

NOTES AND COMMENTARIES

GATEKEEPER CATEGORIES: MEANINGS OF GOVERNMENT TYPES IN A LOS ANGELES OLYMPIC PRESS KIT

*Lawrence Chalip and Pamela Chalip**

For most countries, the Modern Olympic Games are significant as more than athletic contests. The Olympics provide an international stage for nations to be presented and contrasted.¹ Olympic ceremonies, particularly the opening ceremonies, provide key arenas for nations to assert their identities as nations among other nations.²

Examination of the competition and ceremony structure of the Olympic Games clarifies the bases for the significance of the opening ceremonies. During these ceremonies, the parade of nations provides a unique occasion for each country to showcase its team before a world-wide audience. At the 1984 Summer Olympic Games in Los Angeles, for example, only 41 of 140 participating countries earned medals. Within each event, many teams and athletes competed despite performance standards that were clearly insufficient to aspire to a medal or even a place in the finals. Only during the parade of nations did athletes from every team gain global attention as they marched before the Olympic audience as representatives of their country. It is an indication of the importance countries attach to representation that even countries which can not expect to be competitive athletically go to the expense of sending teams.

However, Olympic representations are mediated. The overwhelming majority of the Olympic audience experiences the parade of nations via the communications media. The meanings to be attained by national representation

* Lawrence Chalip is Associate Professor of Kinesiology, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, U.S.A. Pamela Chalip is with the Prentice-Hall Legal and Financial Services Division.

are structured, at least in part, by the presentation and interpretations accorded by the attending media,³ particularly during presentations of ceremonies.⁴

Media presentation and interpretations have particular potential to shape audience impressions of countries other than one's own. International images are typically formed without firsthand knowledge of specific foreign governments or their peoples. As a result, those images are commonly ill-articulated, gross, and poorly organized in the attitude structures of most individuals.⁵ Under those circumstances, the mass media serve as a significant source for categories and meaning systems by which to frame and interpret social objects, events, and processes.⁶

Information provided by event organizers — in the form of press kits, press releases, or information packets — can play a substantial role in shaping media choices of categories and interpretations. Pressures of time, immediacy, and deadlines require reporters to make direct and indirect use of prepared information.⁷ Prepared information helps journalists quickly to recognize, organize, and relay large amounts of information.

We examine here the government labels given to broadcast journalists by the International Broadcast Center (IBC) of the Los Angeles Olympics prior to the opening ceremonies. The IBC was operated by the host broadcaster, ABC, at the 1984 summer Olympic Games.⁸ It served as the central site for broadcast media operations, serving the 4,863 accredited broadcast personnel from the 156 nations whose broadcast media reported the Games.

In preparation for the opening ceremonies at the Games in Los Angeles, the IBC provided an information packet to accredited journalists. The packet was provided to the 1,452 accredited broadcast commentators. Since commentators often worked alongside print media colleagues, the packet was sometimes shared with other journalists. The packet provided a synoptic description of countries (except the United States) expected to participate in the parade of nations. The description of each country included information about land mass, principal products, and type of government. Government type was given as a category. One of 46 government types was applied to each of 136 countries. These types and the countries labeled with each type are presented in the appendix.

Media messages are received as well as sent.⁹ The pairing of country names with particular descriptors has been shown to alter subsequent thoughts and judgments about the countries described.¹⁰ Specifically, positive descriptors foster positive thoughts and attitudes about the country while negative descriptors foster negative thoughts and attitudes about the country.

Our objective in this study was to examine the ways that the government

types suggested by an IBC press kit could steer broadcaster and audience attitudes toward countries at ceremonies like the parade of nations. How might domestic broadcasters and audiences construe the various government-type categories? Were the categories and their connotations consistent with those available from expert domestic sources? Do they suggest any systematic bias? These questions take on particular significance as global fascination with the Games continues to expand, and the consequent impact of the Games on cross-national perceptions intensifies.¹¹ Their significance is further amplified by the return of the summer Games to an American city, Atlanta, in 1996.

METHOD

Instrument Construction

In order to obtain ratings of the various categories of government types, we constructed a scaled instrument. Governments are typically rated on left-right¹² and/or free-unfree¹³ dimensions. We sought descriptors which naturally occur in reference to government, as well as describe a government on left-right and/or free-unfree dimensions.

Both of us independently perused three copies each of *Time*, *Newsweek*, *U.S. News and World Report*, and the *Chicago Tribune*. Editions were chosen at random, and were different for each of us. From these, we constructed lists of adjectives used to describe governments and their operations. This yielded one list of 11 adjectives and another of 13 adjectives. Six of these were common to both lists, and were appropriate for construction of a unidimensional scale. These formed three separate but related adjective pairs: free-repressive, democratic-authoritarian, responsive-unresponsive.

Three nine-point semantic differential scales were constructed from these items. For purposes of scale administration, the democratic-authoritarian scale was reversed to reduce response set. Twelve University of Chicago students chosen randomly rated clusters of ten government types using the three semantic differential scales.

This pretesting showed the free-repressive and authoritarian-democratic scales to be meaningful in relation to the government types. However, respondents complained that the responsive-unresponsive scale lacked an object. The item was reworded as "responsive to citizens" – "unresponsive to citizens."

The resulting instrument listed each government type listed in the IBC press kit. For purposes of later comparison, the United States was also listed.

Government types were listed in random order, with the restriction that the United States appear last since it had not appeared in the IBC press kit. Randomization was facilitated by computer-assisted construction and printing of the instrument. Only government types were listed; none of the countries referenced in the IBC press kit was listed. Under each government type, the three semantic differential scales were listed. Instructions asked respondents to rate each government type on the three scales.

The complete and revised instrument was tested on twenty University of Chicago students. The semantic differential items were meaningful to subjects in relation to the government types.¹⁴

The scale could be successfully self-administered in 25 to 45 minutes. The three semantic differential items were unidimensional and consistent; inter-item correlations within each government type were consistently above .5.

Applications of the Instrument

Subjects. In order to obtain an estimate of the connotations each government type might imply to an audience, 188 University of Chicago social science students completed the instrument. None of these had participated in the instrument pretesting. Respondents were volunteers solicited through social science classes and department mail folders. The 89 females ranged in age from 18 to 50 years; mean = 25.58, std = 6.70. The 99 males ranged in age from 19 years to 43 years; mean = 24.02, std = 5.79. Respondents were not told the questions being addressed by this study, the source of the government categories, nor the specific countries to which the categories had been attached.

Testing procedure. Respondents were given a copy of the instrument and allowed to complete the ratings at their convenience. They were instructed to work independently.

Respondents returned the completed instrument to any of four offices or four designated campus mail folders. They were instructed not to place their name on the completed instrument. The completion and returning procedures assured respondents' anonymity.

Additional data. To provide a comparison with the connoted rating given to each government type, each country's recent Freedom House¹⁵ score for political and civil liberties was recorded. The Freedom House ratings rank political and civil liberties on seven-point scales, with higher ratings representing greater infringements on liberty. The political liberties and civil liberties scales are

highly correlated, $r(218) = .916$, $p .0001$. For purposes of analysis, the two scales were averaged.

To provide a comparison for the government types themselves, each country's government type as given by *The World Factbook*¹⁶ was recorded. Four countries described in the IBC press information were not included in *The World Factbook*, and are therefore not included in analyses using these data. Those countries are: The Cayman Islands, The British Virgin Islands, The U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico.

RESULTS

Instrument scaling. Dimensionality of the three scales was explored for each of the 46 government types plus the United States. It was concluded that the scales are unidimensional, and thus suitable for subsequent analysis.¹⁷ In order to obtain a best single score estimate for each government type, given the assumption of unidimensionality, the three scale responses were summed for each type. Each subject's resulting 47 ratings were then standardized to mean=100, std=10. Higher scores correspond to greater freedom / democracy / responsiveness.

MANCOVA tested for any systematic response variation attributable to age or sex. No systematic response effect was found ($p .2$). Data were consequently pooled.

The appendix gives resulting scores and the 95% confidence range for each government type. Government types are listed (top to bottom) from most free/democratic/responsive, to least free/democratic/responsive.

Comparison to the United States. Ratings for each of the IBC government types were compared to the rating given to the United States.¹⁸ Only two government types were not found to be significantly different from the United States: representative democracy¹⁹ and parliamentary democracy.²⁰ 'Democracy' was rated slightly but significantly higher than the United States. The remaining 43 government types were rated as significantly less free/democratic/responsive than the United States.

The absolute scaled distance between the United States and each government type within this sample is given in the appendix. The associated 95% confidence band is also shown.

Connoted ratings and Freedom House ratings. How accurately do the ratings connoted by government type mirror an expert Set of ratings for the same countries? Each country's score for the IBC government type was correlated

with that country's average Freedom House rating for political and civil liberties. The two sets of ratings are significantly related, though they share only 19% common variance: $r(134) = .440$, $p = .0001$.²¹ The government type connotations do correlate with expert judgments of liberty for the same countries, but they do so poorly.

Accuracy of the government type categorizations. We wanted to know how closely the government types given by the IBC correspond to those provided by expert government analysts. Each country's government type as given by the IBC was compared to the government type listed in *The World Factbook*. These were coded as either "identical," "similar," or "different." Each of us independently coded the 132 countries. Reliability was 92.4%, there being disagreements on only ten cases. The disagreements were resolved via consensual discussion.

Thirty-eight countries (28.8%) were coded as identically categorized by the two sources. Fifty-seven (43.2%) were coded as similarly categorized. In this category, examples of discrepancies include (listing the IBC categorization first):

"Parliamentary Democracy" vs. "Federal Parliamentary State Recognizing Elizabeth II as Sovereign"

"Republic" vs. "Republic; Under Martial Law since March 24, 1982"

"Democracy" vs. "Democratic Republic"

Thirty-seven countries (28.0%) were coded as differently categorized by the two sources. In this category, examples of the discrepancies include:

"Socialist Representative" vs. "Republic"

"Independent Commonwealth" vs. "British Dependent Territory"

"Military Dictatorship" vs. "Republican Parliamentary Democracy"

Countries which had *been* categorized differently by the two sources were divided into two groups: (1) IBC categorizations which yielded a better free/democratic/responsive connotation than would have been obtained by *The World Factbook* categorizations, and (2) IBC categorizations which yielded a poorer free/democratic/responsive connotation than would have been obtained by *The World Factbook* categorizations. Twenty-two countries (16.7% of the total; 59.5% of the subsample) had obtained better connotations; 15 countries (17.4%

of the total; 40.5% of the subsample) had obtained poorer connotations. The predominance of more favorable connotations is not statistically significant: $\chi^2(1) = 1.32$, $p .2$. Although there are discrepancies between the two sources, it can not be concluded that the discrepancies are in a systematic direction.

Nevertheless, the content of the two subsamples may be systematic. The countries falling into the "better connotation" and "worse connotation" subsamples were noted. As examination of the appendix shows, countries which obtained better connotations are, with only one exception, those commonly considered to be friendly to the United States. Interestingly, the one exception is Romania, the sole Warsaw Pact nation which did not boycott the Games. However, countries obtaining worse categorization include American allies, like Norway, as well as countries not currently sharing friendly relations with the United States, like Nicaragua. To the extent that categorization bias may be systematic, it seems that improved connotations were reserved for American friends, though not all American friends benefited from the bias.

The appendix shows which countries were categorized identically, similarly, or differently by the IBC and *The World Factbook*. The appendix also shows which countries obtained better connotations and which countries obtained worse connotations as a consequence of IBC categorizations that differ from those in *The World Factbook*.

DISCUSSION

Although each country can assert via Olympic ceremonies its identity as a nation among nations, no country escapes the labels attached to its institutions by the attending media. Those labels carry connotations with the potential to sway both reporters' and audiences' perceptions of each participating country. From the standpoint of implicit comparison to the United States, it is particularly significant that only one category of government type was rated higher than the United States by our sample, and only two were rated equivalently. The remaining 43 categories, which were applied to 119 (87.5%) of 136 countries, obtained significantly lower ratings than did the United States.

This is not to argue that reporters or audiences judge countries solely on the free/democratic/responsive connotation of the government type. Nor is this to suggest that broadcasters universally or uncritically relied on the IBC categorizations. Neither is this intended to gloss over the significance of variations among audience members in their interpretations of media labels. Clearly, audiences do use multiple and varying criteria to interpret and even to

reject media messages and categories, particularly when messages or categories are important or salient to the audience member.²²

However, mere exposure to descriptors of government type paired with country name can alter broadcaster and audience images and attitudes. Most importantly, when an audience member brings little outside information to the mediated experience, as is frequently the case in cross-national contact,²⁴ media categories and their connotations become significant. Moreover, when the overwhelming majority of government-type categories are judged more negatively than an audience's own national affiliation, as was the case here, the mediated "hidden curriculum"²⁵ implies a siege mentality. At the Los Angeles Olympics, the IBC press kit suggested that there are a lot more potential villains out there than there are "good guys."

In this context, it is significant that the connoted ratings correlate only moderately with expert ratings of human rights in the same countries. The government-type connotations are fallible. Even if there were a siege mentality, government-type categories do not provide the requisite information to identify it accurately.

Indeed, the government type may itself be inaccurately specified. Fewer than a third of the IBC categorizations precisely match those applied by U.S. government analysts, and nearly the same number are in clear disagreement. However, it is unlikely that inaccuracies would alter audience impressions about the relative ubiquity of governments less free/democratic/responsive than the United States. For this American sample, the United States rates like a representative or parliamentary democracy, with only a pure democracy rating higher. All other forms of government are rated lower. Variations of government type attributions would thus be unlikely to alter impressions about the aggregate situation, although a variation might raise or lower the attitude obtained toward individual countries.

At the opening ceremonies, countries are represented before an audience that brings interpretive frameworks which include highly socialized attitudes and preferences. The ratings given by our sample of American students to the United States and democracy provide an example. To the degree that interpretive frameworks presuppose the preferability of an audience's own national affiliation, impressions about the aggregate character of the rest of the world may be as much confirmed as altered.

It was a significant feature of Coubertin's vision for the Olympic Movement that the Olympic Games should foster international understanding.²⁶ Labels may be attached as national descriptors, but informative portrayals of participating

countries' social, cultural, historical, economic, and/or political situations are scarce in media coverage of the Games.²⁷ For the Olympic Games to fully achieve Coubertin's educational ideal, coverage would include opportunities for audiences to obtain specific and accurate information about participating countries. In particular, the descriptors that official Olympic press kits recommend would be analyzed prior to distribution for accuracy of denotation and connotation.

As international fascination with the Olympic Games continues to grow, the potential of each Games to communicate unintended as well as intended messages also grows. The media serve as pivotal gatekeepers. This study shows how recommended national descriptors might bias reporter and audience attitudes toward participating nations. Examination of the impacts and potential impacts of gatekeeper categories can further our grasp of the ways that Olympic messages are formulated and obtained.

Notes

1. This feature of the Olympics is described by Laurence Chalip, "Multiple Narratives, Multiple Hierarchies: Selective Attention, Varied Interpretations, and the Structure of the Olympic Program," in *The Olympics and Cultural Exchange*, edited by Shin-pyo Rang, John MacAloon and Roberto DaMatta (Seoul: Hanyang University Institute for Ethnological Studies, 1987), pp. 539-576.

2. The general theory for this effect of the Olympic ceremonies is elaborated by John J. MacAloon, "Olympic Games and the Theory of Spectacle in Modern Societies," in *Rite, Drama, Festival, Spectacle: Rehearsals Toward a Theory of Cultural Performance*, edited by John J. MacAloon (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues Press, 1984), pp. 241-280. The effect is demonstrated by John J. MacAloon, "La Pitada Olimpica: Puerto Rico, International Sport, and the Constitution of Politics," in *Text, Play, and Story: The Construction and Reconstruction of Self and Society*, edited by E. Bruner (Washington, DC: American Anthropological Association), pp. 315-355.

3. Chalip, "Multiple Narratives," in *Super Media: A Cultural Studies Approach*, edited by Michael R. Real (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989), chapter 8.

4. Alan Tomlinson, "Representation, Ideology and the Olympic Games: A Reading of the Opening and Closing Ceremonies of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games," in *The Olympic Movement and the Mass Media: Past, Present and Future Issues*, edited by R. Jackson (Calgary: Hurford, 1989), pp. 7/3-7/12.

5. Irving L. Janis and Michael B. Smith, "Effects of Education and Persuasion on

National and International Images,” in *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis*, edited by H. Kelman (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965), pp. 177-205.

6. G. Murdock, “Mass Communication and the Construction of Meaning,” in *Reconstructing Social Psychology*, edited by N. Armistead (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), pp. 205-220.

7. Herbert J. Gans, *Deciding What's News* (New York: Pantheon, 1979); B. Roshco, *Newsmaking* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).

8. Operations of the IBC are described by the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, *Official Report of the Games of the XXIIIrd Olympiad of Los Angeles, 1984*, Volume 1 (Los Angeles: LAOOC, 1985), pp. 763-772. Details of media accreditations are provided on p. 475. At each Olympic Games, it is expected that operation of the IBC will be delegated by the organizing committee to a host broadcaster. That is why the IBC in Los Angeles was run by ABC.

9. Denis McQuail and S. Windahl, *Communication Models for the Study of Mass Communication* (London: Longman, 1982) discuss ways in which reporters and their audiences interpret messages that are sent and received via media.

10. David Kuykendall and John P. Keating, “Altering Thoughts and Judgements through Repeated Associations,” *British Journal of Social Psychology* 29 (1990): 79-86.

11. The intensification of impact the Olympics obtain as a result of expanding world interest is discussed by John J. MacAloon, ‘Encountering Our Others: Social Science and Olympic Sport,’ in *The Olympics and Cultural Exchange*, pp. 1-27.

12. This aspect of rating government types is discussed and demonstrated by F.G. Castles and P. Mair, “Left-Right Political Scales: Some ‘Expert’ Judgments,” *European Journal of Political Research* 12 (1984): 73-88.

13. This is the method used in particular by R.D. Gastil, *Freedom in the World* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982).

14. However, the government types themselves varied in their meaningfulness to respondents. Types like “monarchy,” “representative democracy,” and “military dictatorship” were said by respondents to be more meaningful than types like “point sovereignty by France and the Spanish Bishop of Urgel,” or “Hellenic Republic.”

15. *Ibid.* Freedom House ratings from 1982 were the most recent (to 1984) available at the time of study. Our previous experience with the ratings showed them to be highly stable across successive years, usually showing year-to-year correlations above .95. Nevertheless, the 1983 fall of the military government in

Argentina rendered its 1982 ratings inapplicable. Consequently, Argentina is not included in the subsequent correlation analysis.

16. Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1985). This reference book is prepared by CIA analysts for use by U.S. government personnel from each branch of government. The book is the product of research by expert analysts, and is intended to accurately describe each country.

We intend no claim that the CIA analysts are themselves unbiased, nor that the book's categories of government type are beyond dispute. The book does, however, provide an independent source of government type categories compiled by expert analysts in reference to each country. The 1985 edition was used because it is based on data drawn from the Olympic year under study. Nonetheless, the government type categories are relatively stable from year-to-year.

17. Analysis followed standard factor analytic procedures. The three principal component eigenvalues were extracted. In all 47 cases, only the first eigenvalue exceeded unity, ranging from 1.98 to 2.71. The second eigenvalue ranged from 0.21 to 0.68. The third eigenvalue was never larger than 0.39.

18. One sample t -tests were conducted, with the .05 alpha level protected by the Bonferroni criterion, p .0011.

19. p = .028.

20. p = .076.

21. The Freedom House ratings are scored in an opposite direction to the one used in scoring our own instrument. Thus, as expected, the sign of the correlation was negative. For the sake of conceptual clarity, the sign has been dropped.

22. This feature of audience reaction is discussed throughout David Morley, *The 'Nationwide' Audience* (London: British Film Institute, 1980).

23. Kuykendall and Keating, "Altering Thoughts and Judgements."

24. Janis and Smith, "Effects of Education and Persuasion."

25. The notion that media content provides a "hidden curriculum" is developed by George Gerbner, "Teacher in Mass Culture," in *Communications Technology and Social Policy*, edited by G. Gerbner, L. Gross and W. Melody (New York: Wiley, 1973), pp. 265-286.

26. This aspect of Coubertin's educational objective for the Olympic Games is discussed by Laurence Chalip, "The Revival of the Modern Olympic Games and

Coubertin's Thoughts on Sport for All," paper presented at the International Olympic Academy, Olympia, Greece, 1991, pp. 7-8.

27. This aspect of media coverage is documented by Laurence Chalip, "The Politics of Olympic Theatre: New Zealand and Korean Cross-National Relations," in *Toward One World Beyond All Barriers*, volume 1, edited by Seoul Olympic Sports Promotion Foundation (Seoul: Poong Nam Publishing, 1990), pp. 408-433; Robert G. Meadow, "The Architecture of Olympic Broadcasting," in *The Olympic Movement and the Mass Media*, pp. 6/7-6/20; Yakov M. Rabkin and David Franklin, "Soviet/Canadian Press Perspectives on the Montreal Olympics," in *ibid.*, pp. 4/29-4/38; Michael Real, Robert Mechikoff and David Goldstein, "Mirror Images, The Olympic Games in Cold War Rhetoric: U.S. and Soviet Press Coverage of the 1980 and 1984 Summer Olympics," in *ibid.*, pp. 4/39-4/36.

APPENDIX

The following table lists in rank order government types from the IBC press information, from those rated most free/democratic/responsive by our sample to those rated least free/democratic/responsive by our sample, as described in the text. The scaled score and its 95% confidence interval are given. The absolute scaled distance from the United States, dUS, and the associated 95% confidence interval are also shown.

For each government type in the IBC press kit, the countries assigned that type are listed. The contrast between the IBC category and the category given by *The World Factbook* is also indicated:

* = identical

** = similar

*** =different, the IBC category obtains a better free/democratic/responsive rating than would have been obtained by *The World Factbook* category.

**** =different, the IBC category obtains a worse free/democratic/responsive rating than would have been obtained by *The World Factbook* category.

The four countries not preceded by stars are those not listed in *The World Factbook*.

TABLE OF GOVERNMENT TYPES OF COUNTRIES

- | | |
|--|--------------------------|
| <p>☐ 1. Democracy
 Score = 114.10 ± 0.74
 ** Costa Rica
 *** Argentina, Honduras, Luxembourg</p> | <p>dUS = 3.06 ± 0.80</p> |
| <p>☐ 2. Representative Democracy
 Score = 112.12 ± 0.85
 Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands
 ** Senegal
 *** Dominican Republic, Portugal, San Marino</p> | <p>dUS = 1.09 ± 0.96</p> |
| <p>☐ 3. United States
 Score = 111.04 ± 0.74</p> | <p>dUS = 0.00</p> |
| <p>☐ 4. Parliamentary Democracy
 Score = 110.20 ± 0.61
 * Trinidad & Tobago, Zimbabwe
 ** Australia, Fiji, Papua-New Guinea
 *** Israel, Singapore</p> | <p>dUS = 0.84 ± 0.92</p> |
| <p>☐ 5. Parliamentary
 Score = 109.27 ± 0.61
 * Belize
 *** Canada</p> | <p>dUS = 1.76 ± 0.95</p> |
| <p>☐ 6. United Kingdom
 Score = 109.18 ± 0.76
 ***United Kingdom</p> | <p>dUS = 1.85 ± 0.88</p> |
| <p>☐ 7. Democratic Republic
 Score = 108.62 ± 1.11
 ** Finland, Somalia
 *** Soloman Islands</p> | <p>dUS = 2.41 ± 1.23</p> |
| <p>☐ 8. Swiss Confederation
 Score = 108.50 ± 0.87
 * * * Switzerland</p> | <p>dUS = 2.53 ± 1.13</p> |
| <p>☐ 9. Constitutional Republic
 Score = 108.42 ± 0.74</p> | <p>dUS = 2.61 ± 1.02</p> |

** Peru, Western Samoa

- ☐ 10. Independent Commonwealth dUS = 3.52 ± 0.94
 Score = 107.51 ± 1.078
 British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands
 * Bahamas
 ** Antigua
 *** Bermuda, Hong Kong
- ☐ 11. Parliamentary Republic dUS = 4.32 ± 1.03
 Score = 106.72 ± 0.74
 ** Ireland, Lebanon
- ☐ 12. Federal Republic dUS = 4.76 ± 1.14
 Score = 106.27 ± 0.90
 * Austria, Federal Republic of Germany, India
 ** Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela
 *** Nigeria
- ☐ 13. Parliamentary Democracy Under dUS = 4.92 ± 1.01
 a Constitutional Monarchy
 Score = 106.11 ± 0.78
 ** Malaysia
 *** Mauritius, Netherlands Antilles
- ☐ 14. Independent Republic dUS = 5.43 ± 1.11
 Score = 105.60 ± 0.74

☐ ** Camaroon, Indonesia
- ☐ 15. Republic dUS = 5.45 ± 1.14
 Score = 105.59 ± 1.01
 * Algeria, Bolivia, Chad, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
 Ecuatorial Guinea, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Iceland, Italy, Philippines,
 Tunisia, Uganda, Uruguay
 ** Bangladesh, Central African Republic, Columbia, Cyprus, France,
 Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Korea (S), Malaysia, Mali,
 Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tanzania, Togo, Yemen Arab
 Republic, Zaire
 *** Madagascar, Taiwan, Zambia
 **** Malta, Sri Lanka
- ☐ 16. Commonwealth dUS = 5.62 ± 1.19
 Score = 105.42 ± 0.82
 *** Tonga

- ☐ 17. Republic within the Commonwealth of Nations
 Score = 105.38 ± 0.68
 * Guyana
dUS = 5.66 ± 1.03
- ☐ 18. Independent Sovereign State within the Commonwealth
 Score = 104.72 ± 0.80
 * Barbados
dUS = 6.32 ± 1.14
- ☐ 19. Hellenic Republic
 Score = 102.99 ± 0.91
 ****Greece
dUS = 8.05 ± 1.23
- ☐ 20. Monarchy (British Commonwealth of Nations)
 Score = 102.51 ± 1.08
 **** New Zealand
dUS = 8.52 ± 1.27
- ☐ 21. Constitutional Republic with a Powerful Executive Branch
 Score = 102.35 ± 1.03
 ** Paraguay
dUS = 8.68 ± 1.13
- ☐ 22. Constitutional Monarchy
 Score = 102.20 ± 0.96
 * Belgium, Japan, Jordan, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, Sweden, Thailand
 ** Kuwait, Lesotho, Nepal
 **** Jamaica
dUS = 8.83 ± 1.27
- ☐ 23. Socialist Representative
 Score = 101.36
 ****Burma
dUS = 9.67 ± 1.41
- ☐ 24. Principality
 Score = 100.67 ± 0.83
 **** Liechtenstein
dUS = 10.36 ± 1.15
- ☐ 25. Centralized Republic
 Score = 99.77 ± 1.88
 * Panama
dUS = 11.27 ± 1.14

- ☐ 26. Monarchy with a Council of Ministers
 Score = 98.91 ± 0.85
 * * Saudi Arabia

dUS = 12.13 ± 1.16
- ☐ 27. Spanish State
 Score = 98.81 ± 0.81
 **** Spain

dUS = 12.23 ± 1.12
- ☐ 28. Federation of Emirates
 Score = 97.52 ± 0.78
 ** United Arab Emirates

dUS = 13.51 ± 1.13
- ☐ 29. Joint Sovereignty by France and the Spanish Bishop of Urgel
 Score = 97.25 ± 0.68
 * Andorra

dUS = 13.78 ± 0.99
- ☐ 30. People's Republic
 Score = 96.94 ± 1.32
 ** People's Republic of the Congo

dUS = 14.09 ± 1.67
- ☐ 31. Socialist Republic
 Score = 96.83 ± 1.05
 *** Romania

dUS = 14.20 ± 1.46
- ☐ 32. Socialist Federal Republic
 Score = 96.56 ± 1.03
 ** Yugoslavia

dUS = 14.48 ± 1.45
- ☐ 33. Kingdom
 Score = 95.92 ± 0.76
 **** Norway

dUS = 15.11 ± 0.98
- ☐ 34. Monarchy
 Score = 95.51 ± 1.00
 ** Bhutan, Denmark, Swaziland

dUS = 15.53 ± 1.28
- ☐ 35. Traditional Emirate
 Score = 95.27 ± 0.80
 ** Qatar

dUS = 15.76 ± 1.11

- | | |
|--|---------------------------|
| <p>☐ 36. Ruling Council
Score = 94.80 ± 0.82
**** Iraq</p> | <p>dUS = 16.23 ± 1.10</p> |
| <p>☐ 37. Single Party Republic
Score = 94.78 ± 0.94
** Seychelles, Sudan</p> | <p>dUS = 16.26 ± 1.18</p> |
| <p>☐ 38. Traditional Empire
Score = 93.30 ± 0.82
** Bahrain</p> | <p>dUS = 17.73 ± 1.09</p> |
| <p>☐ 39. Marxist-Leninist
Score = 91.13 ± 0.90
** Benin</p> | <p>dUS = 19.90 ± 1.31</p> |
| <p>☐ 40. communist
Score = 90.57 ± 1.04
* People's Republic of China</p> | <p>dUS = 20.47 ± 1.43</p> |
| <p>☐ 41. Absolute Monarchy
Score = 89.46 ± 0.88
** Oman</p> | <p>dUS = 21.57 ± 1.22</p> |
| <p>☐ 42. Marxist One-Party State
Score = 88.81 ± 0.86
****Mozambique</p> | <p>dUS = 22.22 ± 1.28</p> |
| <p>☐ 43. Military Republic
Score = 88.27 ± 0.57
* Mauritania</p> | <p>dUS = 22.77 ± 0.89</p> |
| <p>☐ 44. Centralized Republic Under
Military Control
Score = 87.52 ± 0.74
** Libya</p> | <p>dUS = 23.52 ± 1.01</p> |
| <p>☐ 45. Military
Score = 86.97 ± 0.88
* * Liberia</p> | <p>dUS = 24.07 ± 1.16</p> |
| <p>☐ 46.Dictatorship
Score = 84.59 ± 0.90</p> | <p>dUS = 26.44 ± 1.18</p> |

* * * * Nicaragua

☐ 47. Military Dictatorship

dUS = 27.39 ± 1.01

Score = 83.64 ± 0.70

**** Chile, Pakistan, Turkey