

“At the end the Cardinals hoisted [winning pitcher] Breechen to their shoulders but other players, clamoring to get near him, reached up and hauled him down like a goal post. As they disappeared from the field, Cronin came out of the first-base dugout and pushed slowly through the crowd. Now and then a man hurrying past reached out to tap his big shoulders. Joe didn’t lift his head” (29).

While Smith could sing poetically about the greatness of Walter Johnson or Babe Ruth on the occasion of their passing, he also celebrated the journeyman ballplayer, like the Tony Lazzeris and Hugh “Losing Pitcher” Mulcahy. His prose was peppered with phrases and images that recalled not the halls of Valhalla but the streets of New York. In a column describing Pittsburgh’s poor attendance record, he wrote, “The way the Pirates have been drawing, a guy could be rubbed out in left field and the body might not be found for weeks” (149).

Smith was also something of a humorist, although it was humor penned in a style that suggested the wit and detachment of the professional observer, ironic rather than just funny. In a column covering a 1948 game between the Boston Red Sox and their much-hated rivals, the Yankees, he wrote of the bloodlust of the Bosox fans as “The 31,354 specimens penned in the park had a shine on their faces, the sweatily eager look that a bullfight crowd wears when the bull is five runs ahead of the matador in the ninth inning” (64). And his phrasing could be colorful and descriptive when it had to be, but always with a jab at the reporter’s art: “Hermanski smashed a drive to the scoreboard. Henrich backed against the board and leaped either four or fourteen feet into the air. He stayed aloft so long he looked like an empty uniform hanging in its locker. When he came down he had the ball” (46).

As the title of his collection *Strawberries in Wintertime* suggests, Red Smith’s baseball writings were the product of summer days but the fun is in enjoying them all year around. Although labeled a sportswriter, Red Smith was something more. He was a perceptive observer of the American scene, a fighter for what he saw as the underprivileged or underclass in the sport machine, and a remarkable humorist. Like those summer berries, *Red Smith on Baseball* should be consumed not in handfuls at a time, but singly, savoring and appreciating the taste of every one as it is consumed.

—PATRICK A. TRIMBLE
Pennsylvania State University

DUQUETTE, JEROLD J. *Regulating the National Pastime*. Westport, CT Praeger, 1999. Pp. 184. \$59.95 cb.

A primary focus of study in the history of baseball has been the locus of power. Owners gained the upper hand over the players in the late nineteenth century via the use of the infamous reserve clause. By the turn of the century as the American League was absorbed into the national agreement, the reserve clause was institutionalized, and major league baseball owners assumed control of the game’s institutions. The regulation of baseball in the twentieth century, according to political scientist Gerald Duquette, had four distinct phases which, related both to events within the game and national political phenomena.

Written from the perspective of a “historical institutionalist” methodology, Duquette avoids the heavily scientific approach of the behavioral movement in political science, depending instead on a methodology that makes use of historical structures while remaining analytical rather than descriptive.

Duquette sees control of baseball in the twentieth century experiencing four distinct phases. The first phase coincided with the progressive philosophies of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. The second phase extended from the 1930s to the 1950s during the impact of Franklin Roosevelt’s national regulatory activities, including those of professional sport. The third phase, from the 1960s through the 1970s became more complex as competing issues of individual freedoms, rights of labor unions, and the strongly focused federal role of the New Frontiers/Great Society set up conflicts that rocked the game. In a concluding chapter, Duquette evaluates “the baseball anomaly of the 1990s,” seeing the decline of regulatory activity within the game to be reflective of the economic philosophy of the post-Reagan state, with fewer federal controls allowing greater freedoms for self-governance in nearly every enterprise—baseball included.

This concise volume analyzes the major issues that impacted the regulation of the game in each of the eras. The development of baseball’s special status, legitimized by the *Federal Baseball* decision of 1922, ratified the general tendency of American society to give baseball a special role to play in American life. As early as the *Lajoie* (1902) and *Chase* (1914) decisions, the courts demurred to baseball decision-makers. This provided a framework for *Federal Baseball*, allowing baseball control over its internal affairs, including player personnel controls and business activities.

Baseball, according to Duquette, matched the progressive social, cultural, and political agendas, and therefore received favorable treatment in the judicial system. Baseball did not face significant problems in either the 1920s or the 1930s. The stability of the 1920s came in the aftermath of the Black Sox scandal, and the tight control by Commissioner Landis during the Depression caused baseball players not to seek remedies to perceived inequities.

The internal peace began to unravel after World War II, as the media enhanced the economic value of the game and as players sought out additional playing opportunities which would pay them more and perhaps allow them more control over their own destiny. The appointment of A.B. “Happy” Chandler as Commissioner allowed additional voices to enter the discussion. As blacks came into baseball and as players both challenged the sport’s hierarchy in the courts and tried to play in the Mexican League, the sport’s protection by the courts appeared to be in question.

Commissioner Chandler believed baseball’s reserve clause to be vulnerable to judicial action and settled the *Gardena* case rather than allowing it to go through the courts. Baseball owners tried to avoid the jurisdiction of either the Sherman or Clayton Antitrust Act. Fearing that the regulatory nature of the New Deal may not work in baseball’s favor, settling cases became preferable to allowing challenges to work through the courts. Congress, however, was not disposed to remove the protection granted in *Federal Baseball*, and therefore the combination of settled cases and a friendly Congress kept baseball from the scrutiny of regulatory agencies. This came about despite the general tendency of other professional sports to fall under the jurisdiction of antitrust law.

The regulatory explosion of the 1960s and 1970s caused baseball to blanch when challenged by players, unions, and society in general. Thinking that internal action was preferable to having the courts act to remove the special status, baseball acted to maintain its special role. Though baseball initially reacted negatively to attempts to remove some of its most odious forms of player control, the baseball owners eventually sought to keep its special place in American life by modifying practices such as the reserve clause. Despite the fact that many areas came under control during the regulatory 1960s and 1970s, baseball was left to deal with its own issues. Those modifications were not reached hannoniously; strikes, lockouts, and work stoppages became part of the sport's very language.

During the 1990s the reversal of the regulatory state, begun in the Reagan years, allowed baseball to continue its anomaly of being the only sport not subject to the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts. Duquette believes that the protection is very fragile in both the courts and in Congress in the late 1990s. He believes that baseball's biggest problem rests with its loss of special status with the American public. Another work stoppage will cause the public enough frustration that nothing will stand in the way of the application of the regulatory legislation that applies to other sports businesses.

This nicely written, if somewhat dry, volume has value in its interpretative style and precise language.

—HARRY JEBSEN, JR.
Capital University

PIETRUSZA, DAVID. *Judge and Jury: The Life and Times of Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis*. South Bend, IN: Diamond Communications, 1998. Pp. 564. \$34.95 cb.

Peering from the dust jacket is the “judge and jury” in all his harsh—and harshly contrived?—glory. With left eye at full stare and right eye at half squint, he is caught sternly surveying a baseball diamond somewhere. But the pose is vintage Landis anywhere. With jaw at full jut and white mane mildly askew, he leans forward ever so ostentatiously, as he observes the business at hand ever so grimly.

This baseball business, after all, is serious business. Somewhere in this favored land a ball game is underway, and the professional game's first commissioner is more than simply in attendance. The concentration is total. (Or is it?) The interest is undeniable. (Or is it?) Doubters need only check the chin rest of a right arm that seems attached to the box seat railing. This is “judge and jury” Kenesaw Mountain Landis at full pose.

But was it really an act? Landis, after all, was a genuine baseball fan. He loved the game as no commissioner has ever loved the game. So what? Given that Peter Uebberoth was a Landis successor, that line means next to nothing; so this. Given that Bart Giamatti once occupied the same office, that same line could well mean a good deal. David Pietrusza thinks the latter.

Here we are, better than a half-century after Landis's death, and we finally have the Landis version of the Landis era. Far from damaging the game that he loved, Landis improved it, concludes Pietrusza. In fact, it might even be said that he improved it dramatically. Most prominent among Landis's prominently advertised virtues was his honesty