

could be more competitive if they formed just one team from the beginning, forgoing their intra-league schedule over the first half of the season. The team formed was named the Los Angeles Bulldogs. So, in 1936 Southern California fans witnessed legitimate games against real N.F.L. opposition. The Bulldog's accomplishments set a standard of excellence for teams that followed from 1940 to 1945. Such standards were never established in Northern California, and teams in that region were constantly faced with poor management and insufficient monetary capital. The result was a low image, meagre, if not negative media coverage, and insufficient gate receipts.

The third reason was the appearance of former N.F.L. coach Paul Schissler in Los Angeles. Schissler further contributed to the standard of excellence of Southern California professional football. Forming and coaching various all star teams in 1938 and 1939, he was instrumental, in 1940, in the forming of the Pacific Coast Professional Football League (PCFL). His team was PCFL champion in 1941 and 1945, and on many Sundays Schissler's Bears drew crowds of 15,000 to 18,000 spectators in Gilmore Stadium, often filling the stadium to capacity. In comparison, in the north, teams such as the Oakland Giants, San Francisco Packers, and later the Clippers, seldom drew over 4,000 playing customers.

Professional football teams in Northern California never attained the level of excellence and thus popularity and paid attendance of the Los Angeles-based teams. If it is assumed that the overriding motive for the placement of a professional sports team is that of monetary income potential, these reasons would explain the choice of Los Angeles over San Francisco as a city to put the first West Coast franchise.

Sources for this research included 65 taped interviews with men who played professional football in California from 1934 to 1948, as well as material derived from the Los Angeles Times, the San Francisco Chronicle, and the Oakland Tribune.

The Revolt of the Sinful Severn The Failure to Expel the Schools Who Refused to Enforce the Sanity Code

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Recently in *Unsportsmanlike Conduct*, former NCAA executive director Walter Byers argued that repeal of the Sanity Code in 1951 represented the revenge of the lawless southern schools against their long dominant northern opponents. This paper shows that the desire for revenge by southern schools does not entirely explain the repeal of the first NCAA regulation on subsidizing athletes. Passed in 1948, the Sanity Code served as a halfway house between the older idea of unsubsidized athletics

and the new notion of athletic scholarships. Looking backward while moving forward, the NCAA through the Sanity Code limited drastically the amount of aide that college athletes could receive. Already southern schools had awarded scholarships in football, and the Sanity Code represented a step backward. Yet, the seven schools, "the Sinful Seven," who refused to enforce the Sanity Code, were led by the University of Virginia and included only one football power, the University of Maryland, presided over by a former football coach.

President Colgate Darden of Virginia, a former governor, had little to gain since his school was not a major football power. The same could be said of Virginia Tech, Virginia Military Institute, and the Citadel. Two Catholic schools, Villanova and Boston College, reflected the financial crisis that hit the urban Catholic schools after World War II. President Harry Clifton "Curly" Byrd of Maryland, the former coach, had more reason to oppose the Sanity Code and spearheaded the floor fight at the NCAA Convention.

Though the Sanity Code passed unanimously in 1948, it depended on the discipline imposed by the NCAA. The Midwestern and Far western leadership of the NCAA sought to expel the "sinful seven" and failed to get the two thirds majority necessary. As a result, the Sanity Code was virtually dead and would be repealed in 1952.

Why did the Code fail to get the support it needed and why did the schools of the upper South spearhead the opposition? Were those schools simply stalking horses for the Southeastern and Southwestern conferences which rallied to their support? Was the tactic of expelling the schools too drastic for an organization that had largely confined itself to discussion and voluntary standards? Did the floor leadership of Dr. Byrd manage to gain the necessary votes to save the offenders? All of these factors played a part, but southern states rights, as embodied in the thinking of Colgate Darden and the improving football situation at the University of Virginia explain the initial rebellion against enforcement.

Whatever the reason, the repeal of the Sanity Code represents a point of departure. The NCAA in 1956 imposed a new set of scholarship standards and established machinery for enforcing them. The attempt to expel the offenders in the Sanity Code episode represented the point at which the NCAA had to abandon its older policies and become what many have called a "cartel."

The Sanity Code reflects still another chapter in the attempts to regulate intercollegiate sports that began with the formation of the NCAA reform of football in 1906. Despite reforms in the Progressive Era, abuses in the form of subsidies to athletes and unsanctioned methods of recruiting cropped up in the 1920s. On the eve of World War II, it was clear that teeth needed to be put into the enforcement of NCAA policy. The practice of giving athletic scholarships by southern schools and the under-the-table subsidizing of athletes by other big-time institutions had become

commonplace. In World War II and in the years just after, athletes often were receiving benefits from the GI Bill or were participating in athletics as part of the military. The Sanity Code was an attempt to bring aid to athletes above board and to put limits on the extent to which it was given. In that way, it would satisfy both liberals and conservatives. Though it passed by an overwhelming majority, it failed to satisfy either those who wanted to expunge professionalism from the NCAA or those who believed in bringing athletic subsidies out of the shadows.

OLYMPIC STUDIES

***Merry Christmas Mr, Samaranch:* The IOC, ISL, and the Origins of TOP**

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It is well known that the sale of Olympic television rights, particularly to American networks, solved the most persistent problem faced by the IOC since its establishment in 1894, that being, continually operating in financial deficit. The sale of Olympic television rights, beginning in 1960, provided a substantial though somewhat precarious solution. By the 1970s, the IOC's income from television underwrote 98% of its quadrennial budget associated with its administrative function carried out in Switzerland and allocations to its tripartite family members: host cities of winter and summer Olympic festivals; National Olympic Committees world-wide; and, International Sports Federations. An increasing level of anxiety permeated IOC chambers of deliberation over the fact that virtually all of its revenue was dependent on a single source. Such anxiety led the IOC to consider attempts at securing alternative sources of finance. One possibility explored a relationship between the Olympic Movement and international corporate entities. Such an initiative was not altogether new; there had been modest Olympic affiliations with commercial advertisers dating from the very first Games in Athens in 1896. By the 1970s, however, the need to fuel an Olympic economic flame of immense dimensions required revolutionary measures in Olympic commercial thinking.

In mid-December 1982 Juan Antonio Samaranch, President of the International Olympic Committee, received a salutary letter from one Klaus Hempel, executive director of ISL, a Swiss sports marketing firm with account portfolios representing several international sports organizations in marketing relationships with multi-international corporations. In his letter to Samaranch, Hempel introduced himself and his company, International Sports-Culture-Leisure Marketing AG of Lucerne,