

# JOURNAL ARTICLE REVIEWS

A section of review scholarship, *Journal Article Reviews*, appears for the second time in this volume of OLYMPIKA. The intent of this dimension is to present short reviews of articles on Olympic themes appearing in the major sociocultural journals of the world. In this issue, ten articles are reviewed by Gordon MacDonald and Douglas Brown, Centre for Olympic Studies at the University of Western Ontario, London, Canada.

Ian Jobling, "Australia at the 1936 Olympics: Issues and Attitudes," *Canadian Journal of History of Sport*, Vol. XIII, No. 1, (May 1982) 18-27. Reviewed by Gordon MacDonald.

Between 1933 and 1936 various groups in Canada, France, Great Britain, and the United States argued against participation in the 1936 Berlin Olympics because of various objectionable policies of the Nazi government. Jobling states that Australians paid little heed to the arguments of foreign countries against participation, although prominent Australian newspapers noted such arguments. Furthermore, Australians paid little attention to protests raised by an Australian labour organization. Despite the rise of the Nazi government in Germany, Australian participation in the 1936 Olympics was never really questioned by the populace.

His argument begins with a discussion of Australian newspaper coverage of the Nazi regime and of Germany's preparations to host the Olympic Games. While acknowledging that Australia still looked to the United Kingdom for foreign policy direction in the 1930s, Jobling notes several instances in which domestic newspapers and the popular press sounded warnings as to Hitler's designs in Europe.

Jobling then discusses the more specific example of Australian reaction to overseas protests against Nazi policies, and the attempts by groups in the United States, Britain, Canada, and France to organize boycotts of the 1936 Olympic Games. The Australian sporting community appears to have been unmoved by such activities in other countries; Jobling found little evidence of any Australian reaction. Most politicians, social commentators, and sporting people appear to have been silent on the issue.

The only real evidence of an Australian reaction came from the Victorian Executive of the Australian Labour Party, which apparently planned to protest against Australian participation in the Games. However, Jobling states that the plan must have failed because it was never brought before the general membership.

Australians participated in the Games, while reports in the Australian newspapers were generally positive. The evidence leads Jobling to conclude that Australians, despite being fairly well informed about the nature of Nazi Germany, were "insensitive and unresponsive" to the use of the Games for Nazi political purposes. Of course, one wonders what percentage of the population was reached by the newspapers Jobling surveyed. The blanket statement that Australians were

“insensitive and unresponsive” may be too broad. However, those people, such as the politicians, sports people, and social commentators who did not react when they had the opportunity may indeed fall into Jobling’s “insensitive and unresponsive” category.

The bulk of Jobling’s sources are the major Australian newspaper reports of the various international activities, some secondary sources in journal articles, and, finally, books written during the period under consideration.

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Sheila Mitchell, “Women’s Participation in the Olympic Games 1900-1926,” *Journal of Sport History*, Vol. 4, No. 2, (Summer, 1977), 208-228. Reviewed by Douglas Brown.

**W**omen’s entrance into the Olympic Movement signifies a long and arduous struggle with many significant events and individuals demarcating its history. The purpose of Mitchell’s article is to “identify and examine the factors which affected the development of women’s participation in the Olympic Games in order to determine the reasons underlying the International Olympic Committee’s (IOC’s) decision to officially accept women in the program.” Mitchell studies the issue by focusing on the organizational decision-making and power structures that compose the IOC and its affiliated sport bodies. She delimits herself to factors that are internal to the organization. The demographic profile of the IOC’s membership, the IOC’s relationship with the International Sport Federations (IFs) and the hosting committee’s of the Olympic Games, and the leadership of Baron Pierre de Coubertin provide the historical data upon which Mitchell interprets the formal entrance of women into the Olympic Games. The amateur ideology of the IOC is also given due consideration in this paper.

The relationship between these factors have led Mitchell to identify two specific periods that articulate the process of including women on the Olympic Games program. During the years 1896 to 1912, the IFs and Olympic Games hosts demonstrated their authority to include women’s events on the Olympic Games program. The IOC’s authority lay in the formulation of the Olympic ideology, and not with the actual decision-making and programming at the Games. In the second period (1912-1925) the IOC becomes much more authoritarian in decision-making related to the Olympic program and specifically the inclusion of women. Mitchell concludes that by 1912, the IOC had converted their internationalist ideology into a practical decision-making policy specific to the sport program of the Olympic Games. Mitchell interprets this policy, which defined Olympic sports as those practiced in a minimum of six countries, as tool used for ensuring “that only well established predominantly male sports would qualify for admission” on the Olympic program.

This article puts forth several hypotheses regarding the gradual increase in the number of women’s event on the Olympic program. While the study is formally restricted to factors internal to the decision-making function of the IOC, the author

has permitted herself a few forays which consider external factors. Fortunately these forays add a broader sociocultural context to the research, although, much more could have been pursued in this regard. This article offers an interesting presentation of the organizational 'system that has been influential in defining the history of women's participation in the Olympic Games.

The author has used a variety of primary sources, including: IOC minutes from the Annual Sessions; and *Revue Olympique* (articles by de Coubertin). An abbreviation of the paradigm for organizational development, employed by Richard J. Moriarty in his Ph.D. dissertation "The Organizational History of the Canadian Intercollegiate Athletic Union Central 1906-1955," provides the analytical framework for Mitchell's research.

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John Lucas, "Early Olympic Antagonists: Pierre de Coubertin Versus James E. Sullivan," *Stadion*, Vol. III, No. 2, (1977) 258-272. Reviewed by Gordon MacDonald.

In this article, Lucas traces the relationship between the Baron Pierre de Coubertin and James E. Sullivan from the time of their first meeting in 1893, until Sullivan's death in 1914. The bulk of the story focuses on the period 1900-1908, when the greatest amount of interaction took place between the two. Despite their dislike for each other, the two men were tied together in promoting international sport and, furthermore, their personal animosities affected the broader relationship between the IOC and United States sports organizations.

Their differences began almost as soon as they met. Sullivan was not a big proponent of the initial Olympic Games of Athens and did little to help American athletes attend. However, he was interested in promoting track and field internationally. As early as 1900 he attempted, unsuccessfully, to form an international federation to control track and field. This worried Coubertin, who quite rightly saw the action as a threat to the Olympic Games.

In 1901, Sullivan attempted to stage an Olympian games in Buffalo while Coubertin lobbied for the Olympic Games to be held in Chicago or New York in 1904. Lucas argues that the two men were on completely different wavelengths, Sullivan pushing hard for the ascendancy of American track and field, while Coubertin championed an international multi-sport festival. In the end, the 1904 Olympic Games were awarded to Chicago, but then moved to St. Louis. According to Lucas, the relationship between Coubertin and Sullivan warmed a bit when Coubertin appointed Sullivan an administrative officer of these Games.

The 1904 Games, deemed unsuccessful by Coubertin, led him grudgingly to accept interim games in Athens in 1906. Sullivan was an integral player in ensuring American supremacy at these games. Lucas provides an extended account of the correspondence between the two men after the Athens games, which shows that Sullivan was keenly disappointed at not being appointed to the IOC, and that

Coubertin had never recognized the authority of the Amateur Athletic Union of the United States to rule international sport.

The problems continued at a different level during the 1908 London Games, which saw much acrimonious debate between the Americans and the British. Sullivan's antagonistic and bellicose attitudes frustrated Coubertin and he criticised the American for the same.

However, relations between the two mellowed by 1912 when the Stockholm Games were held. Sullivan even wrote to tell Coubertin about a book he was writing on Olympic history and acknowledged that their dispute of 1908 should not have occurred. Finally, shortly before his death in 1914, Sullivan travelled to France to receive an award from Coubertin for his work in promoting the Olympic Games. Thus, despite their quarrels, both men managed to allay some of their differences and achieve a measure of accord.

Lucas places Sullivan within the American sporting context to a greater extent than Coubertin is placed within the French equivalent in this article. While Sullivan's American supporters and detractors are noted, Coubertin appears as a more solitary figure in terms of his own country.

Lucas has relied mostly on Coubertin's memoirs, personal letters between the two antagonists, Coubertin's writings in the *Revue Olympique* and the *Bulletin du Comité des Jeux Olympiques*, newspaper accounts, and the writings of famed turn-of-the-century sports journalist and IOC member Caspar Whitney to provide evidence for his case in reconstructing this symbiotic relationship.

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Allen Guttmann, "The Games Must Go On: On the origins of Avery Brundage's life credo," *Stadion*, Vol. II, (1979), 251-262.  
Reviewed by Douglas Brown.

**T**he career of Avery Brundage, one of the most prominent administrative leaders of the modern Olympic Movement, has been scrutinized extensively since Allen Guttmann wrote this article in 1979. Brundage's tyrannical commitment to preserving the values of amateurism within the context of the Olympic Games has led to a number of consistently similar historical portraits of this man. Histories of the Olympic Games have been dominated by inquiries into the structural-functional elements of this twentieth century phenomenon. Suited to this paradigm, the character of Avery Brundage seems inevitably to be contextualized within the power relations of the International Olympic Committee's management. Guttmann's biographical article is an exception because he accepts the character and role of Brundage outright. Guttmann strives to understand the origins of Brundage's religious-like conviction to Olympism. The events of Brundage's life, how his character was constructed, and the emergence of his unwavering commitment to the values and ethics of Olympism are examined in this article.

Guttman acknowledges the great lack of historical documentation describing the early life of Avery Brundage. Enough evidence exists, however, for Guttman to piece together a theme that pervaded Brundage's life and self-image, that of the self-made man. Brundage was proud of his path through life, from humble, fatherless origins to Olympic athlete and millionaire business man. Guttman does not attempt to provide evidence that contradicts Brundage's self-interpretation; however, he does challenge the reader's understanding of the validity of espousing oneself as a self-made man. In fact, Guttman questions the parameters that enable a person to be defined, unwittingly, as a self-made man. Ultimately, the idea of the self-made man is identified as a cultural archetype in American society. Brundage is described as being fascinated with this American archetype. The evidence and interpretation put forward by Guttman in this article describes Brundage as a conscious promoter of his own self-made man status, particularly within the context of the Olympic Movement. Guttman hints that the credo of the Olympic Movement confirmed and augmented Brundage's project of self-creation.

This brief biographical sketch of Avery Brundage is valuable because it reveals an aspect of the Olympic Movement that is too frequently overlooked by historians, the interface between the ideological premise and the varying degrees to which individuals subscribe to the ideology and translate it into actions. This article describes how the Olympic Movement and a young Brundage converged on an explicit ideological level. The interface between ideology and the human element is dramatically unproblematic for Brundage in this analysis. Consideration of Brundage's passion for archetypes enables us to understand his motivation to lead the Olympic Movement on the high road ideologically. Guttman's analysis, which emphasizes the constructed nature of moral zealots may lead to studies that successfully demystify the notion of Olympism and the Olympic Movement.

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Uriel Simri, "The Development of Female Participation in the Modern Olympic Games," *Stadion*, Vol. VI, (1980) 187-216. Reviewed by Gordon MacDonald.

In this article Simri provides a chronological account of female involvement in the Olympic Games from their first participation in 1900 until the early 1980s. Basically, the article encapsulates the major themes of a monograph he released on the subject in the late 1970s. For the most part, this account simply unfolds from Games to Games, touching on the number of sports and the women who participated in them; though Simri does mention the sociological debate whether female participation in sport has been a cause or effect of emancipation.

He argues evidence exists that at least one woman wanted to compete in the Olympic Games of 1896, but was prevented from doing so. Thus, women first participated in the 1900 Olympic Games. Even then, they competed because of the power of the Paris Organizing Committee, which overruled IOC President Pierre de

Coubertin's objections to the idea. Simri focuses on Coubertin's ideas at some length to show that the Baron's biases against women's participation in the Games remained consistent throughout his life.

The first real breakthrough for women occurred in 1912 when swimming for females was introduced. It quickly became the sport with the largest number of female participants. Furthermore, women's gymnastics demonstrations took place for the first time. However, the big problem of convincing Olympic Games organizing committees to allow track and field competitions for women remained. The Federation Sportive Feminine Internationale (FSFI), an organization created by a women to promote women's sport internationally, helped this cause significantly. Several world women's games were held under the auspices of the FSFI. The track and field competitions at these games helped to convince IOC members to include women's track and field competitions at the 1928 Olympic Games. Simri notes that this innovation was implemented, not coincidentally, soon after the resignation of Coubertin as president of the IOC.

In connection with the track and field issue, Simri discusses paternalistic attitudes in the years prior to the Second World War, noting the predominant medical opinions still held that strenuous exercise was not safe for women. Furthermore, many of these attitudes were extremely slow to change, some lasting well into the decades after the war.

Thematically, Simri also examines the great impact of the former Soviet bloc on women's athletics, the recent growth of women's participation both in numbers and in events, the present status of women's sport (in 1980) and the significant presence of women in the Winter Games. By 1980, women had made great strides in the Olympic Movement, but still were not included in administrative leadership, and still suffered from prejudice.

Simri concludes that male chauvinism has slowed female participation in the Olympic Games, but adds that religion has also played a role in suppressing women's involvement. (Of course, one might argue that religion has been male dominated too, so, naturally, religions' influence on sport would favour males.)

The primary sources for this article are official reports from some early Olympic Games and Olympic Congresses. Most of the information for the later periods is based on secondary sources found in three languages (English, German, and French). Simri includes two tables at the end of the paper which show the evolution of women's sports on Olympic programmes, and the participation rates of women in the Games. These two tables encapsulate nicely much of the basic information in the paper.

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James Riordan, "The USSR and the Olympic Games," *Stadion*, Vol. VI, (1980), 291-313. Reviewed by Douglas Brown.

James Riordan proposes the thesis that "[t]he story of Russian and Soviet relations with the Olympic Movement in the preceding 84 years ... is largely that of Russian and Soviet foreign policy." He formulates this thesis, partially, on the assumption that the Olympic Movement had been fully integrated into both the political systems of tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union. Riordan's thesis is further supported by an impressive interpretation of primary sources--in the Russian language. Unfortunately, most of the endnotes are printed in the original Russian which reduces the reader's opportunity to scrutinize his work. Translations of these citations would have been more useful to the reader of this English article.

Riordan's historical method, the analysis of Russian and Soviet sport from the perspective of foreign policy decision-making, was a shrewd and timely choice which has stood the test of time. The article is structured chronologically which is useful for contextualizing the development of the infamous Soviet sport machine in the history of the Russian culture. Ultimately, this structure emphasizes the long and relatively continuous interest amongst Russians to use sport as a tool of foreign policy. Furthermore, Riordan describes how this interest in sport has endured political revolution, war, and social re-structuring. The first period, the final years of tsarist Russia, signifies the founding of a centrally organized sport program. Riordan reveals, rather obliquely, that Russia's athletic prowess at the Olympic Games was perceived as a mode of asserting itself internationally. This, in itself, is a valuable insight because it challenges the naive interpretation that the nation-state rivalries that we have known at the Olympic Games recently were solely a product of Cold War relations.

The USSR's path to international athletic pre-eminence and Olympic Games domination has been a truly fascinating example of foreign policy deployment involving sport. In the ten years since this article was published, the completely unidimensional nature of the Soviet government's sport program has come under critical examination. Today, Riordan's article signifies a rather bizarre and sad irony for the former Soviet Union and its role as a leader in the Olympic Solidarity Programme. Only a few years ago, the USSR was regarded as a most generous benefactor to developing countries desiring the international advantages of belonging to the Olympic Movement. That role has changed drastically with the re-organization of political boundaries.

The history of sport has traditionally emphasized political and sociological interpretations. Riordan's article demonstrates the effectiveness and expediency of this historical method. However, too often, this emphasis ignores the cultural context of sport which ultimately denies the potential to understand the human agency in sport. Of course, it may be possible that the Soviet regime had effectively eliminated all of the potential for human agency in sport by politicizing the delivery system to such an extreme. This could have provided an underlying thesis in Riordan's article. While the Soviet sport machine has been effectively shut down, many fascinating

historical questions about sport participation and spectatorship in the Russian culture remain unexplored.

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James L. McClain, "Cultural Chauvinism and the Olympiads of East Asia," *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, Vol. 7, No. 3, (December 1990) 388-404. Reviewed by Gordon MacDonald.

McClain looks at forms of nationalism bred by the Olympic Games no matter where they are held. While the official goals of the 1964 Tokyo Games and the 1988 Seoul Games were to promote international understanding and provide an excellent competition for the athletes involved, both hosts displayed cultural chauvinism. This article provides what the author calls some initial comparisons of the nationalism that these Games generated in their host countries.

First, McClain describes positive aspects of the Olympic Games, arguing that they can promote international understanding through sport and artistic competitions. Generally speaking, however, nationalism is nearly always present and he begins by noting the forms that have appeared in American, Japanese, and Korean mass media. Even the International Olympic Committee promotes nationalism because of the structure of the ceremonies and the fact that athletes represent their countries at the Games.

Turning to the Asian examples, the Olympic Games have been used to showcase technology, as happened in Tokyo where new equipment was introduced for timing and measuring events. More importantly, McClain discusses the numerous symbols created for the two Olympiads which attempted to be international while promoting national cultural pride, but which tended towards the latter. These ranged from the architectural designs of certain Japanese venues, to the Seoul tiger cub mascot, Hodori.

In the second half of the article, McClain describes the economic nationalism, cultural chauvinism, and neo-nationalism that have appeared in varying forms in Japan since Tokyo hosted the 1964 Olympic Games. He also offers a brief discussion of Korea, with the underlying hypothesis that a similar phenomenon is occurring in this country in the years following the 1988 Games. He wonders about the connection between these recent forms of nationalism and the pride created by holding the Games. While there is surely a connection between the two, how strong or causal that connection may be is not easily quantified. Hence, a further question is whether the Games may be seen as causally related to the subsequent growth of nationalism, or was the Olympic festival just a reflection of what was already occurring?

This article makes some interesting points about the experience of hosting the Games, and raises even more questions about the causal connections between the symbols surrounding the Olympic Games, the promotion of nationalism, and a sense

of national culture. McClain concludes that the forces of nationalism in these two countries will continue to be important as they attempt to forge new cultural identities that are both cosmopolitan and, yet, Korean and Japanese.

McClain relies on Japanese and Korean journals, magazines and newspapers as his major sources. He cites several translations of Japanese and Korean articles, as well as English language publications devoted to the Far East.

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Bruce Kidd, "Canadian Opposition to the 1936 Olympics in Germany," *Canadian Journal of History of Sport and Physical Education*, Vol. IX, No. 2, (December, 1978), 20-40. Reviewed by Douglas Brown.

The political viability of Canadian athletes' participation in the Olympic Games of 1936 Berlin was challenged as early as 1933. The purpose of this article is to "describe the nature of opposition to the German Olympics in Canada and the events which led to sending a Canadian Team to the People's Olympic Games in Barcelona." Bruce Kidd reveals the complex social variables that defined the dialogue over Canada's participation in the Nazi Olympics. Specifically, Kidd reveals sport-minded Canadians' attitudes towards socialism, communism, and fascism, as well as the relationship between sport and politics. Ultimately, Canada sent a team in excess of one hundred athletes to the Berlin Olympics. A small group of athletes, who were essentially ostracised from the amateur athletic community in Canada, travelled to the ill-fated worker's Counter Olympics that had been scheduled for Barcelona one week prior to the Berlin Games. Kidd suggests that the proposed Canadian boycott of the 1936 Berlin Olympics represented a protest against the racial discrimination policies of the German Nazis as well as a rejection of the decadent bourgeois nature of the International Olympic Committee. Bruce Kidd concludes that the boycott was not supported because it did not reflect the concerns of the majority of Canada's sport community. In other words, evidence presented in this article suggests that the relationship between sport and politics was ignored, or at best unrecognized, by politicians, sport administrators, and especially athletes of this generation.

This article is peppered with interesting remarks from individuals who were involved in the boycott campaign or affected by it. To a great extent, Kidd allows the past to speak for itself. He has interviewed a number of the athletes who were affected by the debate over Canada's participation in the Berlin Olympic Games and the Barcelona Worker's Games. From these interviews, Kidd illuminates the characters and political savvy of Canadian youth at this time in Canadian history. The primary sources are meticulously assembled and presented. References from a number Amateur Athletic Union of Canada Annual Reports, a broad spectrum of Newspapers and several personal interviews add to the reader's awareness that Canadian attitudes towards the Olympic Games, sport and sportsmanship were

diverse, and yet not always terribly complex on a social level. Comments of former athletes are particularly revealing in this regard. All in all, this article offers the reader a vivid narrative of Canadian society in the years leading up to the Second World War. Through the debate over Canada's participation in the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games, Kidd examines Canadian society at large and reveals class and ethnic diversity and alienation, regional exceptionalism, and a general naivete in the realm of international relations, particularly as pertaining to sport. One of many significant contributions that this article makes to the history of sport and the Olympic Movement is the prominent inclusion of the athletes and their diverse perspectives on the boycott issue. The career of Canadian high jumper Eva Dawes, and the other athletes who committed themselves to the workers sport movement, have received well deserved recognition for their roles in this controversial episode of Olympic history.

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John Lucas, "American Involvement in the Athens Olympic Games of 1906: Bridge Between Failure and Success," *Stadion*, Vol. VI, (1980) 217-228. Reviewed by Douglas Brown.

Lucas argues that American participation in the alternate Olympic Games of 1906 helped boost the image of international sport and the Olympic Games. In this progressive era, Americans also saw their domination of the track and field events as proof of their young nation's burgeoning international superiority.

His tale starts with IOC President Pierre de Coubertin's reluctant acquiescence to the Greeks' wish to stage the Games. Because of the lack of success of the 1900 and 1904 Olympic Games, and Coubertin's still tenuous position as leader of the fledgling movement, the Baron realized that supporting interim games would be in the best interests both of the movement and for himself personally.

James E. Sullivan was the key person for the Americans, and was in charge of the United States contingent. He assembled a team composed entirely of men, with most of these being track and field athletes. Lucas states that the U.S. team left for Athens with little fanfare because the American public was preoccupied with many domestic affairs ranging from social reform to national politics to the professional baseball season. Furthermore, the spring of 1906 saw several natural disasters that captured the world's attention. A coal mine disaster in France, the eruption of Mount Vesuvius in Italy (which the Americans passed on their way to Athens), and the great earthquake in San Francisco all drew international attention.

Because of Sullivan's focus on track and field events, the Americans participated in few of the other events and won only one medal in them. In track and field, however, they dominated the Games. After the American athletes' dominant performances, Sullivan was congratulated in person by the King of Greece, and by telegram from U.S. President Roosevelt.

The U.S. public was, of course, preoccupied with the San Francisco tragedy, but many sports journalists spoke of the American victories with considerable hyperbole. Lucas argues that the Americans' success in track and field was understood (incorrectly) as being indicative of American superiority in all sports. Furthermore, some journalists seemed to believe that American sporting success demonstrated the superiority of the U.S. as a nation, as well as its position as a new international leader. Because of the U.S. athletes' success and the nationalistic coverage by American journalists of the 1906 Games, impetus was gained for greater participation at the 1908 Olympic Games.

Lucas' sources for this article consist primarily of contemporary newspaper and periodical stories and several firsthand accounts written by American team members. He also relies on several secondary sources such as general histories of the modern Olympic Games, as well as dissertations written on specific aspects of the Olympics. His use of contemporary accounts and his contextualization of the Games within the major international events of the time strengthen the article considerably.

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Stephen R. Wenn, "A Call to Arms: A. Sidney Dawes' Campaign for C.O.A. Independence," *Canadian Journal of History of Sport*, Volume XXI, Number 2 (December, 1990), 33-46.  
Reviewed by Douglas Brown.

The stated purpose of this article is the re-examination of the Canadian Olympic hierarchy established by the administrators of amateur sport during the period 1946-1948. Specifically, this paper studies the events that eventually led to the founding of the Canadian Olympic Association (COA). In 1948, at the Amateur Athletic Union of Canada's (AAU of C) Annual Meeting, Canadian sport governing bodies were finally granted the right to determine the structure of their own National Olympic Committee. In effect, this signalled the end of the AAU of C's control over all matters concerning the participation of Canadian athletes at the Olympic Games. The persistence of A. Sidney Dawes, the support of influential friends, the apparent need to conform with International Olympic Committee (IOC) regulations, and declining Canadian Olympic performances are identified as the factors that contributed to the establishment of the new Olympic committee in Canada. Wenn employs a military battle metaphor to structure his article. This format emphasizes the personality conflict between A. Sidney Dawes, President of the COA (a committee of the AAU of C) and the President of the AAU of C, George C. Machum. In dramatic fashion, A. Sidney Dawes emerges as the victor in this confrontation.

As a case study in organizational re-structuring, this article makes an interesting contribution to the expanding historical research on the institutionalization of the Olympic Movement. With his very thorough research skills, Wenn has painted a portrait of Canadian amateurism in action in 1948. With colourful characterizations, Wenn demonstrates the important role of politically astute individuals who defined

the power structures of Canadian sport. In this instance, A. Sidney Dawes, Nelson Hart, and George Machum, and even Avery Brundage, are credited with the founding of the first independent and autonomous COA. In concluding this paper, Wenn comments on the lack of media attention given to the organizational re-structuring of the COA in 1948. Apparently, the impact of this event was deemed to have little impact on the sportsmen and sportswomen of Canada. The contextualization of this historical event is somewhat subsumed by the personality and leadership struggle between Dawes and Muchum. As a result, the significance of the COA break from the AAU of C in 1948 appears to be a minor event in Canadian sport history.

Stephen Wenn has used an impressive array of sources in his research. AAU of C Annual Minutes, the John H. Crocker Collection, the Avery Brundage Collection and personal interviews provide the bulk of his primary sources.