

# ***From Allusion to Causal Explanation: The Comparative Method in Sports History***

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## **Abstract**

Comparison is a widely used tool of historical analysis where the historian alludes to similarities and differences in contrasting cases as a way to strengthen their explanations of a particular case. Although instances of comparison litter sports history, one struggles to find examples of rigorous comparison based on systematic analysis and evaluation of specific criteria. Rather, sports historians have tended to apply the comparative method in an ad hoc manner, seemingly choosing their examples at random and failing to define and justify the criteria used to make their comparisons. This article begins with a critical examination of three better examples of comparative sports history; it then investigates a sophisticated form of systematic comparison pioneered by the historical sociologist Theda Skocpol. In historical sociology systematic comparison forms the basis for causal explanations and theoretical-type generalisations. When applied to the schism in rugby and the formation of rugby league in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Skocpol's method demonstrates the tremendous potential of systematic comparison for making causal explanations in sports history.

The design of historical writing is not merely to entertain . . . besides that it has in view to instruct the reader. It sets before us the more interesting and important events of human life, points out the causes by which those events were brought about and by this means points out to us by what manner and method we may produce a similar good effect or avoid similar bad ones. We are not satisfied [if a fact is told us] which we are at a loss to conceive what it was that brought it about.<sup>1</sup>

Few scholars would consider methodological innovation a characteristic of sports history. On the contrary, not only do most sports historians shy away from philosophical and practical issues involving methodology, those who even bother to discuss their method typically bury it deep in the endnotes or appendices. Sports historians are not necessarily unique in this regard; as Michael Postan reminds us a great many historians make every endeavour to 'study history without trying to understand it!'<sup>2</sup> While a burgeoning literature may appear to negate the need for concern, at least one prominent historian of sport thinks otherwise. John Hoberman blames staid methods for the 'stagnation' of the 'serious study of the Olympic movement' (as evident in the 'seemingly endless debate between the defenders and detractors of "Olympism", with its pronounced emphasis on ethical values at the expense of historical factors').<sup>3</sup> Hoberman, however, finds his salvation in the comparative method. He is not alone. Arthur Marwick believes that 'highlighting both similarities and differences' can serve as 'a source of new

syntheses, new questions and, sometimes, convincing answers',<sup>4</sup> while Arthur Stinchcombe notes that careful comparison can often 'yield rich concepts that fruitfully enter into many causal statements'.<sup>5</sup>

This article examines two forms of comparative method and their application in sports history. Part one analyses allusion as a form of comparison where the historian highlights similarities and differences in particular instances, Examples include Kevin McAleer's comparison of pistol duelling and boxing as sources of masculinity in Germany and England respectively, Andrew Moore's meticulous analysis of the origins of rugby league in Australia and England, and Hoberman's investigation of the Olympic movement as an idealistic transnational organisation.<sup>6</sup> These examples demonstrate that when employed creatively, the comparative method offers sports historians a powerful tool to raise important questions and the opportunity to produce bold syntheses. Yet, sports historians have generally overlooked the comparative method as a means to construct causal explanations, While traditionally enjoying a closer association with, and affinity to, historical sociology, systematic comparative methods offer sports historians a sophisticated tool of casual explanation. Part two of this article analyses a form of systematic comparison pioneered by Theda Skocpol. This form demonstrates the tremendous potential of the comparative method and is applied to address the question, what caused the schism in rugby and the formation of rugby league in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries?

### **Illustrating Particular Cases: Comparative Allusions in Sports History**

In its broadest conceptualisation, the comparative method involves alluding to another case, or other cases, in order to illustrate or highlight aspects of a particular case. Comparisons may be made with instances of a similar or a different kind and may range across space, time, practices, ideologies, institutions, groups and individuals. Some historians, it bears noting, consider comparative allusions intrinsic to historical analysis. Historians, says John Tosh, 'have in fact never written of events as though they were entirely unique because it is impossible to do so'.<sup>7</sup> Examples abound in sports history. McAleer compares different practices in different countries when he contrasts British boxing and German pistol duelling in the late nineteenth century. His objective is to exemplify the rigid codes of conduct and peculiar masculinity associated with duelling.

Proper German gentlemen harboured a particular distaste for boxing and its two-fisted muscularity, considering it lower class and bestial. The German duel, on the other hand, was supposedly imbued with a chivalrous patina because it equalised chances between combatants and elevated them above the messy, random and spontaneous fury of the streets by virtue of its performed rules, which happily also supplied it a unique legal status. But the decisive reason why duellists were so horrified by the sweet science of boxing – though they were unwilling to admit it – was that Gleason's Gym posed a greater threat to duelling's pretentious rigmarole than the most

severe penal sanctions. Arrogant Germans could be humbled when levelling challenges across the Channel in Britain. 'In many cases', gloated one critic, 'he immediately receives for his troubles an unpleasantly hard, and unpleasantly sure, fist in the solar plexus'. For the German duellist, aggressive only by rote, swift and real fighting seemed a contingency beyond his spirit's reckoning. There was not a can-do mentality; hidebound duellists were too preoccupied with doing nothing *wrong*. [Renowned proponent of duelling Albert] Von Boguslawski pleaded the case that the Englishman paid special attention to his muscular development, implying that Germans were not physically equipped for the rough work of light sparring. The traditional affiliations signified by the synonymous equation of the word *Boxerei* with the terms *Schlägerei* and *Prügelei* (both meaning a brawl or street fight) died hard. The scrappy English way was wholeheartedly deplored by an old guard of German votaries who had long sworn their allegiance to the Comte de Chatauvillard, not the Marquis of Queensberry. 'Gentleman Jim' Corbett may have been heavyweight champion of the world (1892-97), but for Germans he was certainly no gentleman. The two titles were incompatible in the minds of patrician-nosed duellists.<sup>8</sup> Thus, by identifying the socio-psychological characteristics of masculinity associated with British boxing, McAleer cleverly, and eloquently, underscores different notions of masculinity among German pistol duellists.

Moore, too, uses the comparative method to highlight aspects of a particular case: the schism in Australian rugby and the formation of rugby league. Moore compares this rupture with that which occurred in England. Like McAleer, Moore focuses on differences although in his case these involve ideology and space. According to Moore, the respective splits in rugby in Australia and England were fundamentally different. In England the break was the culmination of a campaign waged by senior members of the Rugby Football Union to rid the competition of wretched workers from the north who threatened to take over their game. While widely portrayed as a strike by working-class players, the famous meeting at the George Hotel in Huddersfield in 1895 was more correctly 'a response to a lockout'.<sup>9</sup> By contrast, 'the antipodean split should remain cast as a strike by the workers rather than a lockout by the bosses'.<sup>10</sup> The English rugger fraternity may have been keen to see the backs of the proletarians, says Moore, but one finds little evidence of the same levels of antagonism in Australia.<sup>11</sup>

Hoberman uses the comparative method to highlight aspects of a particular case, namely the idealistic characteristics and traits of the Olympic movement.<sup>12</sup> However, while Hoberman compares different institutions, ideologies and practices, his primary emphasis is on similarities. Comparing the early Olympic movement with the Boy Scouts, the Red Cross and the Esperanto movement, he identifies a set of common characteristics, values and behaviours (practices and ideologies) that conjoin idealistic international movements (institutions) into 'a distinct category of thematically interrelated organisations'. Among the 'core repertory of behaviours and orientations' found in these four organisations are:

a rhetoric of universal membership, a Eurocentric orientation that limits universal participation, an insistence on political neutrality, the empowering role of wealth, social prominence and aristocratic affiliations, a professed interest in peace making or pacifism, a complex and problematic relationship between national and international loyalties, the emergence of a (marginalised) 'citizen-of-the-world'-style radical supranationalism, and the use of visual symbols such as flags and anthems.<sup>13</sup>

Differences also appear in Hoberman's approach and his conceptualisation of the Olympic movement as an idealistic transnational organisation. For example, he refers to international Marxism – a transnational organisation with a radically different philosophy and set of objectives to the idealistic international organisations – and to the international feminist movement. Although Hoberman does not precisely categorise the latter, he does bring to light two key areas where it differed from the early Olympic movement. Firstly, it dispensed with the 'conspicuous hagiographical tradition' of honouring its founders; secondly, it discarded all notions of chivalry as an ideological foundation.<sup>14</sup> As these examples show, by alluding to other cases – whether of a similar or different kind – sports historians can dramatically strengthen their perspectives and accounts. Nonetheless, this method has not escaped critical attention.

### **Allusion: Problems and Facilitation**

At a philosophical level, the most common objection to comparisons is that they are 'wrong in principle because history is about unique entities and, as a consequence, nothing in the past can be compared with anything else'.<sup>15</sup> In addition, a host of problems beset the comparative approach at the practical level. The variety of primary sources and laborious methods of evaluation, limit the extent to which historians can claim competence in their subject. Historical expertise is typically confined to a particular period that becomes smaller and smaller as the number of sources increases, And, as well as specialisations in time and place, historians also deal with specialisations relating to theme. In short, historical research is not conducive to comparative approaches that require access to sources from different regions or countries, across diverse time spans or entail high linguistic competence.<sup>16</sup>

Perusal of sports history literature confirms these practical concerns, Too often sports historians base their comparisons on grossly mismatched categories of primary and secondary sources or, in the case of a comparison of the recreational and sporting pursuits of middle-class women in colonial New Zealand and England, on a single primary source! According to the author of this article, the pioneer culture, with its 'less severe divisions of social class and the relatively spontaneous tenor of community life', afforded women in New Zealand a 'degree of emancipation' in sport and recreation unknown among British women.<sup>17</sup> But where is the evidence for this claim?

The case for New Zealand women is solid with the author making extensive use of diaries and letters written by women, and newspaper accounts. By contrast, the evidence supposing the claims about the situation in England is astonishingly sparse with the two key claims not supported by a single reference. In the literature that has been written about women during the 'pioneer' period words such as 'strength', 'courage' and 'determination' appear regularly. In Victorian England notions of femininity would not normally have included such characteristics:

the situation in Victorian New Zealand shaped a process of gender socialization where certain women worked with men. The primary sources of information reinforce a picture of an absence of that feeling of antagonism to the environment or to the opposite sex which characterized English society of the day.<sup>18</sup>

In the final analysis, the evidence in this article that lends support to the activities engaged in by English women rests on a single diary entry written by Lady Barker. And she wrote the entry while living on a sheep station in South Canterbury in the late 1860s and early 1870s: 'one's nerves and courage are in very different order out in New Zealand to the low standard which rules for ladies in England, who "live at home in ease!"'<sup>19</sup> Such limited evidence hardly inspires confidence in the method or the findings.<sup>20</sup>

With respect to linguistic competence, too few sports historians (including the author) are bi- or multi-lingual. As well as reducing opportunities for genuine comparison, this factor can also detract from other types of historical analysis. Hoberman, for example, blames much of the poor understanding of Olympic internationalism during the Nazi period on the 'limited number of English-language commentaries'.<sup>21</sup>

Are these problems insurmountable? Miles Fairburn and John Tosh both dismiss outright the philosophical criticism that historical instances are unique. 'If taken to its logical conclusion', Fairburn explains, 'the objection would forbid us from using generalising concepts in history such as "social class", "monarchy", "feudalism", "the family", and force us to employ only particular terms, a restriction which would prevent us from talking about almost anything related to the past'.<sup>22</sup> Tosh concurs:

The very language which historians employ imposes a classification on their material and implies comparisons beyond their immediate field of interest. The only reason why scholars can use the phrase 'feudal tenure' of a particular relationship between lord and tenant, or the word 'revolution' of a major political upheaval, is because they share with their readers a common notion of what those words mean, based on a recognition that the world would be incomprehensible if we did not all the time subsume particular instances into general categories.<sup>23</sup>

The same is true in sports history. Amateur, professional, working class, middle class and a plethora of other general categories and connotative terms comprise the language that cements the field.<sup>24</sup>

In several cases sports historians have used collaboration to circumvent logistical and resource problems inherent in the comparative method. A good example is the edited collection *Making Men: Rugby and Masculine Identity*. In *Making Men* the project initiators and coordinators, John Nauright and Timothy Chandler, were primarily concerned with developing concepts that could explain what it meant to 'be a man' in Victorian societies influenced by the liberal political and economic ideals of the upper and middle classes. While individual contributors investigate historical details in different 'regions', including Northern England, Wales, New Zealand, Natal and New South Wales, the editors make the comparisons in their introductory and concluding chapters.<sup>25</sup>

The above examples also raise the question, why do historians employ the comparative approach? Answers vary. Comparison afforded McAleer the opportunity to paint a clearer picture of German pistol duellists. Moore's aim is to debunk what he calls the 'unchallenged mantra about the origins of rugby league in Australia' and the orthodox view that the schism was 'a heroic response by the battlers, albeit a politically muted one, to the "tyrannies of the Establishment"' and 'part of a project for promoting "humanitarianism" and "democracy" in sport'.<sup>26</sup> Hoberman's objective is explicitly political:

if we are interested in establishing the potential of idealistic internationalisms, then the value of the comparative method lies in establishing realistic parameters of action (and even imagination) over the long term. If we ask, for example, whether the Olympic movement has done what it should have been able to do in fulfilment of its professional aims, what we are really asking is whether it has performed on a par with analogous organizations in comparable historical conditions.<sup>27</sup>

Nauright and Chandler sought to develop a greater understanding of masculinity at a specific historical conjuncture.

Importantly, of these historians only Moore employs the comparative method with the explicit intention of producing a causal explanation, although one can discern embryonic elements of causation in Hoberman's article and *Making Men*. At one stage Hoberman observes that all idealistic internationalisms followed late eighteenth century Enlightenment cosmopolitanism in making assumptions about transforming the modern world, and 'appealed to deep feelings among Europeans that were rooted in anxieties about war and peace'.<sup>28</sup> While the very title *Making Men* implies causation, I will examine what I believe is an implicit approach to causation in Nauright and Chandler's work in more detail below. Moore, however, explicitly builds on his comparison of conditions in England and New South Wales to explain the schism in Australian rugby in the early twentieth century. He

locates the origin of rugby league in the Eastern states of Australia in 'ties of kinship, allegiance and culture' between the North of England and New South Wales and Queensland, and local factors. In the case of the former, critical social ties were forged by sizeable contingents of northerners who comprised convicts and, early in the final quarter of the nineteenth century, assisted migrants. In analysing local conditions, Moore notes that, 'as a cultural phenomenon rugby league emerged from a period when the working class was recovering from the defeats of the 1890s and reasserting itself industrially and politically. The debate about professionalism was part of this broader working class challenge, a contribution to the project of civilising capitalism, as was the taking of the parliamentary road in the formation of the Australian Labor Party'.<sup>29</sup> Nonetheless, while useful (and certainly interesting) in helping him achieve his specific objective of debunking historical orthodoxy, Moore's brief references to Wales and New Zealand alert us to the even greater potential of the comparative method as a means to generate a rigorous causal explanation of the early development of rugby league.

### **Theory and Generalisation: Systematic Comparison and Causation in Sports History**

The preceding section discussed a broad conceptualisation of the comparative method where the historian alludes to another case, or other cases, as a means to highlight aspects of a particular case. This section analyses a more sophisticated and technical form of comparison. The method involves the systematic comparison of cases to test or demonstrate an hypothesis about a general cause and effect relationship.

Causal relationships, or explanations, are a fundamental problem confronting all historians.<sup>30</sup> Edward Carr offers the classic illustration of this problem in his account of the death of Robinson:

Jones, returning from a party at which he has consumed more than his usual ration of alcohol, in a car whose brakes turn out to have been defective, at a blind corner where visibility is notoriously poor, knocks down and kills Robinson, who was crossing the road to buy cigarettes at the shop on the corner. After the mess has been cleaned up, we meet – say, at local police headquarters – to inquire into the causes of the occurrence. Was it due to the driver's semi-intoxicated condition – in which case there may be criminal prosecution? Or was it due to the defective brakes – in which case something might be said to the garage which overhauled the car only the week before? Or was it due to the blind corner – in which case the road authorities might be invited to give the matter their attention? While we are discussing these practical questions, two distinguished gentlemen – I shall not attempt to identify them – burst into the room and begin to tell us, with great fluency and cogency, that, if Robinson had not happened to run out of

cigarettes that evening, he would not have been killed; that Robinson's desire for cigarettes was therefore the cause of his death; and that any inquiry which neglects this cause will be waste of time, and any conclusions drawn from it meaningless and futile. Well, what do we do? , . . what answer have we to the interrupters?<sup>31</sup>

Carr in fact never offered his interrupters an answer but he did give historians some concrete advice. He recommended that they follow sociologists in systematically comparing similar cases and looking for instances of consistent causation. In practical terms Carr meant distinguishing between major and minor causes of an event where a major cause bore some semblance to a covering law or could be generalised across different cases and examples. This approach certainly found favour in historical sociology where the comparative method is the lynchpin of explanatory models. In this respect historical sociology follows the conventions of the social sciences (which in turn are based on the experimental methods practised by the physical sciences).<sup>32</sup> For example, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, two of the founding fathers of sociology, stressed the importance of comparison. According to Durkheim, 'comparative sociology is not a special branch of sociology. It is sociology itself'. Similarly, Weber wrote 'we are absolutely in accord that history should establish what is specific, say, to the medieval city; but this is only possible if we first find what is missing in other cities'.<sup>33</sup>

Historians proved more reticent. Certainly conservative sports historians shied away from historical sociology in the misguided belief that it leads to a theoretical quagmire and predetermined structural explanations. At first glance the renowned historical sociologist and practitioner of comparison Theda Skocpol appears to lend support to this view when she argues that theoretical concepts and hypotheses are integral to comparative historical analysis:

the comparative method alone cannot define the phenomenon to be studied. It cannot select the appropriate units of analysis or say which historical cases should be studied. Nor can it provide the causal hypotheses to be explored. All of these must come from the macro-sociological imagination, informed by the theoretical debates of the day, and sensitive to the patterns of evidence for sets of historical cases.<sup>34</sup>

However, as noted with respect to generalising concepts such as amateurism and social class, Skocpol's position is germane to all history and not peculiar to the comparative method. Moreover, Skocpol advocates the comparative approach in history on the grounds that it can prompt 'new ways of looking at concrete historical cases'.<sup>35</sup>

Similarly, predetermined structural explanations are not confined to the comparative method. Indeed, many sports historians have lapsed into

predetermined structural explanations independently of the comparative approach. Structures refer to the actions taken by groups of individuals in pursuit of their objectives that over time become institutionalised or entrenched in such a way that the options open to them thereafter are constrained or structured. McAleer offers a brilliant illustration of structural constraint in his discussion of courage among German pistol duellists. Interestingly, in this example he also employs an allusion to underscore his point, just as he did when he referred to British boxing. But this time his contrast is more contemporary:

[T]he German duelist bore an uncanny resemblance to the average soldier in the field. His forlorn courage was not of the rare inborn kind. It was borrowed from a cause, an army, its officers. The cause was his inextricable predicament as defined by the code; the officers were the attending seconds; and the army, which swept him forward into battle, consisted of his tony societal counterparts and their *bien pensant* opinions. If the first great thing to learn about life is to refrain from doing what you really do not want to do, then duelists were to be pitied more than anything else. They lacked the courage not to be brave; like a young woman today lacking the self-confidence to be unapologetically overweight in body-beautiful Southern California – although no one for a moment is pretending that duelists were subject to pressures quite so extreme.<sup>36</sup>

One gains a glimmer of a structural explanation in orthodox descriptions of the schism in New South Wales rugby that attribute the rupture to a class war – ‘a heroic response by the battlers . . . to the “tyrannies of the Establishment”’.<sup>37</sup> The new league formed shortly after Alex Burdon broke his collarbone playing for the New South Wales Rugby Union. When the amateur union refused to pay Burdon’s medical expenses, dissatisfied players agreed to play the All Golds, a team of professionals from New Zealand returning home from a tour of England. Still unable to reconcile their differences with the Union, the players and their entrepreneurial backers formed a new professional rugby competition in time for the following season.<sup>38</sup> Orthodox (structural) explanations analyse the refusal of the Union to compensate Burdon in the context of pre-existing social antagonisms, and then attribute these antagonisms to manifestations of class conflict in a capitalist system. A more extreme, predetermined, version of the schism would dispense entirely with the role of actors such as Burdon on the grounds that class antagonisms are an inherent feature of capitalism and independent of all individuals. At best, Burdon’s broken collarbone would fulfil the function of a catalyst for the class conflict spilling into sport, a conflict that was predestined to erupt irrespective of the contributions made by any individuals.

Digressing slightly, it is worth noting that by-and-large sports historians have avoided the other extreme form of causal explanation: contingency.

Contingent relationships typically assume the form event A preceded event B therefore event A caused event B. A contingent explanation would attribute the formation of the New South Wales Rugby League to Burden's broken collarbone, a contingent, or purely fortuitous, occurrence. Contingent explanations typically convey the fine details and nitty-gritty particulars of events and in so doing emphasise the personalities, temperaments, abilities, prejudices, idiosyncrasies and intentions of individuals, or human agents, at the expense of social categories, generalisations and social structures.

Paradoxically, sports historians have evaded contingent explanations by virtue of the fact that they have tended to analyse the development of sport in the context of broader social, economic and political forces such as industrialisation, urbanisation, modernisation, nationalisation and (more recently) globalisation.<sup>39</sup> These macro-forces typically lend themselves to structural accounts and down play the significance of agency. Agents appear, if at all, in vague references to assorted coalitions and alliances of predominantly middle-class interests. Against this background, however, sports historians have been remiss in failing to address the philosophical tensions between structure and agency. Choices are seldom completely open as McAleer demonstrates above and as Marx more famously put it in the *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. 'Men make their own history', Marx said, 'but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given, transmitted from the past'.<sup>40</sup> But neither of these positions mean that actors lack agency.

Sociologists of sport have been much more responsive to the agency-structure question than sports historians. Sociologists typically focus on the reciprocal relationships between action and structure where over 'time, actions become institutions and institutions are in turn changed by action'.<sup>41</sup> For example, in the third quarter of the nineteenth century male pupils and students in the public schools and universities played sport according to a peculiar set of Christian ideals based on self-restraint, fairness, honour and unenvious approbation of another's success. These ideals were codified as amateur lore. By the late nineteenth century amateurism was the dominant setting for sport. Yet, even before the formalisation of this code, other groups were busy constructing alternative models that conceived organised sport as a hedonistic festival and as a vehicle to express partisanship, celebrate victory and to challenge rules and authority.<sup>42</sup>

Sports historians have evinced little interest in following sociology's lead by undertaking systematic comparisons, or even in distinguishing between major and minor causes of an event. One can find examples of practitioners making other kinds of distinctions, even if they are usually implicit, A reasonably common distinction is that between essential and particular factors. Essential factors have at least a kernel of explanatory power across religious, cultural, national and historical boundaries; particular factors are confined to specific circumstances, events or developments in one of the places or periods under investigation.<sup>43</sup> Referring to the essential factors that

made sporting men in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Chandler and Nauright conclude that manhood is not an immutable construct but an adaptation to social environments. They describe rugby helping to reinforce masculine hegemony at different times and different places when white men felt their identities and power threatened by female political and social emancipation or, in some settler societies, by large indigenous populations. Referring to the particular, Chandler and Nauright observe that while rugby is an international game it is also 'a nuanced activity' with distinct regional histories. Although it remained a largely middle- and upper-class game in England and Scotland, rugby developed into a mass sport in Wales, New Zealand and white South Africa.<sup>44</sup>

Distinguishing between essential and particular factors is nonetheless a fairly crude measure and only marginally more insightful than the allusionary method of comparison discussed in the first section of this article. A much more rigorous method of systematic comparison is that applied by Theda Skocpol in her *States and Social Revolutions*. Skocpol's approach involves two procedures: analysing cases of agreement and disagreement.

First, one can try to establish that several cases having in common the phenomenon one is trying to explain also have a common set of causal factors, although they vary in other ways that might have seemed causally relevant. Second, one can contrast the cases in which the phenomenon to be explained and the hypothesised causes are both absent, but which are otherwise as similar as possible to the positive cases.<sup>45</sup>

One sporting question appears particularly ripe to test Skocpol's comparative method of agreement and disagreement: why did professional rugby emerge and prosper in England and Australia around the turn of the twentieth century? In suggesting an answer, the objective is merely to outline the mechanics of a rigorous comparative method and the potential pitfalls.

As a starting point let me restate Skocpol's approach utilising information extracted from the rugby examples cited above. With respect to the method of agreement, the objective is to test the hypothesis that irreconcilable class-based differences over the meaning of rugby constituted a causal factor in the development of professional rugby in Australia and England, notwithstanding the fact that there were key differences in the two schisms that might prove causally relevant (e.g., what Moore calls a 'lock-out' in England as opposed to a 'strike' in Australia). With respect to the method of disagreement, the objective is to 'highlight by negation the significance of this cause', that is, class-based differences of meaning.<sup>46</sup> New Zealand, Wales and South Africa offer a potential set of comparative cases that are reasonably similar but sufficiently different to the situation in Australia and England. South Africa never produced a professional rugby competition while those in Wales and New Zealand were weak. If these so-called negative cases do not contain the same outcome (e.g., vibrant professional rugby)

then the result reinforces the conclusions of the method of agreement. As Miles Fairburn explains, 'the hypothesised causes in the positive cases *must have produced the outcomes, since the negative cases contained neither the same outcomes nor the same postulated causes but were similar in every other respect*'.<sup>4 7</sup>

Notwithstanding his claims to the contrary, Moore, like the orthodox explanations that he seeks to debunk, identifies class tensions as a cause of the schism in rugby in England and Australia. What Moore adds, however, is greater clarity to the nature of those class tensions. Rather than discussing them in terms of predetermined hostilities based on abstract economic interests, Moore contextualises the class tensions in terms of ideological differences over the meaning of rugby: amateurs played rugby solely for pleasure and physical health, professionals played for material gains. And, critically, local conditions meant that those differences were more intense in England than in Australia. Extending the comparison and examining instances of negation (i.e., employing the method of difference), sharpens our understanding of why viable professional rugby competitions emerged in England and Australia but not elsewhere. Class tensions were also present in New Zealand, Wales and South Africa<sup>48</sup> but attempts to form alternative professional rugby competitions were either short-lived and essentially ineffective (Wales and New Zealand) or never eventuated (South Africa). Why? Were rugby authorities there able to successfully reconcile the amateur and professional meanings of sport? Certainly not! Rather what they did do was deflect and partially ameliorate class differences in sport by defining rugby as a nationalist project. By so doing they nullified potential working class defectors.

In a climate of 'growing working-class belligerence' following a series of unfavourable decisions handed down by the Arbitration Court, Albert Baskerville, a Wellington postal worker, organised a team of New Zealand rugby players to tour England and Australia as professionals in 1907-08. The New Zealand Rugby Football Union (NZRFU), an affiliate of the Rugby Football Union in England, immediately expelled the architect of the professional game in New Zealand. Although the tour proceeded and professional rugby gained a 'foothold' in New Zealand, rugby league remained financially impoverished. Even as early as 1907-08 NZRFU, with support from the press, had assigned the mantle of New Zealand's national game to rugby and many New Zealanders viewed it as means of nurturing imperial patriotism. 'Football is the national game of New Zealand', proclaimed the *New Zealand Herald*, 'and the fame that New Zealand has won in it all over the world is worth guarding and should not be risked in any way'.<sup>49</sup>

A similar situation prevailed in Wales. Rugby quickly became an expression of Welsh nationalism although the Welsh, too, tolerated a degree of professionalism 'in order to accommodate working men'. One area of difference between New Zealand and Wales concerned the way national interests conceptualised rugby historically. In the former, rugby was a modern

game for an emerging nation while 'the Welsh industrial bourgeoisie promoted an indigenous Welsh culture by connecting the distinctive aspects of contemporary Wales (particularly rugby), to a distant . . . Celtic past'.<sup>50</sup>

Racial interests largely overrode class interests and shaped nationalist sporting projects in South Africa in the early twentieth century. In Natal, for example, race determined which football code local inhabitants played. When, in 1907, Africans formed their own soccer association, whites, 'particularly those of the upper classes, . . . abandon[ed] the round for the oval ball'. White workers in Durban initially continued to play soccer but within a few years rugby had emerged as 'the emblem for the province's white sporting prospects'.<sup>51</sup> Rugby's appeal among Afrikaners was largely limited to the sons of the elite who attended Victoria College, later Stellenbosch University, in the Western Cape. Rugby provided the university with a 'specific Afrikaner identity to counter that of the neighbouring and predominantly English-speaking University of Cape Town'. In the Boer republics the game was virtually unknown at the turn of the century, and in Johannesburg 'working Afrikaners had little leisure time for organized sport'. Political union in 1910 united the former British colonies and Boer republics under one flag and a central government. The governing South African Rugby Board might have excluded blacks but it viewed the game as a vehicle for 'promoting understanding' between Afrikaners and English-speakers and nurturing a 'white "South Africanism" [that] could ultimately act in the interest of "the higher scheme of imperial unity"'.<sup>52</sup>

In conclusion, professional rugby stemmed in the first instance from irreconcilable class-based differences over the meaning of sport. But a strong working class capable of supporting an alternative concept of the game was a prerequisite for the materialisation of those differences. The method of difference confirms the significance of these interacting causes. In New Zealand, Wales and South Africa smaller and weaker working class movements found themselves easily distracted and hence co-opted by nationalist sporting ideals propagated by the middle classes. Ultimately, they were unable to effect their class-based sporting aspirations. Not surprisingly, systematic comparison has been subjected to rigorous cross-examination and has attracted a number of criticisms over and above those directed at the simpler and more common methods.

### **Systematic Comparison: Issues and Resolution**

Systematic comparison, it must be stressed, does not lend itself to establishing causal relationships in all historical cases. Obviously there are many instances where historians simply want to reconstruct the causal structure of a particular case without parallel in any general case. And when this occurs 'no amount of systematic comparison of the general case' will identify 'the important components in the causal structure of the [particular] case'.<sup>53</sup> In other instances significant obstacles can prevent the use of the comparative method. Excessive internal diversity in the cases under consideration is a particular problem.<sup>54</sup> Consider the search for

generalisations to explain the demise of amateur ideology and the acceptance of professionalism in sport during the twentieth century. Referring to the situation in Australia, Robert Paddick identifies several reasons why 'it is difficult to describe clearly the nature of this change':

First, . . . we lack accurate historical analyses of the development of many . . . sports, particularly about the ideas and roles of the administrators. What is known suggests significant differences between sports because they are subject to different pressures and constraints. The financial considerations for spectator sports like . . . rugby union, rugby league, and cricket seem quite different from those for Olympic sports such as track and field and swimming, because the sources of funds are different. The differences in timing, the continued existence of professional and non-professional forms, the influence of television and of international competition increases the likelihood that generalisations will lack substance. Some sports like athletics, boxing, and sculling were professional from the beginning with amateur forms emerging later. Other sports such as hockey remain amateur, while others like rugby have developed different forms. Some sports moved gradually to professionalism while others, particularly cricket, emerged abruptly amid controversy, while basketball and soccer started abruptly but in a planned way. Second, it seems that often the disputes are only superficially about money: they are really about what sport is, who controls it and for what purposes. They therefore draw on complex sets of moral, educational, psychological, and social values, many of which remain unstated because they are taken for granted by their proponents. Third, there seems, in many instances, to have been a difference between rhetoric and reality. The dispute was not so much between proponents of different practices but rather between practice and ideal. This adds to the complexity of any analysis because of the difficulty of knowing what counts as evidence.<sup>55</sup>

Internal diversity within Australia and England raises questions about the validity of generalisations pertaining to the schism in rugby. Why, for example, was professional rugby largely confined to Lancashire, Yorkshire and Cheshire in England, and Sydney, Newcastle and Brisbane in Australia? To what extent did behaviour in those regions represent the whole country? Complete answers probably require further comparisons with soccer and Australian football respectively. Suffice to say, professionalism emerged in soccer and Australian football with minimal opposition from amateur ideologues.<sup>56</sup> In contradistinction, perhaps there are less differences between the positive cases and the oases of negation than initially indicated. Did the ethos of rugby in New Zealand, Wales and South Africa really conform to

English ideals? Did New Zealanders, Welsh and English-speaking South Africans really play the game according to the Christian amateur ethos of English public school boys? Evidence from New Zealand and South Africa suggests not. 'New Zealanders, with their peculiarly pragmatic and unsentimental approach to rugby,' argues Finlay Macdonald, 'often found more in common with the [English men of the north, whose working lives . . . more clearly matched their own].'<sup>57</sup> Scant evidence from South Africa implies that conditions there were similar to New Zealand but certainly in the 1920s and '30s Afrikaners introduced a particularly aggressive nationalistic ethos to the amateur game in South Africa akin to the professional version in England and Australia.<sup>58</sup>

These questions are a salient reminder of the difficult task historians face when searching for comparative cases capable of yielding substantive and sustainable generalisations. For Skocpol,

even when the cases are roughly approximate, perfect controls for all potentially relevant variables can never be achieved. Thus, strategic guesses have to be made about what causes are actually likely to be operative – that is, which ones could, or could not actually affect the object of study. The upshot is that there always are unexamined contextual features of the historical cases that interact with the causes being explicitly examined in ways the comparative historical analysis either does not reveal, or must simply assume to be irrelevant.<sup>59</sup>

In the same vein,

comparative historical analysis necessarily assumes (like any multivariate logic) that the units being compared are independent of one another. But actually, this assumption is rarely if ever fully valid for macro-phenomena . . . [T]hese phenomena occur in unique world-historical contexts . . . , and they happen within international structures that tie societies to one another.<sup>60</sup>

Indeed, international 'ties of kinship, allegiance and culture' lie at the heart of Andrew Moore's argument: the cultural and political specificities of Yorkshire and Lancashire had a general influence on Australian society (e.g., a penchant for fish and chips!) as well as specific regional influences, particularly in 'the epicentres of labour militancy' in New South Wales and Queensland, where Labor Party branches and professional rugby gained early strongholds.<sup>61</sup>

In light of these problems it is perhaps not surprising that John Tosh wonders whether 'attempts to write comparative history have proved their worth less in revealing common patterns than in sharpening our awareness of the fundamental differences between the periods or places under discussion?'<sup>62</sup> But do these problems render systematic comparison

inoperable? Miles Fairburn rejects any such notion. But he does advise historians to take certain precautions. In the first instance they must defend their choice of cases in advance and demonstrate that they are not arbitrary. This is essential in the case of professional rugby discussed above because the negative cases contain the same postulated causes as the positive cases, that is, class-based antagonisms were present in rugby playing New Zealand, Wales and South Africa as well as Australia and England in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. What then is the justification for persisting with these negative cases? Arguably it is one of scale: in Wales economic prosperity greatly diminished class tensions, in New Zealand the working class population was relatively small, and in South Africa a racial aristocracy elevated white workers to the top of the status pole and helped obscure class interests.

Fairburn also advises historians to “anticipate” the problem of excessive diversity and clearly demonstrate that any internal variations within their cases are not unreasonable. In the case under consideration, South Africa may well require additional justification given its peculiar mix of racial and ethnic issues. Lastly, Fairburn warns, historians might well encounter situations where it is necessary for them to prove that a regular cause played more than an infinitesimal role in a causal structure.<sup>63</sup>

## **Conclusion**

Sports historians have generally used the comparative method as a simple tool of allusion to highlight aspects of particular cases. In so doing they have overlooked the explanatory power of systematic comparison. This oversight has undoubtedly detracted from the intellectual credibility of sports history and its contributions to broader social history. Nonetheless readers should not expect any sudden moves to rectify the situation. The cultural turn in sports history, identified and articulated by Jeff Hill,<sup>64</sup> has raised a host of new ontological and epistemological issues, particularly; relating to truth and knowledge and their interrelationships with power.<sup>65</sup> But sports historians should not allow these issues to completely dominate the agenda; nor should they continue to ignore more traditional empirical methodologies.

## **NOTES:**

1. Adam Smith, *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*, edited by J. C. Bryce (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 90 and p. 98.
2. Michael Postan, *Facts and Relevance: Essays on Historical Method* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 64.
3. John Hoberman, 'Toward a Theory of Olympic Internationalism', *Journal of Sport History*, 22, 1 (1995), p. 2.
4. Arthur Marwick, *The Nature of History*, second edition (London: MacMillan, 1981), p. 75.

5. Arthur Stinchcombe, *Theoretical Methods in Social History* (New York: Academic Press, 1978), p. 22.
6. Kevin McAleer, *Dueling: The Cult of Honor in Fin-de-Siècle Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Andrew Moore, 'Jimmy Devereux's Yorkshire Pudding: Reflections on the Origins of Rugby League in New South Wales and Queensland', Tom Brock Lecture, 1999 (Australian Society for Sport History); Hoberman, 'Olympic Internationalism', pp. 1-37.
7. John Tosh, *The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods and New Directions in the Study of Modern History*, second edition (London: Longman, 1991), p. 159. See also Edward Carr, *What is History*, second edition (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1990) and Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 35.
8. McAleer, *Dueling*, pp. 77-8.
9. Moore, 'The Origins of Rugby League', p. 7. Moore's draws this account from Tony Collins, *Rugby's Great Split: Class, Culture and the Origins of Rugby League Football* (London: Frank Cass, 1998).
10. Moore, 'The Origins of Rugby League', p. 11.
11. Moore, 'The Origins of Rugby League', p. 9. Here Moore rests his case on the comments by an 'astute observer' H. M. Moran, a rugby union player at Sydney University: 'For the students of Sydney University the establishment of professionalism in sport meant serious loss. In my time the undergraduates were in danger of all being stamped into a single mould. They were being given one uniform pattern in their prejudices and preferences. Sport provided an extramural course in a totally different discipline. We tussled with factory hands and fireman, with miners, wharf-labourers and carters. These players might have rough manners, but in many of the elementary virtues of life they were our superiors. Above all they had a hard edge to their characters, and a robust humour. By contact with them we gained immeasurably more than they. When professionalism came, University players were shut out from friendships with men in ranks called lower and their education suffered by it. Whatever polite scholarship they might possess they now were sentenced to be weaker in humanity'.
12. In this article Hoberman sets out to reconceptualise the Olympic movement with a view to highlighting the complexity of the Olympic phenomenon. According to Hoberman, supporters and critics of the Olympic movement both assume that they know 'what the movement is or, at least, what it is worth to the international community'. But, he argues, neither side has even scratched the surface of what the Olympic phenomenon really means. Hoberman also advances an interesting political explanation for the lack of comparative studies of the kind he undertakes. He sees this as an attempt to preserve 'the iconic status of the movement' and to 'limit . . . Olympic historiography as a whole' and thereby constrain debates 'regarding values'. Hoberman, 'Olympic Internationalism', p. 2.
13. Hoberman, 'Olympic Internationalism', p. 3, p. 6 and p. 10.
14. Hoberman, 'Olympic Internationalism', p. 9 and p. 10. This characteristic is central to Hoberman's argument which is that "chivalric" ideals played an important role in shaping relations between the "male" internationalism and Nazi Germany'.

15. Miles Fairburn, *Social History: Problems, Strategies and Methods* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), p. 92; Tosh, *The Pursuit of History*, pp. 157-8.
16. Jeremy Black and Donald MacRaild, *Studying History* (London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 102; Tosh, *Pursuit of History*, pp. 159-60.
17. Scott Crawford, "'One's Nerves and Courage are in very Different Order Out in New Zealand": Recreational and Sporting Opportunities for Women in a Remote Colonial Setting', in J. A. Mangan and Roberta Park (eds.), *From Fair Sex to Feminism: Sport and the Socialization of Women in the Industrial and Post Industrial Eras* (London: Frank Cass, 1987), pp. 161-181.
18. Crawford, 'Recreational and Sporting Opportunities', p. 162 and p. 171.
19. Crawford, 'Recreational and Sporting Opportunities', pp. 164-5.
20. This raises the notion of historical facts. Gottschalk provides a useful working definition: a 'particular derived directly or indirectly from historical documents and regarded as credible'. According to Gottschalk, credibility rests on the particular passing four tests: whether the source was *able* to tell the truth, whether the primary witness was *willing* to tell the truth, is the primary witness *accurately reported* with regard to the detail under examination, is there any *independent corroboration* of the detail under examination'. Louis Gottschalk, *Understanding History: A Primer of Historical Method*, second edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), p. 140 and pp. 150-71. At the very least Crawford is remiss by not providing independent corroboration of Barker's claims about English ladies who live a life of ease.
21. Hoberman, 'Olympic Internationalism', p. 17.
22. Fairburn, *Social History*, p. 93.
23. Tosh, *Pursuit of History*, pp. 159-60.
24. For a discussion of the use of social class in sports history see Douglas Booth and John Loy, 'Sport, Status, Style', *Sport History Review*, 30, 1 (1999), pp. 1-26.
25. John Nauright and Timothy Chandler (eds.), *Making Men: Rugby and Masculine Identity* (London: Frank Cass, 1996).
26. Moore, 'The Origins of Rugby League', p. 7 and p. 9.
27. Hoberman, 'Olympic Internationalism', p. 14.
28. Hoberman, 'Olympic Internationalism', p. 11 and p. 14.
29. Moore, 'The Origins of Rugby League', p. 4, pp. 12-14, p. 16, and pp. 17-18.
30. One school of thought, however, maintains that the study of causation is wrong in principle. The renowned controversialist John Vincent encapsulates this view in a provocative claim that 'causes do not exist'. Causes, insists Vincent, 'exist only in a form so general, or, contrarily, so particular and subjective, as to require little attention. The cause of an event, say some, is all that leads up to an event: all. On this view, to say that something is a cause, is no real help (even if true) because so, in varying degrees, is everything else. The cause of an event, say others, is a matter

of almost arbitrary choice. Here the subjectivity is blatant. What we choose to name as a cause . . . is no more a cause than all the other circumstances that we choose not to name. Cause is simply the wrong word to use. It raises hopes of an unattainable accuracy'. Of particular concern to Vincent, and others who share his view, is that causation tends to underestimate the capacity of actors to make choices and to shape their own situations and thus leads to different forms of structural determinism (see below for a fuller discussion of this point). John Vincent, *An Intelligent Person's Guide to History* (London: Gerald Duckworth, 1995), pp. 45-6, and p. 48.

31. Carr, *What is History*, pp. 104-105.
32. Fairburn, *Social History*, p. 86.
33. Black and MacRaild, *Studying History*, p. 104.
34. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, p. 39.
35. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, p. 40.
36. McAleer, *Dueling*, p. 37.
37. Moore, 'The Origins of Rugby League', p. 9.
38. Details from Murray Phillips, 'Football, Class and War: The Rugby Codes in New South Wales, 1907-1918', in Nauright and Chandler, *Making Men*, pp. 161-2.
39. S.W. Pope, 'Introduction: American Sport History—Toward a New Paradigm', in S. W. Pope (ed.), *The New American Sport History: Recent Approaches and Perspectives* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997), pp. 3-6.
40. David McLellan, *Karl Marx Selected Writings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 300.
41. Philip Abrams, *Historical Sociology* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 2-3.
42. For the clearest statements of these two positions see, Robert Morford and Martha McIntosh, 'Sport and the Victorian Gentleman', in Alan Ingham and John Loy (eds.), *Sport in Social Development: Traditions, Transitions, and Transformations* (Champaign: Human Kinetics, 1993), pp. 51-76 and John Hargreaves, *Sport, Power and Culture* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986), p. 67. Sports sociologists it should also be noted have been prominent in calling for the breakdown of arbitrary boundaries between the two disciplines. Eric Dunning, Joseph Maguire and Robert Pearton (eds.), *The Sports Process: A Comparative and Developmental Approach* (Champaign: Human Kinetics, 1993), p. 6; Joseph Maguire, 'Common Ground? Links Between Sports History, Sports Geography and the Sociology of Sport', *Sporting Traditions*, 12, 1 (1995), pp. 3-25.
43. Black and MacRaild, *Studying History*, p. 103.
44. Tim Chandler and John Nauright, 'Introduction: Rugby, Manhood and Identity', in Nauright and Chandler, *Making Men*, pp. 1-12.
45. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, p. 35.

46. Fairburn, *Social History*, p. 101.
47. Emphasis in original. Fairburn, *Social History*, p. 97. Fairburn has modified Skocpol's method in an attempt to add even greater precision and sophistication to the comparative approach. Fairburn employs a fourfold typology: sufficient condition, necessary condition, sufficient and necessary condition, and neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition. A sufficient condition is one where x and y are present and are always succeeded by z. However, although x and y will always produce the outcome, and have completely predictable consequences, other factors can also bring about z: groups that subscribe to different meanings of sport (x and y) predispose social tensions in sport (z) but different meanings of sport do not explain all the tensions in sport that can arise from financial disputes, personality conflicts, competing media interests, hostile fans, and so forth. A necessary condition for an outcome, though essential to that outcome, will not by itself produce the outcome. Wherever there is z (conflict in sport), there is x and y (competing groups with different interests) but x and y are not enough to produce z, rather there needs to be a precipitating factor. For example, the mere presence of amateur ideologues and supporters of professionalism does not necessarily mean a conflict situation in sport. The most important cause and perfect predictor of an event is a sufficient and necessary condition. Thus in the preceding example, an event, issue or personality spurs either the amateur ideologues or supporters of professionalism into taking action against their opponents, whether perceived or real. Lastly, conditions that are neither necessary nor sufficient have no causal role in relation to the outcome. Fairburn, *Social History*, p. 89.
48. At first glance this violates Skocpol's method because the negative cases contain the same postulated causes as the positive cases, that is, class-based antagonisms were present in rugby playing New Zealand, Wales and South Africa in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries just as they were in Australia and England. This apparent violation is discussed further below.
49. Geoffrey T. Vincent and Toby Harfield, 'Repression and Reform: Responses within New Zealand Rugby to the Arrival of the "Northern Game", 1907-8', *New Zealand Journal of History*, 31, 2 (1997), pp. 237-8 and p. 239. Macdonald argues that the Great War settled 'the battle for rugby's amateur soul' in New Zealand: 'The wasteful carnage of the First World War meant that rugby, like most male sports, emerged in tatters; so many young men dead, injured or psychologically damaged; no fees paid for so long that clubs struggled for years to regain their pre-war strength. There would have been little fight left for the right to play rugby the New Zealand way. For most of the century the New Zealand Rugby Football Union would obey the laws set down in England by the inheritors of an elite tradition'. Finlay Macdonald, *The Game of Our Lives: The Story of Rugby and New Zealand –And How They've Shaped Each Other* (Auckland: Viking, 1996) p. 33 and p. 37.
50. David Andrews, 'Sport and the Masculine Hegemony of the Modern Nation: Welsh Rugby, Culture and Society, 1890-1914', in Nauright and Chandler, *Making Men*, p. 53 and p. 58; Gareth Williams, 'From Popular Culture to Public Cliché: Image and Identity in Wales, 1890-1914', in J. A. Mangan (ed.), *Pleasure, Profit, Proselytism: British Culture and Sport at Home and Abroad 1700-1915* (London: Frank Cass, 1988), pp. 128-43. For details of the early history of rugby in New Zealand see Jock Phillips, 'The Hard Man: Rugby and the Formation of Male Identity in New Zealand', and John Nauright, 'Colonial Manhood and Imperial Race Virility: British Responses to the Post-Boer War Colonial Rugby Tours', in Nauright and Chandler, *Making Men*, pp. 70-90 and pp. 130-31.

51. Robert Morrell, 'Forging a Ruling Race: Rugby and White Masculinity in Colonial Natal, c.1870-1910', in Nauright and Chandler, *Making Men*, p. 114.
52. Morrell, 'Masculinity in Colonial Natal', p. 114; Albert Grundlingh, 'Playing for Power? Rugby, Afrikaner Nationalism and Masculinity in South Africa, c.1900-c.1970', in Nauright and Chandler, *Making Men*, p. 181, p. 182, p. 184, p. 185.
53. Fairburn, *Social History*, p. 92.
54. Fairburn, *Social History*, p. 92.
55. Robert Paddick, 'Amateurism', in Wray Vamplew, Katharine Moore, John O'Hara and Richard Cashman (eds.), *The Oxford Companion to Australian Sport*, second edition (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 12.
56. Collins, *Rugby's Great Split*, pp. 180-89; Leonie Sandercock and Ian Turner, *Up Where Cazaly? The Great Australian Game* (London: Granada, 1981), pp. 46-53; Rob Hess and Bob Stewart (eds.), *More Than a Game: An Unauthorised History of Australian Rules Football* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1998) pp. 75-90.
57. Macdonald, *Game of Our Lives*, p. 31.
58. Robert Archer and Antoine Bouillon, *The South African Game: Sport and Racism* (London: Zed Books, 1982), pp. 64-75.
59. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, pp. 38-9.
60. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, p. 39.
61. Moore, 'The Origins of Rugby League', p. 4, p. 12 and pp. 14-15.
62. Tosh, *Pursuit of History*, p. 182.
63. Fairburn, *Social History*, pp. 93-5.
64. Jeff Hill, 'British Sports History: A Post-modern Future?', *Journal of Sport History*, 23, 1 (1996), pp. 1-19.
65. For a full discussion see Murray Phillips (ed.), *Deconstructing Sport History: The Postmodern Challenge* (New York: SUNY Press, forthcoming).