically, Black Consciousness philosophy also meant severing existing ties with white liberals (Biko, 1979).

Black Consciousness philosophy pushed the entire anti-apartheid movement towards non-collaboration, particularly after the Soweto riots in 1976 and the state's subsequent crackdown on resistance organisations the following year. Non-

collaboration underpinned international sanctions against South Africa, including the sports boycott, and from the perspective of black South Africans it negated the state and provided a psychological escape from helplessness. But non-collaboration neither transformed the state nor empowered the victims of apartheid. Moreover, it served as an obstacle to the resolution of apartheid. Only after confronting the realities of a South Africa teetering on the edge of an economic and political abyss did the anti-apartheid movement finally abandon non-collaboration and agree to negotiate with the apartheid regime.

Discussions about multiculturalism flourished in the turbulence of negotiations. 'Constitutional guidelines', prepared in the late 1980s confirmed the ANC's commitment to official recognition of the 'linguistic and cultural diversity of the people'. Likewise, its election policy, 'A better life for all', for the first universal-suffrage election in 1994 referred to 'developing . . . different cultures, beliefs and languages as a source of . . . common [national] strength'. The 'rainbow nation', a term coined by Nobel laureate Archbishop Desmond Tutu to signify an indivisible yet simultaneously intrinsically divided nation, represented a Charterist interpretation of a multicultural South Africa (Filatova, 1997).

Since the 1994 election South Africa has witnessed an Africanist renaissance. Filatova (1997) attributes this to a series of political realities and new cultural, intellectual and ideological tendencies weakening ideas about a multi-racial nation. She makes three central observations. Firstly, both the 1994 and 1999 elections demonstrated the paramountcy of race and ethnicity in South Africa (Johnson, 1998; Reynolds, 1994). Secondly, evidence of the ANC's support for ideological and cultural Africanisation was a prerequisite for Africa's acceptance of South Africa as a political and economic power and as a moral leader in the continent's affairs. Likewise, Africanisation was a prerequisite for the ANC's domestic support, particularly among left-leaning political groups opposed to the ANC's policy of reconciliation with the former beneficiaries of apartheid. Thirdly, Filatova (1997) attributes much of the cultural renaissance to a 'natural reaction to the past'. No longer 'denigrated by the apartheid regime' or 'stigmatised' by the resistance movement as apartheid props, African cultures and languages have blossomed. 'The whole continent has gone or is going through this process', she says, and it would be 'strange if South Africa was spared . . . the re-assertion of pride, the invention and re-invention of black identity, styles and fashions, . . . the discovery of "Africanness"' (Filatova, 1997: 52-3).

Critics of the ANC, especially those who identify themselves as liberals (for whom the nation is a category of equivalent individuals), claim that South Africa is rapidly declining into majoritarian nationalism under African hegemony (Johnson, 1998; Uys, 1999). The ANC's discussion document, 'Nation-formation and nation building', released in mid-1997, gives these claims credence. Referring to strategic and tactical decisions taken at the 1969 and 1985 consultative conferences, the document states that the principal aim of the national democratic revolution is the 'liberation of Black people in general and Africans in particular'. What is required', the document adds, 'is a continuing battle to assert African hegemony in the context of a multicultural and nonracial society'. Consistent with Africanisation, the document also questions the value and use of 'the popular imagery of a "rainbow nation"', which it warns risks collapsing into a euphemism for a South Africa where black Africans pay allegiance to Africa, whites to Europe, Indians to India and 'Coloureds somewhere in the undefined middle of the rainbow' (ANC, 1997: thesis 7). Critics also cite Thabo Mbeki's famous 1996 'I am an African' speech as

evidence of the new presidents Africanist leanings. In fact, Mbeki's (1996) speech emphasises the multi-racial character of the African identity:

I am an African . . . I owe my being to the Khoi and the San . . . I am formed of the migrants who left Europe . . . In my veins courses the blood of the Malay slaves . . . I am the grandchild of the warrior men and women that Hintsa and Sekhukhune led . . . I am the grandchild who lays fresh flowers on the Boer graves at St Helena and the Bahamas . . . I come of those who were transported from India and China (Mbeki, 1996: 1-2).

Nonetheless, the ANC has to formulate a set of policy objectives for multiculturalism beyond its historical role as an antidote to apartheid. This lack of clarity has implications for mixed sport that the ANC believes will, somehow, engender a new non-racial national identity. But as we shall see, a number of obstacles stand in the way -just as they do in Australia.

### **Diversity and Tolerance in Multicultural Anglo-Australian Sport?**

In the 1970s and 1980s successive Labor and conservative coalition governments advocated multicultural nationalism as a foundation for a tolerant plural Australia. Sport offers an excellent vehicle to test this concept and to ascertain the relationships between official policy and public sentiment in the cultural sphere. Two sports, soccer and Australian football, provide some valuable lessons,

Anglo-Australians controlled soccer in the 1950s and initially the game's administrators 'enthused' about boats arriving crammed with immigrants, Goodwill rapidly dissipated when the new Australians refused to play the Australian way. At issue were 'vastly different concepts of manliness and method, aggression and authority'. Australians played a physical game based on hard running and body contact; Europeans played at a slower pace, emphasising skills and the 'deft touch'. Australians unquestioningly accepted referees' decisions and they did not pull shirts or spit; immigrants 'voiced dissent' and sought 'retribution for perceived injustices on the field'. Anglo-Australians built soccer clubs around district loyalties while new arrivals founded clubs on ethnic identities and invested more in the financial and social structures of clubs than in the code (Mosely, 1997a: 159-62; Hay, 1994: 70).

Soccer, writes Mosely (1997a: 155, 162-3) 'was an exceptional forum in which immigrants felt they stood equal with, if not superior to, Australians'; European-style football had already surpassed British-style and immigrants knew they were good. By the early 1960s Italian and Greek immigrants controlled the game's governing authority, the Australian Soccer Federation (ASF), and ethnic clubs dominated the top competitions. By the late 1960s immigrants, including Slavs, Jews, Hungarians, Czechs, Ukrainians, Poles, Germans, Dutch and Maltese, had a sizeable presence in the game.

Anglo-Australians generally dismissed soccer as a 'wog's' game. Some vented disapproval. In 1965, for example, youths in Melbourne dabbled anti-soccer slogans over the Middle Park soccer ground, chopped down the goal posts, and tried to torch the grandstand (Mosely, 1997a: 167). Australian football and rugby league officials also reacted to the perceived threat posed by soccer. In 1952 the Victorian Football League directed suburban affiliates to 'secure all available public sporting space in Melbourne in order to stifle the burgeoning threat posed by soccer's migrant-inspired growth' (Stewart, Hess & Dixon, 1997: 191).

Traditional sports such as Australian football, rugby league and cricket attracted some immigrants, a handful of whom even became stars. But most participated despite, rather than because of, assimilation policies. Born to Maltese parents, rugby league player Mario Fenech describes being called a 'wog' and being made to 'feel different'. He chose to play rugby league at school to prove his Australian-ness to his peers (Mosely, 1997b: 204-5).

During the period of mass immigration, 'soccer clubs became a vehicle and forum for the expression of nationalistic sentiment' (Hughson, 1997a: 54-5) particularly among Croatians and Macedonians concerned about the independence of their former homelands. Violence associated with ethnic rivalry, most of it grossly exaggerated by an hysterical media, prompted soccer officials to consider banning ethnic club names in the 1960s (Hay, 1994). A second set of proposals culminated in the ASF prohibiting clubs from using ethnic names in 1977. Rescinding the ban in 1983, it was reapplied to all levels of competition in 1992 (Mosely, 1997a).

Paradoxically, many senior soccer officials who witnessed first hand the failure of assimilation are now committed Australian nationalists who question multiculturalism. They argue that multiculturalism dissolves national identity and they have made determined efforts to Australianise and 'de-ethnicise' the game. Concerned about the game's image and eager to transform soccer into a major football code, the ASF commissioned an independent investigation that blamed soccer's poor image on the game's close affiliation with ethnicity. The investigation recommended breaking the ethnic backbones of clubs in the national soccer league and emphasising geographic loyalties and identities. In essence, this meant removing foreign and ethnic names, logos and emblems. Thus, Sydney Croatia, for example, changed its name, first to Sydney CSC (Croatia Soccer Club), and then to Sydney United.

Has the ban tempered ethnic rivalry? Hughson (1997b) says not. Tensions 'simmer' between and within communities, and some supporters continue to parade their ethnicity in ways contrary to the spirit of multiculturalism. He points to the Bad Blue Boys, a group of 'highly parochial supporters' who follow Sydney United and use soccer to express an aggressive nationalistic allegiance to Croatia as it existed in the 1940s under the leadership of the Nazi collaborator Ante Pavelic. Why do these young Australian-born men 'choose to form their social identity in the image of their parents' culture?' Hughson blames 'exclusion from Australian sports such as rugby league and cricket'. The Bad Blue Boys feel 'ostracised from the dominant sporting culture' and thus 'band together with other Croatians and "wogs" to play soccer'. Ostracism also manifests in the Bad Blue Boys' indifference to Australia's national team, the Socceroos. By reserving their support for national players with Croatian backgrounds, the Boys express, at best, a secondary allegiance to the Socceroos.

Australian soccer nationalists chide those who do not subscribe to the idea of sport as a means of forging cultural unity. In 1992, journalist Ray Gatt accused Sydney CSC of failing to foster the game and using soccer to promote long-standing political grievances. Gatt's colleague Jeff Wells accused Sydney United of being 'brazenly Croatian' (Hughson, 1997a: 58). Australian sporting nationalists show very little, if any, comprehension of multiculturalism. They equate multiculturalism with assimilation, that is, they demand that ethnic minorities affirm their allegiance to the dominant culture. According to Mike Cockerill from the *Sydney Morning Herald*, the 1992 Socceroo team was a 'microcosm' of a multicultural society that showed how 'people can co-exist peacefully' when they 'leave their traditional grievances

behind' (Hughson, 1997b: 172). A few months later Cockerill urged supporters of Sydney CSC to embrace 'assimilation' and throw away their national flags (Hughson, 1997a: 58). Australian sporting nationalists refuse to concede the presence of 'cultural boundaries that might exclude some from membership of the Australian nation' (Hughson, 1997a: 58). Yet, in many respects this popular view fitted the official policy put forward by the former office of multicultural affairs in its 'National agenda for a multicultural Australia'. By setting 'carefully defined limits' on how immigrants express their identities, the agenda privileged traditional Anglo-Australian culture, even if the content and values of the latter escape precise definition (Hughson, 1997b: 169).

The multicultural agenda no doubt focused the attention of sports officials on racial issues. But where much of the debate about multiculturalism centred on the symbols of identity, overt malicious racism prompted senior sports officials to intervene in a more decisive legal manner. Australian football and rugby league began a tentative recruitment of Aboriginal players in the 1960s. Incarcerated on reserves, missions and settlements few Aborigines played representative or elite sport in Australia before then. Of course, sport could not escape rising Aboriginal consciousness (which, as noted earlier, contained a cultural dimension), confidence and power. Australian footballer Syd Jackson and jockey Richard Lawrence 'Darby' McCarthy, embodied the fundamental and significant change in Aboriginal life in the 1960s. Neither shied from expressing the differences between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal culture; both were abrasive and aggressive about their Aboriginality. Darby recalls a 'bloke asking me about being coloured': 'No', Darby replied, 'I'm black, you're coloured. I was born black, stay black and die black. You're born pink, go white, get brown in the sun and finally end up grey' (Tatz, 1995: 249).

Spectators and fans, however, were less inclined to put out welcome mats for Aborigines. In 1982 Michael Gawenda, now editor of the *Melbourne Age*, reported hearing a 'chorus' of racial invective directed at Aboriginal footballer Jim Krakouer every time he approached the ball. Similarly journalist Martin Flanagan recalls 'nice young men', occupying the best seats at the Melbourne Cricket Ground, going 'pink from the exertion of yelling "hit him" every time a black player [went] near the ball'. 'Go sniff your petrol' was a commonplace, as was 'you black fucking cunts' – not from rough men standing in the 'outer' but from middle aged women sitting in the main stands (Tatz, 1995: 154). Seventy-four year-old Mary Millard admitted calling Krakouer a 'black bastard'. While she played down the significance of her words – 'it's all part of being at the footy on a Saturday arvo. It's just a way of letting out your feelings' (Warren & Tsaousis, 1997: 34) – they add weight to what social critic Humphrey McQueen labels the jingoistic and viciously racist Australian character (White, 1981: 168).

After decades of silence Aborigines finally responded to racial sledging. In 1993 Australian footballer Nicky Winmar answered the racial abuse from supporters of the opposing Collingwood club. The *Sydney Morning Herald* describes well the scene:

The Collingwood cheer-squad had decided to remind Nicky Winmar . . . that he was one of them rather than one of us, and they did so in the manner for which they are justly notorious. After the final siren [Winmar] gave the [Collingwood] cheer-squad as good as he had received, lifting his jumper and pointing to his skin. As spectacularly talented as he is with or near a football, Winmar has never been more

eloquent or effective for his cause or his colour than he was in that moment. (Tatz, 1995: 154)

Aboriginal player Michael Long took the response to its next stage in 1995, forcing the governing Australian Football League (AFL) to implement a code of conduct that included provisions for dealing with racial abuse. Earlier that season Long alleged that Collingwood's Damien Monkhorst had called him a 'black cunt'. Why do we have to put up with it?', asked Long:

That's not part of the game; it's not why I play. It's not what we should have to put up with. I think any racial or verbal abuse concerning colour or about your parents directed at you is wrong . . . Aboriginal people have been coping it for too long and I wanted to make a stand - not just in relation to what happens on the football field but off the field in day to day life. (Warren & Tsaousis, 1997: 38).

The AFL initially proposed arbitration as a means to deal with racial vilification but the issue continued to simmer and the federal minister for immigration and ethnic affairs, Nick Bolkus, finally intervened. He forced the AFL to implement a racial vilification policy that imposes heavy fines and match suspensions on offenders (Winkler, 1998). But can the law facilitate multicultural/multiracial 'tolerance' in Australia? As we shall see, this question applies equally to South Africa where the ANC government threatens to deploy the law to nationalise the social formation.

### **Sport Under the South African Rainbow**

ANC leaders identified sport as a key tool in the forging of a multicultural South Africa. Notwithstanding some highly promising moments, the political realities of ethnocentric majoritarianism intruded – just as they did in Australia.

Concomitant with the reappraisal of noncollaboration as a strategy of resistance in the late 1980s Charterists advocated negotiations with the internationally isolated apartheid establishment as a way to transform racist sporting structures. As Krish Naidoo, a spokesperson for this group argued, 'we're past the stage of straight anti-apartheid resistance. We're building a new non-racial South Africa and there's a proper way of doing things through consultation. The time has come to sit down and start talking' (Booth, 1998: 178). But elements of the far-left, which enjoyed support from Africanists, opposed negotiations and debates over strategy split the anti-apartheid sports movement. The ANC-aligned National Sports Congress (NSC) seized the initiative from the South African Council on Sport and led negotiations (Booth, 1998: 156-60, 176-9).

In 1991 the NSC issued several prerequisites for lifting the boycott and readmitting establishment sport to international competition: a single controlling association in each code, implementation of development programs to redress material inequalities caused by apartheid, affirmative action in team selection, and new flags, anthems, colours and emblems. The establishment greeted with hostility and outrage suggestions that selectors might use criteria other than merit to choose representative teams: in its eyes sport transcended multicultural nationalist objectives. The Citizen called the United Cricket Board's decision to add two black

players to the 1992 Cricket World Cup squad 'ridiculous' while the *Financial Mail* claimed that the Board had 'undermined the principle of fairness'. The *Cape Times* condemned as a 'bad principle' the selection of a non-white player, Cheryl Roberts, ahead of the higher ranked Surita Odendaal, an Afrikaner, in the South African table tennis team for the Barcelona Olympics (Booth, 1998: 192). Likewise, the establishment and the Afrikaner community declared the Springbok emblem 'non-negotiable'. According to a spokesperson from the right-wing conservative party, 'black communists and white liberals' rejected the Springbok because it represented Christian values' (Booth, 1998: 212-13).

If affirmative action contradicts the notion of sport as a meritocracy, it is consistent with multicultural nationalism that seeks to stabilise relationships in a cultural network. Moreover, as a professed liberal democracy, South Africa cannot turn a blind eye to blatant social inequalities. The ANC's affirmative action programs aim to nurture equity. Identical treatment of social groups would constitute discrimination because it would leave intact apartheid's legacies by focusing on equality of opportunities rather than equality of results. If the state continued to afford equal opportunities to everyone then it would merely favour those who monopolised past opportunities (Adam & Moodley, 1993). Such was the intensity of opposition to affirmative action that it lends credibility to claims that merit selection is a euphemism for status quo.

Opponents dressed their position in conservative liberal ideology, insisting that the state should not pursue collective (multicultural) goals beyond guaranteeing the personal freedom, welfare and security of its citizens. But by focusing on the individual they ignore the fact that people only emerge as individuals through the process of socialisation. In other words, collective life shapes individual identity (Habermas, 1998; Kymlicka, 1995). Opponents also ignore South Africa's historical and political context. Four decades of apartheid provides more than enough moral justification for affirmative action, a point well made by officials from the International Table Tennis Federation and the International Olympic Committee who advanced the selection of Cheryl Roberts as a special moral case. They invited South Africa to send two players to Barcelona, one from the former anti-apartheid Table Tennis Board and another from the former establishment Table Tennis Union, to promote a symbolic unity in local table tennis.

Over the past decade rugby, long the national game of Afrikaners, has been the principal site of sporting struggle in South Africa with township development, the Springbok emblem and racial quotas key concerns. Apartheid symbols remained an issue even after the anti-apartheid South African Rugby Union and the establishment South African Rugby Board amalgamated as the South African Rugby Football Union (SARFU) and the Republic rejoined international competition. Matters reached boiling point in August 1992 during a rugby Test against New Zealand at Ellis Park (Johannesburg). Several white spectators taunted Steve Tshwete, then the ANC's spokesperson on sport and later the minister for sport in the first ANC government, by extending an apartheid flag for his autograph. Before the kickoff Louis Luyt, an Afrikaner nationalist and vice-president of SARFU, instructed the announcer to play the apartheid national anthem—*Die Stem van Suid Afrika* (The Voice of South Africa). It was a deliberate breach of a pledge not to promote apartheid symbols. The white crowd sang as one. In the furore that followed, an Afrikaans newspaper *Rapport* waxed lyrical about Afrikaner defiance and the heroic supporters who had declared 'here is my song, here is my flag. Here I stand and I will sing it today' (Booth, 1998: 191; Nauright, 1996).

The inauguration of Nelson Mandela as president on 10 May 1994 was an emotional and joyous occasion. One lasting moment from that day is of black people cheering airforce planes as they passed overhead and swarming over armoured police vehicles. They now claimed as their own these former reviled instruments of white authority. Indeed, a black president and black ministers 'proved' black ownership. By contrast, no black people claimed ownership of the South African rugby team. When England trounced South Africa in a Test match shortly after the inauguration, many black people expressed delight.

Logically, then, there seemed little prospect of the Springbok team nationalising South Africa during the Rugby World Cup (RWC) in 1995. One could hardly expect a lily-white team, predominantly white spectators and a racially divisive emblem to inculcate national feelings of belonging among blacks. On the eve of the tournament, however, president Mandela embraced the team: 'the Springboks are our boys. I ask every [South African] to stand behind them because they are our pride, they are my pride, they are your pride' (Nauright, 1997: 5). It was an unanticipated gesture. As the official host, protocol required his participation, but Mandela could have maintained a stiff and indifferent formality. Instead he showed a genuine and infectious enthusiasm.

Adam and Moodley (1993: 43) argue that 'politics is about the manipulation of symbols as a precondition for the exercise of real power'. This only partly explains Mandela's support. Three additional factors influenced Mandela: his broad philosophies of multiculturalism and reconciliation which, at that juncture, coincided with a fresh drive by the ANC to win white votes in the upcoming municipal elections, and a steadily reforming rugby administration under chief executive, Edward Griffiths.

But even Mandela's endorsement did not initially transform ordinary black opinion. Black reappraisal only came after the Springboks defeated Australia in the opening match of the tournament. That victory engendered perhaps the first palpable sense of nationalism among South Africans. Ultimately, the effectiveness of a national ideology requires the presence of 'another community' whose differences the nation seeks to project and protect itself against (Balibar, 1991). In front of an estimated world wide television audience of 300 million, South Africa 'defeated' the ideal 'other' – Australia, the reigning champion. On 25 June, in an unprecedented act by any head of state, Mandela strode onto the turf before the final against New Zealand wearing a South African team jersey. The predominantly white audience rose to its feet chanting 'Nel-son, Nel-son, Nel-son'. Eighty minutes plus extra time later South Africa was the world champion. Black and white South Africans joined in celebration: Nelson Mandela hugged team captain François Pienaar who told the world that 'we were inspired by the president' (Booth, 1998: 218). It was a moment of intense multicultural nationalism, a moment when South Africans formed a 'natural' community whose interests transcended individual differences and social conditions.

By definition national identity is temporary (Sartre, 1976) and the euphoria accompanying South Africa's victory in the RWC soon receded as different groups began to reflect on their positions. Some right-wing Afrikaners disavowed the Springboks labelling the players 'traitors'. 'I wouldn't pay five cents to go to their games', declared a spokesperson for the paramilitary *Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging*: 'the players have no national pride whatsoever. It is the Mandela team. Mandela is an enemy of the Afrikaners'. Likewise, several black commentators challenged popular notions that sport could nationalise South Africa

in any substantive sense. Rafiq Rohan, a parliamentary reporter for the black newspaper *City Press*, wrote that 'it's going to take a lot more than a smiling and gleeful president sporting a [Springbok] jersey and . . . cap to get everyone in the country to accept the symbol and colours of the historic enemy, the cultural, social, and political enslaver, and to proclaim them with pride' (Booth, 1998: 219, 221). Like the sentiments expressed by some Australian-Croatians with respect to the Soccerroos, these comments highlighted the inherent contradictions in multicultural sporting nationalism.

Black sports officials expressed increasing anger during 1996 and 1997 at the continued selection of lily-white Springbok teams and SARFU's failure to take rugby to black, now euphemistically referred to as 'disadvantaged', communities. In rugby, Tshwete complained, 'linesmen are white, referees are white, team is white, everything is white' (Barnett, 1998). A long list of incidents added to an already tense situation: the insensitive selection of Henry Tromp (an Afrikaner convicted of killing a black farm labourer), a resurgence of apartheid flags at international matches, and the public airing of a secretly taped conversation in which the Springbok coach, Andre Markgraaff, called Mluleki George (president of the NSC, now the National Sports Council) a 'kaffir' – the worst expletive in Afrikaans.

Responding to public outrage, Tshwete instructed officials in his department to investigate rugby. And on the basis of a damning departmental report, president Mandela approved a full judicial enquiry, headed by advocate Jules Browde, into the state of rugby in South Africa (Black & Nauright, 1998). SARFU successfully challenged the inquiry in court. But by compelling Mandela and Tshwete to give evidence and face gruelling cross examinations, Louis Luyt, then the president of SARFU, overplayed his hand. The ANC and NSC changed tack and forced Luyt to resign with a proposal to disband SARFU and set up an alternative structure that would control the game in South Africa and preserve all existing financial contracts.

Unfortunately, the puerile reaction of several ANC spokespersons, particularly the minister for sport, to the court's decision against the legality of the commission of inquiry reinforced perceptions of a tightening African hegemony (Johnson, 1998). Discarding his position as a government minister in a state whose constitution endorses judicial reviews of executive decisions, Tshwete dismissed the ruling and called on the international community to boycott Springbok rugby. Z. B. du Toit, a senior political reporter with *Rapport*, quite correctly reminded readers of the

democratic principle that limits should be placed on the state's power in terms of its rights to interfere in the affairs of autonomous organisations in civilian society. [South Africa] is exhibiting the characteristics of a one party state more and more, it is essential that institutions that are part of the civil society retain a great deal of autonomy. Not only the supreme authority of the law but also individuals' free and unfettered access to the courts have been endangered by the Luyt debacle (*City Press*, 10 May 1998).

Of course, like many former Afrikaner nationalists who have suddenly found democratic liberalism and now bleat about what they call their loss of democratic rights, du Toit conveniently overlooked forty years of apartheid repression and the apartheid state's consistent circumvention of judicial decisions.

Yet, even du Toit's lack of historical contextualisation cannot hide the ANC's apparent determination to Africanise – in its mind, truly democratise – sport. The

department of sports and recreation's white paper considers Africanisation a priority – it is described as 'an instrument' that will 'lead to long-term sustainability' (Department of Sports and Recreation, 1998: 9) – while an early draft version of the Sport and Recreation Bill included provisions for fines and/or jail sentences for sports officials who failed to select blacks in national teams! These moves prompt the question, can the law facilitate racial and ethnic tolerance in the national interest.

### **'Constitutional Patriotism': A Recipe for Multicultural Nationalism?**

Manifest in multicultural nationalism is a political tension between support for cultural difference and ethnocentricity. Can these tensions be resolved? Habermas believes so. His solution resides in what he calls 'constitutional patriotism', a process whereby the state 'uncouples' the political culture from different cultural, ethnic and religious identities and nurtures the former under the umbrella of a neutral system of law. The initial objective is to forge a consensus among cultural groups on the language, procedures and conventions for the legitimate enactment of laws and the legitimate exercise of power in the competition for resources in a shared political arena; the ultimate objective is to forge a nation of citizens for whom the idea of an ethnic-cultural nation is a myth (Habermas, 1998).

When it comes to explaining how, precisely, states might achieve constitutional patriotism, Habermas is short on detail, and even more parsimonious with examples. The whole process apparently rests on the 'political integration of citizens' which he argues 'ensures loyalty to the common political culture'. Although even this process, he admits, is not neutral: political goals influence legislative decisions and frame the legal and constitutional system that expresses a particular form of life, and a particular historical experience, and not merely notions of basic rights with respect to political incorporation (Habermas, 1998: 217, 225; Habermas, 1999). Interestingly, Calhoun (1997: 48) singles out Switzerland, Canada and the United States as examples of highly developed 'political cultures – and consumer and media cultures – that are not reducible to the culture of any of the many ethnic groups within them'.

What about multicultural Australia and South Africa? The preceding discussion certainly identifies space in which a determined state could nurture some form of constitutional patriotism. But this may not be necessary. Rather than a prerequisite for multicultural nationalism, as Habermas suggests, a well defined and structured 'neutral' system of law may be sufficient to put the brake on extreme expressions of nationalist sentiment and engender a new political culture. Powerful nationalising forces based on notions of cultural homogeneity still flourish in Australia and South Africa as the respective ban on ethnic club names in soccer and the department of sport and recreation's white paper testify. Moreover, notions of multiculturalism still remain hopelessly vague and ambiguous. Consider the following comments by a young Australian-Croatian soccer fan:

multiculturalism is a big mumbo jumbo kind of thing . . . there is always going to be trouble with it. How can it work? Take the Croatians and Serbs as an example . . . you come here and are supposed to be Australian now . . . but they still allow you to be Croatian and Serbian. The Croatians come here and build their clubs and community, the Serbians come here and build their clubs and community which

support their Serbian philosophies and Croatians our philosophies. They expect there not to be some anger between us . . . it's saying it's alright but they know the consequences of it. Multiculturalism has just got too many consequences . . . it's a load of shit I think. . . . *but it's good*, like we can use it . . . take advantage of it, if it's here . . . the Australian government wants it . . . we'll take advantage of it. (Hughson, 1997b: 181-2).

Nonetheless, in their commitment to multiculturalism Australia and South Africa have both established official bureaucracies to assist in its development, promotion and reinforcement. More importantly, they have passed legislation to ensure its protection. Australia's Race Hatred Act (1995) is one example. The Act prohibits offensive behaviour based on racial hatred. Such behaviour includes words, images or writing that is likely to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate another person on the basis of their race, colour, national or ethnic origin. The Race Hatred Act was critical in facilitating the AFL's racial vilification rule (Gardiner, 1997).

Notwithstanding an 'avalanche of invective' directed at the judge who upheld SARFU's appeal against the commission of inquiry into its affairs, the fact that both sides (with the notable exception of Steve Tshwete) adhered to the legal process bodes well for a new political culture in South Africa—a point not lost on the editors of *Business Day*:

South Africans should stop for a moment to marvel how, against the odds, we have crafted a constitutional state with a judiciary sufficiently independent to make such critical findings against the political authority. We should also be grateful that the transition has been sufficiently stable that judges of the old order have retained their tenure. We should be grateful, too, that the president appeared in court, if not eagerly at least without demurring . . . he has reacted to the finding against him with appropriate dignity and gravitas, making the point that the veracity of [the] judgement needs to be tested in the appeal court. Mandela and his office have set a good example in defining the legitimate bounds of criticism of judges.

Arguably, these constitutional and legislative foundations of multiculturalism in Australia and South Africa have shifted the national perspective of many citizens. But this has been achieved, not so much by a conspicuous separation of the political culture, that treats all citizens equally (although this has probably been more significant in Australia than in South Africa), from the broader hegemonic majority culture, but by continual social debate about rights, freedom of association, equality and justice. South African sport offers some good examples.

In 1998 when the South African government proposed restructuring the administration of sport, it met opposition from the National Olympic Committee of South Africa, headed by the former international anti-apartheid campaigner Sam Ramsamy. He argued that provisions to deny funding to sports federations that did not sponsor development competitions or that excluded disadvantaged people from their national teams would discriminate against smaller, mostly white, sports and the volunteers who give their free time in the interests of the nation's youth. At a

subsequent parliamentary hearing on affirmative action, Lulu Xingwana, the chair of parliament's sport and recreation committee, said that the ANC had noted increasing numbers of blacks in top-level sport. At the same hearing, Ali Bacher, managing director of the United Cricket Board, assured the committee that no province will 'ever [again] field an all-white team', while Rian Oberholzer, chief executive of SARFU, spoke confidentially about a new quota system in junior ranks bearing fruit at the senior level. Indeed by 2000, SARFU's quota system was operational at all levels below the Springbok national team level (Kruger, 2000).

These are significant reversals in longstanding entrenched positions and at least point to the emergence of a national consensus on how citizens should recognise themselves as members of their polity. Given South Africa's violent past, this is indeed a miracle. South Africa is not alone. Australia, too, experienced something of a miracle in the early 1970s. When Labor engineered a series of policies that afforded basic rights priority over the imagined ethnic-cultural nation, it effectively privileged *multiculturalisation* over nationalisation.

## NOTES:

1. Notwithstanding the multicultural composition of their social formations, Australia and South Africa are predominantly Anglo-Celtic and African cultures respectively. In 1991, 86% of Australians were born in either Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom or Ireland. Asians made up 4% and Aborigines 1.6% of the population (Jupp, 1997: 139). In 1993, 76% of South Africans were African with 6% English-speaking whites and 7% Afrikaners (Thompson, 1995: 278). The approach adopted here has three strengths. Firstly, terms such as multiculturalism and nationalism lack precision, are typically ambiguous, and are often used in 'strikingly diverse' ways. However, because they are 'shaped by historical contingencies and political exigencies', political-historical approaches analyse meaning in practice (Kymlicka, 1995: 75; see also Kincheloe & Steinberg, 1997). Secondly, as Arthur Stinchcombe (1978: 21-2) and John Tosh (1991: 124) remind us, the most profound insights derive from comparisons that reveal the similar and the unique. Thirdly, a plethora of studies confirm Lincoln Allison's (1993: 4-5) observation that sport 'has a complex and important interaction with nationality and the phenomenon of nationalism' (e.g., for Australia see Booth & Tatz, 2000; for South Africa see Nauright, 1997).
2. In the 1960s the Northern Territory and every state, except Queensland, reconsidered and revised their Aboriginal statutes, either abolishing or ameliorating them.
3. Ironically, Labor also terminated Australia's mass migration program. Under increasing attack for a policy that critics said fuelled inflation, Labor cut its immigration target from 140,000 (1972) to 50,000 (1975) (Martin, 1987: 71-2).
4. In 1975, after the opposition blocked supply and prime minister Whitlam refused to test his party's support at the polls, the governor-general, John Kerr, dismissed the Labor government.

5. In 1992, the High Court ruled in the Mabo case that native title existed at the time of British occupation and that it continued to exist in the Torres Strait, Led by prime minister Paul Keating, who asserted his authority over the process, Labor passed the Native Title Act in 1994. The Act acknowledged that native title existed on all land and that it would continue to exist where the Crown had not seized such land. The Act also established an Indigenous Land Corporation to purchase land in areas unavailable for claim. In December 1996, the high court ruled in the Wik case that Aborigines had conjoint rights with pastoral leaseholders, but that in the event of conflict over such rights, those of the leaseholders would prevail. Newly elected prime minister Howard immediately initiated a legislative response to effectively extinguish native title rights on pastoral leases. The 'ten-point' Wik legislation passed in 1998, following bitter debate, particularly over the coalition's malicious claims about the vulnerability of white property rights. In 1995 Labor bowed to years of lobbying and pressure from Aboriginal groups and established a national inquiry into the separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children from their families. The inquiry concluded that Australia knowingly committed genocide through the forcible transfer of children as a matter of official policy as recently as the 1970s. During 1996 the newly elected conservative coalition government balked at making a submission to the inquiry. Finally persuaded, the government insisted that it should not be involved.
6. Originally the South African Native National Congress, it adopted the title African National Congress in 1923.
7. The key clause in the Charter is 'South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white'. The Charter also promised 'equal rights' to 'all national groups' including the rights to 'use their own language and to develop their own folk culture and customs'. Both black and white nationalist thinking in South Africa treats ethnicity and race as identical.
8. The collapse of multiparty negotiations at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa, massacres in Boipatong and Bisho, endless killings on the East Rand and in Natal, several suspensions of official political discussions, and the assassination of ANC and Communist Party leader Chris Hani, testify to the turbulence of negotiations.
9. With the exception of the Coloured and Indian working classes who voted for the National Party in the 1994 election, and whites who redirected their votes from the National Party and the Freedom Front to the Democratic Party in the 1999 election, the pattern of voting in both elections followed traditional ethnic divisions.
10. Booth & Tatz (2000: 131) estimate that only 18 Aboriginal men and two women made careers in sport between the two world wars.
11. In recognition of the apartheid state's increasing tolerance of racial mixing, the antiapartheid movement adopted the term 'establishment' to refer to state sponsored structures and organisations. Hence establishment sport refers to

the white dominated network of clubs, national associations and umbrella federations intertwined with the apartheid state.

12. Injured during an earlier Test against Western Samoa, South Africa's sole black representative, Chester Williams, a Coloured, only regained selection in the Springbok side midway through the tournament.
13. Luyt sacked Griffiths shortly after the RWC.
14. Mandela told the court that rugby was a national asset and that it was his duty to ensure its proper administration. In a controversial 1,159 page judgement, judge William de Villiers declared invalid and unconstitutional president Mandela's decision to approve the commission of inquiry. Mandela, he said, had not made the decision himself, as required by law, but had rubber-stamped a prior decision made by Tshwete. De Villiers also lambasted Mandela for using the witness box as a 'political podium', concluded that the director-general of the department of sport, Mthobi Tyamzashe, had lied, and described Tshwete's evidence as 'evasive, lacking candour and inconsistent' (*Mail and Guardian*, 20 March 1998; *Mail and Guardian*, 14 August 1998; *Sunday Times*, 16 August 1998; *Sunday Times*, 20 September 1998).
15. Luyt told *Rapport* (10 May 1998) that he had been 'sold out' by the SARFU executive.
16. The department of sports and recreation deleted the provision from subsequent drafts.
17. Editorial of 14 August 1998, Mandela appealed the verdict. According to his legal team, judge de Villiers demonstrated bias towards SARFU by ignoring the political context of the trial: the request to cross-examine Mandela came from 'a litigant who symbolised the old order' and 'was made . . . by a judge of the old order who was reputed to have been one of its ardent supporters' (*Sunday Times*, 21 February 1999). For a biographical sketch of de Villiers see *Business Day* (7 August 1998). But during the appeal process, the constitutional court condemned government officials for criticising de Villiers. 'There is', the court said, 'an unfortunate tendency for decisions about which there is disagreement to be attacked by impugning the integrity of the judges rather than by examining the reasons for the judgement' (*Business Day*, 6 June 1999).

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