

Toward a Theory of Olympic Internationalism

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“Well, all right then, let’s talk about the Chairman of the World. The world gets into a lot of trouble because it has no chairman. I would like to be Chairman of the World myself.”

—E. B. White, *Stuart Little* (1945)

“But when it comes to our age, we must have an automatic theocracy to rule the world.”

—Sun Myung Moon (1973)

Back in 1967, Dr. Wildor Hollmann, one of Germany’s most prominent sports physicians and longtime president of the International Federation for Sports Medicine (FIMS), was visiting the International Olympic Academy at Olympia on the day of its annual inauguration, with King Constantine himself in attendance. Naively assuming that the Academy was an open forum for thinking about the past, present, and future of the Olympic movement, Dr. Hollmann expressed the view that, in the not-too-distant future, the “Olympic idea” itself would inevitably fall victim to the logic of development inherent in the professionalization and commercialization of elite sport. The words were hardly out of his mouth before Dr. Hollmann was engulfed in a storm of indignation, during which an Italian member of the IOC declared that merely expressing such thoughts was in his view nothing less than a desecration of this holy site.¹

Olympic historiography has long been inseparable from the Movement’s status as a redemptive and inspirational internationalism. Like so many readings of its founder, Pierre de Coubertin (1863-1937), historical interpretations of the Olympic movement have generally taken the form of “either hagiographies or hagiolatry,” and not least because the founder himself “proclaimed Olympism beyond ideology.”² Historical treatments of the Movement since the launching of that provocative claim have thus had no

1. W[ildor] Hollmann, “Risikofaktoren in der Entwicklung des Hochleistungssports.” in H. Rieckert, ed. *Sportmedizin—Kursbestimmung* [Deutscher Sportärztekongreß Kiel. 16.-19. Oktober 1986] (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1987): 18.

2. John J. MacAloon, *This Great Symbol: Pierre de Coubertin and the Origins of the Modern Olympic Games* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981): 2, 6.

choice but to embrace or call into question the transcendent status of Olympic sport that is symbolized so powerfully by opening and closing ceremonies that tap into deep and unfulfilled wishes for a Golden Age of harmony and peace. Due at least in part to the impassioned and seemingly endless debate between the defenders and detractors of "Olympism," with its pronounced emphasis on ethical values at the expense of historical factors, serious study of the Olympic movement has stagnated. Recent monographs have presented familiar events and issues without much in the way of new research or methodological innovation.³ While the periodical literature of the past decade or so, including voluminous conference proceedings, has offered a wider range of perspectives, the conceptual landscape inhabited by the historian has not really changed in significant ways. This closed circulatory system of topics and problems has rigidified the important debate over values by limiting our understanding of the object of contention—the Olympic movement itself. The arguments between supporters and critics of the Movement that tend to dominate discussion naturally proceed from the assumption that both actually know what the Movement is or, at least, what it is worth to the international community. Yet the sheer complexity of the Olympic phenomenon suggests there is much more to know even without entering the domain of ethnographical research. I would propose that the production of this knowledge depends on reconceptualizing the Olympic movement in fundamental ways.

This essay proposes a theory of Olympic internationalism based on a comparative method. Indeed, the fact that no comparative study of this kind has ever been published suggests that the iconic status of the Movement has had a profoundly limiting effect on Olympic historiography as a whole and thus on the debate regarding values, as well.⁴ For by exaggerating the uniqueness of the Movement, Olympic historians have conferred on it a degree of splendid (or, alternatively, discreditable) isolation that is contradicted by the historical evidence. An important consequence of this overly narrow

3. See, for example, Allen Guttman, *The Olympics: A History of the Modern Games* (Urbana and Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 1992); and "The Olympic Games," in *Games & Empires: Modern Sports and Cultural Imperialism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994): 120-138. The former offers a good survey of Olympic history. The latter discusses the Olympic movement in the larger context of sport and cultural diffusion. See also Christopher Hill, *Olympic Politics* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1992), which pays special attention to Olympic finance and the bidding process. For a highly personal and admiring treatment of the modern Olympic movement, see John Lucas, *Future of the Olympic Games* (Champaign, IL, Human Kinetics Books, 1992).

4. To this observation I must append an additional (and ironic) one. Even as I argue that the failure of Olympic historiography to embark upon comparative studies has isolated the movement, I must point out simultaneously that historical treatments of other international movements have isolated them in exactly the same way. In a word, nothing resembling a comprehensive theory of these international movements exists, perhaps in part because there are so many of them and they are so heterogeneous. For example, Samuel P. Huntington's treatment of "Transnational Organizations in World Politics" (1973) includes none of the organizations discussed in the present essay and lists an "idealistic" organization like the Catholic church along with profit-oriented corporations and a pair of important Cold War institutions. His list reads as follows: Anaconda, Intelsat, Chase Manhattan, the Agency for International Development, the J. Walter Thompson advertising agency, Air France, the Strategic Air Command, Unilever, the Ford Foundation, the Catholic Church, the CIA, and the World Bank. The purpose of his essay is to analyze what he calls "a transnational organizational revolution in world politics." See "Transnational Organizations in World Politics," *World Politics* 25 (1973): 333-368.

interpretation has been to exacerbate and confuse the debate about values by crowning (or afflicting) the Movement with an exaggerated picture of its uniqueness as a vessel of reconciliation (or harm). The evidence presented below suggests that a comparison of the Olympic movement with contemporary and analogous international movements reveals a core repertory of behaviors and orientations that are common to them all. The comparative procedure presented here divides the history of these "idealistic internationalisms" into three periods that are roughly separated by the First and Second World Wars, respectively. The establishment of the Olympic movement in 1894 coincided with the sharply accelerated formation of a broad range of international organizations during the last decades of the nineteenth century. Between 1855 and 1914, their overall numbers increased from a mere handful to around 200, and the numbers have grown exponentially since the turn-of-the-century period.⁵

The comparative study of international organizations and the "movements" they launch remains underdeveloped to a striking degree, and this is so even in the case of important types of international activity. Thus, while Olympic historiography is rather well established, one historian has referred to the world of international science as a "largely unexplored domain." On a broader scale, as another historian recently noted, "the construction of internationalism has merited scarcely a glance."⁶ Accounting for such lacunae in the writing of history is in itself an interesting, and often difficult, historiographical problem. It may be less difficult, however, in the case of movements that have created both core groups of loyal adherents and benevolent self-images that in some cases have exercised a virtually global reach for most of a century. The Olympic (1894), Scouting (1908), and Esperanto (1887) movements, for example, have all benefitted from benign myths of origin rooted in reverential attitudes toward the personal qualities of their respective founding fathers and the salvational doctrines they created. One result of such cults of personality is a "halo effect" that can confer on such movements a degree of immunity to critical examination. As one of the few serious historians of Scouting has pointed out: "Scouting has for so long been a familiar and well-loved part of the Western world that it appears always to have been with us, less a man-made creation than a natural, indigenous activity of our civilization." The consequences of according such iconic status to culturally constructed institutions have been profound. In the case of Scouting, "it is startling that so few have seriously considered what it all meant. Such immunity from critical scrutiny has left Scouting almost entirely in the

5. Elizabeth Crawford, "The Universe of International Science, 1880-1939," in Tore Frängsmyr, ed. *Solomon's House Revisited: The Organization and Institutionalization of Science* (Canton, MA: Science History Publications, U.S.A., 1990): 259-260. For evidence for the proliferation of international organizations during the twentieth century, see the *Yearbook of International Organizations* (Brussels: Union of International Associations, 1974).

6. Crawford, "The Universe of International Science," 265; Leila J. Rupp, "Constructing Internationalism; The Case of Transnational Women's organizations, 1888-1945," *American Historical Review* (December 1994): 1571.

hands of its own historians and publicists, a situation that is not helpful in trying to understand the origins and meaning of any movement.”⁷ These words are precisely descriptive of the Olympic movement, as well, the only difference being that Olympic historiography has developed (over the past 25 years) a degree of autonomy the history of Scouting has not. This autonomous branch of Olympic historiography is necessarily based on scholarly or investigative activity that produces interpretations of the Olympic movement that do not always coincide with those of the IOC and its adherents in the press and in academia. And it is here that analyzing the Movement will often be interpreted as “criticism.”

Today, a generation after Wildor Hollmann’s heretical (and prophetic) remark about the future of Olympic sport, criticism of the International Olympic Committee is still capable of offending the dignity of its most powerful members. The landmark event in this regard was the publication in 1992 of *The Lords of the Rings*, an expose of the IOC’s inner circle by the investigative journalists Vyvian Simson and Andrew Jennings. Translated into 13 languages, the book became a global media event that traumatized the IOC leadership and, in particular, its President, Juan Antonio Samaranch, who stood accused of political opportunism and fascist allegiances both during the Franc period and after the Generalissimo’s death in 1975. The publication of Jaime Boix and Arcadio Espada’s book *El deporte del poder. Vida y milagro de Juan Antonio Samaranch*, containing essentially the same material on Samaranch’s political background, had gone virtually unnoticed by the world press only a year earlier.⁸

The reaction from IOC headquarters to the atmosphere of scandal created by *The Lords of the Rings* deserves a study in itself. On 17 February 1994 the IOC and President Samaranch filed a criminal action in a Lausanne court against the authors but not against their more powerful major publishers (Simon & Schuster, Bertelsman, Flammarion). The indictment (Investigation No.: CH.132.92) charged libel under article 174 and defamation under article 173 of the Swiss Penal Code. The tone of the document can be conveyed by quoting from its text: “The plaintiff, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) is an international nongovernmental organization, constituted as a nonlucrative association. It has the status of a person The work of the accused constitutes a lampoon directed against the plaintiffs, against the management of the IOC and its officials and against the behaviour of the former and of some of their co-contracting parties. To a large extent, the formulated criticisms constitute a blow to the honour of the IOC, its president and its

7. Michael Rosenthal. *The Character Factory: Baden-Powell’s Boy Scouts and the Imperatives of Empire* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986): 1, 12.

8. Vyv Simson and Andrew Jennings, *The Lords of the Rings: Power, Money and Drugs in the Modern Olympics* (London: Simon & Schuster, 1992); Jaime Boix and Arcadio Espada, *El deporte de poder. Vida y milagro de Juan Antonio Samaranch [The Sport of Power. The Life and Miracle of Juan Antonio Samaranch]* (= *Hombres de hoy*, Vol 30) (Madrid: Ediciones temas de hoy, 1991). For a very useful summary of this (still untranslated) volume see the review by Arnd Krüger in *The International Journal of Sports History* 10 (August 1993): 291-293. The author of this essay wishes to point out that he has not read *El deporte del poder*.

members . . . The IOC is described as a secret and clandestine organization, similar to the mafia . . . The IOC, its president and its members are depicted as depraved and disgusting persons.” In December 1994, after hearing testimony from President Samaranch himself, the court sentenced the authors *in absentia* to a five-day suspended jail sentence and the payment of \$2,000 in court costs (which remains unpaid). The explicit reference in the indictment to violated “honour,” and the failure of article 173 to provide for any assessment of the truth or falsity of the alleged “defamation,” are a poignant reminder of the nineteenth-century origins of the IOC and the role that aristocratic ideas about honor have played in shaping the value system and political behavior of the Olympic movement (see below).⁹

The furor created by this undocumented work of investigative journalism raised interesting questions for Olympic research, and the most important of these topics may well be the relationship between sports journalism and sports scholarship.¹⁰ As Arnd Kruger points out in his review of *El deporte del poder*: “Good investigative reporting often beats much of what historians can offer in terms of graphic information and anecdotal material not so readily available in archival research.” To this I would add that, in addition to useful anecdotal embellishments, these journalistic treatments of the political career of IOC president Samaranch offer the historian an opportunity to expand the framework for doing Olympic history in the direction of the comparative method described above. Indeed, Krüger himself points to the larger importance of such journalism: “This book ends many myths about the IOC and its current president” by excavating his political past and raising questions about how a person’s political formation may affect his conduct as

9. The carelessness (or dishonesty) with which the IOC drew up the indictment is evident in one instance in particular. Its list of alleged inaccuracies committed by the authors falsely accuses them of making an unflattering remark about the IOC that is clearly attributed in *The Lords of the Rings* (p. 211) to William Simon, former president of the United States Olympic Committee, former Secretary of the Treasury, and on account of his prominence, an unlikely target of IOC retaliation. The author of this essay wishes to point out that in November 1994 he sent a letter to the judge trying this case in Lausanne defending the authors’ right to publish *The Lords of the Rings*.

10. John J. MacAloon has written disapprovingly of what he regards as the degeneration of sports scholarship into a genre resembling sports journalism. He refers, for example, to “the uncomfortable interpretive alikeness—at least in the U.K., where socialist analysis is one sort of cultural common sense—of much sports journalism and popular commentary on the one side, and sports sociology, stripped of its academic apparatus and pretenses, on the other.” See “The Ethnographic Imperative in Comparative Olympic Research,” *Sociology of Sport Journal*, 9 (1992): 110. Or, “Treated like Journalists, sport scholars are tempted to act like them.” See “The Turn of Two Centuries: Sport and the Politics of Intercultural Relations,” in Fernand Landry, Marc Landry, and Magdeleine Yerlès, eds. *Sport . . . The third millennium* [Proceedings of the International Symposium, Quebec City, Canada, May 21-25, 1990] (Sante-Foy: Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 1991): 36. MacAloon’s second point, regarding the likely consequences of the IOC’s unwillingness to share more information with Olympic researchers, is particularly insightful. He offers this remark in the context of arguing that sports leaders should not “deny themselves the professional expertise of scholars.” By contrast, the author of this essay regards the secretiveness of the IOC as essential to its operations as an “offshore” international body sheltering important individuals whose various operations would not stand up to press scrutiny. I would also point out that in neither of his essays does MacAloon criticize the many journalists who function as de facto publicists for the IOC. At a Colloquy on Olympic issues held in Lausanne in April 1994, IOC Director General François Carrard expressed the view that there are “some ten to fifteen” journalists in the world who actually understand Olympic issues. See “Proceedings of the Colloquy on the Themes of the Olympic Centennial Congress Held in the Olympic Museum, Ouchy, Lausanne on 8th, 9th and 10th April 1994” (unpublished document).

the leader of a powerful international organization that is to be counted among those “transnational forms, none of them transcendent, innocent, or neutral in political history,”¹¹ which include the IOC. My point here is that the more we know about the formative history of an Olympic politician, the better the chances of finding comparable figures and patterns of behavior in other international organizations. In this sense, a book like *The Lords of the Rings*, while unsuitable as scholarly source material, has already served Olympic historiography by drawing attention to a triad of interrelated and neglected topics: first, the sheer autonomy and freedom from surveillance enjoyed by many high-ranking international functionaries inside and outside the IOC; second, how the upper echelons of international organizations provide political and financial opportunity and sanctuary to significant numbers of people who have compromised themselves in various ways back in their national communities; and third, the long history of extreme right-wing personalities and attitudes within the IOC. As Simson and Jennings put it: “The Samaranch who went to the IOC in 1966 would have found himself at ease among the many other members from authoritarian or undemocratic backgrounds.”¹² One purpose of this essay is to account for this continuity between the IOC of the fascist period in Europe and the comparable elites to be found at the top of international sports federations today. This ideological continuity is not simply a result of the procedures by which the IOC or any of the other federations choose their members. On the contrary, the self-perpetuating process which renews the membership of the IOC has been made even more efficient by the way it and comparable organizations have served as “offshore” enterprise zones for right-wing personalities and various amoral opportunists since the political collapse of fascism in 1945.

1. The Early Internationalist Period

Any study of the “idealistic” international movements of the *fin de siècle* period must acknowledge their diverse characteristics as well as demonstrate the values and behaviors that make them cohere as a distinct category of thematically interrelated organizations that sometimes attracted overlapping clienteles. Their homogeneity and heterogeneity as a class of social phenomena become yet clearer if we expand the scope of our survey beyond the four primary movements to be examined here, namely, the Red Cross (1863), the Esperanto movement (1887), the Olympic movement (1894), and the Scouting movement (1908). It is of fundamental importance, for example, that all of these movements were ideologically distinct from Marxist internationalism. Indeed, this is one way to account for the fact that all of them eventually accommodated the Nazis in various ways. The First International (or International Working Men’s Association) was founded by Marx in 1864, outlawed in France and Germany, and effectively dissolved in 1872. Despite its

11. MacAloon, “The Ethnographic Imperative in Comparative Olympic Research,” 126.

12. Simson and Jennings, *The Lords of the Rings*, 111.

political insignificance, as James Joll notes, “it had awakened all Europe to the possibilities of international working class action And so, on the eve of its extinction, the International was endowed with a legendary power it had lacked in its lifetime, and acquired a largely spurious tradition of heroic international revolutionary action.” The Second International (1889-1914), which collapsed when the European proletariat deserted international solidarity for national chauvinism and military service at the outbreak of the Great War, actually employed some of the ideas and rhetorical devices characteristic of the “bourgeois” internationalisms of the epoch. That these superficial resemblances were outweighed by the ideological barrier is evident in the fact that its ideological descendants would eventually stage an impressive series of Workers Olympiads (1921-1937) that the Socialist Workers Sports International claimed were more genuinely international than the “bourgeois” Olympic Games.

The internationalism of the late nineteenth century could also take the form of an artistic cosmopolitanism. Like the Olympic movement, Wagnerism was an international movement originating in an established cultural medium (music) that developed both a distinctive ideology, composed of a cultural critique and a program for cultural renewal, and an international clientele. The golden age of Wagnerian internationalism commenced in 1872, when the master moved to Bayreuth, and ended with his death in 1883. Olympism and Wagnerism both served up ersatz religious experiences to people disillusioned with European “progress” and positivist thinking. “There was a pervasive need for an emotional piety that was less vulnerable than orthodox religious observance to the dessicating effects of change, scientific progress, and higher biblical criticism.”¹³ During the last decades of the nineteenth century there appeared a variety of internationalisms that could satisfy such needs, and the Wagner cult that spread west to America and east to Russia was one of them. To be sure, Wagnerism was German in a way the Olympic movement could not be, although the 1936 Berlin Olympiad, judged as an aesthetic production, was a great triumph of the Olympic “Germanizers” that put its permanent mark on Olympic ritual.¹⁴ Yet even the Germanness of Wagnerism took the form of a universalistic doctrine that anticipated the Olympic movement and its redemptive mission across national boundaries. For in identifying the Germans as the most “universal” of peoples, Wagner was proclaiming Germany’s mission to the world. This sort of ethnocentric cosmopolitanism, as we shall see in the next section of this essay, eventually served as a transitional *Weltanschauung* to expedite the process by which Germany overcame the xenophobic inhibitions deriving from its own cultural insecurities and appropriated Olympic internationalism on German terms.

13. David C. Large and William Weber, “Introduction”; David C. Large, “Wagner’s Bayreuth Disciples,” in David C. Large and William Weber, eds. *Wagnerism in European Culture and Politics* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1984): 18.

14. Thomas Alkemeyer, “Gewalt und Opfer im Ritual der Olympischen Spiele 1936,” in Gunter Gebauer, ed. *Körper und Einbildungskraft: Inszenierungen des Helden im Sport* (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag, 1988): 44-79.

Wagner's foreign admirers were thus able to enjoy his musical productions as supranational experiences. In addition, as Gerald D. Turbow has pointed out, the Wagner devotee was participating in the general internationalist ferment of the epoch whether he knew it or not. Thus one French enthusiast, "writing shortly after the Geneva Treaty on War [1864], the establishment of the Red Cross [1863], and the organization of the First International [1864], found the principle of world unity and peace in Wagner's operas. In characteristic utopian terms he maintained that just as Wagner had eliminated the barriers that existed between set numbers in the formal operas and just as the old boundaries between cities were vanishing, so now would they disappear between countries as well."¹⁵ It is even more interesting to learn that Coubertin experienced his own Wagnerian epiphany. In his *Olympic Memoirs* (1931), Coubertin reports that a visit to Bayreuth, and the "passionate strains" of Wagner's music, assisted him in seeing the "Olympic horizons" before his mind's eye.¹⁶

The existence of a Wagnerian internationalism demonstrates that certain internationalist projects of this period were not negations of nationalism but rather cultural projections of nationalist impulses employing cosmopolitan vocabularies rooted in ethnocentric ideas of national grandeur.¹⁷ A variety of internationalist initiatives, including the Olympic movement, both included and disguised nationalist and even cultic themes which could be presented as cosmopolitan projects within the European context. Rooted in racialistic European mythologies, such idealistic cosmopolitanisms did not anticipate, to take only one example, the multiracial agenda of the modern Olympic movement. Olympism, Wagnerism, and the Salzburg [music] Festival (1920-) are three such cosmopolitanisms rooted in cultic reappropriations of the European past. Their respective ideological sources are the myth of ancient Hellas, Germanic mythology, and a myth of Austria's baroque cultural heritage, and there is evidence which suggests they once constituted a single festival metagenre in the minds of some observers. Thus, in 1918, an Austrian cultural critic wrote that the Salzburg Festival was the first "total aesthetic realization (*Durchbildung*) of the festival character" since the revival of the

15. Gerald D. Turbow, "Art and Politics: Wagnerism in France," in *Wagnerism in European Culture and Politics*, 153.

16. Pierre de Coubertin, *Mémoires olympiques* (Lausanne: Bureau international de pédagogie sportive, 1931): 64. It is also interesting to note that Jules Ferry, an early prime minister of the French Third Republic, was both a supporter of Coubertin and an admirer of Wagner. See Turbow, "AR and Politics: Wagnerism in France," 143, 146.

17. Cosmopolitanism and internationalism have been (properly) defined as different ideals. Marcel Mauss, writing in 1919-1920, regarded these terms as opposed ideas. "Internationalism worthy of the name is the opposite of cosmopolitanism. It does not deny the nation, it situates it. Internation is the opposite of a-nation. Thus it is also the opposite of nationalism, which isolates the nation." Mauss defines cosmopolitanism as a doctrine which tends toward "the destruction of nations, to the creation of a moral order (morale) in which they would no longer be the sovereign authorities, creators of the law, nor the supreme ends worthy of future sacrifices to a superior cause, named humanity itself." Mauss derides this ideal as "an ethereal theory of the monadic human being who is everywhere identical." See Marcel Mauss, "Nation, national, internationalisme," in *Oeuvres*, 3 (Paris: Editions de minuit, 1969).

Olympic Games.¹⁸ What is more, historians of both Wagnerism and the Salzburg Festival have shown how these cultural productions—in effect, nationalistic cults—were successfully marketed to international audiences. “The tact and success of the pan-European Salzburg propaganda came from the fact that this nationalist program could be expressed as a cosmopolitan ideal that in turn would seem like pure internationalism to the English and the French.”¹⁹ The Olympic movement, too, has derived much of its international prestige from precisely this sort of transformation, whereby an essentially national ambition has been perceived as Enlightenment cosmopolitanism. In all three cases—Olympism, Wagnerism, and Salzburg—the “European idea” proved to be a politically viable packaging for nationalistic content. As we will see in the next section, both German “universalism” and the “European idea” served to reconcile the ideological needs of European rightwingers to the requirements of Olympic internationalism.²⁰

Certain international movements of this period can be seen as gendered, embodying a kind of male or a female solidarity and an ideology to express this gendered orientation. The Olympic and Scouting movements began as internationalisms that promulgated related conceptions of the ideal male, an orientation that had political consequences during the fascist period (see below). Even though both eventually absorbed female participants, gender integration occurred in a male-dominated context that ascribed limited capacities to female participants. A countervailing example of gender-segregated internationalism was the organizing of women on a transnational basis, which began in 1888 with the founding of the International Council of Women in Washington, D.C. “Both by assuming fundamental gender differences and by advocating separatist organizing, women in transnational organizations drew boundaries that separated men from women.”²¹ This autonomous policy of segregation makes female internationalism especially interesting to the comparativist as a “control group” internationalism vis-à-vis other groups precisely because its leaders claimed to be building upon a distinct and more pacific type of human nature than that possessed by their male counterparts. In retrospect, however, the comparison between “male” and “female” international organizations is interesting precisely because it reveals more similarities than differences, confirming my operating thesis that there is a core repertory of behaviors and attitudes that characterize the important groups that appear during this extraordinary period of internationalist ferment. This repertory includes a rhetoric of universal membership, a

18. Michael P. Steinberg, *The Meaning of the Salzburg Festival: Austria as Theater and Ideology, 1890-1938* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990): 60.

19. Large, “Wagner’s Bayreuth Disciples, 95: Steinberg, *The Meaning of the Salzburg Festival*, 69. “The festival program revealed on every level a convergence of explicitly cosmopolitan and pan-European ideals with a Bavarian-Austrian—that is, a baroque-nationalism.” See Steinberg, 23.

20. I have adapted this paragraph from John M. Hoberman, “Olympic Universalism and the Apartheid Issue,” in Fernand Landry, Marc Landry, and Magdeleine Yerlès eds. *Sport. . . The third millennium* [Proceedings of the International Symposium, Quebec City, Canada, May 21-25, 1990] (Sainte-Foy: Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 1991): 531.

21. Rupp, “Constructing Internationalism,” 1582.

Eurocentric orientation that limits universal participation, an insistence on political neutrality, the empowering role of wealth, social prominence and aristocratic affiliations, a professed interest in peacemaking or pacifism, a complex and problematic relationship between national and international loyalties, the emergence of a (marginalized) "citizen-of-the-world"-style radical supranationalism, and the use of visual symbols such as flags and anthems. One might also say that all of these movements offered to their members a philosophy of creative international action amounting to a way of life for those possessing the necessary dedication and financial independence to pursue it. The Feminist International appears to have differed from its male counterparts in not producing a conspicuous hagiographical tradition honoring its "founding mothers." More importantly, an exclusively female membership and its doctrine of biogendered pacifism ("All wars are men's wars") precluded their adopting (as the Olympic and Scouting movements did) the ideology of chivalry as the basis for establishing an idealized transnational identity. As we will see in the next section, the establishment of a transnational male identity based upon "chivalric" ideals played an important role in shaping relations between the "male" internationalisms and Nazi Germany.

In addition to sharing a set of core behaviors and attitudes, the idealistic internationalisms were bound together by personal ties between groups and by individuals with ties to more than one group. For example, Dietrich Quanz has demonstrated Coubertin's close ties to the European peace movement of the *fin de siècle* and the prewar Nobel Peace Prize Laureates (1901-1913): "Coubertin must have noticed this model for international private organizations. He had had contact with almost half of the Nobel Peace Prize winners, some of whom were his friends. He listed five of them as honorary members of the Founding Congress of the IOC in 1894."²² Among Coubertin's Nobel Peace Prize contacts was the Austrian pacifist Alfred Hermann Fried, who published an Esperanto textbook for German-speakers in 1903.²³ Coubertin was also co-founder in 1910 (with the Nobel Prize-winning [1908] physicist Gabriel Lippmann) of the Ligue d'Education National, the forerunner of the French Boy Scouts,²⁴ while Lord Baden-Powell, the founder of the Scouting movement, promoted the British ideology of sportsmanship absorbed by Coubertin.²⁵ The pacifistically inclined German educator Friedrich Wilhelm Förster (1869-1966) called Baden-

22. Dietrich R. Quanz, "Formatting Power of the IOC: Founding the Birth of a New Peace Movement." *Citius. Altius. Fortius*, 3 (Winter 1995): 12. See also Dietrich R. Quanz, "Die Gründung des IOC im Horizont von bürgerlichem Pazifismus und Internationalismus," in Gunter Gebauer, ed. *Die Aktualität der Sportphilosophie* (St. Augustin: Academia Verlag, 1993), 191-216; "Civic Pacifism and Sports-Based Internationalism: Framework for the Founding of the International Olympic Committee," *Olympika. The International Journal of Olympic Studies*, 2 (1993): 1-23.

23. Ulrich Lins, *Die gefährliche Sprache: Die Verfolgung der Esperantisten unter Hitler und Stalin* (Gerlingen: Bleicher Verlag, 1988): 41.

24. Arnd Krüger, "Neo-Olympismus zwischen Nationalismus und internationalismus," in Horst Ueberhorst, ed. *Geschichte der Leibesübung*, 3/1 (Berlin: Bartels und Wernitz, 1980): 524.

25. Rosenthal, *The Character Factory*, 10, 31.

Powell's *Scouting for Boys* (1908) "the best pedagogical book to have appeared in decades."²⁶ Like Coubertin, the German chemist Wilhelm Ostwald (Nobel Prize 1909) had multiple ties to internationalist projects. At first a supporter of Esperanto, Ostwald changed his allegiance to Esperanto's chief competitor, the artificial language Ido, in 1908. He also worked toward founding an international chemical institute.²⁷ In a more eccentric vein, Ostwald served as President of the International Committee of Monism, a philosophy based on the universal authority of science that aimed at propagating "a rational ethics." In *Monism as the Goal of Civilization* (1913), Ostwald held out the possibility of "a completely neutral and likewise easily acquired auxiliary language" as "an indescribable blessing" for mankind, pointing to "the rapidly increasing international arrangements and relations" and the "irresistible flow toward the international organization of human affairs."²⁸ All three of the early international women's organizations weighed the possibility of adopting Esperanto as a means of facilitating communication.²⁹ The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) sent a delegation to the Esperanto Congress held in Dresden in 1907.³⁰ The first chairman of the London Esperanto Club, Felix Moscheles, was President of the International Arbitration and Peace Association and a major figure in the pacifist movement.³¹ These and other interrelationships confirm the thesis that such groups belong to a genre of international organizations, both unified and variegated, that deserves to be studied in a comparative manner. As the great early promoter of international sport, "the Esperanto of the races" (Jean Giraudoux), Coubertin occupies a central position within this configuration of internationally minded idealists.

All of the idealistic internationalisms of this period appealed to deep feelings among Europeans that were rooted in anxieties about war and peace. As inhabitants of a political universe that has effectively banished the memory of socialist internationalism prior to the Third (Communist) International, we would do well to recall its stature as the preeminent antiwar movement of its period (1889-1914). "For at least fifty years," as James Joll has noted, "international Socialism was one of the great intellectual forces in Europe . . . while no statesman or political thinker could avoid taking it into account." The urgency of the feelings shared by Socialist and non-Socialist internationalists alike was evident at the emergency congress of the Socialist International, held in Basle in November 1913, as fear of war spread throughout

26. Karl Seidelmann, *Die Pfadfinder in der deutschen Jugendgeschichte* (Hannover: Hermann Schroedel Verlag, 1977): 28-29.

27. Lins, *Die gefährliche Sprache*, 42; Crawford, "The Universe of International Science," 264, it is worth noting that Crawford calls Ostwald "the most ubiquitous of scientists" (264).

28. Wilhelm Ostwald, *Monism as the Goal of Civilization* (Hamburg: The International Committee of Monism, 1913): 10, 6, 25.

29. Rupp, "Constructing Internationalism," 1578.

30. Peter G. Forster, *The Esperanto Movement* (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1982): 170.

31. Lins, *Die gefährliche Sprache*, 28.

Europe. Sobered into a state of somber meditation that permitted the relaxation of ideological discipline, the delegates heard the great French leader Jean Jaurès sound a religious note, while the next day the veteran Swiss Socialist Greulich, “when finally closing the proceedings, not only referred to Bach’s B Minor Mass but even, though with an apologetic ‘Don’t be alarmed’, quoted from the Roman Catholic liturgy to express the socialist hope: ‘Exspecto resurrectionem mortuorum et vitam venturam saeculis’.”³²

The ideological divisions that separated Socialists from non-Socialists (and, later, Socialists from Communists) have had a profound impact on the entire phenomenon of European internationalism during this century. The sports and Esperanto movements eventually split along ideological lines into socialist and “bourgeois” factions, while Baden-Powell’s bourgeois-nationalist Boy Scout organization was subjected to harsh criticism just after the Great War by his onetime successor-apparent, John Hargrave, a militant proponent of “World Friendship” who could not stomach the imperialist component of Baden-Powell’s doctrine. That Baden-Powell rejected the charge as “Bolshevism” only confirms the importance of the division between the anti-imperialist, non-establishmentarian internationalisms and their bourgeois-nationalist counterparts.³³ In the case of the Esperantists, however, this ideological divide was mostly illusory, due to the fact that the artificial language movement appealed to the marginal and the underprivileged from its very beginnings in eastern Poland and Russia in the late 1880s and 1890s. This affinity between the fraternal idealism of the Esperantists and the ethical program of the revolutionary Left was recognized by the early psychoanalytical writer J.C. Flügel, who was himself an Esperantist. “The Esperanto movement,” he wrote in 1925, “with its *quasi*-religious enthusiasm and its attempt to break down the barriers between nations and races, inevitably challenges comparison with certain other movements of a universalizing tendency. It has, of course, certain features in common with Socialism and Communism. These also are international and pacifist in character, and aim at fostering a spirit of comradeship among fellow-members; but they differ from the Esperanto movement in two important respects: (a) In the essential economic basis of their programme; (b) In that the revolutionary and insurgent tendencies—based ultimately on displacements of father-hatred—are very much more prominent. In the Esperanto movement these latter tendencies are implicit rather than explicit”³⁴ This crucial distinction between explicit and implicit “insurgent tendencies” was the most important difference between the revolutionary and his typological opposite, the linguistic humanitarian whose progressive idealism was channeled into more symbolic forms of re-

32. James Joll, *The Second International 1889-1914* (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974): 1, 158, 159.

33. Rosenthal, *The Character Factory*, 245-247.

34. J. C. Flügel, “Some Unconscious Factors in the International Language Movement With Special Reference to Esperanto,” *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, 6 (1925):

sistance to political repression and national chauvinism.

Despite its nonrevolutionary status, Flügel saw his analysis of the artificial language movement as a contribution to “the psychology of progressive social movements” in a wider sense. A study of the “unconscious mental mechanisms with which psycho-analysis has made us familiar” could thus illuminate “the wider psychological problems presented by language and by constructive social movements in general.” Such comments make it clear that Flügel was canny enough to understand that “rational” policies might well derive in part from nonrational impulses. Thus he did not hesitate to identify the altruism and dynamism of his fellow Esperantists with sexual wishes and potentially grandiose ideas about undoing the havoc wrought in the Biblical story of the Tower of Babel.³⁵ Still, it is apparent that Flügel saw internationalism as a single genre of activity that was inherently “progressive” despite its psychoanalytic complications, and it is likely that he associated its “constructive” potential with the Enlightenment tradition of rational problem-solving and cosmopolitan understanding.

The problem with this portrait of the Esperantists is that it is expurgated (or simply uninformed) and thus historically inaccurate in important respects. By 1925, there was plenty of evidence to suggest that the Esperanto movement was not uniformly “progressive” in a political sense; it would appear, however, that Flügel overlooked these facts on account of his deep respect both for the founding father of the movement and for many of his fellow enthusiasts. The founder of Esperanto, Ludwig Lazar Zamenhof (1859-1917), was a Jew born in Bialystok, Poland, who was convinced that only an artificial and universally comprehensible language could heal the ethnic strife that plagued this area. (At the age of 10, Zamenhof wrote a five-act tragedy, set in Bialystok, based on the Tower of Babel story.) In the years that followed his publication of the first Esperanto textbook in 1887, adherents of the movement de-emphasized Zamenhof’s Jewish origins in order to minimize anti-Semitic resistance to their proselytizing efforts. More surprising in retrospect is the fact that the Dreyfus Affair (1895) the great political litmus test of *fin-de-siècle* French political life, polarized the French Esperantists, demonstrating that linguistic internationalism alone did not guarantee a “progressive” political orientation. The “Declaration on the Essence of Esperanto” that was adopted at the first Congress of Esperantists held at Boulogne-sur-mer in 1905 was a clear declaration of political neutrality that did not even mention world peace. Indeed, the Universal Esperanto Association (UEA) was not established until 1908, by which time the influence of Zamenhof’s quasi-religious doctrine of universal brotherhood was already in decline.³⁶ To some extent this breach between the founders’ ideals and a more practical orientation emphasizing commerce and science reflected a difference in out-

35. Flügel, “Some Unconscious Factors,” 171-172, 208, 187, 190.

36. Lins, *Die gefährliche Sprache*, 29, 31, 26.

look between Western Europe (especially France) and Eastern Europe and Russia, where political repression and a high proportion of Jewish Esperantists had preserved the early idealism. The larger lesson, however, is that even early on linguistic internationalism showed signs of the defensive political neutralism and resulting fissiparous tendencies that compromised its independence and opened windows of opportunity for political activists on the Left and the Right during the 1920s and 1930s. That even as well-informed an observer as Flügel did not understand the ideological instability of the Esperantists points to some of our own acquired habits of thought regarding the effectiveness of internationalist ideals and the transnational groups that attempt to implement them.

The traditional (though now eroding) assumption that idealistic internationalisms can transform the modern world has been profoundly shaped by our image of the Enlightenment cosmopolitanism that dates from the late eighteenth century. The League of Nations, the United Nations, the vast empires of modern science and sport, and countless international arrangements of equal or lesser scope all trace their ancestry (or an important part of it) to a period that has taken on the aura of a Golden Age. It has been more than two hundred years since the American Philosophical Society proclaimed (in 1778) that "Nations truly civilized (however unhappily at variance on other accounts) will never wage war with the Arts and Sciences and the common Interests of Humanity,"³⁷ but the charm (and the pathos) of such a declaration, and its promise of a Sacred Truce between the nations, affect us still. By the end of the nineteenth century, this ideal was most clearly expressed in what Elisabeth Crawford has called the "universe of international science." "Because science was universal and constituted a common language," she notes, "international scientific organizations, it was felt, could become models for international associations generally and even help usher in world government."³⁸ This idealized image of cosmopolitan networking in the service of progress has been the standard against which internationalist projects have been judged for the last century. What is more, this fantasy of a transnational scientific enterprise untainted by national self-interests has created unrealistic expectations in relation to all of the idealistic internationalisms, prominently including the Olympic movement.

If we are interested in establishing the potential of the idealistic internationalisms, then the value of the comparative method lies in establishing realistic parameters of action (and even imagination) over the long term. If we ask, for example, whether the Olympic movement has done what it should have been able to do in fulfillment of its professed aims, what we are really asking is whether it has performed on a par with analogous organizations in comparable historical conditions. While no two of these organizations have had identical resources at their disposal, even the (necessarily

37. Thomas J. Schlereth, *The Cosmopolitan Ideal in Enlightenment Thought* (South Bend: The Notre Dame University Press, 1977): 45.

38. Crawford, "The Universe of International Science," 254.

abbreviated) survey presented in this essay can, I believe, identify that “core repertory of attitudes and behaviors” that makes comparison worthwhile. Perhaps the most general of these factors is the contest between nationalist and internationalist motives and loyalties (in differing proportions) within the minds of those who led or followed. If Coubertin came to “the conviction that patriotism and internationalism were not only not incompatible, but required one another,” then this was one (entirely reasonable) response to a problem that could be solved in various ways.³⁹ In the case of Baden-Powell’s movement, “the celebration of national greatness,” as Michael Rosenthal points out, “becomes a problem for the Scouts . . . when the insistence on British national superiority clashes with the equality of all people that is so much a part of Scouting, and more particularly within the movement’s worldwide ambitions that rapidly developed.”⁴⁰ This potential for intrapsychic conflict affected the Esperantists, as well, even if Zamenhof had personally resolved the internal conflict between the competing identities of “human being” and “patriot” in favor of the former. Disagreements among the Esperantists regarding whether they should organize on a national or supranational basis were another manifestation of this basic conflict between national and internationalist affiliations. How the individual member resolved this conflict was a question of political temperament, although it is also true that the range of choices depended to some extent on the movement to which one belonged. The Esperanto movement, for example, tolerated radical, “citizen-of-the-world”-style supranationalism in a way that the Scouting and Olympic movements did not. A comparative look at their founders can help us understand why.

The movements of Lord Robert Baden-Powell (1857-1941) and Pierre de Coubertin are strikingly similar in several respects. Both movements proclaimed early on their universal, apolitical, nonracial and nonmilitary nature: while neither founder was a pacifist—Baden-Powell was an acclaimed professional soldier—both claimed to serve the cause of peace: while they claimed to be classless movements, both were also intended as strategies to deal with domestic social instability and class conflict. Both founders were acclaimed as “educators” and mobilizers of youth. Both shared the racialistic ideas of their time, although Baden-Powell made openly racist statements in a way that Coubertin did not.⁴¹ Both put a high priority on appearing politically neutral, and both understood the importance of creating a rhetoric and a public image that “transcended” politics. When recruiting the Comité Jules Simon, as John J. MacAloon points out, “Coubertin reproduced the now familiar claim that ‘we have recruited adherents of all parties, our work is in effect sheltered from all political quarrels.’ In fact, the ‘shelter,’ such as it was, owed to drawing all of the members from the ‘parties of order’ and

39. MacAloon, *This Great Symbol*, 112.

40. Rosenthal, *The Character Factory*, 176.

41. Rosenthal, *The Character Factory*, 40-43, 181, 254-267. On Coubertin’s racial thinking see Hoberman, “Olympic Universalism and the Apartheid Issue,” 524-525.

skewing their 'neutrality' toward the right."⁴² Baden-Powell pursued the same strategy, and the Esperantists too did their best to establish a nonpartisan profile.⁴³ (Among the late-nineteenth-century movements, the Red Cross had pioneered the policy of absolute neutrality in the 1860s.) It is clear, then, that the claim (or pretense) to political neutrality, a policy that would both empower and constrain these movements throughout the twentieth century, was regarded by most non-Socialist internationalists as an absolute requirement for effective action.

What distinguished the Scouting and Olympic movements in quite another sense from the Esperantists and the Red Cross was their pursuit of aristocratic affiliations or royal patronage, itself an important ideological signature of movements that were bent on achieving a reconciliation of the social classes. By contrast, Zamenhof saw Esperanto as an instrument of the oppressed, and Flügel later offered an interesting explanation as to why "the international language movement has enjoyed comparatively little support from the more aristocratic and educated classes."⁴⁴ The mononational Red Cross, which until 1923 recruited its membership exclusively from the cream of the Genevan professional bourgeoisie, did not need aristocratic sponsorship.⁴⁵ Coubertin, on the other hand, had to create his own establishment. In 1908, European nobility made up 68 percent of the membership of the IOC, a figure which declined to 41 percent by 1924.⁴⁶ In Britain, Baden-Powell—a socially prominent hero of the Boer War—had access to a uniquely celebrated caste of royals. "The Royal family and the English government have shown a great interest in scouting since its inception," one observer wrote in 1948. "The King became the Patron of the British Boy Scouts, the Prince of Wales became Chief Scout for Wales and Princess Mary the president of the Girl Guides." At the first Jamboree held in London in 1920, Prince Gustav Adolph of Sweden was made honorary president of the International Boy

42. MacAloon, *This Great Symbol*, 105.

43. The official Soviet view of Scouting in the West challenged its claim to political neutrality: "Scouting seeks to train the younger generation in a spirit of loyalty to the ideals of bourgeois society. Although professing to be unaffiliated with any political party, scout organizations do in fact have clearly expressed political, militaristic, and religious tendencies they strive to keep the younger generation from participating in the struggle for revolutionary and democratic change and to isolate young people from the influence of materialism and communism. Scouting advocates the idea of class peace in a capitalist state. . . . The Komsomol [youth organization] consistently struggled against the scout movement. The second, third, and fourth Komsomol congresses (1918-20) adopted resolutions calling for the dissolution of scout groups and worked out a program for the creation of a new, communist type of children's organization." Here, as in other areas of popular culture like sport and the arts, Communists faced the challenge of repackaging attractive "bourgeois" activities in conformity with Marxist-Leninist ideological requirements. See the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, Vol. 23 (New York: Macmillan, 1979): 253.

44. Flügel, "Some Unconscious Factors," 200; see also 175, 176, 201.

45. Jean-Claude Favel, *Warum schwieg das Rote Kreuz? Eine internationale Organisation und das Dritte Reich* (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1994): 25-26.

46. M. Blödorn and W. Nigmann, "Zur Ehre unseres Vaterlandes und zum Ruhme des Sports," in M. Blödorn, ed. *Sport und Olympische Spiele* (Rheinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1984): 42. See also Krüger, "Neo-Olympismus zwischen Nationalismus und Internationalismus," 529, 551.

Scout Committee.⁴⁷ Appearances notwithstanding, the recruitment of these prestigious sponsors did not point to politically reactionary intentions on the part of the recruiters. In fact, Coubertin used his affiliations with the nobility to advance the cause of sportive internationalism against the resistance of stubborn nationalists.⁴⁸ Today, however, the IOC's interest in recruiting royals appears to be less pragmatic than a response to the prestige-seeking needs of its current President.

2. Olympic Internationalism in the Age of Fascism

Olympic internationalism during the Nazi period remains poorly understood, in part because the number of English-language commentaries remains limited.⁴⁹ My purpose in this section is to depart from the traditional emphasis on the 1936 Berlin Olympiad, which has been widely misunderstood as an isolated lapse on the part of the IOC, in order to place it in the larger political-historical context where it belongs. We now know that Coubertin saw the "Nazi Olympics" as the culmination of his life's work, and it is important to understand why he believed this and why in a sense he was right in doing so. For the Olympic movement during this period is best understood as a right-wing internationalism that was effectively coopted by the Nazis and their French and German sympathizers during the 1930s. This cooptation was made possible in part by an ideological compatibility between the IOC elite and the Nazis based on a shared ideal of aristocratic manhood and the value system that derived from their glorification of the physically perfect male as the ideal human being. It is important for us to understand this IOC-Nazi collaboration if only because, contrary to what many have doubtless

47. Saul Scheidlinger, "A Comparative Study of the Boy Scout Movement in Different National and Social Groups," *American Sociological Review*, 13 (1948): 740, 741.

48. Krüger, "Neo-Olympismus zwischen Nationalismus und Internationalismus," 549.

49. The traditional approach to the Olympic history of this period is to focus on the 1936 Berlin Olympiad as an exceptional event in the history of the movement. See, especially, Richard Mandell, *The Nazi Olympics* (New York: Macmillan, 1971); Arnd Krüger, *Die olympischen Spiele 1936 und die Weltmeinung* (Berlin, Munich, Frankfurt/M.: Verlag Bartels & Wernitz KG, 1972); Duff Hart-Davis, *Hüller's Games: The 1936 Olympics* (New York: Harper and Row, 1986). The indispensable sources for understanding the relationship between the IOC and the Nazis are Hans-Joachim Teichler, "Coubertin und das Dritte Reich," *Sportwissenschaft*, 12 (1982): 18-53; Allen Guttmann, *The Games Must Go On: Avery Brundage and the Olympic Movement* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1984); and W. J. Murray, "France, Coubertin and the Nazi Olympics: The Response," *Olympika: The International Journal of Olympic Studies*, 1 (1992): 46-69. See also John Hoberman, *The Olympic Crisis: Sport, Politics, and the Moral Order* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Aristide D. Caratzas, Publisher, 1986). More recent publications on the Olympic movement during the interwar period include Stephen R. Wenn, "A Suitable Policy of Neutrality? FDR and the Question of American Participation in the 1936 Olympics," *International Journal of the History of Sport*, 8 (1991): 319-335; Bill Murray, "Berlin in 1936: Old and New Work on the Nazi Olympics," *International Journal of the History of Sport*, 9 (1992): 29-49; Martin Polley, "Olympic Diplomacy: The British Government and the Projected 1940 Olympic Games," *International Journal of the History of Sport* 9 (1992): 169-187; William J. Baker, "Muscular Marxism and the Chicago Counter-Olympics of 1932," *International Journal of the History of Sport* 9 (1992): 397-410; Per Olof Holmäng, "International Sports Organizations 1919-25 Sweden and the German Question," *International Journal of the History of Sport* 9 (1992): 455-466; and Junko Tahara, "Count Michimasa Soyeshima and the Cancellation of the XII Olympiad in Tokyo: A Footnote to Olympic History," *International Journal of the History of Sport*, 9 (1992) 467-472. On the workers sport movement, see Jonathan F. Wagner, "Prague's Socialist Olympics of 1934," *Canadian Journal of the History of Sport*, 12 (1992): 1-18.

assumed, it was not interrupted by the collapse of the Nazi empire in 1945. The postwar denazification of tainted European organizations, limited as it was, did not extend to the IOC, which continued to accommodate its Nazi members and their sympathizers in the old spirit of collegiality. The third section of this essay will examine how this ideological affinity group managed to preserve its traditional viewpoint (and the careers of some important adherents) well into the postwar era, and how its immunity to liberal-humanitarian influence remains a model for the IOC today. At this point, however, some historical background is required.

The following narrative can be introduced by a so-called trivia question, to wit: Who was Jules Rimet, the man for whom the World Cup of soccer is named? I found the answer to this question in the April 1933 issue of the *Deutsch-Französische Rundschau*, one of several journals devoted to Franco-German cultural exchange and mutual understanding during the period between the world wars. On 18 March of that fateful year, the French national soccer team arrived in Berlin led by Jules Rimet, president of both the French Soccer Association and the international federation (FIFA). Waiting to greet the French delegation were the chairman of the German Soccer Association (DFB), representatives of numerous other sports federations, and the press. In a word, this occasion was a political and media event.

The game between the French and German teams, played before 45,000 German spectators under a sparkling spring sky, somehow ended in a tie. Rimet himself observed that the German team had controlled the ball for three-quarters of the game, and the Parisian sports paper *L'Auto* said the Germans had, in effect, lost a game they should have won. At the traditional banquet after the game, the chairman of the DFB referred briefly to recent political events—the Nazi seizure of power was at this point less than three years old—and declared that the German struggle against Bolshevism was being waged on behalf of all civilized Western societies. Jules Rimet then took the dias to praise the “chivalrous play” of both teams, the astonishing impartiality of the German crowd, and the high cultural level of the German nation under its new leadership. He concluded by admonishing the members of the French delegation to spread the good word about the new Germany upon their return to France in order to counteract false ideas and misunderstandings about the Third Reich.⁵⁰ Three years later in Berlin, the IOC and its German hosts sponsored their own version of this international sporting encounter on a much grander scale, and once again the French delegation was received with special warmth.⁵¹

50. Korfiz Kneiser, “Zweites Fußball-Länderspiel Deutschland-Frankreich.” *Deutsch-Französische Rundschau*, 6 (April 1933): 256-259.

51. “German dignitaries went out of their way to greet the French athletes and officials when they arrived early in the morning of 30 July [1936] on the tram from Paris, and the rapturous reception given by the German spectators to the French contingent in the opening ceremony was surpassed only by that given the Austrians and the home nation.” See W.J. Murray, “France, Coubertin and the Nazi Olympics: The Response,” *Olympika: The International Journal of Olympic Studies*, 1 (1992): 62.

The key to interpreting this episode in Franco-German reconciliation is Rimet's reference to the chivalric principle, which is credited with making possible an emotionally stirring rapprochement between the "hereditary enemies" of Europe. The scenario narrated by Rimet, depicting the stylized competitive ritual (or, in traditional terms, the duel) contested by two honorable opponents, remains one of the most powerful mythic formations of Western civilization and, in all likelihood, an archetypal confrontation in the collective mind of any culture, such as Japan, which preserves or remembers a warrior tradition. This (male) mythos has been called by Michael Nerlich "the ideology of adventure," which he defines as "the systematic glorification of the (knightly, then bourgeois) adventurer as the most developed and most important human being." Any observer of the enormous global market for "action" films will appreciate the enduring power of this cultural archetype, which has permeated modern consciousness even as feminist and anti-racist activists have attempted to diminish its hold on ideas about masculinity, race, and gender relations. "Integration of the chivalric adventure-ideology into bourgeois consciousness," Nerlich writes, "and its use in denoting capitalist activity meant an extension of adventure-desire, adventure-thought, and adventure-mentality ultimately to all domains of social practice. This gives us a starting point for rewriting the history of humankind, that is, for rewriting the history of modernity."⁵² Our more limited purpose here is to understand the co-opted, "right-wing" Olympic internationalism that flourished during the Nazi period (1933-45) by employing Nerlich's model as an ideological framework.

For the historian of European ideologies it is of interest that Engels loathed the chivalric tradition, denouncing "every conceivable vileness that hides behind the name of knighthood and speaks incessantly of honor and loyalty." Engels knew that the knightly ethos was the precise negation of socialist rationality, solidarity, and the improvement of ordinary life for the greatest number; for, as Nerlich notes, the ideology of adventure which "demands and celebrates voluntary daring, the quest for extraordinary events, i.e., adventures, with (more or less) unpredictable risk, the 'enduring of danger-filled adventures' as the highest ethical achievement, as 'honor' (*êre*) and 'knighthood' (*riterschaft*), is the courtly-knightly ideology." What is more, the sheer superiority of the chivalric adventurer implied that there were two qualitatively distinct classes of men, since "the ideology of (knightly) adventure [is] exclusively inimical to those deprived of rights."⁵³ That this intrinsically predatory ethos assigned to itself a Christian motivation must have struck Engels as the worst kind of hypocrisy.

The importance of the chivalric code for Olympic history is that it facilitated the ideological bonding of the IOC and the Nazi agents of influence

52. Michael Nerlich, *Ideology of Adventure: Studies in Modern Consciousness, 1100-1750*, Vol. 1 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987): xx, xxi.

53. Nerlich, *Ideology of Adventure*, 46, 5, 39.

who collaborated in staging the great festival of sport in Berlin. It did so by providing twin frameworks for achieving (or imagining) reconciliation between soldiers and athletes, respectively—the code of mutual respect between military adversaries and the ideal of sportsmanship that binds competitive athletes. The power of the ideal of Franco-German reconciliation in particular was rooted in the catastrophe of the Great War and in the longing for peace that followed the cessation of hostilities in 1918. One result of this European trauma was the development of what George Mosse has called “the Myth of the War Experience, which looked back upon the war as a meaningful and even sacred event. This vision of the war developed, above all, though not exclusively, in the defeated nations, where it was so urgently needed,” and especially in Germany, where right-wing veterans “sought to make the camaraderie they had experienced into a principle of government opposed to parliaments and political parties”⁵⁴—a “principle” drawing its authority from the experience of armed struggle that is analogous to the ostensibly apolitical principle of sportsmanship that binds athletes into yet another community of shared experience. The Myth of the War Experience, and the charismatic authority inherent in the idea of military heroism, were appropriated by the political Right across Europe, thereby establishing the basis for a transnational military fraternity united in their shared passage through the “storm of steel” that had raged across the Western front. The Olympic movement could now provide its own version of an action-oriented male subculture in which the transnational comradeship of the trenches could be reenacted in ceremonial form as a European festival of reconciliation.

The internationalization of wartime camaraderie was based on more than romantic mythmaking. On Christmas Eve of 1914, “German, French, and English soldiers climbed out of their trenches to fraternize with each other in no man’s land. Stringent regulations were immediately issued by each nation to prevent it from happening again, and the whole system of military justice was brought into play. That system which kept so many soldiers of all nations fighting—forced them to fight—was successful, and the meeting of the first Christmas was never repeated.”⁵⁵ The enduring image of this suppressed transnational fraternity was the flying ace (of any nationality), the aviator who “appeared to be a genuine war hero, comparable to cavalrymen in Napoleon’s era or chivalrous knights in the Middle Ages. Beginning in 1915, aces found themselves lionized as hugely popular celebrities, particularly in France and Germany. And after the war, a steady stream of hagiography enhanced their heroic status. To this day, myths opposing the individual, distinctive combat of the aces to the industrial mass war on the ground remain deeply embedded in Western folklore.” In the skies over the muddy fields on which ordinary soldiers fought and died, the legend of a

54. George Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990): 7, 23.

55. Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers*, 77.

transnational elite—"a vague international of fighter pilots" guided by "sportsmanship and honor"—was born.⁵⁶

The Olympic movement achieved its popularity in part because it expressed certain tastes and impulses among the generation of European youth who came of age during and after the Great War. Robert Wohl has written of "the antiintellectualism, the careerism, the pragmatism, the athleticism, and the militarism of the young men of 1912,"⁵⁷ effectively combining the sportive and military impulses in the style of Coubertin himself. It was Coubertin, after all, who referred to antimilitarism as "a form of neurosis, a kind of weapons phobia, infantile and pitiful," adding: "To curse war is no longer the way to diminish its frequency. Only the strong and those who favor force are qualified to preach serenity, inaction and—if necessary—retreat."⁵⁸ Like the Myth of the War Experience, Olympic sport offered a transnational ethos of contest and fraternity to European youth. Like the war itself, the Olympic Games assembled young men to engage in physical contests under their nations' flags, and there is a famous and influential postwar text that expresses their supranational ethos. This author celebrates in his own way the spirit of play and festivity and advocates respect for the opponent, proclaiming the presence of his fellow competitor to be nothing less than a "deliverance." Indeed, he says, the meaning of life itself is to bring together "the elite of the nations," "the best team of the peoples, for a competition that affirms all participants beyond the parochial limits of nationalistic preoccupations."⁵⁹

But this is not an Olympic text. It is *Battle as Inner Experience* (1922), Ernst Jünger's relentless and fanatical hymn of praise to the horrors and gratifications of the "storm of steel" he had survived during four years of trench warfare as a young and highly decorated German officer. Like an Olympic devotee intoxicated by the beauty of ancient Greek statuary, Jünger was a connoisseur of "pliant, lean, sinewy bodies,"⁶⁰ but these bodies were not meant for the timid sacrifices of sport. (Coubertin, nevertheless, would have appreciated Jünger's view that there was probably more real piety in evidence at an average motor race than in most churches.⁶¹) Most interesting in this context is the factor that Jünger's supranational idealism had nothing to do with promoting peace among the nations. On the contrary, he regarded war as the apex of human experience, and right-wing terrorists in Germany

56. Peter Fritzsche, *A Nation of Fliers: German Aviation and the Popular Imagination* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992): 64, 89, 87. The idea that these deadly aerial duels were a form of hunting strengthened the association between the aviator and the chivalrous medieval aristocrat. See Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers*, 122. Yet this, like the popular idea that war in the air was a kind of "sport," was an illusion. "The notion that the aces were in the main aristocrats or former cavalry officers is not true." See Fritzsche, *A Nation of Fliers*, 98.

57. Robert Wohl, *The Generation of 1914* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1979). 16.

58. Pierre de Coubertin, *Pages d'histoire contemporaine* (Paris: Plon, 1909): 116.

59. Ernst Jünger, "Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis [1922], in *Sämtliche Werke*, Vol 7 (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, 1980): 87, 17, 34, 47. I have translated Gegner as both "opponent" and "competitor" in this citation.

60. Jünger, *Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis*, 37.

61. Quoted from *Der Arbeiter* (1932) in Siegfried Mossburger, *Ideologie und Leibeserziehung, im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Ahrenshurg bei Hamburg: Verlag Ingrid Czwalina, 1972): 38.

used his text to justify their own acts of violence after the war. Yet Jünger had no difficulty at all in extolling “that internationality of the heart that every decent man and soldier ought to uphold.”⁶² Like his French counterpart Henry de Montherlant—writer, athlete, bullfighter, combat veteran and author of the devotional volume *Les Olympiques* (1924), published to coincide with the 1924 Paris Olympic Games—Jünger’s nationalist feelings were pallid compared to his loyalty to the supranational warrior ethos that traced its lineage back to the chivalric internationalism of the Middle Ages. The power of this tradition—the legacy of the Male International—has played an important role in shaping the chivalric ethos of the Olympic movement and the indiscriminate character of its political associations—what I have called elsewhere the foreign policy of “amoral universalism” practiced by the IOC both before and after the Second World War.⁶³ Ernst Jünger and Pierre de Coubertin shared a fascination with this supranational utopia of male action. Their spiritual compatibility in this sense, and the Berlin Olympiad it made possible, should make us reexamine what Olympic internationalism has really meant over the past century and prompt us to search the international horizon for comparable international enthusiasms.

The male ideology shared by Coubertin and Jünger was also an important preoccupation of Nazi doctrine. Coubertin’s original version of the idealized male action figure was the “débrouillard,” the dynamic “go-getter” type who (like the ideal soldier) could run, climb, swim, shoot, march, sail, row, and drive an automobile. Small wonder that he compared the spontaneous force of modern sport with military “raids.”⁶⁴ Such a male type was wholly compatible with the requirements of Nazi ideology, and this athletic ideal was realized most perfectly in the Nazi context in the person of SS General and Gestapo chief Reinhard Heydrich, an accomplished fencer and a major Nazi war criminal who, having manipulated himself into the presidency of the International Criminal Police Commission in 1940, used his SS power to make himself president of the International Fencing Federation in 1941.⁶⁵ (In this sense, Heydrich is the unsavory prototype of today’s most ambitious international sports bureaucrats, for whom collecting high offices is standard operating procedure.) Heydrich was a tall and athletic man whom his subordinates sometimes called “the Blond Beast” after Nietzsche’s late-nineteenth-century fantasy creature,⁶⁶ and he was, in fact, an extraordinarily multifaceted athlete: fencer, horseman, pilot, skier, swimmer, sailor, rifleman, and a competitor in the modern pentathlon. Heydrich was also a fanatical adherent of

62. Quoted in Dagmar Barnouw, *Weimar Intellectuals and the Threat of Manipulation* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988): 215, 198.

63. Hoberman, *The Olympic Crisis*, 2, 29-32, 122.

64. Krüger, “Neo-Olympismus zwischen Nationalismus und Internationalismus,” 526.

65. Günther Deschner, *Reinhard Heydrich: Statthalter der totalen Macht* (Bechtle, 1977): 123, 124; 132-133.

66. Joachim C. Fest, *The Face of the Third Reich: Portraits of the Nazi Leadership* (New York: Ace Books, 1963): 151. See also John M. Hoberman, *Sport and Political Ideology* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984): 98, 100.

the ideal of “high performance” who insisted that SS men be superior athletes: “in the area of sport we must always be among the very best,” an ideal that responded to Hitler’s demand that Germany produce “a youth that will terrify the world.” Apart from Heydrich’s key role in implementing the Final Solution, what is most unsettling about his career, as Günther Deschner has pointed out, is that it is impossible to separate the sports enthusiast from the political criminal.⁶⁷ In this sense, Heydrich was a living embodiment of the fusion of Olympic and Nazi ideals, a man whose genuine respect for sportsmanship in athletic competition coexisted easily with the instincts of the mass killer whose mobile killing squads machine-gunned enormous numbers of men, women, and children into mass graves. This grotesque contradiction between ritualized self-control and sadistic bloodlust can be understood as a consequence of the chivalric ethos that sanctions competition for the elite and despises the (racially) inferior. For Heydrich and many others like him, the realm of “chivalric” action was a utopian field of action on which conquest and killing did not have ethical consequences. The Berlin Olympiad, and the Franco-German collaboration that it required, were expressions of a less extreme version of this doctrine and the “political neutrality” it represented as a higher form of sportsmanship.

Despite the pioneering research of Hans Joachim Teichler, which remains largely unknown outside of Germany, the Franco-German axis which organized the Berlin Olympiad remains poorly understood.⁶⁸ Even Teichler does not situate this project within the broader campaign of Franco-German rapprochement in which it belongs. At the center of this operation was the aged Coubertin himself, courted and deceived by German operatives, including his disciple Carl Diem, the general secretary of the Berlin Games who collaborated with the Nazi regime from the beginning to the end of the Third Reich. The machinations of this group notwithstanding, Coubertin was genuinely drawn to the new Germany and the spectacle of the Berlin Games, which he regarded as a worthy fulfillment of his life’s work. It was Hitler’s Foreign office which proposed Coubertin for the Nobel Peace Prize, Hitler’s government which gave him 10,000 Reichsmarks, and Hitler himself who received Coubertin’s letter of thanks. On a larger scale, the Berlin Olympiad must be understood as the most dramatic event within a political scheme pursued throughout the 1930s by Nazi agents like Otto Abetz, later a German ambassador to occupied France, in partnership with French fascists and other right-wing elements which looked forward to a fascist New Order in Europe. For this Franco-German network, the Berlin Olympiad was the political and aesthetic fulfillment of an inchoate Fascist International and the hottest VIP ticket in Europe. By the time of his death in 1937, Coubertin had been

67. Deschner, *Reinhard Heydrich*, 137, 138.

68. Teichler, “Coubertin und das Dritte Reich,” 18-53. Texts in English that discuss Teichler’s findings are Hoberman, *The Olympic Crisis*, 43; and Murray, “France, Coubertin and the Nazi Olympics: The Response,” 47, 64.

assigned iconic status by the Comité France-Allemagne, a principal front group managed by Abetz.⁶⁹ A year later, the Comité and its German counterpart dedicated a bust of Coubertin at a “cultural congress” held at Baden-Baden.⁷⁰ This ceremony capped a decade of efforts by Abetz and others to promote their own brand of Franco-German reconciliation in the interests of German foreign policy. This “fraternal” campaign sponsored bilateral student festivals and reunions of French and German war veterans. Dedication to sport and a “cult of outdoorsy muscularity”⁷¹ became defining characteristics of this movement and of French fascism itself. This sportive style, and the right-wing Weltanschauung with which it is associated, had attracted an international cast of adherents to the Olympic movement since the turn of the century. No one has studied how this ideological affinity group recruited its membership over the long term; only its origins, ideological mood, and long-term influence are addressed in the present essay.

It should be evident that a “Nazi” Olympics required ideological compromises by the Nazi regime as well as the IOC, which had to persuade the relevant officials in Berlin to remove the most obvious offenses to the principles of universal participation and mutual respect, such as anti-Semitic signs and eligibility rules. Beyond these essentially cosmetic issues there is the larger question of how Nazi internationalism could exist at all. In conformity with the basic fascist premise that the proper expression of foreign relations is war, Nazi doctrine equated internationalist sentiments with weakness and effeminacy, and the special target of resentment in this regard was the Jew. Thus the sports propagandist Bruno Malitz accused the Jews of attempting to feminize the German male by turning him toward pacifism and internationalism, substituting the innocuous contests of athletes for the struggles of warriors.⁷² As early as 1928, the Nazi ideologist Alfred Rosenberg had called the Olympic Games a crime on account of their international character.⁷³ This doctrinal resistance was overcome in 1933 by Joseph Goebbels’ propaganda ministry, which saw in the Berlin Games a unique public relations opportunity for the Third Reich.⁷⁴ Propaganda goals overcame ideological resistance to internationalist fraternizing and racially-mixed athletic competitions. At the same time, the Nazi appropriation of the Games actually transcended their tactical value for the foreign policymakers in Berlin in that they dramatized a centuries-old fantasy of German dominion over the European world that had assembled in the Olympic Stadium.

69. See, for example, Theodore Draper, “Nazi Spies in France,” *The New Republic* (August 1939): 72; W. Sternfeld, “Ambassador Otto Abetz,” *The Contemporary Review* (1942): 85-90; Pascal Ory, *Les collaborateurs*, 1940-45 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1976): 13-15.

70. Otto Abetz, *Histoire d'une politique franco-allemande 1930-1944* (Paris: Librairie Stock, 1953): 69; see also Ory, *Les collaborateurs*, 19.

71. Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972): 33.

72. Hajo Bernett, ed. *Nationalsozialistische Leibeserziehung* (Schorndorf bei Stuttgart: Verlag Karl Hofmann, 1966): 37.

73. Krüger, *Die Olympischen Spiele 1936 und die Weltmeinung*, 35.

74. For a brief account of this process, see Hoberman, *The Olympic Crisis*, 103.

This is not the place to chronicle the contest between nationalist and cosmopolitan impulses that has done so much to shape the German experience over the past two centuries. It will be necessary, however, to sketch however briefly the complicated relationship between these two orientations, and in particular the impossibility of disentangling them, in the context of modern Central Europe. The tension between chauvinistic and universalistic values is well documented in German cultural history. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, to take one example, the poet Novalis ranked the cosmopolitan, the European, and the German in descending order of importance and proclaimed that: "The instinctive universality of the Romans is shared by the Germans." His contemporary, the romantic political philosopher Adam Müller, construed German universality in a very different way in 1806: "Just as the German tribes founded the political order of Europe, so the German mind will eventually dominate the continent." The famous "National Festival of the Germans," convened under liberal auspices in Hambach (Bavaria) in 1832, presented evidence of both "rational cosmopolitanism" and "nationalist exclusivism" (Hans Kohn). The literary giant Goethe called for the end of national literatures and the advent of a "world literature." Most of a century before Coubertin made an almost identical pronouncement. Goethe stated: "It must not be assumed that all nations should think alike, but they should become aware of one another and understand one another; and if they cannot love one another, they should at least learn mutual toleration." A hundred years later the great novelist Thomas Mann was proclaiming (in 1918) the "superabundant bodily force" of that "world people of the spirit," the German nation, while denouncing internationalism and establishing the famous (and invidious) distinction between the depth of German *Kultur* and the shallowness of Western *Zivilisation*.⁷⁵ Such quotations remind us that the nationalist egotism of an imperial power is inseparable from its international repercussions. Even as late as 1946 the German historian Friedrich Meinecke could write: "It has always been a fact that a specifically and genuinely German spiritual production has succeeded in having a universal Occidental effect." It is important to keep in mind that prior to the Nazis the German nationalist temperament construed this "universal Occidental effect" not as domination, but as a gift to the world. As Michael P. Steinberg has pointed out: "Wagner's original conception of the German mission was not narrowly nationalistic but quite cosmopolitan: in 'healing' themselves, the Germans would heal the world. In articulating this vision of the Germans as the most 'universal' of peoples, Wagner was restating one of the central tenets of German idealist thought."⁷⁶ The same principle could also be applied to the

75. Hans Kohn, *The Mind of Germany: The Education of a Nation* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965): 53, 65, 119, 42, 251-252, 255. The Goethe quotation can be compared with Coubertin's formula: "To ask the peoples of the world to love one another is merely a form of childishness. To ask them to respect one another is not in the least utopian, but in order to respect one another it is first necessary to know one another." See MacAloon, *This Great Symbol*, 268.

76. Steinberg, *The Meaning of the Salzburg Festival*, 85, 81.

Berlin Olympiad. The “Wagnerian Games of 1936,”⁷⁷ as one French fascist fondly recalled them many years later, were yet another gift of German grandeur to a world that stood in need of transformation.

The future domination of the Olympic movement by Nazi Germany was more than just an idle fantasy before and during the Second World War. In a conversation with Albert Speer during the Berlin Games, Hitler described an eminently practical solution to the problem of racially mixed athletic competition: “People whose antecedents came from the jungle were primitive,” Hitler said with a shrug; “their physiques were stronger than those of civilized whites. They represented unfair competition and hence must be excluded from future games.”⁷⁸ The key figure in planning for a “Greater German Olympiad” was Carl Diem (1882-1962), a principal organizer of the Berlin Games and a typical German cultural conservative of his era who served the Olympic movement (and its Nazi manipulators) from the 1912 Stockholm Games until the year of his death. That a man like Diem was attracted to the movement is hardly surprising; as we have seen, Coubertin’s potent combination of sport, international competition, pagan ritual, and body cultism had long appealed to sports-minded German males for whom racial nationalism and a right-wing military outlook were wholly compatible with devoted service both to the Olympic movement and to the Nazi regime.⁷⁹ By 1938 Diem was director of the International Olympic Institute in Berlin. In 1940 he declared that “the reorientation of European sport has its geographical and spiritual center in Germany.” In 1941 he proposed a stadium capable of holding 200,000 spectators so that Berlin would become “the crossroads of world sport.” In 1942 he gave a lecture in Paris titled “The Olympic Idea in the New Europe.”⁸⁰ Like analogous Nazi agents assigned to the areas of literature or music, Diem made his contribution to building the Fascist International that a Nazi occupation of Europe had made possible.

Variations on the German “cosmopolitanism” that broadcast Wagnerian music and mythology across the rest of Europe appeared in the German versions of transnational movements other than Olympic sport. As paradoxical as it seems, the ranks of German Esperantists included people for whom the very idea of internationalism was repellent. What is more, there were non-German Esperantists who approved of the Nazi regime and its policy

77. Hoberman, *The Olympic Crisis*, 97. In this sense the Berlin Olympiad belongs to the “festival metagenre” (including the Salzburg Festival) to which I have referred above. This metagenre encompasses various spectacles. For example: “The drive to cultural totality . . . emerges as the common denominator between the baroque and the fascist, between the Salzburg great world theater (the text and the historical process) and the political theater of the Nuremberg Rally of September 1934.” See Steinberg, *The Meaning of the Salzburg Festival*, 225.

78. Albert Speer, *Inside the Third Reich* (New York: Avon Books, 1971): 114.

79. On Diem see Guttman, *The Games Must Go On*, esp. 63-65, 67-69, 74-75, 78-79, 97-98, 201-202; Hoberman, *The Olympic Crisis*, 45-50; and, especially, the entire first issue of the *Zeitschrift für Sozial- und Zeitgeschichte des Sports* (1987).

80. Hans Joachim Teichler, “Der Weg Carl Diems vom DRA-Generalsekretär zum kommissarischen Führer des Gaues Ausland im NSRL,” *Zeitschrift für Sozial- und Zeitgeschichte des Sports*, 1 (1987): 43, 70, 77, 52.

toward the Jews. At the same time, Esperanto in Germany benefitted from the popularity of the “Pan-European Idea” that often seemed to imply German cultural hegemony and that served the European Right as a congenial ideological framework for the Berlin Olympiad. (The idea of the universal, supranational Reich also appeared in the doctrine of a German Scout leader, Ludwig Habel.⁸¹ The German Scouts were not, however, officially recognized by the International Bureau.⁸²) In the German context, conservatives could see Esperanto as compatible with an “internationalism” that did not threaten their cultural identity even as they rejected other internationalist affiliations. Here, as in the case of other non-Socialist transnational movements, the political “neutrality” of the German Esperanto Federation (DEB) proved to have a conservative orientation. This anti-internationalist conservatism within the DEB did not, however, shelter the group from Nazi persecution directed against its “Jewish” origins and the fact that its members spoke the “secret language of the Communists.” Under pressure from the Nazis, the DEB bent over backwards to emphasize that a “true” internationalism must have a firm national basis, a capitulation that drew criticism from foreign Esperantists. In April 1933, the organ of the DEB went so far as to argue that Esperanto would serve the German racial community by transmitting “the German essence” to foreign countries. Within the World Esperanto Federation (UEA), the debate over whether to attend the 25th World Esperanto Congress scheduled for July 1933 in Cologne foreshadowed the similar controversy over the 1936 Berlin Games. They did meet in Cologne, but drew only half the expected number of participants. By January 1935, the new leader of the DEB, a Nazi, had declared that the purpose of Esperanto was “to spread our National Socialist world-view to all the countries of the world.”⁸³

The 1933 Esperanto Congress and the 1936 Berlin Games posed and answered the same question: Should an international organization engage in cultural relations within the borders of an officially xenophobic state? Or, as in the case of the 1936 Games, tolerate state sponsorship, as well? In both cases international organizations replied in the affirmative. The Boy Scout movement, too, maintained relations—in this case, with the Hitler Jugend—for several years after the Nazi seizure of power.⁸⁴ Unlike the IOC, the Chief Scout, Lord Baden-Powell, finally broke off contact with the Nazis after the anti-Jewish violence of 9 November 1938 (*Kristallnacht*). From a comparativist standpoint, then, the IOC’s collaboration with the Hitler regime was not as deviant by the internationalist standards of that era as it may

81. Seidelmann, *Die Pfadfinder in der deutschen Jugendgeschichte*, 63.

82. Tim Jeal, *The Boy-Man: The Life of Lord Baden-Powell* (New York: William Morrow, 1990): 545.

83. Lins, *Die gefährliche Sprache*, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 95-96, 98, 103.

84. For a contentious difference of views on the views of the Chief Scout, Lord Baden-Powell, regarding the Nazis see Rosenthal, *The Character Factory*, 277-278; and Jeal, *The Boy-Man*, 543-553. See also Ian Buruma, “Boys Will Be Boys” [a review of *The Boy-Man*], *The New York Review of Books* (March 15, 1990): 17-20, who generally supports Jeal’s views; and Rosenthal’s letter in response: “A Bad Scout?” *The New York Review of Books* (June 28, 1990): 60-61.

appear today. Putting aside the ethical or tactical correctness of these policies, we are reminded once again that the dichotomy that most effectively separates twentieth-century internationalisms into opposing types is the difference between the Socialist and non-Socialist, and that many "bourgeois" institutions demonstrated a willingness to do cultural business with the Nazis. The final section of this essay examines ideological continuities and discontinuities within the Olympic movement between the fascist era and our own. In addition, it situates the Olympic movement within a metagenre of post-1945 "right-wing internationalisms" that have not been compared before.

3. The Age of Transnational Evangelism

On a cold March day in 1945, only weeks before the end of the catastrophic war Germany had begun, Carl Diem stood before thousands of Hitler Youth assembled on the Reich Sports Field in Berlin. His audience was adolescent cannon fodder about to be sent off to the "Final Battle" on the Russian front. In the course of the tirade he delivered to these 16-year-old warriors, Diem called upon them to make an heroic showing that would exemplify "the Olympic spirit" of never giving up the struggle. Execution stakes were erected between the monuments to German Olympic victors of years gone by, so that the "cowards" and others who sought to escape the slaughter could be executed in a properly heroic setting. Of those who went to the front, two thousand of these boys returned as corpses.⁸⁵

Carl Diem survived the war to become the "Nestor" of postwar West German sport, his political past either ignored or unknown. As a self-styled cosmopolitan in the German nationalist sense of the term, Diem regarded himself and was seen by many others as a German humanist, a "homo universalis," in the tradition of Goethe. At the same time, his political record has been concealed or falsified by sympathetic German colleagues within the sports studies establishment. A contributing factor to the successful reinvention of Carl Diem has been his image as a deep thinker and even an anti-Nazi. In 1957 the publicist of the German Gymnastic Federation called him "the first and perhaps the last universal spirit produced by modern physical culture." Fifteen years later, the same official called Diem one of the "great cultural figures of our century." In 1962, Willi Daume, the other grand old man of the postwar West German sport revival and a longtime IOC insider, called Diem "the most creative and far-reaching personality" of modern sport. As late as 1986, the newly elected president of the German Sports Federation (DSB) hailed Diem's alleged resistance to the Nazi takeover of German sport.⁸⁶ In 1961, Diem served as co-founder of the International Olympic Academy in Greece.

85. "Dokumentation," *Zeitschrift für Sozial- und Zeitgeschichte des Sports*, 1 (1987): 105; Alkemayer, "Gewalt und Opfer im Ritual der Olympischen Spiele 1936," 71.

86. Hajo Bernett, "Carl Diem und sein Werk als Gegenstand der sportgeschichtlichen Forschung," *Zeitschrift für Sozial- und Zeitgeschichte des Sports*, 1 (1987): 11, 11, 10-11; *Zeitschrift für Sozial- und Zeitgeschichte des Sports*, 1 (1987): 4.

Outside of Germany, Diem, a longtime friend of IOC-president Avery Brundage, moved easily within the inner circle of the Olympic movement and among his fellow members of the German Olympic affinity group. The postwar head of the West German National Olympic Committee, Karl Ritter von Halt, had been Hitler's last *Reichssportführer*, a member of the SA, and a longtime member of the IOC (1929-64). When the Winter Olympic Games were held in Oslo in 1952, the Norwegians would not even let him into the country.⁸⁷ Diem's friend Walter von Reichenau had traveled with him to the United States in 1913 to study American sport. As one of Hitler's most powerful generals, von Reichenau was renowned for his sporting prowess: at the age of fifty-six, he had run a quarter-mile in under a minute, and in 1940 he had sparred with Walter Neusel, the German heavyweight champion. As Field Marshal and commander-in-chief of the German Sixth Army "during the Russian campaign of 1941 he issued a notorious order of the day condoning a stupendous massacre of Jews which the SS conducted at Kiev."⁸⁸ Reichenau had become an IOC member in 1938, and it is possible that his puzzling death in 1942 from "apoplexy" on the Russian front saved the IOC from the disgrace of seeing one of its members stand trial at Nuremberg.

The ideological ambiance that welcomed Nazis and their sympathizers into the Olympic inner circle was not simply a creation of the Germans. Avery Brundage, who as president of the American Olympic Committee had led the campaign for American attendance at the 1936 Berlin Games, was a pronounced germanophile and anti-Semite whose IOC presidency (1952-72) can only have encouraged participation by those with Nazi affiliations or sympathies.⁸⁹ The political career of Jean Borotra, the Basque tennis star of the 1920s is another case of how collaboration with a fascist administration preceded a leadership role in international sport circles after the war. Borotra served as Commissar-General for Education and Sport in the Vichy administration of Marshal Pétain, then was arrested and deported by the Gestapo in 1942 when the Germans moved into the unoccupied zone. As late as the 1970s Borotra was playing a prominent role in the Association for the Defence of the Memory of Marshal Pétain.⁹⁰ In 1964 he founded the International Committee for Fair Play (ICFP), which awards trophies and certificates

87. For a brief and apologetic survey of von Halt's political and Olympic career, see Karl Adolf Scherer, *Der Männerorden: Die Geschichte des Internationalen Olympischen Komitees* (Frankfurt/M: Limpert, 1974), 74-77. For a more detailed and reliable account of von Halt's contributions to the Nazi sport apparatus see Krüger, *Die Olympischen Spiele und die Weltmeinung*. While Scherer (p. 76) dispels a false rumor that von Halt had belonged to the SS, Krüger (p. 128) confirms that he had been a member of the SA and the NSDAP.

88. Gerald Reitlinger, *The SS: Alibi of a Nation* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1989) 135. For the English text of von Reichenau's statement, see Lucy S. Dawidowicz, *The War Against the Jews, 1033-1945* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975): 124. For a part of the German text including a reference to "Jewish subhumans" [*jüdischen Untermenschen*] see Teichler, "Der Weg Carl Diems" 47ftm. A recent apologetic account of von Reichenau's career emphasizes his athleticism and refers only obliquely to his notorious statement of 1941. See W. Görlitz, "Reichenau," in C. Barnett, ed. *Hitler's Generals* (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989): 209-219.

89. See, especially, Guttman, *The Games Must Go On*; and Hoberman, *The Olympic Crisis*, 50-57.

90. "Jean Borotra," *The Times* [London] (July 18, 1994): 19.

of honor at an annual ceremony held in the Paris offices of UNESCO. This ceremony, according to an ICFP booklet, is attended by “numerous leading celebrities of the international sports organizations and National Olympic Committees.” The ICFP’s affiliated members are, in fact, a Who’s Who of the IOC elite. In 1988, the presidency of the ICFP was passed on (at Borotra’s request) to his old friend Willi Daume, president of the West German National Olympic Committee,⁹¹ who was subsequently implicated in the covering up of doping practices among West German athletes and physicians.⁹² Doping is a form of cheating that is specifically targeted by ICFP rhetoric.

The founding of the ICFP, according to its brief historical self-portrait, derives from a Seminar held near Munich in 1963 at UNESCO’s Youth Institute.⁹³ In fact, this account truncates the history of the use of the fair-play ideal as an inspirational principle that “transcends politics.” During Germany’s great Olympic year of 1936, Nazi publications appropriated the related themes of (English) fair play and (German) chivalry to score points for “Adolf Hitler’s policy of peace” and to settle some old foreign policy injustices. Even back in 1919, we are told, fair-minded Englishmen, animated by their own ideal of fair-play, had protested the unfair terms and the “Shylock-chains” imposed by the Versailles Treaty. Now in 1936 such ideals promised to prevent war between Germany and her neighbors to the west. Given that Germany, France, and England were all bound together by a shared idea of “honor,” war could surely be avoided.⁹⁴ The power of this rhetoric to affect political judgments by creating an emotional groundswell in the direction of “reconciliation” should not be underestimated. Through the transforming power of metaphor, political conflicts based on moral and ideological principles take on the appearance of encounters between “honorable” sportsmen, and the illusion of ethical parity (between Englishmen and Nazis) is achieved. In the general bonhomie that surrounds this sort of good fellowship, it is easily forgotten that the politically “neutral” cult of sportsmanship can easily serve political interests.

The International Committee for Fair Play is an ideological sideshow, an institutionalized (and virtually invisible) Olympic conscience that exists as a minor part of the IOC entourage. At the same time, its hortatory, inspirational activity points to the IOC’s self-appointed role as leader of a kind of crusade of global reconciliation that is “beyond politics,” and thus to a metagenre of transnational movements, including the IOC, that we may call

91. “Immer unter Volldampf,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, August 14/15, 1988.

92. See John Hoberman, *Mortal Engines: The Science of Performance and the Dehumanization of Sport* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 251-252.

93. “A Short History of the International Committee for Fair Play” (October 1991). Unpublished document. See also “A Selection of Fair Play Attitudes Distinguished by the International Committee for Fair Play” (February 1992). Unpublished document.

94. Heinrich Rogge, “Frieden durch Recht: Fair Play—Ehre und Ehrlichkeit.” *Hochschule und Ausland* (March 1936): 250, 251. See also Heinrich Rogge, “Frieden durch Ritterlichkeit,” *Europäische Rundschau* (September 1936): 752-753; and Otto Kriegk, “Gespräch mit Baron Pierre de Coubertin,” *Europäische Revue*, 12 (August 1936): 609-614.

the “evangelical internationalisms.” A more overtly evangelical movement is the crusade that came to be known as Moral Re-Armament (MRA), the brainchild of a Lutheran minister from Pennsylvania named Frank Buchman (1878-1961) whose mindset and performance on the world stage recall the temperament and career of Avery Brundage. What began as the First Century Christian Fellowship (1921) was eventually renamed the Oxford Group (1929) and finally Moral Re-Armament (1938), marking a transition from Christian evangelism to a political evangelism. After Buchman’s death in 1961, MRA became known as the “Up With People” campaign, a travelling musical show that brought “uplifting” messages of hope for the world.

MRA was an international anti-Communist movement that was heavily dependent on the charismatic leadership of its founder and the publicity he derived from hobnobbing with a galaxy of international celebrities. By the end of Buchman’s life, “the movement that he had created was known throughout the world and he had been photographed with and decorated by more monarchs, statesmen, and other potentates than any other religious leader except, possibly, the Pope.”⁹⁵ While its plays, films, and “task-forces” toured the world, its primary product was on display at the annual World Assemblies—the fatuous rhetoric of spiritual renewal that flourished in Europe between the world wars among those who refused the beggar’s choice between capitalism and communism. Speaking before an audience of 30,000 in the Hollywood Bowl for the Moral Re-Armament “Call to the Nations” Assembly on July 19, 1939, Buchman declared that: “Moral Re-Armament is the scenario of a Golden Age—a God-directed production—a preview of a new world.” MRA, he said, “is a world network of hate-free, fear-free, greed-free people,” its four standards being “absolute honesty, absolute unselfishness, absolute love and absolute purity—personally and nationally. They are the four standards of personal, national and international life.”⁹⁶ “The bottleneck,” he said in 1949, “is that people say that human nature cannot change.”⁹⁷ These and many similar verbal confections aimed at staking out a politically neutral high ground from which MRA could evangelize the warring nations.

Frank Buchman was described by an early admirer in the following terms: “tall, upright, stoutish, clean-shaven, spectacled, with that mien of scrupulous, shampooed, and almost medical cleanliness or freshness, which is so characteristic of the hygienic American.”⁹⁸ This portrait of confident American self-righteousness recalls Buchman’s contemporary Avery Brundage (1887-1975), an Olympic evangelist who once declared that: “The

95. Tom Driberg, *The Mystery of Moral Re-Armament: A Study of Frank Buchman and His Movement* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1964): 18.

96. *Remaking the World: The Speeches of Frank N.D. Buchman* (London: Blandford Press, 1961): 95, 101-102, 96.

97. Frank N.D. Buchman, “Is There an Answer? There Is,” *Caux; Report of the World Assembly of Moral Re-Armament* (Caux-sur Montreux; Editions de Caux, 1949): 20.

98. Driberg, *The Mystery of Moral Re-Armament*, 15.

Olympic movement today is perhaps the greatest social force in the world.”⁹⁹ Like Brundage, Buchman was a pronounced germanophile who socialized with Nazis at the Berlin Olympiad and imagined that he had a transideological lubricant for diplomatic relations between Germany and the democracies. “I thank heaven for a man like Adolf Hitler, who built a front line of defence against the anti-Christ of Communism,” Buchman told the *New York World-Telegram* in 1936. And, like Brundage, the once-provincial Buchman was exhilarated by his global reach: “There is a note of exultation in his reports of the world-wide demands for his presence and of the tributes to his work from the great and famous.”¹⁰⁰ “I’m dictating letters every day to all parts of the world on questions and problems relating to the Olympics,” Brundage told an interviewer in 1956.¹⁰¹ Finally, Buchman’s movement included a few well-connected athletes who were willing to spread the word. During the 1930s, it was H.W. “Bunny” Austin, once a British tennis champion, who declared in 1939 that: “Sportsmen morally rearmed can unite the world.”¹⁰² A far more interesting follower of MRA was Sir Arnold Lunn (b. 1888), the founder of Alpine ski racing, to whom Richard Holt has devoted a much-needed essay. “It is his background,” says Holt, “his manners, his social connections, his ideological as well as his sporting values that make him worth studying.”¹⁰³ Without mentioning Lunn’s affiliation with MRA or the book¹⁰⁴ he wrote about the movement, Holt places Lunn exactly where he belongs—within that right-wing European world of “sportsmanship,” “chivalry,” and “honour” that harbored many fascist sympathizers or, in Lunn’s case, a sympathizer who had his favorite fascist. Lunn’s genuine hostility to the Nazis derived from his conversion to Catholicism, and he “even expressed sympathy for those who wanted to boycott the [Berlin] Games.” Alas, Lunn’s immunity to the ideological temptations of sportive fellowship had its limits, as “his commitment to Catholicism and skiing friendship with the Spanish royal family drew him into support for Franco, whom he saw as the defender of the faith from Communists and atheists masquerading as democrats.” This elective affinity makes Lunn a figure who connects the founder of the modern Olympic movement with the most recent president of the IOC. “In certain social and ideological respects,” Holt points out, “Lunn resembled Pierre de Coubertin. He was a patriot rather than a chauvinist . . . he shared the broadly imperialist, paternalist and hierarchical views of a social elite that was coming to terms with democracy.”¹⁰⁵ It is not altogether surprising, then, that Lunn was eventually absorbed into the francophile milieu of Juan Antonio Samaranch.

99. Quoted in William Johnson, “Defender of the Faith,” *Sports Illustrated* (July 24, 1972): 32.

100. Driberg, *The Mystery of Moral Re-Armament*, 64, 68, 42.

101. Quoted in Robert Creamer, “The Embattled World of Avery Brundage,” *Sports Illustrated* (January 30, 1956): 57.

102. Driberg, *The Mystery of Moral Re-Armament*, 91.

103. Richard Holt, “An Englishman in the Alps: Arnold Lunn, Amateurism and the Invention of Alpine Ski Racing,” *International Journal of the History of Sport*, 9 (1992): 422.

104. Sir Arnpd Lunn, *Enigma: A Study of Moral Re-Armament* (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1957).

The anti-Communist mission and political idiom of MRA point forward to a more powerful evangelical, anti-Communist, international organization that has established itself on a global scale: the Unification Church founded in 1954 by the Reverend Sun Myung Moon. Moon is the messianic (and megalomaniacal) prophet of a deviant Christianity that identifies him as the Savior of mankind. He is also a political dreamer on a grand scale. In June 1975, Moon told an enormous crowd in his native South Korea that he planned a “unified civilization” of the entire world to be centered in Korea and “corresponding to that of the Roman Empire.” He controls a far-flung international network of business interests, educational institutions (including the University of Bridgeport in Connecticut), and various front groups. His International Conferences for the Unity of the Sciences have attracted several Nobel Laureates. Like MRA, the Unification Church employs the rhetoric of “international good will” and wraps its political agenda in a religious idiom. At the same time, it propounded during the Cold War a “virulent” anti-Communism that went far beyond that of the Buchmanites, establishing the International Federation for the Extermination of Communism in 1968. During the 1970s, the Unification Church functioned as an instrument of the South Korean dictatorship of Park Chung Hee and its Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA).¹⁰⁶ During the 1970s and 1980s the Unification Church maintained contacts with the World Anti-Communist League (WACL), a branch of that transnational political twilight zone where old Nazis and neo-fascists of various descriptions have rubbed shoulders with more traditional conservatives.¹⁰⁷

One of the South Korean (ROK) government operatives involved with the Unification Church during the 1970s was a man named Mickey Kim. During the early 1960s he was an aide to Kim Jong Pil, mastermind of the anti-democratic coup d'état of 1961, founder of the KCIA, and political mentor to the Unification Church. In 1964, Mickey Kim was in Washington, D.C., having been appointed Embassy Project Officer for cultural activities “with particular emphasis on the Freedom Center,” a project of the Asian People’s Anti-Communist League (APAACL) that was supported by the ROK and tied to the Korean Cultural and Freedom Foundation (KCFF), a Unification Church front group. Mickey Kim became an aide to Park Chong Kyu, head of the Presidential Protection Force, an eventual Vice-President of the International Shooting Confederation (1976–), and a future member of the Seoul Olympic Organizing Committee (SLOOC). In 1984 the *Olympic Review* announced his election as a new member of the IOC. Mickey Kim also

105. Holt, “An Englishman in the Alps,” 430, 430, 429, 429.

106. “Investigation of Korean-American Relations” [Report of the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives] (Washington, D.C.: Committee on International Relations, 1978): 314, 321, 360, 319, 351, 347. See also Robert Boettcher, *Gifts of Deceit Sun Myung Moon, Tongsun Park, and the Korean Scandal* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1980).

107. “Investigation of Korean-American Relations,” 319: “The Moonies—a power in the service of anticommunism,” *Manchester Guardian Weekly* (February 24, 1985): 12-13.

became head of the World Tae Kwando (Karate) Association, which received payments from the KCFE.¹⁰⁸

Today, Mickey Kim is better known as Kim Un Yong, an IOC member since 1986 and a member of its Executive Board since 1988. He is currently ranked among the three most powerful sports officials in the world, just below Juan Antonio Samaranch.¹⁰⁹ Ranked with him are Primo Nebiolo, the scandal-plagued president of the International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF) and an IOC member since 1992; and João Havelange, IOC member since 1963, president of FIFA since 1974, who is alleged to be tied to the international arms trade.¹¹⁰ At the 1986 World Cup in Mexico City, Havelange was among the high-level FIFA officials who entertained the Argentine admiral Carlos Alberto Lacoste, formerly a close aide to the notorious Admiral Massera, who in December 1985 was sentenced to life in prison for his role in the thousands of kidnappings, tortures, and killings that marked the Argentine military's "dirty war" against the Left in the 1970s. Lacoste had organized the 1978 World Cup in Buenos Aires for the Argentine junta. At the 1986 World Cup, the German delegation played host to Hans-Ulrich Rudel, a hero of Hitler's war and "a fanatical Nazi."¹¹¹

What are we to make of this network of personal and doctrinal associations? The fraternizing incidents would appear to confirm that the right-wing ideological affinities of the pre-1945 IOC are by no means extinct within the upper strata of the major international sports organizations. (The ideological basis of this fraternity is described in the second section of this essay.) The career of Juan Antonio Samaranch, to take only the most prominent example, is tied to the fascist era in two ways. Quite apart from his debt to Franco is the fact that "in 1968 he was appointed chief of Olympic protocol by [Avery] Brundage, who saw him as a potential future president much to his liking and favoured him wherever he could, having a similar ultra-conservative political background and similar business interests."¹¹² Brundage was entirely comfortable in the company of sportsmen who had served the Nazis, and it is reasonable to assume that his political tastes lived on in at least some of his appointments within the IOC. Samaranch, in turn, appointed Mario Pescante, president of the Italian National Olympic Committee (CONI), to the IOC in 1994. In January 1995, the Italian state prosecutor charged that CONI was

108. "Investigation of Korean-American Relations," 356, 363. On the naming of Park Chong-Kyu to the IOC see *Olympic Review* (1984): 738. I am indebted to Andrew Jennings for bringing this to my attention.

109. *sport intern*, 27 (January 16, 1995): 2.

110. On Nebiolo see "Evangelistis Sprung für korrekt befunden," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, July 9, 1987; "Strafen für sieben Offizielle," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, March 28, 1988; "Rücktritt Nebiolos gefordert," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, March 30, 1988; "Präsident Nebiolo in Italien zurückgetreten," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 9, 1989; "Primo Nebiolo opfert die Glaubwürdigkeit der Imagepflege," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, September 7, 1989. On Havelange see "Schlammanschlag gegen den Unsterblichen," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, December 17/18, 1994.

111. "Nichts gelernt," *Der Spiegel* (June 23, 1986): 181-182. On Rudel see Kurt P. Tauber, *Beyond Eagle and Swastika: German nationalism Since 1945* Vol. 1 (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1967): 252.

112. Krüger, review of *El deporte del poder*, 292.

directing funds to a neo-fascist sports club.¹¹³ The apparent political compatibility of these IOC members, whose Olympic careers span half a century, exemplifies the foundation of any “old-boy network.”

More important than Nazi ties is the sheer isolation of many transnational bodies from the winds of political change that have blown during the postwar era. Unregulated by democratic political processes or journalistic scrutiny, these transnational affinity groups have long served as refuges for the politically unsavory. The IOC, after all, is not alone in having sheltered its quota of people with Nazi connections after 1945. Interpol, the International Criminal Police Organization, refused to pursue Nazi war criminals after the war and elected a former SS man, Paul Dickopf, as its president during the period 1968-1972.¹¹⁴ Interpol’s predecessor, the International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC), was taken over by Reinhard Heydrich in 1938 when Germany annexed Austria. Its headquarters were moved from Vienna to Berlin, and Heydrich made himself its president in 1940. It was reconstituted in 1946 by police officials who had remained in power during the Nazi occupation of Europe.

The World Medical Association (WMA), the world’s largest medical society, went through a similar but more publicized episode in 1992, having elected (on 1 October) as its president Dr. Hans-Joachim Sewering, a member of the Nazi Party (August 1, 1934, member 1858 805), the SS (November 1, 1933), the NS-Volkswohlfahrt (Nazi People Welfare Association), and the NS-Altherrenbund (Nazi Elderly Men’s Association). Sewering was implicated in sending disabled patients, including “useless” children, to the Eglfing-Haar euthanasia clinic during the period 1940 to 1944. Given that half of German male doctors joined the Nazi Party, postwar denazification of German medicine was virtually impossible, meaning that anti-Nazi vetting of Germans sent out to fill positions in international bodies simply did not occur. Three of four postwar presidents of the German Chamber of Physicians had been members of the SS or SA. By the mid-1950s Sewering was an official of the WMA, his term overlapping with that of Dr. F. N. Fromm, another former SS member. He resigned as President of the West German Medical Association in 1978 after allegations of financial improprieties but remained as President of the Medical Association of Bavaria.¹¹⁵

113. “Neofascistische Sportler unterstützt,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, January 13, 1995.

114. Trevor Meldal-Johnsen and Vaughn Young, *The Interpol Connection: An Inquiry into the International Criminal Police Organization* (New York: The Dial Press, 1979): 15-29. Malcolm Anderson, *Policing the World: Interpol and the Politics of International Police Co-operation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989): 41. See also Alan Riding, “For Interpol, Regrets of a Shady Past,” *New York Times*, February 22, 1990. Gerald L. Posner, “Interpol’s Nazi Affiliations Continued After War” [letter], *New York Times*, March 6, 1990. Anderson’s claim (p. 41) that the reconstituted ICPC was free of Nazi influence after 1946 strikes me as implausible.

115. Winfried Beck, “The World Medical Association and South Africa,” *The Lancet* (June 24, 1989): 1441-1442; Jennifer Learning, “German Doctors and Their Secrets,” *New York Times*, February 6, 1993; “Nazi’s Rise to Top of Medical World Questioned,” *Forward*, July 15, 1994; “Nazi Doctor Put on Watch List,” *Forward*, August 5, 1994. On the postwar German medical establishment, see Robert N. Proctor, *Racial Hygiene: Medicine Under the Nazis* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988): 298-312.

The postwar history of the major transnational organizations remains to be written, and such a history would necessarily include an examination of how (or whether) these groups purged themselves of fascist members or affiliations after the Second World War. In 1945, to take one example, the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations recommended that "the Secretary-General should take the necessary steps to ensure that no persons who have discredited themselves by their activities or connections with Fascism or Nazism shall be appointed to the Secretariat." Yet in December 1952 "the stipulation disappeared, apparently without opposition from member governments, U.N. leaders and supporters, or the press."¹¹⁶ It is probable that a survey of international organizational behavior during this period would find this episode to be rather typical, so that, in this comparative context, the postwar behavior of the IOC appears to be less deviant and more in conformity with a prevailing (and clearly inadequate) norm.

The postwar international organizations we have been examining can be thought of as a transnational "archipelago" in the Solzhenitsynian sense—a loose assemblage of sometimes interconnected camps, often directed by a right-wing leadership, which allow for upward and even lateral mobility. The political career of Kim Un Yong, once affiliated with the KCIA and the Unification Church, has flourished in the world of international sport, where (like Primo Nebiolo) he has acquired one presidency after the next and (unlike Nebiolo) managed to burnish his image at home.¹¹⁷ The "Olympic family" can also serve as a refuge for more overtly compromised individuals. When Saddam Hussein's son Uday murdered one of his father's bodyguards with a hammer in 1989, he was made the head of the Iraqi National Olympic Committee. When the head of François Mitterand's security unit was sentenced to prison (and then reprieved) for planting incriminating evidence on suspected Irish terrorists, the President made him head of security for the 1992 Winter Olympic Games in Albertville and awarded him the Legion of Honor.¹¹⁸

The systematic lack of attention to extreme right-wing influences, not to mention the business deals of leading IOC members who control vast wealth, make these transnational "offshore" zones into Peter Pan-style magic

116. Shirley Hazzard, *Counenance of Truth: The United Nations and the Waldheim Case* (New York: Viking, 1990): 6.

117. See, for example, the wholly laudatory "Sportführer Kim Un Yong sucht Effektivität statt Schau: Ein Mann mit wichtigen Ämtern verfolgt langfristige Ziele," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* November 10, 1989. It is also worth noting that during the run-up to the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, the South Korean President (former General) Chun Doo Hwan and his government promulgated an anti-Communist festival internationalism that resembled Moral Re-Armament in its emphasis on "moral values," "positive" solutions, "bridge-building," sheer enthusiasm and Hollywood-style spectacles. Chun even called on South Koreans to strengthen their "spiritual armament" against "ideological conflicts which might undermine social stability and the nation's basic order," just as he had told Korea's children to build character through sports. See John Hoberman, "Olympic Internationalism and The Korea Herald," *The Olympic Movement and the Mass Media: Past, Present and Future Issues* (Calgary: Hurford Enterprises Ltd., 1989): 11-35-11-41.

118. "Murder in Baghdad," *The New Republic* (April 9, 1990): 7; "Reporter Assails Elysée Palace Tapped His Phone," *New York Times*, March 5, 1993.

kingdoms where old-line authoritarians are not required to grow to political maturity. Evangelistic internationalisms such as the Olympic movement, which employ various forms (or simulacra) of religiosity to launch ostensibly transideological crusades to heal the world's political wounds, have thus been congenial environments for an older political generation which has long regarded hardcore, WACL-style anti-Communist internationalism as the most inspiring crusade of all.

In conclusion, I would like to point out that this essay's focus on the past of the Olympic movement has necessarily excluded a more adequate discussion of its current political temperament and diplomatic potential, as well as affiliated "offshore" bodies such as the IAAF or the Medical Commissions of the IOC, IAAF, and the International Swimming Federation (FINA), all of which would repay analysis.¹¹⁹ The traditional image of the IOC as a "moribund, antediluvian collection of aging, rich, and titled men completely unconnected with reality" is, as Richard Pound has recently pointed out, inaccurate.¹²⁰ What is interesting about Pound's version of this old cliché is that it portrays the IOC inner circle as politically powerless and inept. In this essay I have argued against the stereotype by attempting to describe the sources of the IOC's power to shape the Olympic movement's values and behavior vis-à-vis the larger political world. The ability of the IOC to retain white South Africa in the Olympic movement until 1970 is a case in point, in that the pro-apartheid policy of Avery Brundage and his allies was clearly the product of an ideological affinity group with a particular racial outlook whose development has been described above. At the same time, there is a case to be made for the potential of the IOC to practice creative diplomacy on an increasingly fragmented international stage. Richard Pound and John J. MacAloon have argued that the 1988 Seoul Olympiad was its most glorious hour in this respect.¹²¹ Fulfilling the IOC's diplomatic potential in the future will depend in part on whether the "ever increasing *dirigisme*" (MacAloon) of Juan Antonio Samaranch persists beyond his announced retirement in 1997. The comparative study of a range of transnational organizations, and the endemic disorders they often share, might help to ease the way into a more diplomatically productive future for the Olympic movement.

119. On the international conspiracy of silence that has frustrated doping control around the world for the past two decades, see Hoberman, "A Conspiracy So Vast: The Politics of Doping," in *Mortal Engines*, 229-268. Among the large number of articles on this subject that have appeared in the German press over the past decade, see especially Thomas Kistner, "Die Stasi führt Olympia-Arzt Joseph Keul als Dopingbefürworter," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, March 21, 1994.

120. Richard Pound, *Five Rings Over Korea: The Secret Negotiations Behind the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul* (New York and Toronto: Little, Brown & Company, 1994): 63.

121. John J. MacAloon, "Review Essay: Richard Pound, *Five Rings Over Korea: The Secret Negotiations Behind the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul* (1994)," *Olympika: The International Journal of Olympic Studies* 3 (1994): 117-123.