
Black Entrepreneurship in the National Pastime: The Rise of Semiprofessional Baseball in Black Chicago, 1890-1915

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During the 1980s and 1990s, popular and professional historians of baseball gave increased attention to the black experience in the national pastime. They have examined the game's relationship to white society, analyzed the trials and triumphs of black ball players, and extolled the competency of black ball players as they confronted racist America. Their research has also examined the connection between black baseball and the black community, emphasizing in particular how the game served as a unifying element to communities in transition and how it helped to bridge class distinctions.¹

These efforts have dramatically expanded our knowledge, but the writings on black baseball have been somewhat narrow and limited. Most of the emphasis has been on the experience of players and the game on the field. While writers have noted the connection between black baseball and the black community, most of the research, especially in popular works, has neglected to analyze this linkage. Part and parcel of these limitations is the virtual absence of any analysis that examines the intersection of the role of local businessmen, communal patterns, and the development of black baseball.

Baseball in black Chicago exemplifies the efforts of black businessmen to pursue sport as an entrepreneurial endeavor. Their attempt to establish baseball as a profitable business illustrates the efforts of black businessmen to counter both discrimination and the exclusion of African Americans from places of amusement. It also illustrates how these African American entrepreneurs responded to obstacles, such as the inability to secure credit, that adversely impacted economic development. These entrepreneurs operated a segregated


enterprise within the fabric of the national economy. In other words, the segregated enterprise-black independent teams—operated within the framework of the national economy—white semiprofessional baseball. African American baseball owners did not seek to promote their ball clubs exclusively to a black clientele. But with the expansion of the African American community in Chicago in the 1890s, due to northern migration, black owners began catering to this growing market.²

Andrew “Rube” Foster was to emerge as Chicago’s most prominent black baseball entrepreneur. He became the first black owner to transform a weekend enterprise into a full-time operation, and he also developed a barnstorming tour in both the West and South in the pre-World War I years. While his Chicago American Giants were a race-based enterprise, Foster recognized the need to maintain business contacts with white baseball owners. This paper will explore the forces that shaped black baseball in Chicago from 1890 to 1915. Four themes will serve to guide the narrative: the changing demographics of Chicago’s black community; the emergence of Chicago’s new black leadership; the origins of semiprofessional baseball; and the internal division among the enterprise’s organizers leading to Rube Foster emerging as Chicago’s most prominent black baseball entrepreneur.

Ghettoization and the Rise of Semiprofessional Baseball

The black population of Chicago expanded significantly between 1890 and 1915. During the first ten years of this period, Chicago experienced a dramatic increase in its black population, from 14,852 to 30,150, an increase of 103 percent. From 1900 to 1910, while the city’s black population continued to climb steadily, its rate of increase declined, the Windy City’s black population rose to 44,603, an increase of 46.3 percent. African Americans remained a minority in the Windy City, but their growing numbers made them far more conspicuous, and the large numbers of recent arrivals were pushed to reside in certain areas. In the late 1890s, most Chicago blacks lived in primarily integrated neighborhoods, with only a little more than a quarter residing in precincts in which they were a majority. By 1915, the roots of ghettoization became firmly planted as African American enclaves emerged primarily on the south and near west sides. Few white neighborhoods had ever accepted with equanimity the purchase of homes by African American families. As the black population increased, whites became less tolerant towards black neighbors and actively resisted black settlement in their areas.³

Eight or nine neighborhoods made up the core of Chicago’s black community. The “black belt” extended from the downtown business district as far south as Thirty-ninth Street. It was slowly expanding to accommodate the growing population. Not only did blacks move steadily southward, but the black belt began to widen as blacks moved into comfortable homes east of State Street. By 1910, blacks were as far east as Cottage Grove Avenue.⁴



Negro Population by Wards, 1900. Adapted from Allan H. Spear, *Black Chicago: The Making of a Negro Ghetto, 1890-1920* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1967).

of ethnocentrism” combined to impel black newcomers toward the ghetto. Many migrants sought homes in areas populated by blacks, where they could find familiar people and institutions.⁵

While this dynamic of choice and constraint, which was heavily influenced by economic factors, was similar to the experiences of Chicago’s European immigrants at this time, there were significant differences. For example, unfamiliarity with English made the ethnic neighborhood essential for many Europeans. Blacks, on the other hand, had no comparable imperative. White immigrants tended to live near workplaces; blacks, scattered in service occupations, could not. Even when African Americans obtained industrial employment, they were excluded from neighborhoods adjoining Chicago’s major industries. European immigrants lived near others of their nationality but usually in ethnically diverse neighborhoods that could hardly be described as ghettos. Whether middle or working class, black Chicagoans were less likely to share public space across ethnic boundaries. More than any other group, blacks in Chicago occupied neighborhoods defined by permanent characteristics.⁶

Simultaneous with and emerging from these demographic and residential changes was the creation of black institutions that contributed to the growing vitality and self-consciousness of the black community. The oldest and most stable African American institution was the church. Quinn Chapel A.M.E. was the first black church in the city; it was established in 1847, fourteen years after Chicago was incorporated. By the end of the century, Chicago had more than a dozen black churches, and between 1900 and 1915 this number doubled. These institutions were attractive to African Americans who preferred to avoid white people and their prejudices. They were also important for establishing a sense of racial pride and community spirit. Historian David Katzman states that the “push of discrimination” and the “pull

The sting of segregation affected more than choice of residence. Although state legislation prohibited racial discrimination in municipal services, public accommodations, and places of amusement, these laws were seldom enforced. Numerous incidents testified to a persistent pattern of discrimination in these areas. Blacks could never be certain of the kind of treatment they would receive when entering a restaurant, saloon, theater, or dance hall outside of the black belt. The LaSalle Hotel, for example, turned away a luncheon meeting of one thousand clubwomen because their number included several black members. Most proprietors would accommodate an African American if they thought refusal would create a major controversy. Booker T. Washington stayed regularly at the Palmer House when he visited Chicago. But less prominent blacks were generally harassed or simply refused service in downtown establishments.⁷

It was within this context that a new black leadership began making their imprint on community development. These African American entrepreneurs, also referred to as “Race men,” were business leaders who deemphasized the fight for integration and dealt with discrimination by creating black institutions. The growing discrimination in Chicago and other northern cities resulted in the emergence of the physical ghetto. It prohibited African Americans from a host of social and economic institutions. Yet increased separation opened new opportunities for entrepreneurship. Between 1890 and 1915, Chicago’s African Americans established a bank, a hospital, and professional baseball teams.*

Many of Chicago’s new black leadership embraced a business concept known as cooperative business enterprises. This notion of cooperative enterprises had its roots in the black community in the late eighteenth century. Early black entrepreneurs recognized that if they were to attain any success in developing black businesses to an appreciable level in the black community, it would come only through economic cooperation. It was evident to them that no concrete help in obtaining capital and credit could be expected from white America. By the early twentieth century, cooperative business enterprises were more an outgrowth of the ideology of self-help and racial solidarity that developed in response to white discrimination. With blacks being excluded from many commercialized amusements, Chicago’s black leaders sought to counter this discrimination by organizing their own commercial enterprises. For instance, by 1910 blacks found themselves completely shut out of the white YMCA, and as a result, the all-black Wabash Avenue YMCA was opened in 1913. Although certainly wanting to make a profit, Chicago’s black leaders were genuinely motivated by a desire to provide services and facilities that were otherwise unavailable to blacks.⁹

At the same time, a development outside the African American community occurred that would significantly impact baseball in black Chicago—the rise of semiprofessional baseball. The emergence of semiprofessional baseball teams can be traced back to the 1870s. Commonly referred to as semipros, these teams could be classified into three categories: local teams or “stay-at-homes,” traveling teams, and touring teams. Local teams usually played games within proximity of their home base. These teams developed a close-knit network with other semipro

teams within, say, a hundred-mile radius, as a means of decreasing travel and overhead expenses. Traveling teams had no home base and would barnstorm the nation for gate receipts. Touring teams fell under both classifications and were the elite of the semipro teams. Possessing their own grounds, and the reputations as ‘crack’ teams, these clubs could expand their travel itinerary and establish rivalries with teams in more lucrative markets, like New York City. Independent touring teams generally did not belong to a league, but they paid their players and charged admission. They commonly discharged their players in the winter, unless they toured the South. Independents often signed their players to one-year contracts, which only rarely contained a reserve clause for the following season. At the beginning of each season, players had to make new arrangements. During the season, independents either paid players a weekly salary or by a ‘‘coop’’ plan, a method in which a team’s share of the gate receipts was divided among the players and owners.¹⁰

Semiprofessional teams utilized the same business practices as organized baseball did in terms of generating and distributing revenues. A home team would share a percentage of the gate receipts—normally 40 percent—or pay a guarantee, a fixed amount usually set at \$250, commonly referred to as a ‘‘heavy guarantee,’’ to the visiting team. This guarantee was essential to attract the top clubs to their home grounds.”

By the early 1900s, semiprofessional clubs in Chicago began forming leagues and associations. The Chicago City League featured some of the top semipro clubs of the era. Two clubs—Cap Anson’s Colts and Mike Donlin’s All-Stars—were formed by former major league players. The other clubs that constituted this league included the Logan Squares, the Gunthers, Donohue’s Red Sox, the West Ends, the Spaldings, and Rogers Park.¹²

Essentially two factors were significant in the rise of white semipro teams in Chicago. The first was the nature of Chicago’s sophisticated park system. In 1901, the Illinois legislature appropriated a \$7.7 million bond for the construction of thirty-one small parks and playgrounds equipped with outdoor gymnasiums, athletic fields, swimming pools, and spacious fieldhouses, which became community centers. Parks with baseball diamonds were leased by many of the top semipro clubs, who thus established both a home base and fan constituency. These clubs were able to promote, schedule, and book their own games, thus alleviating the need for a booking agent.¹³

Finally, Chicago City League clubs, in conjunction with semipro clubs without home grounds, were members of the Parks Owners Association (POA). The POA was a governing body that sanctioned league membership and scheduled games for both black and white semipro teams throughout Chicago’s park system. It had 22 teams in the city league in 1910, eight of which had their own parks. The POA was a loose association that in the early years was not a promoter but a booking agent primarily for teams that did not possess their own grounds.¹⁴

The white semiprofessional clubs in Chicago established a symbiotic business relationship with black clubs. As black clubs rose to prominence and developed a winning reputation, white clubs found them to be good gate attractions. As we

shall see later, two black clubs were members of the Chicago City League. This symbiotic business relationship illustrated the efforts of black entrepreneurs operating a segregated enterprise within the framework of the white semipro scene. Early black promoters did not seek to market their clubs exclusively to a black clientele. While black migration increased Chicago's black population in the pre-World War I era, it was not substantial enough to support professional black teams. More important, black entrepreneurs did not seek to create a black counterculture. In other words, black businessmen were not to isolate themselves from the larger society, selling only to blacks, nor were black fans to patronize black baseball games only because they were black African Americans were to advance themselves by free competition on the open market. Black businessmen's economic philosophy was essentially a *laissez faire* formula for black advancement through individual commitment by individual blacks "to the gospel of work and wealth." The purpose of self-help and racial solidarity was to encourage black unity and self-assertion on a political level, while encouraging cultural and economic assimilation. This would, theoretically, result in the integration of blacks into mainstream American society. In the case of black baseball clubs, this meant white semiprofessional baseball.¹⁵

It was within the context of ghettoization and the rise of white semiprofessional baseball that Frank Leland emerged as black Chicago's first baseball entrepreneur. Leland was emblematic of the new black leadership that became actively involved in

the ownership of black teams. He also exhibited an uncanny ability to establish contacts with local businessmen. Leland was born in 1869, graduated from Fisk University, and was on the roster of the Washington Capital City club of the National League of Colored Base Ball Clubs in 1887. This league was the only attempt to organize a black major league, patterned after the white National League in the late nineteenth century. When the colored league disbanded in May 1887, Leland moved to Chicago, and along with local businessman Henry "Teenan" Jones and two ballplayers, Abe Jones and



Frank C. Leland, Photo courtesy of the Baseball Hall of Fame Library, Cooperstown, N.Y.

William S. Peters, formed the Union Base Ball Club. The club was renamed the Chicago Unions the following year, and by 1896, both Leland and Peters transformed it into a stay-at-home club. The Unions toured Indiana, Wisconsin, and Iowa from Thursday to Saturday and played local teams in the Windy City on Sundays. In addition to his business interests, Leland was also a member of the Republican party and was elected Cook County Commissioner.¹⁶

The Chicago Unions typified the early black independent clubs that began as weekend enterprises. Lucrative Sunday games were vital to the team's economic survival. One Sunday game with a total attendance of 5,000 fans, charging twenty-five cents admission, could amass a gross revenue of \$1,250. After paying the visiting team their share of the gate receipts (\$500), the Unions would make a profit of \$750. The Unions had a significant advantage in residing in the Midwest's largest city. Moreover, according to Sol White—a top black player of the era and later chronicler of the black game—the Unions played 731 games in its existence as both amateurs and professionals, winning 613, losing 118, and tying 12. Clearly the Unions had established themselves as a “crack” team.¹⁷

The Unions' rise to prominence in the Midwest was instrumental in the emergence of a territorial rivalry referred to as the “World's Colored Championship.” The colored championship series was a promotional tool to stimulate fan interest and generate revenue. This series of games possessed an unstructured yet logical format. Beating all the top black clubs within a particular territorial region gave a club the right to proclaim itself as colored champion. The Cuban X Giants, one of the great black teams from the East and reigning colored champions, played a series of fifteen games with the Unions. But Leland's club was no match for the eastern power, and the Cubans won nine out of fourteen games.¹⁸

While it was not evident at the time, the Unions' loss to the Cuban X Giants marked the start of black entrepreneurs making concerted efforts to exploit Chicago's growing black market. Despite losing the series, Leland had exhibited the ability to attract a top black independent competitor. Clearly either the gate receipts or the guarantee was substantial enough to make it economically feasible for the Cubans to travel to Chicago. Evidently the series caught the eye of other prospective black entrepreneurs, who recognized the market potential and sought to organize a club to challenge the Cubans.

In 1899, under the direction of John W. Patterson, a group known as the Columbia club organized the Columbia Giants. Patterson started out with the Cuban Giants in 1893 as a substitute second baseman, playing behind Sol White, but won a starting position in left field the following year. In 1896, he played for the Page Fence Giants, who went on to defeat the Cuban X Giants for the colored championship. When the Page club disbanded in 1898, Patterson and many of his teammates formed the nucleus of the Columbia Giants. Patterson also signed Chicago Unions pitcher Harry Buckner. Patterson then entered into an agreement with Chicago White Sox owner Charles Comiskey to lease his park on Thirty-ninth and Wentworth, an area within walking distance of the emerging black belt. With the Unions located a few blocks away on Thirty-seventh and Butler,

both clubs now competed for the same patronage. This was an obvious conflict of interest for both clubs if they happened to schedule home games on the same Sunday afternoon. Chicago's black community was not large enough to support two teams.¹⁹

In 1899, while the Cuban X Giants and the Unions were playing their series, the Columbia Giants issued challenges to both clubs. The Cubans accepted, but Leland wanted to avoid the upstarts. He was apparently outraged by their territorial invasion and losing his top pitcher. However, Sol White asserted that out of consideration for the public the Unions agreed to a five-game series. The Unions were completely outclassed by the Columbia club, losing the series in five straight games. Patterson's Giants now turned their attention to the Cuban X Giants. A series of games were scheduled in Chicago and towns in Michigan, with the Cubans defeating the Columbia club seven games to four.²⁰

After the championship series, it became evident that two clubs could not develop a lucrative operation within such a close proximity of each other. By 1900, despite their success on the diamond, both the Columbia Giants and the Chicago Unions were in a state of chaos. The Unions defeated the Cuban X Giants for the first and only time. At the same time, the Columbia Giants defeated J.M. Bright's Genuine Cuban Giants of New York. But a disputed championship for local supremacy between the Columbia Giants and the Unions intensified the resentment between the clubs. The following year, financial setbacks caused the collapse of the Columbia Giants. Peters split with Leland and formed Peters's Union Giants. Leland signed several players from the disbanded Columbia club, formed the Chicago Unions Giants, and leased a park on Sixty-first and Lawrence, on the outskirts of the black belt.²¹

Leland's Union Giants continued to be a success on the field, but the club was still a financial failure. His split with Peters brought the East-West colored championship to a halt, and thirteen years passed before another series of this nature took place. The Union Giants were recognized as the top club in the Midwest, despite losing a local championship series to the Algona (Iowa) Brownies in 1903. Two years later, the Union Giants reportedly won 112 of 122 games. But success on the field did not necessarily result in financial rewards. By the winter of 1906, the Union Giants, renamed the Leland Giants, were a debt-ridden team. Recognizing a need for a financial fix, Leland would once again exhibit his ability to form a business coalition.²²

The Leland Giants Baseball and Amusement Association

In 1907, Frank Leland moved his club to Auburn Park on Seventy-ninth and Wentworth Avenue and sought a business alliance with black Chicago's emerging leadership. Leland's association with the new black leadership resulted in an effort by these "Race" men to gain control of Chicago's growing black consumer market and establish a black professional league on a national scale.

The creation of a commercial amusement enterprise, under the auspices of economic cooperation, became the means of achieving these goals.

Two important figures in the consolidation of Leland's ball club into a commercialized amusement and recreation enterprise were Robert R. Jackson and Beauregard Moseley. Jackson, born in 1870, was a Chicago native. He left school in the eighth grade to successfully work as a newsboy, bootblack, postal employee, and finally he established his own printing and publishing business. Moseley was active in politics at an early age. Born in Georgia, he came to Chicago just after 1890. Moseley was a lawyer and businessman and a strong advocate of cooperative business ventures. He lived in a predominantly white section of town, but his law practice drew heavily on the black community. He was also chief counsel of the Olivet Baptist Church, Chicago's largest African American congregation.²³

Leland, Moseley, and Jackson combined to form the Leland Giants Baseball and Amusement Association (LGBBA). Incorporated in 1907, the LGBBA was more than just a baseball team; it was also a summer resort, skating rink, and restaurant. In 1908, the black owned newspaper *Broad Ax* carried an advertisement offering stock options to the public. The objective of the advertisement was to raise funds for the club's new ballpark at Sixty-ninth and Halstead. The language employed typified the race rhetoric and racial solidarity that black Chicagoans advocated during the Progressive Era. It asked, "Are You In Favor Of The Race Owning and Operating This Immense And Well Paying Plant, Where More Than 1,100 Persons Will Be Employed, between May and October each year, where you can come without fear and Enjoy The Life and Freedom of a citizen unmolested or annoyed? The Answer can only be effectively given by subscribing for stock in this Corporation."²⁴

These "Race" men sought to establish an enterprise that would become a means of racial pride through self-help. The association also aided other institutions in the black community. It contributed annually to Provident Hospital, founded by Daniel Hale Williams, the country's best-known African American physician and one of the outstanding surgeons of his day. On August 26, 1910, the Leland Giants played a benefit game for the hospital at Comiskey Park. The LGBBA became a venture that offered jobs to the black community, even as Moseley, Leland, and Jackson were turning a profit.²⁵

At the same time, Leland made his only attempt to organize a black professional league. On November 9, 1907, the Indianapolis *Freeman* reported that a movement was put forth to form the National Colored League of Professional Ball Clubs. The effort to form this league was a clear exposition of the cooperative business philosophy. Under the direction of Leland; Elwood C. Knox, editor of the *Freeman*; and Ran Butler, the owner of the Indianapolis ABC's, these promoters encouraged Race men in the leading midwestern and southern cities to form a stock company as a means of consolidation. The circuit was to be an eight team league with prospective cities to include Cincinnati, Cleveland, Louisville, Pittsburgh, Chicago, Indianapolis, Kansas City, Toledo, Detroit, Milwaukee, Memphis, Nashville, and Columbus, Ohio. In a series of meetings

that took place from December 28, 1907, to January 25, 1908, the league directors elected officers and established guidelines for league entry. Leland was elected president and was the driving force behind the movement. For a club to be considered for admission it had to (1) be represented by a stock company fully organized and incorporated under state law; (2) secure a bond (the amount was not specified) determined by the league's board of directors; (3) pay \$50 into the league treasury to cover the expenses for league operations; and (4) secure a suitable ball park and have full support of the black press. In addition, a small percentage of the gate receipts from each city would be placed in the treasury. The season would run from May to September.²⁶

Despite these organizers' efforts, the league died without throwing a pitch. Essentially, three factors led to its failure. First and foremost, there was a total lack of commitment by black baseball entrepreneurs in the aforementioned cities. According to the *Freeman*, only Chicago and Indianapolis made commitments to the enterprise. The *Freeman* also indicated that several black baseball magnates were totally against league formation, fearing it would damage their business. It appears that these black baseball entrepreneurs were reluctant to travel outside the regional format they had created for themselves. Prior to 1907, only the Cuban X Giants had ever made an extended barnstorming tour, and they were under white management. If, for example, clubs from Pittsburgh and Nashville were members of the league, it would increase the overhead expenses of the midwestern club to travel there. It would also create an unworkable format due to the majority of the prospective cities being in the Midwest?²⁷

Finally, there was no clear-cut plan as to how this league would operate. In other words, there was no attempt to create a business system that would place the black game on a sound economic footing. Many of the proposals, including conditions for league entry were only suggestions. Nothing was agreed upon that indicated how the league would function. Ultimately, the failure of the league injured Frank Leland's credibility with the LGBBA's leadership. Throughout the remainder of the LGBBA's brief history, Leland would operate primarily as a figurehead within the organization. His effort to regain control of his ball club resulted in dissension within the LGBBA's organizers that would cause the association to crumble at its foundation.

Internal Division and a Second Failed League

Internal division among the LGBBA organizers occurred because the multiple enterprises of the members of the association diverted their attention. This disharmony among the association's organizers was the direct result of several interacting influences: the Leland Giants emerging as the top touring team of the Midwest; Frank Leland's attempt to wrest control of the ball club away from Beauregard Moseley; and a formal ban on black traveling teams by Chicago's Park Owners Association. Although this internal dissension placed black baseball on shaky ground, it was instrumental in forming the structure of the black game in the Windy City in the Progressive Era.

The emergence of the Leland Giants as one of the country's top touring teams was due primarily to one man, Andrew "Rube" Foster. His emergence as their manager and booking agent marked the beginning of his dominance of midwestern black baseball. Foster was born in Calvert, Texas, in 1879, the son of a presiding elder of Calvert's Methodist Church. Devoutly religious, Foster neither drank nor allowed anyone to consume spirits in his household, although he was tolerant of it from others. Foster exhibited his organizational skills at a young age, operating a baseball team while in grade school. He left school in the eighth grade to pursue a career in baseball. By 1897, Foster was pitching for the Waco Yellow Jackets, a traveling team that toured Texas and the bordering states. In the spring of 1902, William S. Peters invited him to join his team, but as he sent no travel money the pitcher remained in Texas. Simultaneously, Leland had also invited Foster to join his club, initiating a stormy relationship between the two men. By mid-spring, Foster quit the Union Giants to join a white semipro team in Michigan. When its season ended, he headed east to play for the Cuban X Giants.²⁸

From 1903 to 1906, Foster played for the Philadelphia Giants. Despite their success on the field, the Giants did not reap economic benefits for their exploits. As a result, Foster induced several of the players to jump their contracts at the end of the 1906 season. The player revolt led by Foster coincided with Leland's efforts to persuade the African American flame-thrower to manage his team. Foster accepted Leland's offer, and his first move was to release the players of the previous year despite Leland's opposition. It was evident that Foster wanted his

own players, and he had just brought seven of them from the greatest team ever assembled. Next, due to Leland's failing health and his responsibilities as the newly elected Cook County Commissioner, Foster assumed the responsibilities of booking the team's games. From that time on, Foster established a business arrangement whereby gate receipts would be either divided in half or a substantial guarantee would be paid to attract the top teams.²⁹



Rube Foster, Photo courtesy of Baseball Hall of Fame Library, Cooperstown, N.Y.

The Giants' revised managerial structure was integrated into the LGBBA's corporate configuration.

On January 21, 1909, the association elected the following officers: Frank Leland, president; Robert Jackson, vice president; Beauregard Moseley, secretary and treasurer; and Rube Foster, manager and captain of the team. With Leland, Moseley, and Jackson supervising the LGBBA's other businesses and Foster booking the baseball games, enough capital was generated to run an adequate operation. The LGBBA finished the year with a post-season series against the National League Chicago Cubs. Although the Cubs swept the Giants in three games, both the series and the revised organizational structure elevated the Leland Giants from the ranks of a stay-at-home to the Midwest's top touring team.³⁰

From 1907 to 1910, Foster perfected the barnstorming schedule that would be his trademark for the next decade. On February 20, 1907, the Indianapolis *Freeman* reported that the Leland Giants would embark on a spring training tour. It marked the first time that a semiprofessional club that was both black owned and operated had accomplished this feat. Two years later, the *Freeman* reported that the Leland Giants had traveled 4,465 miles playing both black and white teams in Memphis, Birmingham, Fort Worth, Austin, San Antonio, Prairie View State, and Houston. The Leland Giants traveled in their own private Pullman car, as a means of upholding their reputation as an elite black independent club. In October 1910, after winning twenty straight games in the East and West, the Leland Giants made their first trip to Cuba. More important, the Lelands' trip to the Cuban island served as a means of promoting the LGBBA. Along with the American League Detroit Tigers, the Lelands played the top Cuban clubs including the Havannas—an aggregate of black stars that included John Henry Lloyd and Grant "Home Run" Johnson—and the Alemendares. While the Lelands won the majority of their games, they lost a tough series to the Alemendares?³¹

By 1909, the Leland Giants' success produced a conflict of interest among the team's management. With Moseley supervising the LGBBA's other businesses and Foster managing the ball club, Leland recognized his diminished role within the organization. As a result, he attempted to regain control of the Giants, but the association's investors thought it was in the corporation's best interests to retain Foster as manager. Therefore, in a hostile takeover, Moseley and Foster united to force Leland out. Foster's alliance with Moseley made the split inevitable. In 1910, Leland went to court to prevent Foster and Moseley using the name Leland Giants, but he was unsuccessful. Not only did Leland lose his team, but he lost his interests in the LGBBA's other businesses as well.³²

In response to being forced out, Leland created in 1910 the Chicago Giants in partnership with Robert Jackson and A.H. Garrett. His goal was to make his Giants a top touring team to compete against the Leland Giants, and he also sought to have them play the top semipro clubs in the area. To accomplish this, Leland raided his old club for players, signing stars like Walter Ball and Pete Booker. Unfortunately for him the Park Owners Association thwarted his aspirations when it prohibited the scheduling of games between black traveling teams from outside the Chicago area. Its reason for this ban was that local patrons complained about the lack of contests being scheduled between some of the

regional clubs. The *New York Age* speculated that the prohibition could have emerged as a result of top Cuban teams invading the area for the past two years. In addition, the Philadelphia Giants had also made a couple of barnstorming tours, playing both the top black and white semipro clubs in the Windy City. Race was assuredly an issue in the POA's decision. The POA believed that the rise of both the Leland and Chicago Giants to the status of touring teams, coupled with the arrival of Cuban clubs and the Philadelphia Giants, was a threat to its autonomy. Traveling teams touring the Windy City meant a big payday for both black and white semipro squads, but only clubs that had their own parks could enjoy this luxury. Consequently, both the POA and local teams with no parks had a vested interest in keeping the black traveling teams out.³³

The color ban on traveling teams appears to have directly impacted the Chicago Giants. To remain in the City League, the Giants' management had to refrain from scheduling games with both the black touring and traveling teams. The conservative Leland yielded to the demand. In 1911, his Giants did not tour the South, playing only a local schedule, but the following year, it dropped out of the Chicago City League. Three factors were instrumental in the Giants' departure. First, Jackson left the club to pursue a successful career in politics. He was a significant investor in the enterprise, and his loss crippled the club. Second, the absence of this capital made it difficult for Leland to compete against the Leland Giants, and the court settlement forced him to vacate Auburn Park. Finally, Leland's failing health became a serious concern, and within two years he died at the age of forty-five. In 1913, the Chicago Giants disbanded, two years later, Joe Green, the club's shortstop, reorganized the team as a weekend enterprise, passing the hat to meet expenses.³⁴

Moseley had higher aspirations in mind, and neither the POA's ban nor Leland's efforts to put his former club out of business hindered them. As early as 1909, the young black lawyer advocated the need for blacks to organize their own professional league. He also recognized that the continual territorial invasion and the raiding of player rosters were destructive forces and had to be eliminated. In addition, Moseley recognized that the color line drawn by the POA would also adversely impact the LGBBA's ability to generate revenue. But the proliferation of black teams from the South and Midwest made it feasible, in Moseley's view, to form a black professional league.³⁵

In 1910, Moseley called together a group of black baseball men from throughout the Midwest and the South. The proposed league was more than just a response to the color line, it was another exposition of the doctrine of self-help. In his statement of purpose, Moseley indicated that blacks "are already forced out of the game from a national standpoint" and find it increasingly difficult to play white semiprofessional teams at the local level. This "presages the day when there will be [no opportunities for black baseball players], except the Negro comes to his own rescue by organizing and patronizing the game successfully, which would of itself force recognition from white minor leagues to play us and share in the receipts." Moseley added, "let those who would serve the Race assist it in

holding its back up . . . organizing an effort to secure . . . the best club of ball players possible.”³⁶

The prospective owners first met on December 30, 1910. Moseley was elected temporary chairman and Felix H. Payne of Kansas City temporary secretary. Eight cities were represented: Chicago, New Orleans, Mobile, Louisville, St. Louis, Columbus, Ohio, Kansas City, Missouri, and Kansas City, Kansas. Moseley devised a twenty-point plan explaining how the league should operate. Utilizing the cooperative business philosophy, Moseley suggested that eight race men in each city pool their resources and form a stock company. The league projected an operating capital of 52,500 with each club paying roughly \$300. Half the league’s umpires would be black and paid five dollars per game. A reserve list would be developed, and players who jumped their contracts would be banned from the league. Finally, an effort would be made to limit the league to one franchise per city.³⁷

The league generated a lot of enthusiasm the following year, and rumors persisted of other cities joining the loop, but it still died stillborn. Like in the previous organizational effort, there was an unwillingness of investors to come forth. At its inaugural meeting, only Chicago, New Orleans, and Kansas City, Kansas, were represented by investors, with the remaining five being represented by fans. Second, these entrepreneurs were not willing to follow the Leland Giants’ lead in embarking on extended barnstorming tours. The majority of these clubs would not venture too far outside their established regions. Finally, migration had significantly expanded the black populations in midwestern cities, but it was still insufficient to create a market to establish both territorial regions and set population requirements for a prospective city for league entry. Even in Chicago, the black community was not large enough to support three teams—the Lelands, Chicago Giants, and Union Giants—not to mention becoming a viable territory in a league. It would have required maintaining the symbiotic business relationship with white semipro clubs, and the POA’s ban on traveling teams made this problematic.

In 1911, Foster split with Moseley and formed the Chicago American Giants. It is not clear what led Foster to make a break with the LGBBA, but what is evident is that both the color ban and two attempts to form a league ending in failure were instrumental in him making this decision. The oversaturation of Chicago’s black baseball market would become more of a factor when instead of having three teams vying for Chicago’s black community’s disposable income, now there were four: the American Giants, the Leland Giants, the Chicago Giants, and the Union Giants.

From Player-Manager to Dominant Promoter

Internal division within the LGBBA resulted in Rube Foster becoming an unpopular man in black Chicago. The actions of Leland organizing the Chicago Giants and Moseley forming a coalition of black business professionals were efforts to compete against Foster and put him out of business. The black press

also took jabs at Foster, providing negative coverage and turning public opinion against him. In an effort to win over both the press and the black community, Foster made a series of moves that included forming a partnership with John Schorling, a white tavern owner; expanding his barnstorming tour both during the winter and the local season; reviving the East-West colored championship; and fostering good press and community relations as a means of changing his public image.

Following the break with Foster, Moseley organized a booster coalition from the black community. The Leland Giant Booster Club (LGBC) was an aggregate of black middle-class businessmen and professionals. For example, LGBC president, Jesse Bolling, was a restaurant owner who donated his Burlington Buffet as the club's official headquarters. T. W. Allen, the club's secretary, was a city inspector. Other members of the coalition included the editors of Chicago's two leading black newspapers, Robert Abbott of the *Chicago Defender* and Julius Taylor of the *Broad Ax*.³⁸

The formation of the LGBC exemplified the cooperative business philosophy prevalent among the new leadership. The venture could serve as a means of promoting one another's businesses. One of the booster club's functions was to organize activities surrounding the Leland Giants' local season that had become ritualized in the prewar years. For example, at the opening of each season, the Giants had what was known as "Flag Raising Day." It was equivalent to throwing out the first ball on opening day of the major league baseball season. Another event the LGBC staged consisted of a touring car, known as the Red Devil, parading through the streets to the ballpark. But the booster club's main objective was to provide a united front against both Leland's Chicago Giants and Foster's American Giants.³⁹

Despite the LGBC's enthusiasm, the venture failed as it lacked the financial and political resources to be effective. This rather conservative coalition lacked allies in the local government. Although a black political machine was being organized at this time, it did not become instrumental in black community affairs until after World War I. By 1912, the LGBC ceased to exist.⁴⁰

Moseley had other obstacles confronting him. He was engaged in several business ventures at once besides organizing a baseball league and booking games for the Lelands, and he probably did not delegate authority to booster club members or have an adequate management team to supervise his many operations. While Moseley attempted to reach the black patrons, his facilities were located outside the black belt, where increased white hostility made venturing unpleasant for Chicago's African Americans. The African American working class could not afford these amusements and the middle class was not large enough to sustain them. To make matters worse, Moseley had just moved into and renovated the ballpark on Sixty-ninth and Halstead, no doubt at large expense. The obstacles were more than the LGBBA could bear. By 1912, the skating rink closed for good and the Leland Giants were relegated to a local club.⁴¹

While the LGBBA was in a state of decline, Foster still faced opposition from the black press. Julius Taylor was disgusted by the baseball situation. In a

1912 editorial he expressed his disenchantment with the unwillingness of blacks to organize themselves as well as commit to this venture. The *Broad Ax* editor further noted that the Leland Giants' success proved to be its misfortune. Rivalry and a desire for control led to fragmentation in an effort to "compete for patronage and prowess of the Leland Giants." The issue that most upset Taylor was that the revenues baseball generated went into the coffers of white men. That same year, the *Defender* began to take jabs at Foster because it was also upset over the revenue "going over to the other race." The black newspaper insisted that this was "why so many are pulling against Rube." In addition, it was critical of the lack of support the American Giants gave black institutions in the community, primarily the Chicago *Defender*.⁴²

In spite of this opposition, Foster made a series of moves that enabled his rise as dominant promoter. First was his partnership with John M. Schorling. Schorling had operated a sandlot club in Chicago for several years. He leased the grounds of the old White Sox park on Thirty-ninth and Shields after the American League team moved into their new stadium. The White Sox had torn down the old grandstand, and Schorling built a new one with a seating capacity of 9,000. He approached Foster with an offer of a partnership. Foster now had a ballpark to operate in and Schorling had the best booking agent and field manager outside of organized baseball. Over the next fifteen years they became the best management team at the semipro level."

Several factors led to Foster's success. Unlike the LGBBA, whose facilities were outside the black belt, the Chicago American Giants' park was accessible to the majority of the black population. The better location facilitated gate receipts instrumental to the attraction of the top touring and traveling teams to the Midwest. More significantly, the relocation allowed Foster to accomplish what Moseley failed to achieve: corner the black market. Foster also focused his promotion solely on baseball, and he knew everything about the game. His objective was to present the best product possible to Chicago's black community, which meant securing the best talent available and developing a winning reputation. To achieve such standards, a management team committed to baseball had to be in place. Schorling had prior baseball experience and shared Foster's objectives. This was an unpopular decision as it required that Foster go outside the black community to achieve his goals.

Even more significant, Foster's business approach became the model for future black baseball entrepreneurs to emulate. He was a businessman first and a race man second. At no time did Foster show any indications of severing any business relations with white semipros; in fact he attempted to strengthen them. Yet because these business connections increased his profits, Foster could help serve Chicago's black community by conducting several benefit games to raise funds for civic institutions. In essence, Foster had achieved the objectives spelled out in the compilation of ideologies commonly attributed to Booker T. Washington, building a segregated enterprise within the framework of a national economy. In other words, the segregated enterprise—the Chicago American Giants—through the creation of annual booking arrangements with both black and white semipros,

operated successfully within the framework of the national economy-semiprofessional baseball.

From 1912 to 1915, Foster established a barnstorming tour on the West Coast during the winter months, and the Chicago American Giants became the first black semipro team to regularly play weekly games. The American Giants played in the California Winter League, a conglomerate of teams comprising former and current major and minor league players and teams from the Pacific Coast, Southern, and Northwest leagues. The American Giants won the California League Championship in its first season. On July 5, 1913, the *Defender* reported that the American Giants celebrated winning the championship with a parade, unfurling a banner and displaying their new uniforms. In addition, Foster's alliance with Schorling enabled him to schedule games with white semipro teams during the week Foster had now established the structure that ensured a successful operation of a black semiprofessional team.⁴⁴

Foster's work on reviving the East-West Colored Championship was also instrumental to his success. On July 5, 1913, the *Defender* reported an upcoming championship series between the Chicago American Giants and the Lincoln Giants of New York. A series of thirteen games were scheduled in Chicago and New York. After nine games the series was tied at four victories apiece and one tie. But the Lincoln Giants won the final four games in New York earning the right to be crowned "World's Colored Champions." Although Foster's American Giants had lost the series, he had won the hearts and minds of Chicago's black community.⁴⁵

Finally, Foster and Schorling had learned their lesson well regarding press and community relations. In the prewar years they set a precedent that became a constant throughout the war years. In addition to raising funds for civic institutions, Schorling donated the use of the ballpark for local community activities, like the Chicago Church League championship game. Foster also developed positive press relations. He began by granting an interview with the *Defender* providing readers with insights about his early career in baseball. Throughout the war years, he granted many interviews and become a local patron as well.⁴⁶

The California Winter League championship and the East-West colored championship brought Foster accolades from a prominent member of Chicago's black middle class and on the sport pages of the *Defender*. Julius Avendorph, the "Ward McAllister of the South Side," was an assistant to the president of the Pullman company. He became Personally acquainted with more millionaires than any other colored man in Chicago." From 1886 up until 1910, Avendorph was considered "Chicago's undisputed social leader." Writing in the *Defender* on April 5, 1913, Avendorph extolled the American Giants for "their high class baseball playing . . . [and] for their gentlemanly conduct on the ball field." Avendorph added that the American Giants were "an example that lots of white clubs can take pattern from." When some of Chicago's black patrons berated Foster for raising his ticket prices, the *Defender* came to his defense for the first time. Chicago's black fans would "have to pay for quality and they [the fans] have

certainly got their money's worth lately, referring to the colored championship." Moreover, the *Defender* reminded its readers that many of the Windy City's black fans had "never knew what it was to see a game among those of their race unless forced to go to 79th Street. . . . Now it is a stone's throw from their homes."⁴⁷

Epilogue

Rube Foster's American Giants operated as a segregated enterprise while maintaining a symbiotic business relationship with white semiprofessional teams. He sustained a booking pattern with the top black and white semipros on a consistent basis. In spite of the obstacles that confronted him, Foster had managed to integrate his operation within a segregated market and a national one. Because of the press coverage in Chicago and Indianapolis, Foster's American Giants had become a source of racial pride and solidarity among African American people in the Midwest.

Despite Foster's rise as a dominant promoter, Chicago's market was still a saturated one. Joe Green continued to operate the Chicago Giants, while William S. Peters managed the Union Giants until 1923. Robert Gilkerson, a former ballplayer, assumed control of the club and renamed it Gilkerson's Union Giants. But Green, Peters, and Gilkerson were not as ambitious as Foster, choosing to remain weekend operators and passing the hat to cover expenses. During the years of the Great Migration, Foster would absorb these clubs under his booking control, marking the beginning of his autonomy in the Midwest. In addition, Foster would make rental agreements with major league owners, like Frank Navin in Detroit, and would finance clubs like the Detroit Stars, to gain controlling interest. This midwestern alliance would form the foundation for the Negro National League in 1920. More importantly, at the community level, Foster accomplished what previous black baseball entrepreneurs sought to achieve in creating an institution that served as a source of racial pride and solidarity through self-help.⁴⁸

The author would like to thank Stephen Hardy, Melvin Adelman, and the anonymous reviewer for their advice and support.

1. General histories on black baseball from the 1980s and 1990s include: Sol White, *History of Colored Base Ball, with Other Documents on the Early Black Game 1886-1936* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995); Richard Bak, *Turkey Stearnes and the Detroit Stars: The Negro Leagues in Detroit, 1919-1933* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1994); Phil Dixon and Patrick J. Hannigan, *The Negro Baseball Leagues 1867-1955: A Photographic History* (Mattituck, NY: Ameron House, 1992); Janet Bruce, *Kansas City Monarch: Champions of Black Baseball* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1985); Donn Rogosin, *Invisible Men: Life in Baseball's Negro Leagues* (New York: Atheneum, 1983); Linda Zeimer, "Chicago's Negro Leagues," *Chicago History* (Winter 1994): 36-51. The most comprehensive community study examining black baseball is Rob Ruck's *Sandlot Seasons: Sport in Black Pittsburgh* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987). Neil Lanctot provides an excellent account on the business practices of early black baseball entrepreneurs, as well as the origins of white semiprofessional baseball in *Fair Dealing and Clean Playing: The Hilldale Club and the Development of Black Professional Baseball 1910-1932* (Jefferson,

- NC: McFarland, 1994). On the origins of white semiprofessional baseball, see also Harold Seymour, *Baseball: The People's Game* (New York Oxford University Press, 1990). For a discussion of where the recent works on black baseball's place in the broader baseball history, see Larry R. Gerlach, "Not Quite Ready for Prime Time: Baseball History, 1983-1993," *Journal of Sport History* 21(1994): 121-29.
2. For an account on the notion of operating a segregated enterprise within the fabric of a national economy, see Vishnu V. Oak, *The Negro's Adventure in General Business* (Yellow Springs, OH: The Antioch Press, 1949).
 3. *Abstract of the Eleventh Census: 1890* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1894), 34; *Abstract of the Twelfth Census of the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1902), 103-04; *Thirteenth Census of the United States: Taken in the Year 1910* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1913), 95; Allan H. Spear, *Black Chicago: The Making of a Negro Ghetto* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 11-27; Thomas L. Philpott, *The Slum and the Ghetto: Neighborhood Deterioration and Middle-Class Reform, Chicago 1880-1930* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 119,147-48.
 4. Spear, *Black Chicago*, 11-17.
 5. David M. Katzman, *Before the Ghetto: Black Detroit in the Nineteenth Century* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973), 67-80; Spear, *Black Chicago*, 91-110; James R. Grossman, *Land of Hope: Chicago, Black Southerners, and the Great Migration* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 127.
 6. *Ibid*; Herbert S. Nelli, *Italians in Chicago 1880-1930: A Study in Ethnic Mobility* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 23-25.
 7. Illinois state law and treatment of African Americans outside the black belt in Spear, *Black Chicago*, 41-42.
 8. The rise of the new black leadership illustrates the diverse, and often divisive, class structure at the turn of the century. Between 1865 and 1900, black leaders' primary focus was on securing equal rights for African Americans. They were absorbed in campaigns to secure the ballot, assure an integrated school system, pass and then broaden the Civil Rights Act, and finally bring suits under the act. Any attempt to organize a separate black institution was met with stiff opposition from those who regarded it as a form of self-segregation. One reason why the new black leadership was attracted to recreation and amusement enterprises was the funds required to start such an endeavor were both short and long term in character. In other words, they did not require a substantial financial investment. See Abram L. Harris, *The Negro as Capitalist: A Study of Banking and Business among American Negroes* (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Service, 1936), 53-56. For accounts on black middle class formation, see E. Franklin Frazier, *Black Bourgeoisie* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1957); Bart Landry, *The New Black Middle Class* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). For accounts on the old black leadership in Chicago, see Spear, *Black Chicago*, 51-70; Grossman, *Land of Hope*, 123-60.
 9. Earl Ofari, *The Myth of Black Capitalism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), 11-48. For the cooperative business philosophy as an outgrowth of the ideology of self-help, see Louis Harlan, *Booker T. Washington: The Making of a Black Leader* (New York Oxford University Press, 1972), 204-71. For a detailed discussion on the Wabash Avenue YMCA, see Spear, *Black Chicago*, 100-01.
 10. Seymour, *Baseball*, 258-75.
 11. For an account on the early business practices of professional baseball, see Gerald W. Scully, *The Business of Major League Baseball* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 1-12. In the 1880s, the Cuban Giants attracted clubs from either National League or American Association with a substantial guarantee. See for example, "The Browns Strike," *Sporting Life* September 21, 1887, 4.
 12. Seymour, *Baseball*, 265-70.

13. For an account on Chicago's sophisticated park system, see Michael P. McCarthy, "Politics and the Parks Chicago Businessmen and the Recreation Movement," *Journal of Illinois State Historical Society* 65(1972): 158-72; see also Steven A. Reiss, *City Games: The Evolution of American Urban Society and the Rise of Sports* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991), 128-39.
14. "No Color Line," Indianapolis Freeman September 21, 1907, 7; "Park Owners Association," Chicago Defender June 4, 1910, 4.
15. Wilson Jeremiah Moses, *The Golden Age of Black Nationalism 1850-1925* (Hamden, CT Archon Books, 1978), 83-102. On the gospel of work and wealth, see Samuel R. Spencer, *Booker T. Washington and the Negro's Place in America* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1955), 108-24.
16. James A. Riley, *The Biographical Encyclopedia of the Negro Baseball Leagues* (New York: Carroll & Graf Pub., 1994), 474-75; Dixon and Hannigan, *Negro Baseball*, 96-97; Robert Peterson, *Only the Ball Was White: A History of Legendary Black Players and All-Black Professional Teams* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 63-64; White, *History*, 29; "Frank Leland Laid to Rest," *Defender* November 21, 1914, 5; "The Chicago Giants Base Ball Club," *Defender* January 22, 1910, 1.
17. The estimated attendance figures for black baseball was derived from examining several newspaper accounts from both the *Broad Ax* and the *Defender* from 1907 to 1915. White, *History*, 26. See for example, "Leland Giants Making a Record," *Freeman* August 1, 1908, 7; "Lelands," *Freeman* August 3, 1909, 4; "The Chicago Giants Show Class," *Defender* October 29, 1910, 3.
18. While the notion of a colored championship could be traced back to the Philadelphia Pythians of the late 1860s, this series as a commercial endeavor coincided with the rise of black semiprofessional teams in the 1880s. For a detailed account on this phenomenon, see Michael E. Lomax, "Black Baseball, Black Community, Black Entrepreneurs: The History of the Negro National and Eastern Colored Leagues, 1880-1930," (Ph.D. diss.: Ohio State University, 1996), 68-77.
19. It should be noted that in 1896 the ball players with the Cuban Giants broke with John M. Bright and signed with Edward B. Lamarant and became the Cuban X Giants. Bright continued to operate a ball club, and as a means of averting confusion, renamed it the Genuine Cuban Giants. For an account on the origins of the Page Fence Giants, see Thomas Powers, "The Page Fence Giants Play Ball," *Chronicle: The Quarterly Magazine of the Historical Society of Michigan* (Spring 1983): 14-18. For accounts regarding the origins of the Columbia Giants, see White, *History*, 28-31, 38-40; Dixon and Hannigan, *Negro Baseball*, 96-97. Patterson's background in Riley, *Encyclopedia*, 609-10.
20. White, *History*, 28-31, 38-40. White had stated that the Unions and the Columbia Giants were at "loggerheads" with each other.
21. *Ibid.*, 38; Lanctot, *Fair Dealing*, 32.
22. Zeimer, "Chicago's Negro Leagues," 37; White, *History*, 39, Dixon and Hannigan, *Negro Baseball* 97.
23. Harold F. Gosnell, *Negro Politicians: The Rise of Negro Politics in Chicago* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935), 67-68; "Major General R. R. Jackson, Assistant Supt. Armour Station Financial Secretary Appomattox Club," *Broad Ax* December 27, 1902, 1; "Col. B. F. Moseley," *Broad Ax* March 30, 1901, 1; "Col. Beauregard F. Moseley, Lawyer, Orator, and Property Holder," *Broad Ax* December 29, 1906, 1, 5.
24. "Opening of the Chateau de la Plaisance," *Broad Ax* November 2, 1907,1; "The Chateau de la Plaisance," *Broad Ax* November 16, 1907, 1. For the advertisement offering stock options to the public, see any issue of the *Broad Ax* in 1908. For a discussion on race rhetoric and racial solidarity advocated during the Progressive Era, see Moses, *The Golden Age*, 83-102.

25. For their yearly contributions to Provident Hospital, see "Honor to Whom Honor Is Due," *Defender* May 14, 1910, 4; for the benefit game for the hospital, see "Giants Take Benefit Game," *Defender* August 27, 1910, 5.
26. "A National League of Professional Negro Baseball Clubs for Next Season," *Freeman* November 9, 1907, 6; "Growing Interest Taken in Proposed League," *Freeman* November 16, 1907, 6; "To Organize Colored League," *Freeman* November 23, 1907, 6; "League Meeting a Successful One," *Freeman* December 28, 1907, 6; "A Successful Meeting Is Sighted," *Freeman* January 25, 1908, 6.
27. While the evidence is limited, one newspaper account suggests that William S. Peters attempted to block league formation by building a park "in the colored center of the population on the South Side, which would affect the Leland Giants materially." See "Make War on Leland Giants," *Freeman* February 1, 1908, 6. For an account regarding club owners against league formation, see "League Does Not Fear Outlaws," *Freeman* December 28, 1907, 6; "An Understanding about the League," *Freeman* February 15, 1908, 6.
28. "A Great Historical Account of a Great Game of Ball," *Freeman* September 14, 1907, 6; "Baseball's Greatest Figure Dead," *Defender* December 13, 1930, 1, 14; John B. Holway, *Blackball Stars: Negro League Pioneers* (New York: Carroll & Graf, 1988), 9-10; Charles E. Whitehead, *A Man and His Diamonds* (New York: Vantage Press, 1980), 3, 18-19; Peterson, *Only the Ball*, 104-05; George E. Mason, "Rube Foster Chats about His Career," *Defender* February 20, 1915, 10.
29. Mason, "Rube Foster," 10; Holway, *Blackball Stars*, 13; Whitehead, *A Man*, 22-23; Peterson, *Only the Ball*, 107-08.
30. "Chateau Rink Notes," *Broad Ax* January 30, 1909, 2. Cubs series in Zeimer, "Chicago's Negro Leagues," 39. In the following years Foster would issue challenges for post-season series with the Cubs; none were ever accepted. See for example, "Rube Foster Challenges the Cubs," *Defender* October 18, 1913, 8.
31. "Champion Leland Giants to Go South for Spring Training," *Freeman* February 20, 1907, 7; "Leland Giants Complete a Successful Southern Trip," *Freeman* May 15, 1909, 7; "Chateau Rink Notes," *Broad Ax* October 8, 1910, 2; "Leland Giants to Play Baseball in Cuba," *Defender* October 8, 1910, 3; Lester Walton, "Baseball Flourishing in Cuba," *New York Age* December 8, 1910, 6.
32. Andrew Foster, "Negro Base Ball," *Freeman* December 23, 1911, 16; Peterson, *Only Be Ball*, 108; "Frank C. Leland Enjoined from Using the Name Leland Giants," *Broad Ax* April 23, 1910, 2.
33. In 1906, the National Association of Colored Professional Base Ball Clubs was formed. This association served as means for eastern black clubs, primarily from New York, to play Chicago City League clubs. In other words, this association formalized scheduling commitments between eastern and western black clubs, while at the same time, curb the destructive practice of player raiding. It was through this organization that Cuban clubs from Gotham and the Philadelphia Giants played in Chicago. For a discussion regarding this organization see Lomax, "Black Baseball," 207-51. "The Chicago Giants Baseball Club," *Defender* January 22, 1910, 1; Jack Pot, "Bars Alien Colored Clubs," *Defender* July 23, 1910, 3; "Fans Objects to Color Line," *Defender* July 23, 1910, 1; Lester Walton, "Colored Teams Barred in Chicago," *New York Age* July 21, 1910, 6; for the barnstorming tours of the Philadelphia Giants to the Midwest, see "ABC'S Easy for Giants," *Freeman* August 1, 1908, 7; Lester Walton, "Philadelphia Giants Defeat Leland Giants," *New York Age* August 19, 1909, 6; idem., "Philadelphia Giants Win in Tenth," *New York Age* June 30, 1910, 6.
34. Lester Walton, "No Colored Team in Chicago League," *New York Age* April 18, 1912, 6; "Frank Leland Laid to Rest," *Defender* November 21, 1914, 5. For Leland vacating Auburn Park, see "The Chicago Giants in their New Home," *Defender* June 25, 1910, 1.
35. For Moseley's efforts to form a black professional league, see "Attorney B. F. Moseley Favors the Formation of National Negro Baseball League," *Broad Ax* November 26, 1910,

- 2; "Call for a Conference for Persons Interested in the Formation of a National Negro Baseball League," *Broad Ax* December 17, 1910, 2.
36. "Big Negro National Baseball League Formed," *Defender* December 31, 1910, 1; "Big Negro National Baseball League Formed," *Broad Ax* December 31, 1910, 1; "A Baseball Appeal of a Worthy Undertaking by a Worthy Men; Read and Respond," *Broad Ax* January 21, 1911, 2.
37. *Ibid.*
38. For the activities and membership of the booster coalition see any issue in either the *Defender* or the *Broad Ax* from May to June 1911.
39. "Diamond Dust," *Defender* May 20, 1911, 4; "'Boosters' Ukase from the President." *Defender* May 27, 1911, 4.
40. For a discussion of black Chicago's political situation in the prewar years, see Gosnell, *Negro Politicians*, 65-67, 81-83; see also Spear, *Black Chicago*, 118-26.
41. For the closing of the skating rink, see "The Chateau Rink," *Defender* February 25, 1911, 3. The Leland Giants moved into the ballpark on Sixty-ninth and Halstead in 1910. See "Moseley's Leland Giants to Have New Park" *Defender* March 12, 1910, 1.
42. "Baseball," *Broad Ax* May 18, 1912, 1; "Here and There," *Defender* July 12, 1913, 5; "Sporting," *Defender* August 2, 1913, 3.
43. Peterson, *Only the Ball*, 108.
44. "Rube Foster's Review on Baseball," *Freeman* December 28, 1912, 7; Frank Young, "Local Sports," *Defender* March 22, 1913, 3; *idem.*, "American Giants Lose," *Defender* July 5, 1913, 8. As the *Defender* grew, the American Giants received better coverage.
45. "American Giants Lose," 8; "Sporting," *Defender* August 9, 1913, 7; Lester Walton, "American Giants in New York," *New York Age* July 10, 1913, 6; *idem.*, "Lincoln Win Series," *New York Age* July 24, 1913, 6.
46. "Benefit for the Old Folks Home," *Defender* August 16, 1913, 8; Mason, "Foster Chats about his Career," 10.
47. For Julius Avendorph's background, see Spear, *Black Chicago*, 65-66; Julius Avendorph, "Rube Foster and His American Giants," *Defender* April 5, 1913, 7; "Here and There," *Defender* August 9, 1913, 7.
48. For an account on Rube Foster's midwestern alliance during the years of the Great Migration, see Lomax, "Black Baseball," 290-325.