

# AN OLYMPIAN SQUABBLE: THE DISTRIBUTION OF OLYMPIC TELEVISION REVENUE, 1960-1966

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One should be suspicious of any amateur organization that has money. The minute this occurs its complexion changes and not for the better.

Avery Brundage  
President,  
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Avery Brundage believed that the International Olympic Committee (IOC) was courting disaster in light of rapidly escalating Olympic television revenue during the 1960s. The aging and crusty Chicagoan, who presided over the IOC between 1952 and 1972, was acutely aware of the organization's growing dependence on television money in the latter years of his presidency. Profligate spending of television money by IOC staff members who had toiled for years on a limited budget, warned Brundage, threatened the financial stability of the organization.<sup>2</sup> Brundage could not question the veracity of the statement of Kenya's Reginald Alexander, Vice-President of the IOC's Finance Commission, who referred to television money as the "life blood" of the IOC's "administrative existence."<sup>3</sup> These developments disturbed Brundage, an individual whose record regarding the repudiation of commercialism has been well-chronicled. The unbridled pursuit of a sizeable share of Olympic television money by the International Sport Federations (IFs) and National Olympic Committees (NOCs) provided Brundage with a second source of discomfiture. He concluded that his colleagues had forsaken their commitment to amateur sport and the Olympic ideal.

This paper aims to shed some light on the emergence of television revenue as the primary source of IOC income between 1960 and 1966. The central focus involves an examination of the conflict amongst the IOC, IFs, and NOCs pertaining to the distribution of television money. The advent of satellite technology in the early 1960s led to a predictable increase in the value of Olympic television rights. The availability of larger sums of money intrigued members of the IOC, and

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representatives of the IFs and NOCs. Brundage found himself in a philosophical tug-of-war. He identified television as a viable source of IOC revenue as early as 1955<sup>4</sup> and played an instrumental role in devising the IOC's initial television policy (Rule 49) in 1958.<sup>5</sup> He realized the value of revenue to an organization that had been understaffed and unable to promote Olympism throughout the world to his satisfaction. Yet, Brundage viewed the attempts of the IFs and NOCs to secure a greater share of the television money with a strong measure of trepidation. The persistent grasping for television money by these groups, Brundage said, revealed a disturbing trend of creeping commercialism.

During the years between 1960 and 1966, Brundage and the IOC struggled to pacify the IFs and NOCs. Brundage was constrained by the fact that both the IFs and NOCs played integral roles in the staging of Olympic festivals. The process involved in the formulation of a distribution plan which mollified the IOC, IFs, and NOCs, consumed six years of discussion marked by periodic back-biting among the groups. The development of the "Rome Formula" in 1966 resulted in a major influx of money to the IOC's Lausanne headquarters and challenged Brundage's concept of pure amateurism and Olympism.

### Brundage's Problem

**B**rundage considered that television money could assist future Organizing Committees, the IOC and the IFs in the execution of their mandates. He had been frustrated by the inability of the 1956 Melbourne Organizing Committee to reach an agreement with international television network representatives for the sale of television rights. Television network executives had refused to pay for the right to telecast news footage on a delayed basis, an action that resulted in a virtual blackout.<sup>6</sup> Expressing some consternation at the intransigence of the network representatives, Brundage launched a thorough investigation of the affair.

Specifically, Brundage was puzzled by the refusal of the network representatives to pay for the right to televise the Olympic Games. He was well aware of the significant financial outlay made by the networks for the right to telecast sport events such as the World Series and the Super Bowl. "Everyone reads about these huge sums of money which are paid for the television rights to football games, boxing matches, baseball and basketball games," Brundage wrote Harry Robert, Sports Editor of *Telenews*, "and wonders why television companies seem unwilling to pay for the rights to the greatest sport spectacle of all, which is moreover practically always operated at a loss."<sup>7</sup> Although assuaged by the explanation of the television executives who replied that the live television rights to the Olympic Games would attract appreciable financial offers from the networks,<sup>8</sup> Brundage crafted the IOC's initial television policy in 1958. He did not want the IOC and the 1960 Organizing Committees to miss a second opportunity to acquire income from television rights.

At the 53rd Session of the IOC at Sofia, Bulgaria in September 1957, Brundage spoke of television as a possible "great source of profit to the IOC."<sup>9</sup> Following extensive consultation with television executives, Brundage and IOC Chancellor Otto Mayer completed the expansion of Rule 49, the IOC's policy statement on publicity. Television networks were allowed access to nine minutes of royalty-free Olympic

footage per day for news purposes. The Organizing Committees were assigned the responsibility of selling the live television rights subject to the approval of the IOC. The IOC retained the right to distribute the revenue.<sup>10</sup> In addition to television's financial potential, Brundage was interested in harnessing television for promotional purposes.

Brundage considered television a possible world-wide conduit for Olympism. Recent expansion of the television industry confirmed this promise. In 1954, 55 percent of American homes were equipped with television sets, whereas only 9 percent of American homeowners possessed sets four years earlier.<sup>11</sup> There were 413 stations operational in 273 American cities in January, 1955.<sup>12</sup> The 1956 Rose Bowl game was watched in over 20 million American homes.<sup>13</sup> In the same year, there were over 1 million television sets in use in both the U.S.S.R. and Canada.<sup>14</sup> At the outset of 1955, there were 4.15 million television sets functioning in the United Kingdom, an increase of over 2.3 million within the preceding two years.<sup>15</sup> Television broadcasts had been witnessed in countries such as Argentina, Belgium, Columbia, Morocco, Sweden and Switzerland by the mid-1950s.<sup>16</sup> The growth of the television industry internationally had strengthened its ability to act as a global purveyor of the Olympic ideal.

Brundage was cognizant of the need to protect the image of the Olympic Movement, an idealistic enterprise which spumed commercialism, professionalism, and political interference. In advance of the sale of the 1960 Rome television rights, Brundage advised Marcello Garroni, Secretary of the Rome Organizing Committee:

Much more is involved than just the financial returns. Through television there is a wonderful opportunity to develop public interest in the Olympic Movement along the right lines. We are just as much interested in this as we are in the sale price.<sup>17</sup>

Brundage firmly believed that the Organizing Committees should handle negotiations with television networks in order to prevent "the IOC from becoming involved in commercial disputes."<sup>18</sup> Despite these concerns, the IOC had instructed the Rome Organizing Committee to sell the television rights for the "highest possible tariff."<sup>19</sup> Brundage coordinated discussion between leaders of the Squaw Valley and Rome Committee in hope of maximizing the sale price for the Rome Games based upon the experience of the Squaw Valley Organizing Committee.<sup>20</sup> The paradox of Brundage's Olympic idealism and his desire for the pragmatism of commercialism was clear.

Brundage had stressed the financial needs of the IOC and the IFS in the years preceding the 1960 Squaw Valley and Rome Olympic festivals.<sup>21</sup> The IFS fulfilled a vital role in the preparation for, and management of, Olympic festivals. The principal functions of the IFS included: establishment and enforcement rules pertaining to their respective sports; encouragement of the development of their sports throughout the world; and the assumption of the responsibility for technical control and governance of their sports at the Olympic Games.<sup>22</sup> However, Brundage's earliest effort to secure television revenue for the IFS failed.

Brundage made a concerted effort to secure IOC autonomy with respect to the distribution of the television money secured by the Organizing Committees of the 1960 Winter and Summer Games. He was unsuccessful in this attempt because the Squaw Valley and Rome Organizing Committees maintained accurately that Brundage attempted to exert control retroactively over television revenue. The American and Italian bid committees had been granted the right to host the respective festivals in 1955, three years prior to the passage of the IOC's initial television policy. Any financial policies with respect to the distribution of revenue devised after 1955, noted Squaw Valley and Rome organizers, could not be applied to their enterprises. Brundage acquiesced. The IFs received no money while Brundage grudgingly accepted a \$50,000 donation from the Rome Organizing Committee on behalf of the IOC.<sup>23</sup>

Brundage's frustration with the Squaw Valley and Rome Committees led him to suggest that the television rights should remain the sole property of future Olympic organizers in exchange for a fixed rate of payment that could be shared by the IOC and the IFs. In 1960, the IOC Executive Board established specific figures with reference to the 1964 Olympic Games and television. It demanded a sum of \$150,000, \$130,000 from Tokyo, and \$20,000 from Innsbruck.<sup>24</sup> Brundage considered that this approach would greatly simplify the entire television situation.<sup>25</sup>

The development of satellite technology in 1962 served to complicate matters for the IOC President. The prospect of trans-oceanic telecasts served to increase the value of Olympic television contracts. Whereas Squaw Valley organizers raised a total of \$50,000 from the sale of television rights, the Innsbruck Organizing Committee sold the international television rights to the 1964 Winter Games for over \$936,000. Their counterparts in Tokyo received in excess of \$1.57 million<sup>26</sup> from various television networks. As the television rights fees for the 1964 Olympic festivals exceeded expectations, the IFs saw their percentage share of Olympic television revenue dwindle. The IFs were not satisfied with their portion of the television income at Innsbruck and Tokyo.<sup>27</sup> The Winter IFs received a paltry \$10,000, while the Summer IFs shared a total of \$65,000.

A second contentious issue for the IF leaders remained the fact that the IOC retained the right to determine the amount of television money that each IF received. Although Brundage had wavered slightly on the merit of the IOC determining the amount that each IF would receive,<sup>28</sup> IOC Executive Board member David Burghley, the Marquess of Exeter (Exeter), successfully defended the initiative. Exeter, who also served as President of the International Amateur Athletic Association (IAAF), urged Brundage not to concede the authority to distribute IFs' share of the television dividend. "Heaven forbid that the International Federations should have to decide on how to divide the donation from the IOC," warned Exeter in 1961, "the result would make the Congo [the scene of a contemporary civil war]<sup>29</sup> look like a kindergarten."<sup>30</sup> Exeter believed that some IFs, including the IAAF, were entitled to a larger portion than others based on their "contribution" to the Games. He did not discard the concept of need as an element of the prospective distribution, but he believed live attendance at the Olympic events staged by the respective federations should be factored into the equation. This measure of "contribution," said Exeter would not receive adequate support in an open forum of representatives of the IFs.<sup>31</sup>

He advised Brundage not to discuss distribution of the money at the IOC General Session.

The interests of the IOC would be best served, counselled Exeter, if the apportionment of the IFs share of the payments supplied by the Organizing Committees was the responsibility of the Executive Board.<sup>32</sup> He was only one of many IOC members who enjoyed current or past affiliation with an IF. Open discussion of the issue would provoke disputes, opined Exeter, as members would be tempted to champion the cause of their "own favourite."<sup>33</sup> Executive Board members, conceded Exeter, might cite his presidency of the IAAF as a conflict of interest.<sup>34</sup> He informed Brundage of his desire to devise a distribution plan satisfactory to all concerned.<sup>35</sup> Exeter's stratagem revealed a healthy measure of self-interest; he was intent on pushing forward the financial claims of the IAAF.

Exeter's lobbying efforts paid off. Brundage informed the IOC Executive Board in June 1961 that Exeter was studying the apportionment problem and would present a distribution plan for approval.<sup>36</sup> Four days later at an IOC General Session meeting, Brundage reported that the authority for the allocation of the money to the IFs had been given to the Executive Board.<sup>37</sup> Exeter's desire to proceed with his study while providing minimal information to the IFs themselves also met with Brundage's approval.

He wished to avoid confrontation with representatives of the IFs who might not approve the distribution plan. In order to maintain eligibility for a share of the television money, Exeter and Brundage agreed that an IF would have to designate the Olympic competition as its World Championship for that year.<sup>38</sup> The concession would provide tangible proof each IF recognized the preeminence of the Olympic Games. The IFs were also informed that a minimum payment would be established, and the distribution would reflect each IF's contribution to the Games. The IOC's definition of contribution was soon to be defined.<sup>39</sup>

Exeter undertook a comprehensive study of attendance figures from previous Olympic festivals that gave meaning to the term "contribution" and impacted upon the proposal receiving approval of the IOC in 1962.<sup>40</sup> He calculated the average attendance for each IF's events from the previous three Olympic Games. This average, rationalized Exeter, protected the IFs whose sport had been staged most recently in an area where the sport was not popular.<sup>41</sup> On the basis of his analysis, the IAAF was entitled to 54% of the indemnity supplied by the Tokyo Organizing Committee. However, Exeter's decision to establish a minimum payment for the smaller federations reduced this percentage to 26%.<sup>42</sup> The IAAF was not the only IF required to make this form of financial sacrifice. The swimming, basketball, boxing, and equestrian federations also received a smaller percentage of the money than a distribution schema based solely on attendance figures would have granted them.<sup>43</sup>

Meanwhile, the IFs channelled their efforts towards enhancing their share of future Olympic television revenue. At a 1963 meeting in Lausanne, the IFs passed a resolution calling for one-third of the money from the sale of Olympic telecast rights after 1964.<sup>44</sup> This initiative reflected an admission on the part of IF officials that advances in satellite technology had altered the economic environment. By a majority vote in 1957, the IFs had deemed future financial support tied to Olympic television revenue to be too speculative.<sup>45</sup> Brundage gave the individuals who

presented the petition to the IOC Executive some assurance that the proposal would be placed before the IOC,<sup>46</sup> but he subsequently failed to follow through on his word.

Brundage was hesitant to enlarge the IFs share of the television money. He had become distressed by the increasingly commercial tendencies of the IFs<sup>47</sup> and questioned the devotion of the IFs to Olympic ideals. The IFs, in Brundage's mind, had adopted a distasteful profit-motive stance with respect to television revenue generated at both the Olympics and the World Championships. He was also displeased by the lax enforcement of the rules of amateurism by number of the IFs, including football (soccer), skating, skiing, and basketball.<sup>48</sup> Brundage was convinced that the IFs would employ the majority of any extra revenue for disagreeable, but unspecified, "non-Olympic purposes."<sup>49</sup>

When the IFs that governed sports on the 1968 Mexico City Olympic Games program were informed by the IOC that they would share a total of \$100,000 from the money generated from the sale of international television rights, Brundage received a personal visit from a delegation of agitated leaders of the IFs.<sup>50</sup> Later, Rudyard H. Russell, President of the Association Internationale de Boxe Amateur (AIBA) referred to Brundage's attitude as having been conciliatory. Brundage "admitted that he had entirely overlooked our resolution of two years beforehand," Russell said. "I think he was very embarrassed at the time, he realized that he had led us down, and that unfortunately the terms for Mexico had already been made."<sup>51</sup> Although one accepts Russell's characterization of the discussion, and Brundage's exhibited demeanour, Brundage, in fact, had deceived his visitors.

Brundage's correspondence reveals no direct reference for the need to stall discussion on the proposal placed before him by the IFs in 1963, however, his apology was dubious at best. Correspondence with members of the IOC Executive Board later in 1965 revealed his avowed disapproval of granting one-third of all television monies to the IFs.<sup>52</sup> Brundage would have been closer to the truth had he told his visitors that he had intentionally overlooked the IF proposal of 1963.

The philosophic shift in the IOC's approach to commercialism and amateur sport, that would have resulted from acquiescing to the request of the IFs, was at the crux of Brundage's dilatory treatment of the proposal. Exeter shared the opinion that the IFs were entitled to a contribution from the television money, "however, it should not be the aim of the International Federations to make a clear profit out of the Games and there should be some top limit on it."<sup>53</sup> Brundage's previous actions indicate that he was in agreement. He recognized the legitimacy of the IFs' claim to a portion of Olympic television money. The size of the claim remained the major point of debate.

Brundage's view contrasted that of J. Francis Ahearne, the President of the Ligue Internationale du Hockey sur la Glace (LIHG), a vociferous lobbyist for the IFs on the television question. Ahearne adamantly believed that the IFs were entitled to one-third of all television revenues and the autonomy to determine its distribution. "In my lifetime you cannot deal with a million dollars on an amateur basis," said Ahearne. "Let us once and for all recognise the fact that our amateur sports are a colossal business," asserted Ahearne. "And no one, no one, should deny us the right of making an honourable, justifiable and reasonable commercial approach, when we are talking of millions of dollars." Ahearne concluded: "Despite my amateur heart," the IOC method of distributing the revenue from the sale of the television rights,

“insults my financial brain.”<sup>54</sup> Could Brundage resist this challenge to his vision of Olympism?

While the IFs clamoured for an increase in their share of Olympic television revenue, some IOC members voiced concern on behalf of the NOCs. One of the supporters of NOCs’ right to a portion of Olympic television money was IOC Executive Board member Armand Massard of France. The decision to grant the IFs one-half of the IOC indemnity received from the 1964 Organizing Committees, asserted Massard, ignored the difficulties of the numerous NOCs throughout the world who were forced to rely, in part, on government subsidies. Massard warned Brundage of the threat of government interference in the Olympic Movement posed by a lack of attention to the situation. The IFs, “who have no real needs,”<sup>55</sup> were able to raise money through their World Championships, said Massard, while not all NOCs had access to the various sources of revenue enjoyed by the NOCs in countries such as Italy, England, and the United States.<sup>56</sup>

Brundage’s initial response to Massard’s concerns was sympathetic. “Government subsidy,” Brundage believed, “too often means government interference which, of course, is quite contrary to the spirit of the Olympic Movement.”<sup>57</sup> Although Brundage gave Massard some hope that a portion of the television money would be transferred to the NOCs,<sup>58</sup> he eventually determined that the minimal size of the IOC Innsbruck and Tokyo indemnities did not permit such a distribution.

Giulio Onesti, an IOC member from Italy, and the President of the 1960 Rome Organizing Committee, proved to be a fervent campaigner on behalf of the NOCs. In the early 1960s Onesti spearheaded an effort to elevate the profile of the NOCs through the formation of an association of the NOCs. Brundage considered the formation of such an organization as a threat to the IOC.<sup>59</sup> Intimately related to Onesti’s plan was his preoccupation with securing financial support for the NOCs that had been recently recognized by the IOC. Onesti believed that the poorer NOCs should receive 25% of the total paid for Olympic television rights, while the IFs should be excluded from the direct distribution of future television monies.<sup>60</sup> Onesti’s election to the IOC in 1964 provided him with the platform to press forward his views.

Onesti’s ideas concerning the distribution of Olympic television revenue would not have received a glowing appraisal from representatives of the IFs. He was unable to alter the terms devised for the division of the television money from the 1968 Olympic Games, but he set his sights on the 1972 Olympic television revenue. Onesti suggested that the IFs had no realistic claim to the receipt of a direct percentage of the television money. The demands of the IFs (one-third of all television revenue) were “out of line with their principles of function which would appear to me to purely that of a technical nature and the control over the regularity of sport events.”<sup>61</sup> The Organizing Committees, he offered, were entitled to 25% of the television revenue which could be directed to handling travel expenses of the IF contest officials at Olympic events. In order to provide the means to oversee the Olympic program, Onesti believed that 50% of the money should be directed to the IOC. The remaining 25% would go to the NOCs.<sup>62</sup>

What did Brundage think of the representations of Onesti and his allies who sought to improve the financial status of the NOCs? Brundage's correspondence reveals one reason why he supported a television agreement with the NOCs. Brundage was growing weary of the IFs that continued to badger him for one-third of the revenue from the sale of Olympic television rights. In June 1965, Exeter informed Brundage of threats by the leaders of a number of the IFs to ban telecasts of their events at future Olympic Games if the IOC did not agree to transfer one-third of the television money to the IFs.<sup>63</sup> An exchange of letters with IOC Executive Board member Guru Dutt Sondhi of India provides critical information. Sondhi was not able to rationalize the continued exclusion of the NOCs from the distribution formula. Brundage concurred with Sondhi, who had concluded that the IFs "have assumed too much power and dignity to themselves and covertly, if not overtly, try to overawe the IOC."<sup>64</sup> Brundage responded:

The IFs. . . are demanding one-third of all money received from television, although it is the NOCs that have the expense of bringing the teams to the Games. we should support the NOCs, which are our agents.<sup>65</sup>

The expense borne by the NOCs every four years was ample justification for attempting to satisfy the NOCs, asserted Brundage. The NOCs had significant transportation, food, and equipment costs inherent in the task of supporting an Olympic team. They also managed the selection process for their teams, directed fund-raising projects, and served the primary role in propagating the message of Olympism within their respective countries.<sup>66</sup> Perhaps he also saw the action as a means to rein in the pretentious and overbearing IFs.

### Brundage's Solution

**B**rundage was engaged in a defensive battle as the subject of money had achieved a position of prominence that was antithetical to his personal Olympic philosophy. He was troubled by the emphasis placed on finances by the IFs and NOCs, an emphasis which defied the foundation of amateurism and the Olympic Movement.<sup>67</sup> "[The IFs and NOCs] all seem to forget that the Olympic Movement has reached its present exalted position without money." observed Brundage.<sup>68</sup> He realized that the amount requested by the two groups represented over half of the total proceeds from the sale of television rights. Although he did not commit the thought to paper, Brundage was likely concerned about the power that these organizations would attain with greater financial resources. Their demands posed an additional problem.

The narrow perspectives of the NOCs and IFs threatened the viability of future bids by candidate cities. With the continued expansion of the number of sports on the Olympic program, the costs incurred by an Organizing Committee portended an upward spiral. Brundage affirmed that the needs of Organizing Committees had to be protected if the IOC was to expect cities to bid for the right to host the Olympics in

the years ahead.<sup>69</sup> The onerous task of devising an acceptable distribution formula was entrusted to an IOC sub-committee.

Brundage established a clear mandate for the IOC Sub-Committee on Television Policy formed in 1966. The members of the IOC assigned to the sub-committee were asked to consider the interests of the IOC, IFs, NOCs, and the Organizing Committees during their deliberations which, Brundage hoped, would result in a proposed formula for the distribution of television revenue.<sup>70</sup> The sub-committee's recommendation would be studied by the IOC Executive Board at its meeting scheduled for April 1966 in Rome. Brundage's personal choice for chairman of the sub-committee, Giulio Onesti, warrants analysis.

Brundage's rationale for appointing Onesti as chairman of the IOC Sub-Committee on Television Policy is open to speculation. Brundage's distrust of Onesti resulting from his pursuit of an association of NOCs would seem to have precluded assigning this responsibility to the ambitious Italian. In fact, Onesti's perseverance in the face of Brundage's opposition bred a hostile relationship between the men later in the decade.<sup>71</sup> Onesti had a measure of experience for the task. He had familiarity with the television industry resulting from his management of the 1960 Rome Organizing Committee's contractual negotiations with the international television networks. However, if experience had been Brundage's prime consideration, surely Exeter, an individual well-versed on television matters, would have been selected.

Brundage's action appears more self-serving. By granting this authority to Onesti, Brundage gave weight to Onesti's beliefs that the NOCs were entitled to a portion of the television revenue. Perhaps the promise of money for the NOCs, and the appointment itself, would mollify the man who was aggressively pursuing an agenda that Brundage considered dangerous, namely, the formation of an association of NOCs. The appointment also served as a powerful message to some leaders of the IFs whose haughty conduct had become tiresome. Onesti was hostile to the exorbitant fiscal claims of the IFs. And yet, Brundage had forced Onesti to temper his personal position because he had been informed that the IFs were to be considered in any distribution formula.<sup>72</sup>

The composition of the IOC Sub-Committee on Television Policy did not engender an approving smile from Exeter. He considered his exclusion from the delegation as a personal affront. Exeter reminded Brundage of his diligent efforts with respect to the television issue in the past.<sup>73</sup> Brundage, in turn, reminded Exeter that as he was an IOC Vice-President, he qualified as an ex-officio member of all sub-committees.<sup>74</sup> Exeter was further assuaged when Brundage wrote Onesti and reminded the chairman of Exeter's ex-officio status.<sup>75</sup> The work of the sub-committee was initiated.

Exeter soon perceived that one of his tasks on the sub-committee would involve protecting the interests of the IFs. Despite Brundage's instructions, Onesti continued to question the IFs' need for financial support. Exeter defended the IFs' position in an exchange of correspondence which Onesti later described as "ample and intense."<sup>76</sup> Onesti retreated. "I am sorry that the controversy has been brought to levels of exaggerated tension," said Onesti, "that do not conform to the reality and

nature of our conduct.”<sup>77</sup> The two men in conjunction with the other members of the sub-committee arrived at a compromise agreement.

In the “Preliminary Report to the Executive Board of the IOC on Television Policy,” the sub-committee suggested the concept of a graduated scale for the distribution of revenue from the sale of television rights for the 1972 Summer and Winter Olympic Games (see Tables 1 and 2). The sub-committee based its scheme on the judgment that the Summer Games would attract a total rights fee in the range of \$5 million, while the Winter Games were valued at approximately \$1 million. With respect to the first million dollars from the sale of the television rights to the Summer Games, which had been delegated in its entirety to the IOC, it was determined that the IFs, NOCs, and the IOC should each receive one-third. The remaining \$750,000 accruing to the IOC was to be used at its discretion. The same method of distribution was favoured for the revenue from the sale of the television rights to the Winter Games, however, the decreased projected value of these rights necessitated a different scale.<sup>78</sup> The proposed distribution scales, although they represented the major priorities of the sub-committee, did not represent its only recommendations.

The “Preliminary Report” succinctly stated the need for a more sophisticated approach to the management of television matters. Onesti and his colleagues suggested the formation of an IOC “Select Committee,” which would “treat the questions relating to television rights with competence and technical knowledge of the problem.”<sup>79</sup> Notwithstanding the merits of any select committee for television, the subject of Olympic television money consumed the attention of the representatives of the IFs, who travelled to Rome for their scheduled meeting with the Executive Board of the IOC in April 1966.

TABLE 1

Plan for the Division of the Television Money from the Sale of the Rights to the 1972 Summer Olympic Games

Net Revenue	IOC		Organizing Committee		Total
	%	Amt.	%	Amt.	
Up to \$1 million	100	1,000,000	0	0	1,000,000
From \$1-\$2 million	50	500,000	50	500,000	1,000,000
From \$2-\$3 million	25	250,000	75	750,000	1,000,000
From \$3-\$5 million	0	0	100	2,000,000	2,000,000
		1,750,000		3,250,000	5,000,000

TABLE 2

Plan for the Division of the Television Money from the Sale of the  
Rights to the 1972 Winter Olympic Games

Net Revenue	IOC		Organizing Committee		Total
	%	Amt.	%	Amt.	
Up to \$200 K	100	200,000	0	0	200,000
From \$200 K-\$400 K	50	100,000	50	100,000	200,000
From \$400 K-\$600 K	25	50,000	75	150,000	200,000
From \$600 K-\$1 million	0	0	100	400,000	400,000
		350,000		650,000	1,000,000

If Brundage or Onesti believed the IFs would be satisfied with the substance of the formula, they were mistaken. On April 22nd, 1966, representatives of the IFs met in closed session to consider the proposal devised by Onesti's sub-committee. The atmosphere was strained. The recent signing of ABC's \$4.5 million contract with the 1968 Mexico City Organizing Committee embittered the delegates who realized that the Summer IFs would divide a mere \$100,000 of this sum. Berge Phillips of the Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur (FINA), Oscar State of the International Weightlifting Federation, and J. Francis Ahearne led the sabre-rattling.<sup>80</sup> "We are the bosses," charged an obstinate Ahearne, who decried the IOC's previous refusal to grant the IFs one-third of the future television revenue."<sup>81</sup> The IFs were resolved to press forward their demand. The subject was raised at the meeting of the IOC Executive Board with the IFs on April 23rd, but extended discussion of the allocation problem was postponed until the IOC General Session, scheduled for later in the week.<sup>82</sup> The delay permitted the IOC Executive Board to hold its own closed deliberations on the basis of the sub-committee's proposal.

The IOC Executive Board accepted the graduated scale concept designed by the Onesti sub-committee, however, it altered the proportional distributions. The revised payment schedule appears to have been designed with a measure of sympathy for the concerns of the IFs. According to the plan submitted by Onesti, the IFs and NOCs had been guaranteed one-third of the first \$1 million on the sale of the rights to the 1972 Summer Olympics and the first \$200,000 for the sale of the rights to the Winter Olympics. Any further payment would have occurred at the discretion of the IOC. Regardless, a ceiling had been established on the IOC's share. The IOC would have had no claim on a percentage of any revenue from the sale of the rights in excess of \$3 million for the Summer Olympic Games and \$600,000 for the sale of the rights to the Winter Olympics. Thus, the IFs would not have profited in the event that the sale of the television rights exceeded \$3 million. As the 1968 Mexico City Organizing

Committee had already signed a contract for \$4.5 million with ABC, the problem seemed clear. The IOC Executive Board removed the ceiling, and thereby included the IFs and the NOCs, along with the IOC, in the distribution of all television monies (see Table 3). An identical scale was established with reference to the sale of the television rights to the 1972 Winter Olympics, however, the progression employed a \$200,000 figure rather than \$1 million. Would the guarantee of a portion, albeit not one-third, of the total sale price of the television rights to the Summer and Winter Games appease the IFs?

During the IOC General Session a heated debate ensued with representatives of the IFs who eventually consented to the distribution plan conceived by the IOC Executive Board.<sup>83</sup> Roger Coulon, President of the Federation Internationale de Lutte Amateur, and Berge Phillips, President of FINA, earnestly reiterated the IFs' demand for one-third of the television revenue. Brundage reminded Coulon and Phillips that the IFs already recouped some expenses through the sale of television rights to their world championships. The NOCs and the IOC itself, said Brundage,

TABLE 3

IOC Executive Board Plan for the Division of the Television Money<sup>84</sup>  
from the Sale of the Rights to the 1972 Summer Olympic Games<sup>84</sup>

Net Revenue	Recipient			
	IOC	NOCs	IFs	Organizing Committee
Up to \$1 million	1/3	1/3	1/3	---
From \$1-\$2 million	2/9	2/9	2/9	1/3
From \$2-\$3 million and each successive million	1/9	1/9	1/9	2/3

also had financial requirements. Both Brundage and Exeter were satisfied with the proposal. The concerns of the four contributors to the Olympic Movement -- the IOC, the NOCs, the IFs, and the Organizing Committees -- had been addressed. The British head of the Federation Internationale de Basketball, William Jones, was apparently the individual who succeeded in convincing the majority of his colleagues to accede to the distribution formula.<sup>85</sup> A settlement had been achieved.

### Conclusions

**B**rundage's predicament concerning the vexing problem of distribution of Olympic television revenue between the years 1960 and 1966 has provided the

focus for this paper. The continued cooperation of the NOCs and IFs with the IOC was of paramount importance, as they played a vital role in the staging of Olympic festivals. As the pressure on the IOC intensified for an overhaul of the method of allocating Olympic television revenue, Brundage believed that the situation forced him to broker a compromise agreement.

Brundage discarded his standard tactics for dealing with concerns broached by the IFs and NOCs. Douglas Robey, an IOC member from the United States, recalled Brundage's traditional formula for dealing with the IFs and NOCs, regardless of subject matter. "We'd [the IOC] have meetings with the national Olympic committees or the international federations and [Brundage would] say, 'We'll take it under advisement.' It was a brush off... He just wouldn't listen. . . Let them talk and then forget it," observed Robey.<sup>86</sup> Although Brundage was able to rely on this approach for a brief period of time, the persistent campaigns of the IFs and the NOCs addressing the need for a more equitable distribution of the Olympic television money succeeded in altering the status quo.

For Brundage, the accord represented a Pyrrhic victory and a challenge to his ideals of pure amateurism and Olympism. The IOC had devised a plan which met with the agreement of the IFs and the NOCs. This accomplishment promised to alleviate the tension prevalent amongst the IOC, NOCs, and IFs. Yet, in order to satisfy the IFs, the IOC had approved a plan which was designed to "encourage [Organizing Committees] to obtain as much as possible from the television companies."<sup>87</sup> The Summer Organizing Committee would receive no money from the initial \$1 million,<sup>88</sup> but 2/3 of any sum exceeding \$2 million. The removal of the ceiling figure which the IOC had been entitled to under the terms of the Onesti plan, however, established the IOC, the IFs, and the NOCs as financial beneficiaries of a policy of attempting to obtain maximum sale prices for Olympic television rights. The agreement paved the way for an enormous increase in the size of the IOC coffers.

Brundage's actions in the weeks following the Rome meeting revealed a sense of unease with respect to the prospect of added television revenue. "If we are not careful," Brundage told IOC member Albert Mayer, "this television money can lead to disaster."<sup>89</sup> The potential use of the television money by the IFs troubled him. Brundage believed that many of the IFs were wayward in their devotion to the ideals of the Olympic Movement,<sup>90</sup> and the availability of increased television revenue to these organizations concerned him. He sounded out Exeter on the feasibility of requiring the IFs to submit records that outlined the expenditure of the money received as a result of the recently brokered agreement.<sup>91</sup> Exeter was not opposed to demanding pertinent balance sheets from the IFs, but he cautioned his colleague that an attempt to manage their spending programs would provoke trouble. Still, if the IOC found the expenditures of some of the IFs contrary to its philosophy, commented Exeter, the information could be used when the IOC established future distribution schedules.<sup>92</sup> These musings represented an effort in damage control. If the IOC had ignited the match with the passage of the Rome Formula, Brundage and Exeter were trying to put out the ensuing flames. Despite protestations from leaders of the IFs, the IOC refused to grant the IFs the privilege to distribute their share of Olympic television revenue until 1968.<sup>93</sup>

The promise of the new distribution plan for television was ephemeral, as the peace which prevailed in the aftermath of the 1966 IOC Session proved fleeting. Within days of the close of the meetings, the IFs renewed their demands for one-third of all Olympic television revenue.<sup>94</sup> Giulio Onesti, although gratified by the award of a portion of the television money to the NOCs, interpreted the concession as a sign of the IOC's recognition of past failures to address their concerns.<sup>95</sup> Passage of the "Rome Formula" did not temper the ambition of Onesti or leaders of the IFs. Within two years, Brundage's power base had been eroded by the formation of umbrella organizations for the IFs (General Assembly of International Federations) and the NOCs (Permanent General Assembly of NOCS).<sup>96</sup> The temporary resolution of the conflict with the IFs and NOCs served to spark a second dispute within the Olympic Family.

At the Rome Session, the bid committees representing the cities of Sapporo and Munich, the municipalities awarded the right to stage the 1972 Winter and Summer Games respectively, pledged to abide by the IOC's television legislation.<sup>97</sup> Yet, both Organizing Committees later attempted to maximize their share of Olympic television revenue at the expense of the IOC, IFs, and NOCs, through an interpretation of IOC policy that displayed a strong degree of self-interest. The Organizing Committees desired to separate the financial payment from the American television networks into two distinct categories: rights fees and technical services. According to IOC regulations, the IOC and its affiliated organizations were entitled to apply the "Rome Formula" to the rights fees.<sup>98</sup> The brazen attempt to circumvent IOC policy provided Brundage, Exeter and their colleagues with yet another problem. The advent of satellite telecasting and the increase in the value of Olympic television rights during the 1960s had repercussions for Avery Brundage, the IOC and the Olympic Movement. In 1955, despite the promise of television as a source of revenue and publicity, Brundage questioned the sagacity of the IOC "getting into 'business.'"<sup>99</sup> Brundage's efforts to achieve two divergent aims - the pursuit of commercial television revenue for the IOC and its affiliated organizations and the preservation of the IOC's image - unravelled during the 1960s. Money represented one of the dominant topics within the Olympic Movement. Brundage's vision of Olympism had been compromised by television.

## Notes

1. Avery Brundage to Ivar Vind (IOC member, Denmark), 13 September 1965, Avery Brundage Collection, 1908-1975, Box 64 [hereafter cited as ABC], University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana. Although the original collection is located at the above location, the author has employed the microfilm copy housed at the University of Western Ontario (D.B. Weldon Library), London, Ontario.

2. Avery Brundage to Reginald S. Alexander (IOC member, Kenya), 24 October 1967, ABC Box 98.

3. Reginald S. Alexander to Avery Brundage, 12 March 1969, ABC Box 98.

4. Avery Brundage to the IOC Executive Board (Armand Massard, David Lord Burghley, S.A.R. the Prince Axel of Denmark, S.E. Mohammad Taher, Miguel A. Moenck, and Count Paolo Thaon de Revel), 3 August 1955, ABC Box 114.

5. For an analysis of events which necessitated the formulation of official IOC policy pertaining to television, see Stephen R. Wenn, "Lights! Camera! Little Action: Television, Avery Brundage and the 1956 Melbourne Olympics," *Sporting Traditions* 10 (November, 1993), pp. 38-53.

6. Robert Joseph Lucas, "A Descriptive History of the Interdependence of Television and Sports in the Summer Olympic Games, 1956-1984," (M.A. Thesis: San Diego State University, 1984), pp. 12- 13.

7. Avery Brundage to Harry Robert, 11 April 1957, ABC Box 114. This file reveals that Brundage had collected a number of newspaper clippings regarding the recent purchase of television rights to major sport events in the United States. The value of a number of contemporary sport television contracts provides some context for the discussion. Major League Baseball Commissioner Hap Chandler sold the rights to the World Series from 1951 through 1956 for \$6 million. The television rights for the 1957-1962 World Series attracted \$15 million. Between 1952 and 1960, the value of the television rights to NCAA college football games (regular season) rose from \$700,000 to approximately \$3 million. In 1956, the Columbia Broadcasting System (C.B.S.) paid a little over \$1 million for the right to telecast regular season National Football League games. See, Benjamin G. Rader, *In Its Own Image: How Television Has Transformed Sports* (New York: The Free Press, 1984), pp. 55, 74, 87.

8. Harry Robert to Avery Brundage, 24 May 1957, ABC Box 114. Brundage received earlier counsel on this matter from William McAndrew, Director of News for N.B.C. See William McAndrew to Avery Brundage, 6 April 1956, ABC Box 114.

9. Minutes of the 53rd Session of the International Olympic Committee, Sofia, 23-28 September 1957, p. 7, International Olympic Committee Archives, Chateau de Vidy, Lausanne, Switzerland [hereafter cited as IOCA].

10. *Olympic Charter 1958* (Lausanne: IOC, 1958), pp. 29-30, IOCA.

11. Gary Cross, *A Social History of Leisure Since 1600* (State College, PA: Venture Publishing Inc., 1990), pp. 183-184.

12. *Television: A World Survey Supplement 1955*, in *Television: A World Survey* (New York: Arno Press, 1972), p. 18.

13. Leo Bogart, *The Age of Television: A Study of Viewing Habits and the Impact of Television on American Life* (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1972), p. 172.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 46; and *Television: A World Survey*, p. 170.

16. *Television: A World Survey*, pp. 11-12, 22, 24, 28-30, 38, 42-43.

17. Avery Brundage to Marcello Garroni, 15 January 1959, ABC Box 168. At the 1955 IOC General Session, Brundage provided the following homily. "We live in materialistic times, and it is not easy to resist tendencies toward commercialism. The Olympic Movement has been accepted on all five continents because of its purity, its honesty and its freedom from political intrigue and dollar signs; because it

places sportsmanship above skill, nobility above fame, and honor above success and because it holds out for a happier, healthful and more peaceful world. The International Olympic Committee which has the responsibility to protect this idealistic enterprise asks your assistance in keeping the Olympic escutcheon untarnished.” *The Speeches of President Avery Brundage 1952 to 1968* (Lausanne: IOC, ca. 1969), p. 19.

18.Minutes of the 51st Session of the International Olympic Committee, Cortina D’Ampezzo, 24-25 January 1956, p. 20, IOCA. Still, Brundage desired that the IOC determine the distribution of the television revenue.

19.Minutes of the 53rd Session of the International Olympic Committee, p. 12.

20.See for example, Avery Brundage to Prentis C. Hale (President, VIIIth Olympic Winter Games), 23 June 1958, ABC Box 165; Avery Brundage to Giulio Onesti, 11 July 1958, ABC Box 168; Giulio Onesti to Avery Brundage, 30 July 1958, ABC Box 168; and Avery Brundage to Prentis C. Hale, 2 January 1959, ABC Box 165.

21.Prentis C. Hale to Avery Brundage, 9 July 1957, ABC Box 165; and Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer (IOC Chancellor), 4 August 1959, ABC Box 168.

22. *Olympic Charter 1991* (Lausanne: IOC, 1991), pp. 29-32.

23.Alan E. Bartholemy (Executive Director, VIIIth Olympic Winter Games) to Otto Mayer, 10 July 1957, ABC Box 165. For the right to transmit 31 hours of coverage, CBS paid the Squaw Valley Organizing Committee \$50,000. The IOC did not receive a share of this sum. Giulio Onesti (President, 1960 Rome Organizing Committee) to Avery Brundage, 6 May 1960, ABC Box 168. Onesti refused to transfer the television revenue to the IOC. He did offer the IOC \$50,000. Brundage accepted the offer grudgingly. Minutes Rome Session 1960 Executive Board Meeting, Rome, 19, 24 August 1960, p. 4, IOCA.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

25.Minutes of the 57th Session of the International Olympic Committee, Rome, 22-24 August 1960, p. 3, IOCA.

26.“Droits de Television Verses par les Organismes de Television pour les Jeux d’Olympiade (en Dollars US),” 1986, IOCA.

27.The IFs responsible for sports on the winter program were granted a total of \$10,000 which was sub-divided by a formula devised by IOC member David Lord Burghley, the Marquess of Exeter. This total represented 1.07% of the international television rights. The IOC distributed a total of \$65,000 to the IFs that governed sports on the summer Olympic program. The larger figure corresponded to 4.12% of the money received by the Organizing Committee of the Tokyo Olympics.

28.Avery Brundage to Exeter, 31 March 1961, ABC Box 54.

29.The Congo was the scene of a violent civil war caused by Belgium’s hurried decision to withdraw from the territory in 1960. An inadequate plan for the transfer of power had been established which led to factional fighting. *Larousse Encyclopedia of Modern History from 1500 to the Present Day* (Feltham, U.K.: The Hamlyn Publishing Group, 1972), p. 416.

30.Exeter to Avery Brundage, 7 April 1961, ABC Box 54.

31. Ibid. Exeter's beliefs with respect to a potential distribution scheme can be gleaned from a number of letters. See Exeter to Avery Brundage, 24 January 1960; 26 March 1961; and 31 May 1961. All letters found in ABC Box 54.
32. Exeter to Avery Brundage, 7 April 1961, ABC Box 54.
33. Exeter to Avery Brundage, 26 March 1961, ABC Box 54.
34. Ibid.
35. Exeter to Avery Brundage, 7 April 1961, ABC Box 54.
36. Minutes of the IOC Executive Board, 15 June 1961, Athens, pp. 1-2, IOCA.
37. Minutes of the 58th Session of the International Olympic Committee, 19-21 June 1961, Athens, p. 3, IOCA.
38. Exeter to Avery Brundage, 24 January 1960, ABC Box 54; Exeter to Avery Brundage, 26 March 1961, ABC Box 54; and "Circular Letter [IOC] to the International Federations, #182, July 1961, ABC Box 70.
39. "Circular Letter [IOC] to the International Federations, #182, July 1961, ABC Box 70.
40. IOC General Session Minutes Volume IV 1956-1988, 5-7 June, 1962, Moscow, p. 74 (translation by Wolf Lyberg), Centre for Olympic Studies, University of Western Ontario.
41. Exeter to Lt. Col. R.H. Russell (President of the Association Internationale de Boxe Amateur), 8 March 1967, ABC Box 101.
42. Ibid.. Official IOC documents reveal that the IAAF actually received 27.7% of the \$65,000 dollars that was distributed to the IFs (\$18,000). "Droits de Television Verses par les Organismes de Television pour les Jeux d'Olympiade (en dollars US)," 1986, IOCA.
43. Ibid.
44. Seduta Delle Federazioni Internazionali Sportive (Minutes of the Meeting of the International Sport Federations), 22 April 1966, p. 2/9, ABC Box 81.
45. Exeter to Dr. Bear (Editor, World Sports), 20 July 1957, ABC Box 54.
46. Seduta Delle Federazioni Internazionali Sportive, pp. 2-9.
47. Avery Brundage to Albert Mayer, 19 May 1966, ABC Box 60.
48. Minutes of the 64th Session of the International Olympic Committee, Rome, 25-29 April 1966, p. 2, ABC Box 93; and Avery Brundage to Giulio Onesti, 14 September 1965, ABC Box 61. For the reference to the basketball situation, see Avery Brundage to Exeter, 19 May 1966, ABC Box 55.
49. Avery Brundage to Ivar Vind (IOC member, Denmark), 13 September 1965, ABC Box 64.
50. Seduta Delle Federazioni Internazionali Sportive, pp. 2-10.

- 51.Ibid. The 1968 Mexico Organizing Committee provided an additional \$50,450 to the IFs for distribution (by the IOC) at a later date.
- 52.Avery Brundage to Ivar Vind, 13 September 1965, ABC Box 64; and Avery Brundage to Guru Dutt Sondhi (IOC member, India), 3 July 1965, ABC Box 61.
- 53.Exeter to Avery Brundage, 10 June 1965, ABC Box 55.
- 54.For Ahearne's comments, see Seduta Federazoni Internazionali Sportive, pp. 2/13-14.
- 55.Armand Massard (IOC member, France) to Avery Brundage, 23 September 1960, Box 60.
- 56.Ibid. See also, "Proposition A. Massard," ca. October 1960, ABC Box 60. Massard referred to sport pools and public subscriptions as the sources of revenue.
- 57.Avery Brundage to Armand Massard, 14 October 1960, ABC Box 60.
- 58.Ibid.
- 59.Allen Guttman, *The Games Must Go On: Avery Brundage and the Olympic Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), pp. 173- 177.
- 60.Giulio Onesti to Avery Brundage, 24 June 1965, ABC Box 61.
- 61 .Giulio Onesti to Ivar Vind, 8 September 1965, ABC Box 61.
- 62.Giulio Onesti to Avery Brundage, 24 June 1965, ABC Box 61.
- 63.Exeter to Avery Brundage, 10 June 1965, ABC Box 55.
- 64.Guru Dutt Sondhi to Avery Brundage, 17 June 1965, ABC Box 63.
- 65.Avery Brundage to Guru Dutt Sondhi, 3 July 1965, ABC Box 61.
- 66.*Olympic Charter 1991* (Lausanne: IOC, 1991), pp. 29-32.
- 67.Avery Brundage to Ivar Vind, 13 September 1965, ABC Box 64.
- 68.Ibid.
- 69.Minutes of the 64th Session of the International Olympic Committee, Rome, 25-29 April 1966, p. 3, ABC Box 93.
- 70.Avery Brundage to Giulio Onesti, 25 January 1966, ABC Box 101
71. Allen Guttman, *The Olympics: A History of the Modern Games* (Champaign-Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992), pp. 115-123.
- 72.Avery Brundage to Giulio Onesti, 25 January 1966, ABC Box 101.
- 73.Exeter to Avery Brundage, 8 February 1966, ABC Box 55.
- 74.Brundage to Exeter, 23 February 1966, ABC Box 55
- 75.Avery Brundage to Giulio Onesti, 12 February 1966, ABC Box 101; and Exeter to Avery Brundage, 23 February 1966, ABC Box 55.

76. "Preliminary Report to the Executive Board of the IOC on Television Policy," ABC Box 101; Onesti realized that the IFS had respect for Exeter as he admitted to his IOC colleague that "I know that the international Federations find in you their greatest defender of their rights." Giulio Onesti to David Marquess of Exeter, 7 April 1966, ABC Box 61. This researcher did not have access to this correspondence in its entirety. The correspondents did not send copies of all the letters to Brundage. However, the nature of the debate between the two sub-committee members can be gleaned from Exeter's letter to Onesti dated 31 March 1966. Exeter confirmed the IOC's long-standing recognition of the financial demands placed upon the IFS. "Your statement that the [IFS] incur no expenses is quite unjustified," wrote Exeter. He also maintained that the vast majority of National Sport Federations, which controlled the NOCs according to IOC Regulations, favoured increasing the contribution to the IFS as such action would be "most advantageous to amateur sport." David Marquess of Exeter to Giulio Onesti, 31 March 1966, ABC Box 55.

77. Giulio Onesti to Exeter, 7 April 1966, ABC Box 61.

78. "Preliminary Report to the Executive Board of the IOC on Television Policy," ABC Box 101.

79. Ibid. The IOC formed a Television Sub-Committee in the early 1970s in order to improve the organization's knowledge of the television industry.

80. Seduta Delle Federazioni Internazionali Sportive, pp. 2/15 - 19.

81. Ibid., p. 2/15.

82. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC with Representatives of the IFS. Rome, 23 April 1966, pp. 5-6, ABC Box 93.

83. Minutes of the 64th Session of the International Olympic Committee, Rome, 25-29 April 1966, ABC Box 93. The minutes describe the scene as a "heated discussion." For the recorded details of the debate, see pp. 4-5.

84. Meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC, Rome, 21-24 April 1966, pp. 7-9.

85. Minutes of the Meeting of the 64th Session of the International Olympic Committee, p. 5.

86. As quoted in Guttmann, *The Olympics*, p. 115.

87. Minutes of the Meeting of the 64th Session of the International Olympic Committee, p. 3.

88. \$200,000 was the analogous figure for the Winter Games Organizing Committee.

89. Avery Brundage to Albert Mayer (IOC member, Switzerland), 19 May 1966, ABC Box 60.

90. Ibid.; and Brundage to Exeter, 19 May 1966, ABC Box 55.

91. Brundage to Exeter, 19 May 1966, ABC Box 55.

92. Exeter to Brundage, 31 May 1966, ABC Box 55.

93. The IOC Finance Commission urged the IFS to devise a plan which received unanimous approval of the IFS. Summarised Minutes of the Meeting of the Finance

Commission of the IOC and Representatives of the International Federations' Commission and the Federations of Judo, Shooting, and Athletics, Mexico City, 6 October 1968, p. 3, IOCA. The IFS' share of 1968 Olympic television revenue was distributed according to a plan designed by Exeter because the IFS were unable to reach unanimous agreement on a formula. The Winter IFS and Summer IFS submitted distribution plans in 1970 and 1972 respectively. Both plans received IOC approval. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Amsterdam, 8-16 May 1970, p. 15, IOCA; and "Meeting Between the Three IOC Vice-Presidents and the Representatives of the International Federations," Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Finance Commission, Munich, 17, 28 August, 1 September 1972, p. 7, IOCA.

94. "Report of the Commission No. 3 -- Finances," Report to the General Assembly of International Federations, Lausanne, 22 April 1967, p. 3, ABC Box 207. This report indicates that the majority of the IFS were resolved to a renewal of their claim to one-third of Olympic television revenue within days of the IOC Session in Rome.

95.V.C. Sugahadasa (President, National Olympic Committee of Ceylon) to the President of the National Olympic Committee of Ireland, 25 March 1968, ABC Box 61. Exeter attributed the text of this letter to Giulio Onesti. It represented an attempt to recruit the support of the NOC of Ireland for the establishment of the Permanent General Assembly of NOCs. Exeter to Avery Brundage, 27 May 1968, ABC Box 55.

96. Onesti was motivated by a desire to elevate the status of the NOCs through the formation of a formally constituted organization. Guttman, *The Olympics*, pp. 117-118. IF leaders such as Coulon and Phillips desired to increase the lobbying power of the IFS pertaining to issues such as amateurism, Olympic site selection, and the allocation of money received by Organizing Committees in exchange for exclusive television rights. Minutes of the Meeting of the General Assembly of International Federations, 21-23 April 1967, ABC Box 207. Exeter referred to the GAIF initiative as a "power grab." Exeter to Avery Brundage, 23 January 1967, ABC Box 55. Support for his assessment can be gleaned from a Roger Coulon missive to Marc Hodler, President of the Federation Internationale de Ski and IOC member to Switzerland. Referring to the IOC's refusal to grant official status to the GAIF, Coulon observed, "don't you think that the reason of this, up to a certain extent, is that the IOC thinks that all matters regarding sport are under the exclusive control of the IOC? As far as I am concerned," he stated, "I feel they are wrong." "I think that, in the international field," he said, "the IFS and the IOC have the same responsibilities." Roger Coulon to Marc Hodler, 14 June 1967, ABC Box 207.

97. Minutes of the 64th Session of the International Olympic Committee, pp. 6, 8.

98. For Sapporo, see Tomoo Sato (Secretary General, Sapporo Organizing Committee) to Lord Luke (Member, IOC Finance Committee) 2 October 1969; Tomoo Sato to Lord Luke, 6 October 1969; Lord Luke to Shosei Sasaka (Member, Sapporo Organizing Committee), 3 March 1970. All documents located in "Droits de T.V. Sapporo 1972" Binder, IOCA. For Munich, see Lord Luke to Herbert Kunze (Secretary General, Munich Organizing Committee), 3 November 1969, ABC Box 98; and Lord Luke to Willi Daume (President, Munich Organizing Committee), 15 October 1970, Lord Luke Personal File, 1969-1978, "1970" Folder, IOCA. The Sapporo Organizing Committee flinched in face of IOC pressure. Sato decided that the entire payment (\$6,401,000) from the U.S. network (N.B.C.) would be forwarded to the IOC for division according to the Rome Formula. Willi Daume held firm. The \$13.5 million tendered by the American Broadcasting Company (A.B.C.) was divided into two parts. The rights fees portion of the contract was \$7.5 million.

99.Avery Brundage to the IOC Executive Board (Armand Massard, David Lord Burghley, S.A.R. the Prince Axel of Denmark, S.E. Mohammad Taher, Miguel A. Moenck, and Count Paolo Thaon de Revel), 3 August 1955, ABC Box 114.

APPENDIX A

Olympic Television Revenue, 1960- 1972

Year	Site	Total (U.S. Dollars)
1960	Squaw Valley	50,000
	Rome	1,178,257
1964	Innsbruck	936,667
	Tokyo	1,577,778
1968	Grenoble	2,612,822
	Mexico City	9,750,000
1972	Sapporo	8,475,269
	Munich	17,792,000