

Conflicting Ideologies Concerning the University and Intercollegiate Athletics: Harper and Hutchins at Chicago, 1892-1940¹

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Unresolved questions abound concerning the role that the university ought to play in society. In the United States, many of these questions were to surface in the period following 1876 when a large number of institutions followed the lead of Johns Hopkins and declared themselves to be universities. Typical of such questions are: Should the university be an island of leisurely urbanity protected within the tradition of free intellectual inquiry? Or, conversely, should the university be a societal service station, an instrument of practical affairs and a force for addressing pressing social problems? Should those who attend the university represent an intellectual elite and should their studies focus upon the enduring legacies of the Western intellectual tradition? Or, conversely, should the university pursue a more democratized admissions policy and provide curricular experiences more suited to the social and vocational aspirations of the student body? Clearly, we have elected to provide extreme examples here, but the positions assumed in response to such questions generate consequences that find expression in university governance, pedagogical procedure, curriculum development, funding, and, of central concern to this study, the roles assigned to physical education and athletics.

With respect to the above questions, two University of Chicago presidents, William Rainey Harper and Robert Maynard Hutchins, provide an interesting study in contrasts. Each was a vocal, visible, and forceful proponent of his position and their contrasting ideas ushered in two distinct versions of the internal offerings and the external relationships to be pursued by their Univer-

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sity, versions that deeply affected the form and content of physical education and athletics. That Hutchins will appear as a somewhat more consistent and articulate proponent than will Harper is reflective of the styles of the two men. Also, with respect to athletics, it should be remembered that Harper's strategies developed as part of an on-going game plan whereas Hutchins could, some thirty years later, play the role of the "Monday morning quarterback."

It is the purpose of this investigation to interpret the interplay between ideology and action as it impinged upon the functions assigned to physical education and athletics at the University of Chicago. In the ensuing analysis, we endeavor to describe and interpret the sequence of events that were involved (1) in the founding in 1892 of an institution of higher education which Harper envisioned would be a prototype of a service-station genre of modern urban universities; (2) in the evolution of physical education and athletics in this institution (and, incidently, the rise to national prominence of Amos Alonzo Stagg, Chicago's first Director of Physical Culture and Athletics); and (3) in the struggle which eventuated between Hutchins and Stagg when the former strived to reverse many of the programs that Harper had initiated, among them being intercollegiate football and the requirement in physical culture. We are electing to focus upon a case example of how a university accommodated to the pressures associated with the rise of big-time athletics. We recognize the limitations of such an approach with respect to positing representative generalizations about athletics, university policy, and student life. This latter goal, however, requires a commitment to a comparative analysis of considerable proportions and is beyond the scope of the paper.

The University of Chicago was conceived initially as a college and work leading to its establishment began 1886.² In May 1889, John D. Rockefeller agreed to pledge \$600,000 of the one million dollars deemed necessary to start the venture. This money was pledged to The American Baptist Education Society which, in turn, was confronted with the challenge of raising the remaining \$400,000 within a year.³ The cost of failure was nothing less than the Rockefeller pledge. The Society rose to the challenge successfully and, having appointed the first trustees of the newly-formed institution, withdrew from further involvement. Thus, the problems of implementation and additional fund raising were left in the hands of the trustees and the institution's first president, William Rainey Harper.⁴ Of Harper's appointment, it has been said that the trustees "were reaching out to a man, not a blueprint of university development."⁵

Once installed as president, Harper re-opened his personal campaign—one he had taken to Rockefeller and others in the years immediately preceding his appointment—to establish not a college, but a university in Chicago. What Harper envisioned and later called "the university idea" was, at the time, an

idea *in statu nascendi*. But cognizant of the fact that colleges which had redefined themselves as universities were located primarily in the eastern United States,⁶ the perspicacious Harper saw the need for universities in the midwest and, more specifically, for a major university to be located in Chicago. Not only did Harper sell his vision to the trustees but, in pursuit of his goal, he also persuaded Rockefeller to give an additional one million dollars in 1890 and a second million in 1892—the latter being matched by Chicago’s businessmen ninety days after Rockefeller had made his pledge. Rockefeller’s generosity did not stop there. In all, he gave some 34.7 million dollars to the University. Openly acknowledged by Harper and his colleagues, “Rockefeller gifts were celebrated like football victories, and football victories like the Second Coming.”⁷

Armed with such financial backing, Harper was able to recruit eminent scholars to serve as heads of departments and to secure their help in the recruitment of additional faculty. Of the first ten department heads, five were former colleagues from Yale, one being Amos Alonzo Stagg. Here we should note that the conditions of Stagg’s appointment reflect anomalies in Harper’s ideas about athletics, anomalies which resurfaced from time to time during his presidency. For example, of the first fourteen appointments, only Stagg and the head of Latin lacked advanced degrees. Furthermore, Harper assigned the title, *Director*, to Stagg while the other division heads were each designated *Head Professor*. Thus it seems that functions of mental and manual while proclaimed to be of equal value in the new University, were viewed differently by Harper from the beginning.

All signs, in the years that followed, pointed to the fact that Harper’s perception of the need for a university in Chicago had been correct. Between 1896 and 1909, the University’s enrollment swelled from 1,815 to 5,500 students,⁸ making Chicago a large university by the standards of the time. Chicago was to be raised in stature in terms other than enrollment—for example, in 1900 Chicago was one of five universities involved in the formation of The Association of American Universities. Moreover, it, along with Harvard, Columbia, Johns Hopkins, and California, accounted in 1900 for 55 percent of all earned doctorates in the United States.⁹ In short, Chicago had “arrived” in something less than ten years. A later utterance borrowed by Hutchins from the poet Whitman and suggested as a motto for the University was not only an indication of the future, but an apt depiction of Harper’s original mission: “Solitary, singing in the West, I strike up for a new world.”¹⁰

Conceptions of what would or should constitute a “new world” vary. We begin with those of Harper since it was he, with the aid of the Rockefeller millions, who played the seminal role in raising Chicago to national prominence. An examination of Harper’s educational background suggests that he

was precocious. He, after all, had entered Muskingum College at the age of ten and graduated four years later. At seventeen he obtained a Ph.D. with a specialization in Indo-Iranian and Semitic Languages from Yale. Shortly thereafter, he established himself as an excellent scholar and teacher at the Chicago Baptist Union Theological Seminary, at Chautauqua, and at Yale. The latter two appointments, in particular, provided Harper with experiences and colleagues that were to influence his later work at Chicago.¹¹

Once installed as president of Chicago, Harper exhibited a zeal for his work. His friends and associates remarked that he had a long-range plan for everything (he even planned the details of his own funeral!).¹² His plan for the University was to place it firmly in the mainstream of American life. For Harper, the University was to be “the prophet, the spokesman of democracy, the basis for all democratic progress.”¹³ Furthermore, Harper suggested that the motto of a true university ought to be “service for mankind wherever mankind is, whether within scholastic walls or without those walls and in the world at large.”¹⁴ To this end, the University would become society’s sage whose mission would be to consider the facts and problems of democracy, foster corporate harmony and dedication to the democratic cause.¹⁵ And, given this potential role, Harper, like Eliot of Harvard, wanted to prepare experts who possessed skill, scientific knowledge, and disciplined reason. The provision of such experts was, for Harper, a central task of the University but it would require a departure from the general studies curriculum typical of the college. Specialization, research, and practical problem-solving would become the order of the day.¹⁶ Pursuant to these new emphases, Harper elevated the laboratory (along with the library and the museums) to a position of prominence in the University and he established the concept of majors and minors in courses of study.

Providing experts was only one manifestation of Harper’s service-oriented conception of the University. If the “growing democratization of higher educational work” was indeed the trend of the future then the University had to be carried to the people and vice-versa. The vehicles by which the University would be carried to the people were University Extension, the University Press and a University Affiliations division (devoted to the coordination of the offerings of Chicago with other educational institutions). These vehicles, Harper presumed, would bring culture to the uncultured and Extension, in particular, would provide for the cultural redemption of America: “The University would guide Everyman, provided he was prepared for a strenuous climb upward.”¹⁷

Bringing the people *to* the University required a different set of tactics. Democratization might bring about long-term changes in the social backgrounds of the student body but, in the short-term, Harper realized that the forces of de-

mocratization would not by themselves be sufficient to create a boom in the enrollment at Chicago. Thus, he developed and employed advertising techniques—a departure from staid, conventional practise. One such technique involved convocations or graduation ceremonies. While most colleges and universities had one annual convocation, Harper, enabled by his division of the academic year into quarters, had at least four and sometimes as many as six (e.g., 1898 and 1901)! Edwin Slosson, in his history of great American universities, observed that Harper “used to run in extra convocations once in a while like extra dances at a ball.”¹⁸

Harper also used printed brochures to advertise the university and its offerings. Although Laurence Veysey described these techniques as “a thinly disguised appeal to attract large numbers of students,” particularly the sons of businessmen,¹⁹ the growth in Chicago’s enrollments stood as a testimonial to their effectiveness. And while Veysey’s assertion may be accurate, it should be pointed out that advertising was consistent with Harper’s intent to communicate the superiority of his particular version of the university idea. Nonetheless, Harper’s university idea and his methods for promoting it led J. Laurence Laughlin, Head of the Department of Political Economy, to quip that Harper was “The P.T. Barnum of Higher Education.”²⁰

One proven tool for promoting community interest in the University that Harper borrowed from the established eastern schools was the “Drawing card” of sport.²¹ In 1892, Harper appointed Stagg as the first Director of Physical Culture and Athletics. In appointing Stagg, Harper again was precedent-setting, for not only was Stagg given academic tenure²² but athletics also were placed under university rather than student control.²³ With respect to the latter, Harper established a Board of Physical Culture and Athletics to oversee Stagg’s operations and he appointed himself as its chair. These measures were consistent with Harper’s view of university administration—“system” and “order” were among his favorite catchwords. Commenting in 1896 upon Chicago’s approach to athletics, Harper said, “Here, more than anywhere else, paternalism may be said to have existed. The University did not wait for the student to organize . . . [and] the results show that under certain circumstances paternalism is an effective agency.”²⁴ Such paternalism, together with a preoccupation with system and order, earned Harper and subsequent Harper-like presidents Veblen’s epithet, “Captains of Erudition.”²⁵

Since Stagg was to serve Chicago for some fifty years and since Harper’s views of athletics unfolded during Stagg’s term of service, the interface between Stagg, Harper, and the university deserves attention. The choice of Stagg to direct the physical culture and athletic programs was, perhaps, a natural one for Harper. A “Muscular Christian,” Stagg had first come into contact with Harper upon entry into Yale’s Divinity School: Harper was Stagg’s

professor of Biblical literature. A champion of “moral athletics,” Stagg found time to become involved with the New Haven missions and the YWCA while at Yale.²⁶ But it was in ‘the period following 1888, that Stagg determined to leave the Divinity School for a career in athletics. As Director of Athletics at Chautauqua Institute, Chautauqua, New York, Stagg’s limitations as a speaker became apparent. In his words, “an inability to talk on my feet led me to put aside the cloth” and to the realization “that I could influence others to Christian ideals more effectively on the field than in the pulpit.”²⁷ Stagg, in short, developed a commitment to character training and moral elevation via athletics. And it was this commitment to an athletic version of the Social Gospel and the sustained contact with Harper which Chautauqua afforded that, no doubt, led Harper to consider Stagg for the Chicago position.

Equally important in Harper’s decision, however, was Stagg’s previous acclaim as an athlete: Stagg was one of Walter Camp’s All-Americans. Stagg would be charged with establishing physical culture and athletics on a firm footing in the new University (a task not aided by the disorganized state of Western college athletics) and Stagg’s notoriety would help in this quest. Stagg, in turn, was attracted by the unique and, to his mind, appropriate status to be granted to athletics and physical culture at Chicago. Thus, on November 25, 1890 he wrote to Harper: “After much thought and prayer I feel decided that my life can best be used for my Master’s service in the position which you have offered.”²⁸ Harper, in a less altruistic vein, reportedly later wrote Stagg, “I want you to develop teams which we can send around the country and knock out all the colleges. We will give them a palace car and a vacation, too.”²⁹ In sum, athletics at Chicago would be both a marketing mechanism for Stagg’s morality and a vehicle for the vindication of Harper’s university idea.

In the selection of Harper, Chicago’s trustees selected a man not a program and the same can be said of Harper’s choice of Stagg. Granted unprecedented autonomy, as is revealed in Stagg’s March 24, 1896 letter to Harper on the question of accountability which included the statements, “I understand that I am not to be hampered in my work in any way . . . I am not compelled to explain for what purpose certain money is to be used,”³⁰ Stagg wasted no time in the execution of his assignment. When Chicago opened its doors for the first time on October 1, 1892, Stagg’s football squad held a practice in Washington Park since the University did not have its own field. Tennis, basketball, track, and baseball also were made available in the first year.³¹ Such diverse offerings in a new school presumably diluted the athletic talent pool, for Stagg, himself, was obliged to play both football and baseball in that year.

If the extra-mural procurement of players was initially a problem, then, Stagg had an immediate and, by the standards of the time, innovative solution. He,

together with Harper, established a requirement in physical culture which, in Stagg's words, would aid him to recruit "many skillful players who otherwise would never appear" and would enable him "to develop players for teams."³² That is, until a more efficient extra-mural procurement system was established; the program of physical culture would be an intra-mural *feeder system* for Stagg's athletic teams.³³ Here, it should be noted that the compulsory work in physical training for men consisted, in the beginning, of "training in football formations without scrimmage."³⁴ This practice fueled the skepticism of other faculty members who came to view the Division of Physical Culture and Athletics as one which "seemed too common and too uncommon; it lacked intellectual rigor and academic ancestry."³⁵

Criticisms notwithstanding, Stagg's contributions to athletics and, in particular, football should not be blurred.³⁶ But, like Harper, he was caught up in the *Zeitgeist* of the times. For example, in 1893, Stagg coauthored a book with Henry Williams on football as a *science*.³⁷ In this book, it was argued that the objective of football was to win rather than to play purely for pleasure. And winning required planning, organization, specialization, and coordination—in short, "system" and "order."³⁸ Thus, Stagg advocated for football what Harper had in mind for the University of Chicago. In characteristic progressive tenor, both Harper and Stagg were in the business of saving souls by administrating lives—Christianity, democracy, and scientific management presumably could co-exist.

As has been the case with many platforms, discrepancies emerged between ideas and actions. In the case of Stagg, such discrepancies may have arisen out of the anomalies which can be found in Harper's conduct concerning athletics (a point to which we shall return later) or because Stagg came to equate success with winning and winning with special privilege. That is, it was but a small step from Stagg's winning platform with its attendant requirements for planning, specialization, and coordination to his advocacy of the special needs and concerns of athletes, and to his apparent use of illegitimate means. In a letter to Harper July 5, 1901, Stagg complained about a decision to terminate the practice of housing athletes in a special dormitory. He listed the inconveniences incurred, the chief of which was the ". . . injuries and bruises which would prevent men making long walks to their classes."³⁹ And as a way of conferring distinction upon his athletes, Stagg also helped to organize in the 1905-06 academic year the first athletic letter *club*, the Order of C.⁴⁰ Confirmation of the fact that Stagg considered his athletes as distinct from the general student body is provided in 1905 when Harper had to remind Stagg not to hold football practice on the afternoon of convocation.⁴¹

Stagg created more problems for Harper and himself in his purported use of ineligible players and in his dealings with the officials of other universities. In

their history of the University of Wisconsin, for example, Merle Curti and Vernon Carstensen observed that Stagg was charged, as early as 1895, with employing professional athletes and over-emphasizing winning.⁴² Harper, himself, demonstrated displeasure with some of Stagg's tactics: He reprimanded Stagg for using an ineligible player in the 1896 football campaign and in 1898 scolded Stagg for exceeding his authority on the issue of player eligibility.⁴³ In 1905, Harper demanded that Stagg reply to those who accused him of watering down the field prior to a game with Wisconsin.⁴⁴ (On the validity of such accusations, we have no grounds for comment.)

Success may also have engendered arrogance as was manifested in Stagg's flagrant disregard for schedules and in his repeated claims that such was Chicago's stature that he required a greater share of the gate revenues.⁴⁵ After losing a football game to Wisconsin in 1897, Stagg allegedly felt that the defeat was an accident and, schedules notwithstanding, offered Wisconsin an immediate re-match with a \$5,000 guarantee—a move that was subsequently berated in Wisconsin's student newspaper as being typical of "the tactics of a prize fighter."⁴⁶ Arbitrary scheduling also caused problems between Chicago and Indiana.⁴⁷

Despite the strains which Stagg's conduct was placing upon his relationship with Harper, Stagg wrote to Harper on July 6, 1905 requesting a raise in salary. He suggested a figure of \$6,000 and noted that some of his remuneration could come from the athletic fund. In support of his request, Stagg cited increasing demands upon his time and energies, and ". . . constant university and public pressure bearing down on me."⁴⁸ If notoriety is an indication of demand, then Stagg's claims were not without foundation. For with Chicago's athletic successes, Stagg not only became, with Harper, a figurehead of the University, but later would surpass the president in popular acclaim. As it was, Stagg was granted the increment in salary and thereby became one of the highest paid members of the university.

Whether Harper, the planner, foresaw the acclaim which athletics and Stagg would receive is a difficult question to unearth because there are so many discrepancies to be found in Harper's actions and words. First, the words: In his 1896 Spring Convocation address, Harper had said that "the athletic work of the students is a vital part of student life. *Under the proper restrictions* it is a real and essential part of the college education. The athletic field like the gymnasium is one of the University's laboratories and by no means the least important one."⁴⁹ Furthermore, Harper had suggested that athletics were but a division, a logical subset, of physical culture. Harper had been opposed to funding athletics through gate receipts, had championed university control over athletics, and even had proposed that athletics might be endowed.⁵⁰ This latter measure, he had argued, would allow the elevation ". . . of the cause

of higher physical education to a plane coordinate with that of intellectual education.”⁵¹ Such elevation only could occur if athletes were amateurs of “highest character” and were capable of completing “intellectual work of high order in the various departments.”⁵² In a similar vein, Harper had insisted that coaches should be given faculty appointments so as to protect them from extra-university interests and the pressures to win at all costs.

Concerning the anomalous deeds, Harper had argued for “proper restrictions,” yet he granted Stagg unprecedented autonomy. Harper had suggested that athletics should be a division, a subset, of physical culture, yet he had zealously encouraged athletics to develop a winning tradition, thereby, to stimulate interest in the University and in his version of the “university idea.” In short, he had opened the door for the athletic tail to wag the physical culture dog as is evidenced in his tacit approval of Stagg’s initial use of the physical culture requirement as a feeder system for intercollegiate sport teams. Harper had been opposed to funding athletics through gate receipts and had suggested endowment as an alternative, yet there is no evidence to suggest that Harper attempted to push through this plan. He had argued that coaches should be given faculty status to protect them from extramural pressure yet he was not immune to applying such pressure intramurally. For example, when Chicago was losing at the half in a game against Wisconsin, Stagg recounted that Harper walked into the dressing room and stated, “Boys, Mr. Rockefeller has just announced a gift of \$3,000,000 to the University. He believed that the University is to be great. The way you played in the first half leads me to wonder whether we really have the spirit of greatness and ambition. I wish you would make up your minds to win this game and show that we do have it.”⁵³ Harper had claimed that athletics, as higher physical culture, was a real and essential part of the college education and that it was an important laboratory, yet, despite his appointment of Stagg as a faculty member with tenure, he had placed Stagg in charge of a division which lacked the status of a branch (i.e., a department of knowledge) and had accorded Stagg the title of “Director” rather than confer upon him the “Head Professor” status of his counterparts. Moreover, Harper had placed coursework in physical culture and athletics under the supervision of a non-academic agency, the Board of Physical Culture and Athletics.⁵⁴ And, although Harper had claimed that athletics were educational, he had singled them out as one of the important areas that required attention in the “business side of the University.” In Harper’s words: “Whatever may be thought of the increased emphasis laid upon athletic contests, it will be conceded that, in the management of these contests, a business ability of high order is required.”⁵⁵ And, lest we forget, Harper, in response to Stagg’s salary claims, had approved the sequestering of *athletic* not academic funds for this purpose. Finally, Harper had emphasized that athletes be amateurs of the highest character and capable of completing intellectual work in the various departments, yet he had autho-

rized or tacitly approved tutorial help for athletes and the awarding of athletic scholarships under the guise of student service stipends.⁵⁶

Harper's enigmatic style carried over into the administrative realm too. Whether attributable to the priority that Harper set in athletics or to the incompatibility between self-styled "charisma" and "scientific management," Harper seemed unable to devolve authority upon those he appointed, for he could not refrain from meddling in their affairs.⁵⁷ Thus, despite the fact that Harper had written to Stagg on February 9, 1897 to inform him of changes in their working relationship—here, he had suggested that, henceforth, Stagg should handle most of the work involved with the Department of Physical Culture and Athletics because his own administrative load had become excessive⁵⁸—evidence of Harper's reluctance to totally divorce himself from athletic affairs can be found. On June 16, 1897, Harper requested that Stagg stage a dinner for the baseball team in appreciation of its efforts. In the fall of that year, he proposed that a bulletin board (in essence, a progress report board) be erected near the football field.⁵⁹ A day later, Harper asked Stagg for permission to speak privately to the football team prior to the game with Michigan.⁶⁰ Further on February 13, 1900, Harper inquired if Stagg would be willing to visit a few secondary schools "in the interests of the university" and on November 1, 1901 he requested that Stagg send a person to coach football at nearby Morgan Park—a measure presumably aimed at facilitating recruitment.⁶¹ Little more than two years would pass before Harper inquired if Stagg could do anything about the University of Illinois' success in luring Morgan Park athletes away from the University of Chicago.⁶² And, as a final example, Harper instructed Stagg on at least two occasions to provide complimentary tickets for "friends of university athletics" so as to kindle more interest in this aspect of University operations.⁶³ Clearly, Harper's policies were formulated more easily than implemented and his actions were not altogether consistent with his stated positions.

Anomalies, notwithstanding, Harper's university idea and the place assigned to physical culture and athletics within it continued to be viable even after his death on January 10, 1906. Over the years, however, debate has flourished concerning the extent to which Harper's university idea was really novel. Writing in 1910, one writer found it difficult "to find space to mention all the departures from traditionalism which we owe to The University of Chicago."⁶⁴ In his history of the early years of the University, Thomas Goodspeed, Harper's friend and fellow founder, was equally enthusiastic about Chicago's innovations.⁶⁵ Later appraisals, however, have not been so kind. Laurence Veysey, for example, concluded that the only unique feature to be found in Harper's Chicago was the Summer School and he chided Harper for his "blind imitation of Yale."⁶⁶ Robert Hutchins, likewise, spoke of the bond between "Mother Yale and her child in the West."⁶⁷ In addition,

there is evidence that Harper borrowed freely from Chautauqua.⁶⁸ The list of pros and cons could go on, but Edwin Slosson's 1910 assessment even today appears to hit the mark. Of Chicago, he said it was a "mutant" and, of Harper's university idea: "His plan was a mosaic, the bits of which were cemented into a pattern by a generalization derived from a single case, his own life as an investigator and teacher of the Bible."⁶⁹

With regard to physical culture and athletics, ideas most certainly were borrowed from Chautauqua and Yale, and cross-fertilized at Chicago.⁷⁰ Yet it was the staying power of the Harper/Stagg approach to physical culture and athletics in the post-Harper years that was a testimonial to the efficacy of the ideational meld and to its ability to mystify the proponents of moderation and proportion by coupling the very public signs of its commercial success with the purification processes and good deeds initiated by Stagg. Thus, Harry Pratt Judson (President, 1907-23), Harper's immediate successor, had, as a former member of the Administrative Board of Physical Culture and Athletics, not only aided in the formulation of the Harper/Stagg approach but continued, as President, to support Stagg's "expansionist" policies in the firm belief that Chicago and Stagg could and indeed had (via the Chicago Idea⁷¹) curbed athletic evils and rehabilitated the contests to "a high plane of clean, wholesome, manly, and honorable conduct."⁷² Ernest De Witt Burton (President, 1923- 1925) also furthered the commercialization of sport and, while admitting that "intercollegiate contests had been by no means an un-mixed good,"⁷³ emphasized the moral value of the spirit and practice of team play, the integral part that athletics had in the "educational equipment of the University," and the due proportion and relationship of athletics to University life when conducted under proper regulations and supervision.⁷⁴ In short, Burton like Judson believed in Stagg's leadership and had tangible evidence (e.g., the "Chicago Idea," the statements on anti-professionalism, and the "doctrine of good works," Chicago-style) to justify this belief as well as the view that, at Chicago, athletics were conducted in a way deserving of approbation, even emulation. Chicago seemed to its Executives, to be an exception to the rule; a moral leader in a reprehensible but reformable athletic world. Only Charles Max Mason (President, 1925-28) declared openly that he was inconsistent on the football function.⁷⁵ While football held together the real work of the University by providing fellowship and friendship, he was for it. Its excesses of enthusiasm, however, were dangerous. Balance was the key: If the bookish student would play football and the football player would study intensively, well, Chicago perhaps could do the impossible.⁷⁶ Inconsistency notwithstanding, Mason gave tacit approval to plans already underway to enlarge the football stadium to accommodate 58,000 spectators, this despite the losses increasingly sustained by the football team.

In the years from Harper through Mason Chicago developed a program of

athletics which, as Robin Lester in his history of intercollegiate football at Chicago observes, achieved parity with those in the East.⁷⁷ But in the process, a now familiar sequence of events was in evidence: with popularization came commercialization and the concomitant rationalization of sport and its administrative procedures.⁷⁸ And, in the case of Chicago, there was more than a touch of irony in this regard. For, as Lester indicates, Chicago eventually could not compete favorably (for reasons we shall outline later) in the commercialized and rationalized brand of football which Stagg, with Executive support and blessing, had helped to foster.⁷⁹ To adumbrate what follows, it was this Janus-faced conundrum that Hutchins inherited and with which he would later dispense.

When Hutchins assumed the presidency at Chicago in 1929, he, perhaps, was riding a current of incipient change. After all, the committee elected by the Trustees to advise the Board in the selection of a President had been charged with finding “a leader of such courage, ability, and imagination as to assure not only the maintenance of high standards and sound educational policies but afresh *access* of that pioneering spirit which from the beginning has characterized the University.”⁸⁰ Whether or not the search committee envisioned that “fresh access” would spring from youth can only be inferred from their actions in selecting a man who was thirty at the time of his appointment. Not surprisingly, Hutchins did not have a fully developed educational philosophy at the time of his arrival in Chicago. Specifically, his ideas on just what constituted a “liberal education” had yet to be formulated, a flaw which he attributed to his lack of an extensive “formal” education. The son of a minister-professor, Hutchins stated that his early years were those of self-entertainment principally in the areas of reading and physical exercise. He was later to reflect, “the first meant reading anything you could lay your hands on. The second meant playing tennis.”⁸¹

Hutchins’ formal education began at age 16 upon entry into Oberlin College. But, it was at the Yale Law School where Hutchins claimed he received his introduction to the liberal arts. What he understood in this regard was the Law School’s emphasis upon reading, writing, and speaking.⁸² Upon graduation, at age twenty-six, Hutchins remained at Yale serving as a member of the Law faculty⁸³ and as the Secretary of the University (a position which placed him in contact with the alumni and which required that he be exposed to extracurricular activities).

It was as a member of Yale’s Law faculty that Hutchins came into contact with Mortimer Adler. While Hutchins originally sought Alder out for assistance on the Law of Evidence, Adler’s influence became much broader in scope and significance.⁸⁴ Having spent four years in John Erskin’s “Great Books” course at Columbia, it was he who convinced Hutchins that he was

uneducated.⁸⁵ And it was Adler who accompanied Hutchins to Chicago and with whom Hutchins taught the “Great Books” course. According to Hutchins, his real education thus began in earnest at age thirty-two for, prior to establishing this course with Alder, of all the great books Hutchins had read only Shakespeare, Goethe, and the Bible.⁸⁶

Labels do little to illuminate the educational philosophy developed by Hutchins. It has, for example, been categorized variously as Thomistic, neo-Thomistic, naturalistic, and liberalistic in the Jeffersonian vein.⁸⁷ Regardless of the actual sources from which it was derived, it is clear that Hutchins’ educational philosophy contrasted sharply with that of Harper, and for that matter, with the then popular, Progressive notions of education. Moreover, as the title of one of his books, *No Friendly Voice*, suggests, Hutchins was aware that his views were inconsistent with the popular sentiments of the time.⁸⁸

Harper had envisioned and had endeavored to create an institution of higher education which was tied to the public by its professional schools, its reliance upon science as a source of solutions to practical problems, its athletic programs, and its out-reach programs (e.g., university extensions and affiliations). He, like others of his time, had been deeply concerned with the development of character and had pointed to the contributions of the extra-curriculum in this regard. Hutchins saw both the relationship of the University to the public and the development of character in a different light.

Hutchins’ fundamental point of departure rested in the assumption that a university’s principal function should be to provide *intellectual* leadership in society. Repeatedly, in his writings, he asked his readers to consider what would be sacrificed if the colleges and universities were eliminated. Invariably, he proffered those things intellectual as the answer.⁸⁹ Not surprisingly, then, Hutchins was critical of the practical and “vocationalist” goals that Harper had set for the University.⁹⁰ Vocationalism, Hutchins argued, led to an emphasis upon technical routines, the “tricks of the trade,” at the expense of systematized understanding. It resulted, said Hutchins, in a trivialization and atomization of the subject matter, and it placed a university in an unfortunate position in society: Instead of it “being an agent of unification,” a university mirrored “the chaos of the world.”⁹¹

Other differences between Harper and Hutchins can be illuminated against the backdrop of Hutchins’ book, *The Higher Learning in America*. Here Hutchins outlined three sources of the problems confronting higher education and provided solutions.⁹² The first source as “the love of money” which compelled a university to “sell its soul” and become transformed into “a service station.” And in order to make themselves attractive to students, donors, and legislatures, thereby to acquire money, institutions tended to emphasize social life,

character building, and athletics, all of which led to a debasement of these institutions and to a confusion of their purposes.⁹³ The second problem-source which Hutchins identified lay in a “confused notion of democracy.” While Hutchins championed the position that democracy was best served when all the people received the education that rulers ought to have,⁹⁴ he did not intend that the curriculum should be “levelled,” that all individuals should receive the same number of years of schooling, or that the lay community should usurp the control of higher education and its contents. Rather, he envisioned a universal comprehension and a system of education in which the more meritorious would receive the maximum level of education from which they could derive benefit. To this end a university would be the watchtower of democracy, the seat of intellectual autonomy, and the site of intellectual freedom.⁹⁵ Anything less would erode a university’s mission as Hutchins defined it.⁹⁶ The third source of problems confronting higher education rested in an “erroneous notion of progress,” a misplaced faith in science, technology, and facts to usher in a better world. Such a faith led to the substitution of empiricism for education. And empiricism, in its turn, promoted vocationalism “. . . because the facts you learn about your prospective environment (particularly if you love money) ought to be as immediate and useful as possible.”⁹⁷ The net result, said Hutchins, was that this false notion of progress inculcated a profound anti-intellectualism in society and its institutions of higher learning.

Hutchins’ remedy for these problems and his mission for a university in the creation of a democratic world was to establish higher education on a rational basis and make the public understand it as such.⁹⁸ This rational basis for education, he believed, rested in the fixed truths or those principles that have underscored human deliberation throughout history. Thus, the higher learning, for Hutchins, would be concerned primarily with *thinking about* the fundamental problems of natural science, social science, and metaphysics.⁹⁹ From this pattern of study, would emerge individuals who had developed “. . . the most generalized understanding of the nature of the world and the nature of man.”¹⁰⁰ Character or moral virtue, Hutchins believed, stemmed from such an understanding. He stated: “Hard intellectual work is doubtless the best foundation of character, for without intellectual virtues the moral sense rests upon habit and precept alone.”¹⁰¹ Intellectual work, then, was the purpose of higher education and it could be accomplished only if institutions of higher education eliminated their all-too-many extramural ties and, thereby, established themselves as independent, intellectual fountainheads.

While many of the post-Harper curricular changes at Chicago were consistent with Hutchins’ view of the University and became dubbed as the “Hutchins’ Plan,” it is the case that many of these changes were instigated by members of the Chicago faculty prior to Hutchins’ appointment.¹⁰² Also known as the

“New Plan,” these revisions were aimed primarily at the first two years of undergraduate work or at the “college” portion of the curriculum. As one of its first students described, this plan entailed enrollment in four general courses in the biological, physical and social sciences, and in the humanities. Compulsory class attendance and course credits were replaced by comprehensive examinations. In brief, the students were required to pass the examinations, with or without the assistance of formal course work, before they could proceed into the specialized work of the last two undergraduate years.¹⁰³ Here the specialized work would be completed in the Divisions of the University. As reorganized by Hutchins, they were composed of the Professional Schools, Physical Sciences, Humanities, Social Sciences, and Biological Sciences. Still under the direction of Stagg, the Department of Physical Culture and Athletics was placed within the Biological Sciences Division.¹⁰⁴

Since the “New Plan” carried with it the implication that all extant course requirements be abolished, it was to be expected that the physical culture requirement should be examined in this regard. Stagg attempted, in February 1931, to provide an extensive justification for the requirement in a letter to the Chairman of the Committee on the College Curriculum.¹⁰⁵ As will be seen, the remaining account of the fate of the requirement reads as Stagg and company versus Hutchins and, to a degree, the students. Here, it should be remembered that the hidden agenda for Stagg was to retain the use of the physical culture requirement as a player development system for intercollegiate athletics (see our discussion beginning page 55 for a rationale).

In 1931, the Board of Physical Culture and Athletics, which by then had become Stagg’s tool, was charged with reconsidering the requirement in the light of the “New Plan.” To no one’s surprise, the Board recommended on April 13, 1931 that a two year requirement in physical culture be approved.¹⁰⁶ Members of the college faculty endorsed this recommendation on May 7, 1931 only to have the University Senate refer it back for re-examination two weeks later. On June 1, the College Faculty reaffirmed their resolution and returned it to the Senate.

Meanwhile, a separate group, the College Curriculum Committee and the Executive Board of the Colleges proposed on May 7, 1931 that voluntary physical culture be given a trial and that intramural sports be given added emphasis. This proposal initially was defeated by the College Faculty who favored a requirement.¹⁰⁷ And, in yet another development, the President and Secretary of the Undergraduate Council sent to the Dean of the College a copy of the Council’s resolution that the requirement be eliminated because it was “. . . inconsistent with the spirit of the New Plan.”¹⁰⁸

In determining the future of the physical culture requirement, no stone was

left unturned. Student sentiment was tested in a poll taken by the *Daily Maroon*, the student newspaper. Supervised by a professor, the poll added further fuel to the “abolitionist” fire in that two-thirds of the 1,427 students polled favored the elimination of the physical culture requirement. Finally, an “uncommissioned” report, authored by Dudley B. Reed, M.D., the Health Officer of the University of Chicago, gained the support of some of the faculty. In this report, Reed proposed that a premium be placed on health and enjoyment and suggested that intramurals be elevated over commercialized athletics with its “win at all costs” ethic.¹⁰⁹ Hutchins endorsed and propagated this position wherein exercise and sport were adjunct, rather than central, to the offerings of the University. Such a position, of course, was diametrically opposed to the platform which emerged under Harper and Stagg, and the latter contested it hotly.

Despite the protests of Stagg and his allies, the College Faculty repealed the physical culture requirement on May 18, 1932. In this, Hutchins and other proponents of the New Plan achieved a major victory. And, in accordance with the proposals of the Reed Report, intramurals were elevated in importance thus making it appropriate to transfer the jurisdictional control over the Department of Physical Culture and Athletics from the Biological Sciences to the Dean of Students and the Board of Coordination of Student Interests. In losing the physical culture requirement, Stagg had seen his player development system dismantled. Yet, the irrepressible Stagg was not without a solution. That is, given the renewed need to procure and develop athletes intramurally that had risen in conjunction with the implementation of the “New Plan,” Stagg turned to the intramural sport program and tried to coax Charles Molander, one of his ex-athletes and the Director of Intramurals, into assigning coaches to supervise the various intramural sports.¹¹⁰ Here Stagg faced not only Molander a proponent of student control but also the student body. His coaxing was to no avail.

Clearly, Hutchins’ stance on the issue of the physical culture requirement needs to be understood within the context of his views on the mission of the university. Here, the repeal of the requirement involved not only the logic of the New Plan but also the logic of the University’s role in the training of character as Hutchins defined it. Character for Hutchins developed in conjunction with the training of the mind, a process of cultivation which resulted in the capacity to make intelligent choices on the basis of knowledge. The role of the University was to communicate no less than the Western intellectual tradition and to prepare students to enter into the community of mankind’s finest minds.¹¹¹ A university’s legitimacy could rest on nothing short of its contributions to the Great Conversation.¹¹² The training of the body and the quest for perfection in physique were ancillary to the training of the mind. This view is implicit in Hutchins’ remark that “. . . undoubtedly, fine asso-

ciations, fine buildings, green grass, good food, are excellent things for anybody. You will note that they are exactly what is advertised by every resort hotel.”¹¹³ Universities which dwelled upon things environmental and corporal did so, claimed Hutchins, because they have nothing else to announce.

The physical culture requirement was one of two major issues which separated Hutchins from Stagg. They also failed to reach accord on the role that Stagg would play under Hutchins. Negotiations on Stagg’s future began in 1929, soon after Hutchins became president. At that time, Stagg wrote to Hutchins and requested that he be named Chairman or Director of Intercollegiate Athletics, a position responsible only to the president. This request was quite consistent with Stagg’s views on physical culture, intramurals, and athletics which he saw as requiring the control of specialists as opposed to students and faculty. Clearly, it was also a request which, if granted, would have expanded Stagg’s power. Such attendant implications as much as the “New Plan” must have weighed heavily in Hutchins’ decision to deny Stagg’s request. But this was not the only blow which Hutchins dealt Stagg. In 1932, Stagg, who was then approaching seventy, wished to continue in his role as football coach and Director of Physical Culture and Athletics. Hutchins denied Stagg’s wish and, instead, offered Stagg a public relations post with the University, an offer spumed by Stagg in a terse letter dated December, 1932. Said Stagg: “I am not a salesman. I am a coach.”¹¹⁴

Stagg’s replacement as Director of Physical Culture and Athletics was T. Nelson Metcalfe.¹¹⁵ Hired in 1933, Metcalfe, a graduate of Oberlin and Columbia, had views on physical culture and athletics that were much more closely aligned with those of Hutchins than those of Stagg. Shortly after his arrival, Metcalfe decided to hire a new football coach. With the appointment of Clark Shaughnessy as Chicago’s second football coach, Stagg found himself unemployed. The Harper/Stagg machine thus had been dismantled and the beginnings of a Hutchins-style substitute implemented.

While our account of the Hutchins-Stagg relationship might induce the conclusion that there was animosity between the two, the available evidence (i.e., the public statements) runs contrary to this opinion. Not only did Hutchins single out Stagg’s contributions to the University and to the Big Ten, but on one occasion he stated publicly, “. . . I am proud of Stagg.”¹¹⁶ The crux of the matter probably resides in the fact that the views of Hutchins and Stagg on physical culture, athletics, and the university were irreconcilable. Consider their discrepant positions on character and the trained body in this regard. Stagg’s views were in tune with those of Luther Halsey Gulick and the YMCA, a position and an organization which, despite his father’s close connections, disturbed Hutchins per se. In an address aimed at the Employed Officers Association of the YMCA, Hutchins observed that “if the YMCA is

not a business, neither is it a club nor the Boy Scout's nor a gymnastic organization." He added:

Although I subscribe heartily to the doctrine of *mens sana in corpore sano*, we must agree, I suppose, that the physical aspects of the Association's program have the same relation to it that we have already allocated to the physical plant. That is, these items go to make up a rounded development; they are not, and ought not be, central. . . . I do not urge the withdrawal of the YMCA from a field in which it has provided leadership and preeminent service. I do urge that these things be relegated to their proper place and subordinated to the primary aim of the movement.¹¹⁷

The aim which Hutchins suggested as an embodiment of the YMCA's principles was adult education, especially religious education of the type that would command intellectual respect. As if to reaffirm his oft stated position on the relationship between intellectual training and character formation, he advised the officers in his audience:

Nor do we need to worry if this kind of education does not conform to what we ordinarily call "character education." Education that sets as its stated and obvious aim the development of character is likely to degenerate into sloppy sentimental talk about character. The result is neither character nor education. Rigorous intellectual activity remains the best character education; and the less said about character in the process the better.¹¹⁸

While the discrepant positions of Hutchins and Stagg had surfaced on the issue of required courses in physical culture, it was on the subject of intercollegiate football that their differences were most visible.

Football, more than anything else, continued to bear the mark of Harper and Stagg even after Stagg's departure. Of all the sports in Chicago's intercollegiate program, football was the sport in which so much alumni and support was invested. It was the sport that was the darling of the press and community alike. It was, therefore, the sport that Hutchins would assail, for the aforementioned characteristics detracted from his conception of the university.¹¹⁹ How Hutchins accomplished his aim of dismantling the football program is interesting both in the political intrigue involved and in the way in which it revealed Hutchins' stance.

The 1924 conference championship marked the apogee of Chicago's football fortunes. Thereafter, the football team's successes became fewer and fewer and the point-spread in defeat became larger and larger—a trend which did not impact upon gate receipts until the 1929-30 season.¹²⁰ Despite the fact that Chicago's other athletic teams continued to fare well in conference play,¹²¹ it was the deterioration in football which brought pressures to bear upon Hutchins, Metcalfe, Shaughnessy, and other members of the university community for, regardless of the losses, the alumni support for the football program remained strong.¹²²

By 1936, questions about the future of University of Chicago football abounded. In November, an article appeared in the *University of Chicago Magazine* which, while purporting to address the problems of athletics in general, focused upon those of Maroon Football in particular. Here, the root-cause of football's troubles was identified—it was the “New Plan.” Had not the “New Plan” set entrance requirements higher than many prospective athletes could attain? Had not the “New Plan” encouraged younger students to seek admission and others to transfer from their present colleges and universities. And had not this resulted in fewer students being eligible for athletic participation? Did not the “New Plan” thus dilute Chicago's athletic talent-pool in comparison to other schools in the Big Ten Conference?¹²³ The dilution of the talent-pool was by no means the only deleterious effect which the “New Plan” had upon athletics in general and football in particular. The comprehensive examinations required in the “New Plan” coincided with Spring football practice and at the latter's expense. The absence of a physical education major (or coaching major) impeded efforts at recruitment and, at the same time, contributed to the difficulties faced by some athletes in maintaining eligibility. Finally, the de-emphasis of things corporal was reflected in the fact that Chicago's athletic financial aid lagged behind that of competing schools. In all, the article concluded, it was extremely doubtful that football could be returned to its former prosperity. Such a conclusion, it was observed, was warranted for the schedule had already been reduced from eight to seven games and, of these, only four involved other Big Ten competitors.¹²⁴

Hutchins personally received many inquiries about football from concerned alumni. In 1936, Hutchins responded to the alumni as follows: “The future of intercollegiate athletics at Chicago depends partly on what the University does and partly what other institutions do. . . . To the extent of which other institutions in this region adopt the principles of The University of Chicago this university will be more and more successful in intercollegiate competition.”¹²⁵ The message from the President seemed clear. The game would be played on his terms or not at all. That Hutchins had entertained the latter idea is revealed in his response to a letter received later that year which questioned among other things Shaughnessy's ability as a coach and commented upon the fact that Hutchins' box was always empty at the football games. Hutchins responded that indeed he had attended some football games that fall and that the football problem was not linked to Shaughnessy's abilities. Then he inquired of the alumnus: “What would you think of our withdrawing from the Big Ten or from intercollegiate. football altogether?”¹²⁶

Those alumni, who supported a competitive (i.e., commercialized) football program, were given further grounds to fear Hutchins' intentions by an article, “Why Go To College?,” which appeared in January 1938. In response to this rhetorical question, Hutchins restated many of the ideas contained in *No*

Friendly Voice and *The Higher Learning in America*. To which sentiments he added: "Just as much courage, and courage of a higher sort, is required to tackle a 200 pound idea as to tackle a 200 pound fullback. As long as athletics is recreation, it will do neither the student nor the college any harm and may do them good." But, he warned, "a college which is interested in producing professional athletes is not an educational institution."¹²⁷

If there remained any doubts about Hutchins' views of commercialized athletics in general or football in particular, then they surely were dispelled upon the publication of Hutchins' article, "Gate Receipts and Glory." Here, as in *The Higher Learning*, Hutchins singled out the love of money as the root of evil in higher education. With references to athletics, he stated, first, that "the trouble with football is the money that is in it;" second, that "money is the cause of athleticism in American Colleges," and third, that athleticism for profit and public consumption had subverted the true goal for physical education, namely, the training of the body.¹²⁸ Borrowing repeatedly from *The Carnegie Report on American College Athletics*, Hutchins endeavored to point out that justifications for commercialized athletics were more rhetorical than rational. Moreover, he suggested that the mere reform of existing policies would not suffice—money had to be taken out of athletics. This task, he proposed, would rest upon the shoulders of those institutions which were the leaders, the ones which could afford the loss of prestige and popularity that such action entailed.¹²⁹ Since Hutchins believed that the University of Chicago was obviously one such leader and, also, that Chicago unilaterally could not "reform" football,¹³⁰ the question in his mind was not whether, but how and when, to eliminate football. The time appeared ripe in 1939.

The 1939 football season was even more dismal and, after the articles of the previous year, Hutchins received more and more correspondence, no small portion of which was critical. "My hearty congratulations," wrote one alumnus sarcastically on October 17, "on turning out a team that can be beaten 61 to nothing. I think that is the greatest credit to Chicago of all your achievements."¹³¹ Another alumnus, confident that he expressed "the sentiment of many hundreds of alumni," began his communication with the stereotypical threat: "I do not suppose you are interested in the feelings of University of Chicago Alumni: my guess is that you will not even know what those feelings are until you are disappointed by the results of the drive of alumni contributions for 1940 and 1941." He told Hutchins: "Either fish or cut bait!"¹³² To which Hutchins replied: "If fishing requires us to buy a football team, I am not prepared to fish. . . . If the alumni are so hysterical and so lacking in an adequate conception of what a university is that they cannot look upon football as a game, then we may be forced to cut bait."¹³³ In fact, Hutchins had initiated, with the help of a member of the Board of Trustees, the process of cutting bait the month before.

Hutchins elected to work exclusively with the Board of Trustees to persuade them to mandate the withdrawal of Chicago from intercollegiate football competition. This entailed both general solicitation and more personal forms of negotiation. In the case of the former, it included circulation of opinions favorable to Hutchins' cause. For example, Hutchins received a letter which contained the inquiry: "Would it not be a fine thing for Chicago to be one of the first great institutions to abolish the sport. It would at least be an interesting experiment to see what effect this would have, not only upon the alumni, but also on the reputation of the school."¹³⁴ One week later he distributed it among the trustees with the remark that it was "the best I have ever read on the subject."¹³⁵

In the realm of personal persuasion, Hutchins began in October 1939 to work on the sentiments of John Nuveen. Nuveen, who owned an investment company, was also chairman of the University's Alumni Council and an active fund raiser for the University.¹³⁶ Nuveen, himself a football enthusiast, was persuaded by Hutchins to confront the dilemma faced by Chicago football. As outlined by Hutchins, the choice was between the elimination of football, the continuation of football on its present course with the prospect of more disastrous results, or the stepping up of efforts toward commercialism, a solution which he knew was distasteful to Nuveen.¹³⁷ Consequently, Nuveen worked on the other trustees to persuade them to adopt what had become for him the only recourse—the elimination of football. That Nuveen recognized the urgency of the situation is evident in his letter of December 13, 1939 to fellow trustee Harold Higgins Swift in which he stated: "Whatever decision is made, I believe it must be made quickly."¹³⁸ As with his other correspondence on the matter, a copy was sent to Hutchins.

Nuveen's request for an immediate decision was warranted because the University of Chicago Alumni Club was spearheading an intensive drive to improve the football program. In fact, the Secretary-Treasurer of the Club "got wind of" the clandestine moves of Hutchins and his associates, and on December 12, 1939 wrote to the Board of Trustees to express his concern.¹³⁹ His expression of concern was to no avail: At its meeting of December 21, 1939, the Board voted to eliminate football and to withdraw from the Big Ten.

But when did Hutchins originally decide to move against football? Kooman Boycheff, in his history of athletics at Chicago, suggests that Hutchins had reached a decision on the football question after the fourth game of the 1939 season (a game which Chicago lost to Michigan, 85-0). So disturbed was Hutchins at the plight of the players, states Boycheff, he became convinced that an immediate decision was in order.¹⁴⁰ Other evidence, however, suggests that Hutchins' views on athletics and, in particular, football were formulated long before this humiliating defeat. Indeed, the weakness of Chicago

football Hutchins deemed to be fortunate. As early as January, 1936, Hutchins declared to the Faculty and Trustees that this weakness, coupled with Chicago's antivocationalist posture, helped to keep eyes, even those of the public, fixed on the real goals of the University.¹⁴¹ Thus, if we are to accept Boycheff's assertion, we must assume that the loss to Michigan served only as a catalyst. It provided the conditions of milieu for the implementation of the withdrawal policy and the opportunity for Hutchins to once again denounce those things which diverted attention from the intellectual mission of the University. The withdrawal from football competition was but one more indication that the University of Chicago ". . . regarded education as a serious occupation for serious people, and not as recreation or punishment for the immature."¹⁴² Football was regarded by Hutchins as a millstone: "Every university president bemoans the 'overemphasis' upon football; and every stadium in the Big Ten was built on the recommendation of the president around whose neck it is now hanging."¹⁴³ It was, it appears, one of the many bits of paraphernalia which rendered the mission of the university unintelligible.

Given this stance, it is not surprising that Hutchins would reject alternative proposals for solving the football dilemma. One solution which met with rejection came from a sports writer who extended an invitation to Chicago to join Toledo, Butler, Western Reserve, Xavier, and other mid-western schools in the formation of a new conference.¹⁴⁴ At least one alumnus made essentially the same suggestion and with the same result.¹⁴⁵ Hutchins, in short, was intractable on the football issue. Of all the sports, football represented the excesses of commercialism and most trivialized the University's function as Hutchins defined it.¹⁴⁶

While it is the case that, in retrospect, Hutchins stated that the move to eliminate football was "started by an alumnus trustee who wanted the football question settled,"¹⁴⁷ we think it is clear that Hutchins exercised his executive powers to the full. Indeed, Hutchins' "own man," Metcalfe, was not even consulted.¹⁴⁸ And it was Hutchins who bore the full brunt of the subsequent reactions to the decision to eliminate football.

The reactions to the decision were generally unfavorable. The alumni, for the most part, were vindictive and the students also exhibited an immediate and generalized contempt. (The student response, however, tempered by February, 1940.¹⁴⁹) And, in a series of articles published in *The Chicago Tribune*, the presidents of various Big Ten universities spoke against Hutchins and Chicago, and on behalf of their own schools' football programs.¹⁵⁰ When Hutchins was asked to retrospectively appraise the reasons why other presidents did not follow his lead and, indeed, reaffirmed their commitment to football, he responded, "They could not stand the pressure."¹⁵¹

On January 12, 1940, Hutchins endeavored to explain his position and that of

the Trustees to the members of the University community and, implicitly, to an audience outside Chicago's walls. In a speech titled, "Football and College Life," he again expressed his views on the purpose of a university education and the problems associated with maintaining a *winning* football program at Chicago. Having dispensed with the practical problems linked to student body size, the proportion of transfer students who were ineligible for a time, the absence of a physical education major, and the legal objections to athlete subsidization, Hutchins stated with an air of finality, "In short, the only kind of football you wanted was a kind in which the University could not engage."¹⁵² To this he added:

I hope that it is not necessary for me or anyone else to tell you that this is an educational institution, that education is primarily concerned with the training of the mind, and that athletics and social life, though they may contribute to it, are not the heart of it and cannot be permitted to interfere with it. . . . An educational institution can make one unique contribution, one denied to a fraternal order or a body-building institute: it can educate. It is by its success in making this unique contribution that it must be judged.¹⁵³

Here, as in his previous speeches on higher education in general and athletics in particular, we encounter the vintage Hutchins, the man who, in Dixon Wecter's opinion, ". . . serves best as the Devil's advocate in higher education. . . . Provocative, impatient with truisms, he often displays a salutary rudeness. He is an irritant, never a sedative."¹⁵⁴

Put in its proper context, Hutchins' posture on intercollegiate football was, like Harper's, grounded in his views of the missions of a university. In fact, at a dinner on January 18, 1940, Hutchins, in manner reminiscent of Harper, made the case that his personal missions in higher education and those of the University of Chicago were the same. He spoke to the uniqueness of the institution and reminded his audience that Chicago's task from its inception had been "to pioneer and to take on the hard things in education." Chicago would lead not follow. Its mission was "to set the standards" for others to emulate.¹⁵⁵ It is clear in this regard that Hutchins, like Harper, had his own "university idea," and further, that he anticipated imitation by others, both on the matter of football and the university curriculum. On the other hand, any optimism which he possessed in this regard had been tempered by 1949. Ironically, the same Hutchins who championed rigorous academic standards and a classical curriculum, who chided those who emphasized extra-curricular aspects of universities, lamented: "I greatly fear that my administration will be remembered solely because it was the one in which intercollegiate football was abolished."¹⁵⁶

Such an expression of concern notwithstanding, Hutchins did for a time make his mark on the University of Chicago. That the policies which he endeavored to establish contrasted sharply with those of Harper did not escape observa-

tion. After analyzing the academic history of the University, Mortimer Adler observed: "In 1904 the Chicago School meant one thing; in 1936 it meant another."¹⁵⁷ It should be added that no less can be said with regard to the role of physical culture and athletics in this same institution. On both of these counts, the institutional history of Chicago from Harper through Hutchins represents an important and, even today, a relevant chapter in the history of American higher education.

Notes

1. The authors wish to recognize the assistance of Gurdeep Singh, a former graduate student at the University of Washington, and to express their gratitude to Albert Tannler, Archives Research Specialist, The Joseph Regenstein Library, The University of Chicago, for his help in facilitating research. The present paper is a substantially re-worked version of that which was presented at the Fourth Canadian Symposium of the History of Sport and Physical Education, Vancouver, British Columbia, June, 1979. Appreciation is extended to the anonymous reviewers and to David L. Madsen, Professor, College of Education, University of Washington, for their criticisms and comments.
2. The founding of the University of Chicago is attributable, in large part, to Thomas W. Goodspeed of the Chicago Baptist Union Theological Seminary, to Frederick T. Gates, and still later to William Rainey Harper. See Thomas W. Goodspeed, *A History of the University of Chicago: The First Quarter Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1916), Richard J. Storr, *Harper's University: The Beginnings* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), Charles T.B. Goodspeed, *Thomas Wakefield Goodspeed* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932), and Joseph E. Gould, *William Rainey Harper and the University of Chicago* (Unpublished dissertation: Syracuse University, 1951).
3. Rockefeller was himself a Baptist and gave generously to various Baptist causes.
4. It was stipulated in the original charter of the University that two-thirds of the trustees and the president of the University had to be Baptists. Harper's election to the presidency in 1890 was in this sense by no means a surprise. Further, Harper was the choice of the principals from the time they first envisioned the founding of the new institution and Rockefeller had retained a keen interest in Harper's career subsequent to the latter's departure from the Baptist Theological Seminary of Chicago in 1886. Ironically enough, while the trustees and Harper's Baptist colleagues saw Harper's election as part of a divine calling, Harper was reluctant to accept because of what he saw as his own, and possibly heretical, interpretation of the Bible. After a period of ambivalence, Harper accepted the appointment in 1891. In Storr, *Harper's University*. . . ., pp. 45-51.
5. Storr, *Harper's University*. . . ., p. 45.
6. Adler noted that graduate work at such Eastern institutions as Harvard, Yale, Columbia, and Cornell was both "casual and sporadic." Thus, it was his view that Chicago was preceded only by Gilman's John Hopkins (1876) and by G. Stanley Hall's Clark (1889) as institutions worthy of the "university label. See Mortimer J. Adler, "The Chicago School," *Harper's Magazine*, 183 (September, 1941), p. 378.
7. This statement from Milton Mayer appears in Merle Curti and Vernon Carstensen, *The University of Wisconsin, 1848-1925*, 2 Volumes (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1949), Vol. 1, p. 572. Clearly, the Rockefeller millions were in no small part responsible for the rapid growth and immediate success of the University, and this is portrayed in an adulatory style by Goodspeed, *A History of the University of Chicago*. . . . Storr, *Harper's University*. . . ., pp. 258-280, is a bit more clear-eyed when he suggests that Rockefeller assured the *survival* of the University in its first decade; Harper's unbridled enthusiasm reflected itself in debt after debt which confronted the University's financial officers. Charles T.B. Goodspeed, *Thomas Wakefield Goodspeed*. . . ., pp. 57-58, observed that Harper's spending caused a serious strain on the personal relations between him and T.W. Goodspeed. Further, such deficits also appeared in athletics, and, at one point, Harper, Stagg, and Goodspeed cosigned a note to carry the athletic treasury beyond one of its crises.
8. Goodspeed, *A History of the University*. . . ., p. 189, noted triumphantly that the 1896 enrollments superseded by a total of seven those of Harvard's ten years previously. By 1910-11 Columbia, Chicago, and Michigan were the three largest universities.
9. Bernard Berelson, *Graduate Education and the United States* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 15.
10. Robert M. Hutchins, *Freedom, Education, and the Fund: Essays and Addresses, 1946-1956* (New York: Meridian Books, 1965), p. 78.

11. For example, Storr, *Harper's University* . . . , p. 19, noted that Harper began teaching summers in 1883 at Chautauqua where he also served as an administrative officer. Rockefeller was also involved there, as was Stagg (beginning in 1888). See Joseph E. Gould, *The Chautauqua Movement: An Episode in the Continuing American Revolution* (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1961).
12. See Laurence R. Veysey, *The Emergence of the American University* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 380.
13. William R. Harper, *The Trend in Higher Education* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1905), p. 12.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.
15. Storr, *Harper's University* . . . , pp. 194- 195. op. cit., note 2.
16. In this regard, Harper was but a part of the broad movement to professionalize education, social work, and other public service occupations. For a general discussion of the "professionalism" trend, see Burton J. Bledstein, *The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle Class and the Development of Higher Education in America* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976); Roy Lubove, *The Professional Altruist: The Emergence of Social Work as a Career, 1880-1930* (New York: Atheneum, 1973); Frederick C. Mosher, *Democracy and the Public Service* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968).
17. Storr, *Harper's University* . . . , pp. 196- 197.
18. Edwin E. Slosson, *Great American Universities* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1910), p. 407.
19. Veysey, *The Emergence* . . . , p. 326.
20. Cited in Robin D. Lester, *The Rise, Decline, and Fall of Intercollegiate Football at the University of Chicago, 1890-1940* (Unpublished dissertation: University of Chicago, 1974), p. 18.
21. See Guy M. Lewis, "The Beginning of Organized Collegiate Sport," *American Quarterly*, 22 (Summer, 1970), 222-229.
22. It is generally claimed that Harvard appointed the first salaried athletic director in 1893. Stagg clearly was the first to occupy such a position. Perhaps this common oversight derives from the generally valid assumption that Eastern universities were in the vanguard of fashion concerning significant changes in higher education—see Bledstein, *The Culture of Professionalism* For an example of Eastern leadership in sport see Lewis, "The Beginning of Organized"; Allen L. Sack, "Yale 29 - Harvard 4: The Professionalization of College Football," *Quest*, 19 (1973), 24-34; David L. Westby and Allen L. Sack, "The Commercialization and Functional Rationalization of College Football," *Journal of Higher Education*, 47:6 (November-December, 1976), 625-647.
23. Writing some twelve years after the opening of the University, Harper identified the limitations which inhered in the student control of athletics and the advantages which accrued from control by the University's administrators. See Harper, *The Trend* . . . , pp. 278-279.
24. William R. Harper, Quinquennial Statement, University of Chicago, July 1, 1896 and appears in *The Idea of the University of Chicago*, ed. William M. Murphy and D. J. R. Bruckner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 211.
25. Thorstein Veblen, *The Higher Learning in America* (New York: Huebsch, 1918). The "captains of erudition" were, in Veblen's view, analogous to the "captains of industry" and possessed analogous powers.
26. Ruth M. Sparhawk, *A Study of the Life and Contributions of Amos Alonzo Stagg to Intercollegiate Football* (Unpublished dissertation: Springfield College, 1968).
27. In Sparhawk, *A Study of the Life* . . . , p. 41.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
29. Cited in John S. Brubacher and Willis Rudy, *Higher Education in Transition: A History of American Colleges and Universities, 1836-1976* (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), p. 133.
30. Stagg to Harper, March 24, 1896, Amos Alonzo Stagg Papers, University of Chicago Archives, Box 9, Folder 2. Harper responded two weeks later that he did not agree with Stagg's interpretation of the matter. Harper asserted that accountability procedures were necessary and that such was but a part of the University control of expenditures. Harper to Stagg, April 7, 1896, Stagg Papers, Box 9, Folder 2.
31. In Goodspeed, *A History of the University* . . . , p. 257.
32. See Lester, *The Rise, Decline, and Fall* . . . , p. 21.
33. In using the physical culture classes as a feeder system for athletics, however, Stagg was one of the early exponents of the more general trend described by Guy M. Lewis', "Adoption of the Sports Program, 1906-39: The Role of Accommodation in the Transformation of Physical Education," *Quest*, 12 (1969), 34-46. Here it should be noted that the physical culture concept also was in transition (i.e., moving from gymnastical and calisthenic type activities to sport skills) at around this time. Beginning in the last decade of the nineteenth

- century, the "athletics-oriented" Gulick pushed the YMCA toward a sport/physical culture rapprochement and sport skills found their way into the Harvard Summer School physical culture curriculum. See Clarence VanWyck, "Harvard Summer School Physical Education, 1887-1932," *Research Quarterly*, 13 (December, 1942), 403-431. Harper himself had experienced via Stagg the sport-oriented, physical culture concept while teaching at Chautauqua University, New York during the eighties. See Harold L. Ray, "Chautauqua: Early Showcase for Physical Education," *Journal of Health, Physical Education, and Recreation*, 33 (November, 1962), 37-41, 69.
34. Report of the Director of Physical Culture and Athletics, in *The President's Report, 1892-1902* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903), p. 336.
35. Lester, *The Rise, Decline, and Fall*, pp. 16- 17.
36. For a listing of Stagg's contributions, see Sparhawk, *A Study of the Life*, pp. 115-203.
37. Amos A. Stagg and Henry L. Williams, *A Scientific and Practical Treatise on American Football for Schools and Colleges* (Hartford, Connecticut, 1893).
38. Sparhawk, *A Study of the Life*, p. 79.
39. Stagg to Harper, July 5, 1901, Stagg Papers, Box 9, Folder 4.
40. Sparhawk, *A Study of the Life*, p. 176. See also the Report of Director of Physical Culture and Athletics, in *The President's Report, 1905-1906* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1907), p. 99.
41. Harper to Stagg, September 15, 1900, Stagg Papers, Box 9, Folder 4.
42. Curti and Carstensen, *The University of Wisconsin*, Vol. 1, pp. 709-710.
43. Harper to Stagg, February 9, 1897, Stagg Papers, Box 9, Folder 2 and Harper to Stagg, October 6, 1897, Stagg Papers, Box 9, Folder 3.
44. Harper to Stagg, October 23, 1905, Stagg Papers, Box 9, Folder 11.
45. Curti and Carstensen, *The University of Wisconsin*, Vol. 1, pp. 709-710. The authors state that Stagg's unwavering posture on financing and scheduling football games threatened the survival of the Conference.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 700.
47. Thomas D. Clark, *Indiana University: Midwestern Pioneer*, 4 Volumes (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), Vol. 2, p. 334.
48. Stagg to Harper, July 6, 1905, Stagg Papers, Box 9, Folder 10.
49. In Murphy and Bruckner, *The Idea of*, pp. 211 and in Goodspeed, *A History of the University*, pp. 377-378. (emphases added)
50. Harper, "Should College Athletics be Endowed?" in *The Trend*, pp. 276-284.
51. Harper, *The Trend*, p. 282. Harper used physical education and physical culture interchangeably throughout this chapter. See also, *The President's Report, 1902-1904* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1905), pp. 31-32.
52. In Goodspeed, *A History of the University*, p. 378. In his convocation speech of 1896, Harper commended Stagg as "an example of earnest and conscientious manhood who exerts a powerful influence upon the men themselves toward right conduct and right living." In Murphy and Bruckner, *The Idea of*, p. 212.
53. Amos A. Stagg and Wesley W. Stout, *Touchdown* (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1927), p. 203. Also cited in John A. Lucas and Ronald A. Smith, *Saga of American Sport* (Philadelphia: Lea and Febiger, 1978), p. 219.
54. While discussing the creation of the Department of Physical Culture and Athletics, Goodspeed, *A History of the University*, p. 377, was probably close to the mark when he wrote that it ". . . was regarded as important enough to demand a Director, as though it were one of the great Divisions of the University." (emphases added)
55. Harper, *The Trend*, pp. 175- 176.
56. Lester, *The Rise, Decline, and Fall*, pp. 69-81, 144.
57. Here we should note similar problems in the relationship between Harper and Dewey, another visible member of the university. Dewey was recruited away from the University of Michigan and, like Harper's other faculty recruits, was paid handsomely. But while Dewey's famous laboratory school was established with Harper's approval and philosophical support, the two sparred over finances as well as the future development of the School of Education. See Storr, *Harper's University*, pp. 296-302, 339-341. According to Storr (p. 341), Dewey lost all confidence that he could work unhampered in the University after numerous skirmishes with Harper over the control of his work.

58. Harper to Stagg, February 9, 1897, Stagg Papers, Box 9, Folder 2. Perhaps Harper was never in favor of a total devolution of power, however, as is evidenced by his request that Stagg submit a monthly (later to become annual) statement concerning his department's activities. Stagg, on the other hand, may have wished for total devolution since he overlooked his duty to submit reports, a negligence which earned him repeated reminders and reprimands from Harper.
59. Harper to Stagg, November 22, 1897, Stagg Papers, Box 9, Folder 2.
60. Harper to Stagg, November 23, 1897, Stagg Papers, Box 9, Folder 2.
61. Harper to Stagg, November 1, 1901, Stagg Papers, Box 9, Folder 4.
62. Harper to Stagg, January 13, 1903, Stagg Papers, Box 9, Folder 7. Harper seems to have retained an interest in the recruitment of athletes as is implied by Stagg's request of presidential help in securing a position for an athlete in a local YMCA. Stagg to Harper, September 11, 1905, Stagg papers, Box 9, Folder 11. Yet, in the decennial report of 1902, Harper stated that Chicago would not recruit athletes. In Murphy and Bruckner, *The Idea of . . .*, p. 212.
63. Harper to Stagg, November 25, 1896 and October 13, 1902, Stagg Papers, Box 9, Folders 2 and 6. From the 20/20 vision of hind-sight, of course, a person like Harper who believed in university autonomy in the control of athletics was tampering with the lid of Pandora's box. Whether Harper saw potential problems in kindling extra-university interest in athletic programs is not clear. Nonetheless, his actions were consistent with his belief in university/community interaction.
64. Slosson, *Great American Universities*, p. 405.
65. Goodspeed, *A History of the University . . .*, pp. 131-137.
66. Veyssey, *The Emergence . . .*, pp. 333, 377.
67. Robert M. Hutchins, in *Yale Alumni Weekly* (October 23, 1931) p. 94. The bond identified here was in the number of Yale professors recruited by Harper. Furthermore, Frederick Rudolph, *The American College and University* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1962), observed that Harper borrowed from Yale the idea of dormitories and he added that Chicago's borrowing "tremendously encouraged a wave of dormitory construction at the large urban universities." (p. 100)
68. See Gould, *The Chautauqua Movement . . .*, pp. 56-61 and "Chautauqua Local Circles and Summer Assemblies," *The Chautauquan*, 10 (October, 1889), pp. 102-113.
69. Slosson, *Great American Universities*, p. 57.
70. Stagg played football at Yale under the legendary Walter Camp and Camp was a leader in the rationalization of the game. If Stagg's own approach to football was influenced by Camp, we find no acknowledgement to this effect in Stagg's or Camp's papers. (In the case of the latter, we would like to acknowledge the search efforts made on our behalf by Dr. Allen L. Sack.) Sparhawk, *A Study of the Life . . .*, also fails to find or does not cite evidence to support the idea that Stagg used Camp as a role model. On the other hand, it is entirely possible that Stagg was indebted to Camp but that the debt has not been proclaimed in the more tangible resources. It is interesting to note that in the Financial Statement for the year ending June 30, 1927, The Department of Physical Culture and Athletics is on record as donating \$4,500 to the Walter Camp Memorial Fund. Report of the Director of Physical Culture and Athletics, in *The President's Report, 1926-1927* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928), p. 37.
71. For a description of the "Chicago Idea" see the Report of the Director of Physical Culture and Athletics, in *The President's Report, 1905-1906* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1907), pp. 97-98.
72. Harry P. Judson, Convocation Speech, June 12, 1906. In Murphy and Bruckner, *The Idea of . . .*, p. 215.
73. Ernest D. Burton, "The University of Chicago As It Should Be in 1940: A Confidential Statement by the President," 1925. In Murphy and Bruckner, *The Idea of . . .*, p. 217.
74. *Ibid.*, and Ernest D. Burton, Football Dinner Speech, November 15, 1923. In Murphy and Bruckner, *The Idea of . . .*, pp. 216-217.
75. C. Max Mason, Speech to the Alumni of University of Wisconsin and University of Chicago, December 14, 1925, extracts of which appear in Murphy and Bruckner, *The Idea of . . .*, p. 219.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 220.
77. Lester, *The Rise, Decline, and Fall . . .*, pp. 167- 168.
78. For an elaboration upon this hypothesis see Alan G. Ingham, "Occupational Subcultures in the Work World of Sport" in *Sport and Social Order: Contributions to the Sociology of Sport*, ed. John W. Loy and Donald W. Ball (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 333-389. Also see Westby and Sack, "The Commercialization . . . and, for a contextual analysis of the factors promoting commercialization, Guy M. Lewis, "Enterprise on the Campus: Developments in Intercollegiate Sport and Higher Education, 1875-1939," in *The History of Physical Education and Sport*, ed. Bruce L. Bennett (Chicago: The Athletic Institute, 1972), pp. 53-66.

79. Lester, *The Rise, Decline, and Fall . . .*, p. 169.
80. *The President's Report, 1928-1929* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), p. ix. (emphasis added)
81. Robert M. Hutchins, *Education for Freedom* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1943), p. 2. The context of these remarks is important. The Chapter in which they are located is titled, "The Autobiography of an Uneducated Man." Hutchins' views on education colored his treatment of his own life experiences. The Chapter is laced with humorous self-criticism and tongue-in-cheek remarks. In this Chapter, Hutchins cracked, "The habit of physical exercise I was fortunately forced to abandon at an early date." Perhaps his detractors took his remarks too seriously and attributed to him an absolute anti-exercise stance.
82. Hutchins, *Education for Freedom*, pp. 6-7. Hutchins may have underestimated the Oberlin experience here as Dell recently has suggested. George W. Dell, "Robert M. Hutchins' Philosophy of General Education and the College at the University of Chicago," *The Journal of General Education*, 30 (Spring, 1978), 46. But see Hutchins, "The Sentimental Alumnus," *No Friendly Voice*, pp. 87-94. With reference to Yale, Hutchins observed that its contributions were "too little and too late." *Education for Freedom*, p. 8.
83. Hutchins, *Education for Freedom*, p. 10, facetiously suggested that his appointment was by default: "Just before I was about to graduate from the Law School at the age of twenty-six, a man who was scheduled to teach in the school that summer got appendicitis, and a substitute had to be found. Since I was already on the payroll and everybody else was out of town, I became a member of the faculty of the Law School."
84. See Hutchins, *Education for Freedom*, pp. 12-14.
85. In Hutchins' words, Adler was concerned that "the sole reading matter of university presidents was the telephone book," and "unless I did something drastic, I would close my educational career a wholly uneducated man." *Ibid.*, p. 13.
86. Dell, "Robert M. Hutchins' Philosophy . . .," 48.
87. See, for example, Salvatore D'Urso, "The Classical Liberalism of Robert M. Hutchins," *Teachers College Record*, 80:2 (December, 1978), 336-355.
88. Robert M. Hutchins, *No Friendly Voice* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936). Progressive educators and their leader John Dewey were quick to point out what they saw as faculty assumptions and problems in Hutchins' stance. See, for example, John Dewey, "Rationality in Education," *The Social Frontier III* (January 1937), pp. 103-104. Hutchins' responses to Dewey are to be found in "Grammar, Rhetoric, and Mr. Dewey," *The Social Frontier III*, (February, 1937), pp. 137-139. According to Dell, Robert M. Hutchins' Philosophy. . . ." p. 54, Hutchins once targeted John Dewey and William James as "the leading anti-intellectuals of our time." This phrase appears in "The Higher Learning II." Here Hutchins is, in fact, targeting all those "gradgrinds" and "gadgeteers" who resisted moving beyond details to the level of principles—those who were, by their insistence upon facts and experiences condemned to watch rather than to understand the world. See Hutchins, *No Friendly Voice*, pp. 33-40. But to be fair to Dewey, it should be noted that Hutchins acknowledged Dewey's 1930 clarification of his views on abstraction, a clarification which Hutchins interpreted as a repudiation of the anti-intellectual position. The differences between Harper and Hutchins, perhaps, are attested to by the relationship each had with Dewey.
89. See a recently reprinted article by Hutchins, "The College and the Needs of Society," *The Journal of General Education*, 30 (Spring, 1978), 33-34 and "Why Go to College," *Saturday Evening Post*, 210 (January, 1938), pp. 16-17, 72, 74.
90. Robert M. Hutchins, "A Reply to Professor Whitehead," *Atlantic Monthly*, 158 (November, 1936), pp. 582-588. Whitehead's paper, "Harvard: The Future," projects many of the views held also by Harper on the role of the university. The two papers provide a classic debate on the subject.
- The context for Hutchins' views was, of course, different than that for Harper's. Harper pioneered higher education in the Midwest. By the time Hutchins arrived at Chicago, there were greater numbers of colleges and universities. In 1890, for example, 998 colleges and universities could be located. By 1930, there were 1,409 and, by 1940, 1,708. See Randall Collins, *The Credential Society: An Historical Sociology of Education and Stratification* (New York: Academic Press, 1979), p. 119.
91. Hutchins, "A Reply . . .," p. 64.
92. Robert Hutchins, *The Higher Learning in America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936). Preludes to this work can be found in "A New Plan for Higher Education," *Review of Reviews*, 87 (March, 1933), 35 and "What is a General Education," *Harper's Magazine*, 173 (November, 1936), pp. 602-609. In the former article, Hutchins argued that the university should not be an instrument for popular education.
93. Hutchins, *The Higher Learning . . .*, pp. 4- 11.
94. Robert M. Hutchins, "Education and Democracy," *School and Society*, 69 (1949), 426. Also cited in D'Urso, "The Classical Liberalism . . .," p. 341.
95. D'Urso, "The Classical Liberalism . . .," p. 344.

96. Hutchins, *The Higher Learning . . .*, pp. 11-20.
97. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
98. In *No Friendly Voice*, p. 27, Hutchins stated: "Rational thought is the only basis of education and research. Whether we know it or not, it has been responsible for our scientific successes; its absence has been responsible for our bewilderment. A university is the place of all places to grapple with those fundamental principles which rational thought seeks to establish."
99. Hutchins, *The Higher Learning . . .*, pp. 106-107. Metaphysics included "not only the study of first principles, but also all that follows from it, about the principles of change in the physical world, which is the philosophy of nature, and about the analysis of man and his productions in the fine arts including literature." *Ibid.*, p. 107.
100. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
101. Hutchins, *No Friendly Voice*, p. 93. Such a view of character was diametrically opposed to that of Harper and Stagg.
102. See Dell, "Robert M. Hutchins' Philosophy . . .," 46. The "plan" was implemented in the Fall, 1931. For Hutchins' own outline of the "plan," see *No Friendly Voice*, pp. 188-197.
103. See Aaron Sayvetz, "The Rational Revolutionary," *The Journal of General Education*, 30 (Spring, 1978), 3-9; *The Idea and Practice of General Education*, ed. F. Champion Ward (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950).
104. It is worth emphasizing that the University of Chicago did not offer a physical education major (or athletic coaching major as it was often called). The minutes of the Board of Physical Culture and Athletics (October 26, 1929) make reference to the establishment of coaching majors in other universities and the relationship of such majors to athletics. The concept of a coaching major was investigated at length by the Board. The discussion was prompted by the Carnegie report on intercollegiate athletics. See Howard J. Savage, *American College Athletics* (New York: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, Bulletin No. 23, 1929). Lester, *The Rise, Decline, and Fall . . .*, p. 423, raises the point that a physical education major program might have helped Chicago football in particular and athletics in general. He notes that, by 1931, seven of the Big Ten schools offered such majors and that the University of Illinois, for example, had some four hundred male students enrolled in athletic coaching in the 1930-31 academic year. *Ibid.*, pp. 212-215.
105. Stagg to Dean Chauncey Boucher, February 20, 1931, *Proceedings*, Board of Physical Culture and Athletics, University of Chicago.
106. Minutes of the Board of Physical Culture and Athletics, University of Chicago, 1931-32.
107. *Ibid.*
108. January 20, 1932. *Ibid.*
109. Dudley B. Reed, "A University Program of Physical Education," in Minutes of the Board . . ., 1931-32. A second report was also circulated among the faculty and had some influence. Summarized in this report was the rationale underpinning the decision of the University of Wisconsin faculty to eliminate the requirement in physical culture at that institution. This report stated that a university requirement in physical culture was no longer necessary since modern "physical education" was, in essence, the teaching of recreational sport skills. Such skills, it added, were best acquired in childhood and adolescence, and fell under the purview of the mandatory physical education classes offered by the secondary schools.
110. Lester, *The Rise, Decline, and Fall . . .*, pp. 216, 230-231.
111. See D'Urso, "The Classical Liberalism . . .," pp. 349-353.
112. *Ibid.*, p. 353.
113. Hutchins, *The Higher Learning . . .*, p. 29.
114. Sparhawk, *A Study of the Life . . .*, p. 72.
115. Metcalfe recalled that he "had known Bob Hutchins and his father and brothers when I was coaching football and track and teaching physical education at Oberlin College." Personal communication to authors, January 20, 1975. It would appear that Hutchins selected "his own man" in the case of Metcalfe, just as Harper had done in the case of Stagg.
116. *Yale Alumni Weekly*, 23 (October, 1931), p. 94.
117. Hutchins, *No Friendly Voice*, p. 135.
118. *Ibid.*, p. 139.
119. Nowhere is Hutchins' view clearer than in his "Why Go to College?" *Saturday Evening Post*, 210 (January, 1938), pp. 16-17, 72, 74. In a personal communication to the authors (February, 1975), Hutchins could

not recall the extent to which the Carnegie report on intercollegiate athletics influenced his thinking. However, he noted that he was in complete agreement with the report's concern that the university's primary function could be endangered by the fostering of professional athletics or other activities which detracted from the sincerity and vigor of its intellectual purpose.

120. See the Financial Statements for the years 1926- 1930 contained in *The President's Report*. Between year end 1929 and year end 1930, football receipts dropped 50.3 per cent.

121. For example, the tennis teams won more conference titles than all of the other Big Ten teams combined during the twenties and thirties. In gymnastics, Chicago took the conference championship eleven times between 1921 and 1939. Fencing titles were won successively from 1934 to 1939. Indeed, by 1939, one out of every four men eligible for varsity sport actually participated and, overall, Chicago ranked second only to Michigan in the number of Big Ten championships won over the *period*, 1929- 1939. See *University of Chicago Magazine*, 32 (January, 1940), p. 7.

122. Members of the University's Board of Trustees were prime contributors. Foremost among the alumni-trustees was Harold Higgins Swift, the Board's chairman. Swift, a long-time friend and personal advisor of Stagg, retained a keen interest and involvement in the football team with the result that the 1933 football recruits were dubbed "Swift's premium hams." Lester, *The Rise, Decline and Fall . . .*, p. 236. Swift, in fact, sat on the fence, with regard to the football issue for he could be seen to be a protagonist of both sides of the debate. The Swift files may shed more light on his true sentiments but, unfortunately, they are closed from public access until 1983.

123. John P. Howe, "Athletics," *University of Chicago Magazine*, 32 (November, 1936), pp. 26-29. According to Howe, 64.1 percent of Chicago's undergraduate class of 1935 had taken part of their undergraduate work at other institutions. This was a natural consequence of Harper's plan for the university's affiliation with other schools.

124. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

125. *Ibid.*,

126. Hutchins to an alumnus, October 30, 1936, President's Papers, 1925-1940, University of Chicago, Division of Archives and Manuscripts, Box 30, File 11. Here, and in future references to "unidentifiable correspondents," names are being withheld at the request of the Division of Archives and Manuscripts, University of Chicago.

127. Hutchins, "Why Go. . . ." p. 72.

128. Robert M. Hutchins, "Gate Receipts and Glory," *Saturday Evening Post*, 211 (December 3, 1938), pp. 23, 73-74, 76. (p. 23)

129. *Ibid.*, p. 76.

130. Personal Communication to Authors (February, 1975).

131. Unidentifiable alumnus to Hutchins, October 17, 1939, President's Papers, 1925-1940, Box 30, File 11.

132. Unidentifiable correspondent to Hutchins, November 6, 1939, President's Papers, 1925-1940, Box 30, File 11.

133. Hutchins to unidentifiable correspondent, November 7, 1939, President's Papers, 1925- 1940, Box 30, File 11. It should be noted that Hutchins (in personal communication, February, 1975) never waived from his stance on the proper role of the alumni. If the alumni wished to contribute to the university, it should be through participation in its intellectual life—"A university should not have a 'sporting' life." Nevertheless, Hutchins was aware of the potential link between athletics and alumni financial support. He, in fact, postponed announcement of the receipt of an eight million dollar bequeath to the university until *after* the decision to eliminate football had been made public.

134. Letter from unidentifiable alumnus to Hutchins, November 11, 1939, President's Papers, 1925- 1940, Box 30, File 11.

135. Letter from Hutchins to the Board of Trustees, November 18, 1939, President's Papers, 1925- 1940, Box 30, File 11.

136. Lester, *The Rise, Decline, and Fall . . .*, p. 257.

137. Nuveen's understanding of this dilemma is reflected in his letter to the head of the alumni association, December 13, 1939, a copy of which is included in the President's Papers, Box 30, File 11.

138. Nuveen to Swift, December 13, 1939, President's Papers, Box 30, File 11.

139. Secretary-Treasurer, Chicago Alumni Club, to Board of Trustees, December 12, 1939, President's Papers, Box 30, File 11.

140. Kooman Boycheff, *Intercollegiate Athletics and Physical Education at the University of Chicago, 1892-1952* (Unpublished dissertation: University of Michigan, 1954), p. 61.

141. Hutchins, *No Friendly Voice*, p. 172.
142. *Ibid.*
143. *Ibid.*, p. 170.
144. Menachof to Hutchins, November 3, 1939, President's Papers, 1925-1940, Box 30, File 11.
145. Gowdy to Swift, November 5, 1939, President's Papers, 1925-1940, Box 30, File 11.
146. In a personal communication to the authors (February, 1975), Hutchins stated that the case against football could not be generalized to the other sports for, in his opinion, it was football that was the most visible culprit in the promulgation of the excesses of athleticism.
147. Personal communication to the authors (February, 1975).
148. Metcalfe (personal communication to the authors, January, 1975) stated that he and his staff were "indignant because we had not been consulted in advance of the action." When asked to comment upon Metcalfe's remarks, Hutchins (personal communication to the authors, February 1975) stated that Metcalfe and his colleagues were not involved because "the Trustees had decided to make it their decision." Here again Hutchins plays down his own contrivances to bring the Board of Trustees to this position.
149. See for example, Charles Bartlett, "U. of Chicago Alumni Demand Return of Football: Ask Trustees to consider Ban on Sport," *Chicago Tribune*, January 18, 1940, p. 21. Also "Hutchins' Action Gains Support in 2D Midway Poll," *Chicago Tribune*, February 1, 1940, p. 33. The debate was enjoined by *The Daily Maroon*, January 4, 1940, p. 4 and January 11, 1940, p. 1.
150. See the interviews reported in *Chicago Tribune* on January 3, 1940, pp. 23 and 25; January 4, 1940, pp. 19 and 21; January 5, 1940, pp. 23 and 25; January 6, 1940, pp. 17 and 18; January 8, 1940, pp. 19 and 20; January 9, 1940, pp. 21 and 22; January 12, 1940, pp. 27 and 29. When asked if he had consulted with other university presidents, including those of the Big Ten schools, on the matter of football, its commercialization, and future prospects, Hutchins (in a personal communication to the authors, February, 1975) responded in the affirmative. Furthermore, Hutchins related that many presidents shared his concerns. Indeed, one president wired Hutchins on the decision: "Thanks, the number of pure educational institutions in the country has now been doubled," to which Hutchins replied, "now we are getting somewhere." President's Papers, 1925-1940, Box 30, File 11.
151. Personal communication to the authors (February, 1975).
152. Robert M. Hutchins, "Football and College Life," a speech delivered at Mandell Hall, University of Chicago, January 12, 1940. In this speech Hutchins also reminded the student body that even without football, Chicago's athletic program remained as large as any other in the conference.
153. *Ibid.*
154. Dixon Wetter, "Can Metaphysics Save the World?" *Saturday Review of Literature*, 31 (April, 1948), p. 7.
155. Robert M. Hutchins, "What Chicago Means." A presentation made at the Drake Hotel, Chicago, January 18, 1940.
156. Robert M. Hutchins, *The State of the University, 1929-1949*, University of Chicago, September 21, 1949, p. 37.
157. Adler, "The Chicago School," p. 379.

