

## Growing Pains: The Olympic Movement and Television, 1966-1972

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We are sliding slowly but surely towards “money business.” As you repeated it so many times, the Olympic Movement so far never had any money, and never needed any money. Our ideology which is also a tremendous strength is chiefly based upon good-will, spontaneity, and enthusiasm, these three factors being sources of pure and honest energy. So far, we managed very well indeed and that is why we still exist.

An excerpt from Count Jean de Beaumont’s (Member, IOC Finance Commission) letter to Avery Brundage (President, IOC), 4 November 1971.<sup>1</sup>

A very Brundage’s administrative agenda was replete with troublesome issues in the latter half of the 1960s. Pressure for the expulsion of South Africa failed to shake Brundage’s resolve to separate sport and politics, although by the end of the decade he had to admit defeat on the issue of South African membership.<sup>2</sup> The National Olympic Committees and International Sport Federations, organizations central to the success of Olympic festivals, continued their pursuit of a more prominent role in decision-making concerning the direction of the Olympic Movement. Their dogged campaign agitated Brundage who feared for the erosion of the IOC’s (and his own) power base.<sup>3</sup> In his unending battle against the intrusion of commercialism in the Olympic Movement, the ever-vigilant Brundage trained his cross hairs on French and Austrian skiers who flaunted amateur legislation through the acceptance of sponsorship contracts with ski equipment manufacturers.<sup>4</sup> Brundage, who also harboured no sympathy for individuals who sought to exploit the Olympic Movement for political causes, expressed his consternation following the demonstration staged by Tommie Smith and John Carlos in Mexico City.<sup>5</sup> Once an individual who expressed interest in the potential financial windfall for the IOC from the sale of Olympic television rights, Brundage was perplexed by the struggle with the National Olympic Committees (NOCs), International Sport Federations (IFs), and Olympic Organizing Committees during the late 1960s and early 1970s for an acceptable method of distributing this burgeoning revenue source. The issue was

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especially disconcerting to the aging and increasingly querulous Chicagoan because he had already invested much time on the matter of satisfying the interested parties<sup>6</sup>

During the 1960s Brundage became disenchanted with the effect of television money and television's inherent commercialism upon the Olympic Movement. The presence of television revenue had contributed to strained relations among leaders of the IOC, NOCs, and IFs. "I have deplored on more than one occasion," observed Brundage, "the idea of financial considerations being introduced into Olympic affairs. For the first time serious arguments have been provoked and I do not like it!"<sup>7</sup> Brundage was dismayed by the persistent lobbying of leaders of the IFs and NOCs for an increased percentage of available Olympic television revenue. The IFs were dissatisfied with the receipt of \$150,450 from the 1968 Mexico City Organizing Committee for distribution among the Summer Games federations. The IOC had reserved only \$30,000 for the Winter Games IFs from the 1968 Grenoble Organizing Committee.<sup>8</sup> Subsequent negotiations conducted by the 1968 Organizing Committees resulted in these sums representing 1.54% and 1.15% of the total rights fees negotiated by the Mexico City and Grenoble Organizing Committees respectively. Profligate spending by these organizations, countered Brundage, would bring the Olympic Movement into disrepute.<sup>9</sup> Although he had stalled action on their entreaties for a number of years, Brundage recognized the need for a compromise agreement.

Despite his concern that access to more television revenue might result in some embarrassment to the IOC if leaders of the IFs and NOCs did not exercise discretion regarding expenditures, Brundage had little maneuvering room. The IFs and NOCs were critical to the success of the Olympic Movement.<sup>10</sup> Brundage also considered that a more equitable method of distributing the television revenue might dissuade the IFs and NOCs from establishing proposed umbrella organizations for their member groups. Brundage feared that formal associations would impinge upon the IOC's authority. In 1966, the IOC Executive Board received General Session approval, and support from a majority of the IFs, for a new distribution plan for television money [hereafter cited as the "Rome Formula"]. Although this plan for the division of 1972 Olympic television money did not satisfy the more bellicose IF executives, Brundage departed Rome with confidence that the IFs had been mollified.<sup>11</sup> His sense of relief was short-lived.

Archival documents located in Avery Brundage's personal papers as well as research material at the IOC's Lausanne headquarters reveal that Brundage faced four challenges following the enactment of the "Rome Formula." First, a number of IF leaders expressed dissatisfaction with the terms of the "Rome Formula" within days of the close of the IOC's General Session and lobbied for a greater percentage of the television revenue. Second, some IOC members found it difficult to resist the lure of television money. They linked the IOC's potential effectiveness in executing its mandate with the procurement of optimum contractual arrangements regarding the sale of Olympic television rights. Third, IOC staff members thrust the IOC into a financial crisis because of their inability to manage the new source of revenue. Fourth, the 1972 Sapporo and Munich Organizing Committees adopted negotiation strategies following the establishment of the "Rome Formula" aimed at maximizing their portions of U.S. television money while minimizing the amount available to the

IFs, NOCs, and the IOC. The activities of the Sapporo and Munich Organizing Committees and the IOC's need to protect its financial interests helped move the organization towards a more hands-on and sophisticated method of dealing with television matters. Brundage was the reluctant captain of the IOC ship during this critical period in the IOC's history that witnessed a fundamental change in the organization's level of involvement with the commercial television industry, and hence its philosophical approach to money issues. These events contributed to Brundage's anguish regarding the prominence of financial matters in the daily affairs of the IOC during the latter years of his presidency.

As Avery Brundage departed Rome following the IOC's General Session in April 1966, he could reflect with some satisfaction on the newly brokered agreement with the NOCs and IFs. The "Rome Formula" provided for the allocation of one-third of the initial \$1 million in net revenue from the sale of the 1972 Summer Olympic television rights to the IOC, NOCs, and IFs. These groups divided two-thirds of the second million in net revenue while the Organizing Committee collected the remaining one-third. The Organizing Committee received two-thirds of each successive million with the remaining one-third allotted to the IOC, NOCs, and IFs in equal portions.<sup>12</sup> Since the Organizing Committee received two-thirds of any revenue in excess of \$2 million, individuals negotiating with television networks on behalf of the Organizing Committees were motivated to seek maximum sale prices. Although some of the IF leaders had sought an even larger proportion of the television revenue, the "Rome Formula" provided for a significant increase in money available to the federations.

Brundage refused to yield to their demand for one-third of all television revenue for two reasons. First, Brundage believed that the IFs might spend the money in a manner prejudicial to the reputation of the Olympic Movement. This concern was not alleviated significantly in light of this agreement. Second, he realized that the financial resources necessary to stage an Olympic festival required a plan that would guarantee the Organizing Committee(s) a substantial amount of revenue.<sup>13</sup> Brundage was hopeful that the contentious issue of television money had been settled.

Brundage's efforts had not appeased a number of the more strident IF leaders. Berge Phillips, President of the Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur (FINA) and Roger Coulon, President of the Fédération Internationale de Lutte Amateur, pressed the IOC for further financial concessions. Brundage took offense at their "obnoxious" attitude which was fuelled by "blatant commercialism."<sup>14</sup> The existence of conflict over financial issues, Brundage concluded, endangered the public's respect for the IOC and the Olympic Movement.<sup>15</sup> Phillips and Coulon, two individuals who professed profound dissatisfaction with the IOC's methods of dealing with the concerns of the IFs, further bedeviled Brundage with their concerted effort to establish the General Assembly of International Federations (GAIF). They sought to increase the lobbying power of the IFs pertaining to issues such as amateurism, Olympic site selection, and television money.<sup>16</sup> Phillips, Coulon and Thomas Keller, President of the Fédération Internationale des Sociétés d'Aviron, believed that a united front would result in a more fruitful airing of IF concerns.

The machinations of Phillips, Coulon, and Keller were of acute concern to IOC Vice-President and International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF) President,

David Cecil, the Marquess of Exeter (hereafter referred to as Exeter). Exeter shared Brundage's concern about GAIF's threat to the IOC's power, but he was also worried about the potential impact of GAIF upon the IAAF. Coulon's primary interest, asserted Exeter, was television money.<sup>17</sup> Coulon and his allies challenged the IOC's right to determine the amount of television money that each federation received. Prior to the 1964 Olympic festivals, Exeter had developed a system of distribution based on attendance at Olympic events sponsored by the federations. The IAAF, which provided the marquee events at the Summer Olympics, would suffer a noticeable financial loss if Coulon's desire for equal distribution of the television money among the IFs became accepted policy. Exeter observed that the IAAF and the larger IFs, such as the Association Internationale de Boxe Amateur (AIBA), would be defeated in any vote taken on the basis of the allocation of the IFs' share of future television revenue.<sup>18</sup> Exeter's response to Coulon and Phillips revealed his own "galloping self-interest"<sup>19</sup> regarding Olympic television money.

In order to undercut the power of GAIF and protect the interests of his IF, Exeter refused to lend the support of the IAAF to the fledgling organization.<sup>20</sup> His action received the approval of leaders of AIBA, the Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), and the International Yacht Racing Union (IYRU), who similarly resisted advances from Phillips and Coulon.<sup>21</sup> The IOC, said Exeter, could not grant recognition to an association of IFs that did not include the IAAF and other major IFs such as FIFA and AIBA.<sup>22</sup> Brundage agreed with his IOC colleague.

Exeter's tactics were deplored by Coulon, who understood the magnitude of the IAAF leader's studied action. Coulon continued to skirmish with Brundage and the IOC. "The majority of the IFs [cannot] admit the fact," stated Coulon, "that the [IAAF], whose President is a member of the [IOC Executive Board] considers to have the right to oppose our decisions."<sup>23</sup> In April 1967, GAIF staged its inaugural meeting at Lausanne's Continental Hotel, a short walk from the IOC's Mon Repos headquarters.

Brundage agreed to discuss the IOC's method of distributing television funds with the IFs. He cautioned Coulon that the apportionment of television money remained "under the sole and exclusive control of the IOC,"<sup>24</sup> and that the discussion would only address modifications possible in advance of the 1972 Olympics.<sup>25</sup> A meeting of the IOC Executive Board with representatives of the IFs in January, 1968, accomplished little. Exeter, who had previously warned Brundage that equal distribution of the television money would jeopardize the working relationship between the IOC and IAAF,<sup>26</sup> defended the current policy. Exeter reminded Coulon, Phillips, and Keller that the formula was not based strictly on gate receipts. The IAAF and a number of other federations had sacrificed money to the smaller federations that they would have been entitled to under such a plan. "Certain federations, logically entitled to very little," observed Exeter, "were granted considerable amounts."<sup>27</sup> A combative Coulon called for the IOC to transfer all television money from the 1968 Olympic festivals to the IFs.<sup>28</sup> These amateur sport leaders, who were consumed with the attraction of commercial television money, again proposed that the IFs should receive one-third of all Olympic television revenue that would be subject to equal division among the IFs. Later in the year, the IAAF remained the lone voice of dissent regarding the proposed equal distribution of

television revenue to the IFs. The strength of the IAAF relative to the other federations was revealed by the IOC's decision to encourage the IFs to reach unanimous agreement on a plan for distributing their share of future Olympic television money.<sup>29</sup> This charge occupied the IFs for the next four years.

Brundage yearned for the days when amateur sport officials carried out their tasks without giving a passing thought to the subject of money. While Lord Killanin prepared to assume leadership duties in 1972, Brundage stated soberly that the IOC "should have nothing to do with money."<sup>30</sup> During the latter six years of Brundage's presidential tenure, money was increasingly perceived as necessary for the operation of the IOC. Killanin was committed to enhancing the financial reserves of the IOC.<sup>31</sup> Konstantin Andrianov, an IOC Vice-President, believed television money was the logical source of funds which would permit an expansion of the IOC office, as well as a chief source for facilitating the execution of the IOC's mandate as a "force for peace and social improvement."<sup>32</sup> IOC Executive Board members, such as Exeter and Ivar Vind, advocated the acquisition of increased television rights fees, money that would assist in developing a more efficient system of management of Olympic affairs in Lausanne.<sup>33</sup> Georg von Opel, a West German IOC member, was less reserved in his counsel. "I am of the opinion," said von Opel, "that one person at the Lausanne office should do nothing but secure money for the IOC."<sup>34</sup> Fiscal necessities and a changing economic climate prompted this change in IOC philosophy, but these realities failed to assuage Brundage.

Brundage could not control the thinking of his IOC colleagues, many of whom associated the prospective success of their organization's mission with the acquisition of television money. During the 1960s the refinement of satellite capability had resulted in significant increases in the value of telecast rights to the Winter and Summer Games and the number of hours of Olympic programming.<sup>35</sup> The world-wide television rights for the 1964 Innsbruck Winter Games sold for \$936,667. Four years later, the Grenoble Organizing Committee recouped \$2,612,822 from the same series of negotiations. The 1968 Mexico City Organizing Committee also benefited from advances in satellite technology as it sold the rights to the Mexico City Summer Olympics for \$9,750,00, a six-fold increase on the amount received by the 1964 Tokyo Organizing Committee.<sup>36</sup> It would be wrong to think that IF leaders were the only officials involved in the administration of amateur sport gleefully rubbing their hands together in light of these developments.<sup>37</sup>

Unbridled spending of early financial returns from the Munich Organizing Committee by IOC staff members in Lausanne thrust the IOC into a state of fiscal disarray in the late 1960s. Brundage was extremely concerned with IOC spending involved in the effort to render its Lausanne headquarters more efficient. The rapid expenditure of television money advanced from the Munich organizers alarmed him. The IOC, warned Brundage, was "mortgaging its future."<sup>38</sup> He believed that the Finance Commission, which had been constituted in 1967 under the chairmanship of Great Britain's Lord Luke, needed to inform IOC members of the dire financial situation.<sup>39</sup> Too many members, Brundage maintained, were not cognizant of the financial difficulties.<sup>40</sup> The struggle to regain control of the organization's finances revealed personality conflicts within the IOC and disagreements in Olympic authority. The saga also provides the backdrop for a discussion of the IOC's

increasingly conspicuous involvement in negotiations for the sale of Olympic television rights.

Dissatisfied with the response to his concerns from Lord Luke and Finance Commission Vice-Chairman Reginald Alexander, Brundage dispatched Jean de Beaumont, a third member of the Finance Commission, to Lausanne in March 1968.<sup>41</sup> Beaumont was charged with completing a detailed investigation of the IOC's financial status. Displaying a degree of tact, Beaumont conveyed his travel plans and purpose to Lord Luke. Although he told Luke that he planned to discuss IOC finances with Secretary General Johann Westerhoff, he did not inform Luke of his intent to take his personal accountants with him for the purpose of launching a thorough study of the IOC's financial records. When Luke became aware of the extent of Beaumont's investigation, he criticized his colleague for overstepping his authority.<sup>42</sup> Beaumont was unmoved by the reproach and dutifully reported to Brundage that the IOC's sources of income were limited.<sup>43</sup>

Beaumont's report confirmed Brundage's fears concerning the IOC's dependence on television money. Westerhoff had also been less than helpful to Beaumont during his stay in Lausanne. Records later revealed the IOC had exceeded its budget in 1967 and 1968.<sup>44</sup> "With the encouragement of some members, Westerhoff ran wild," concluded Brundage.<sup>45</sup> This lack of fiscal restraint contributed to the termination of Westerhoff's employment at the end of 1968. Brundage called for the IOC Executive Board and Finance Commission to exert greater authority over the expenditures of the IOC office.<sup>46</sup>

The Finance Commission established a modified spending policy; however, the action failed to solve the problem. In March 1969, the Finance Commission stated that all cheques issued by the IOC office would require two signatures. Any expenditures exceeding \$1,145, which had not been previously budgeted, required the approval of the Finance Commission.<sup>47</sup> Lord Luke was discouraged by the limited impact of this initiative. In 1968 and the first nine months of 1969, the IOC exceeded its budget by \$310,000. "The situation is really serious," commented Luke, "and there seems to be no sense of economy at all amongst those concerned, who are spending." Luke notified the recently installed Director of the IOC, Monique Berlioux, that the Finance Commission wanted to review all spending requests in order to control the situation.<sup>48</sup>

The gravity of the IOC's financial position prompted Beaumont to call into question Luke's performance as chairman of the Finance Commission. Luke and Alexander, claimed Beaumont, failed to exploit the competencies of himself, Jose de Clark Flores, and Gunnar Ericsson. The Finance Commission, observed Beaumont, faced criticism for its dilatoriness in addressing problems.<sup>49</sup> Brundage concurred with the Count, at the same time lamenting that he would be blamed for the difficulties.<sup>50</sup> Luke, miffed by Beaumont's criticism, which he characterized as a "lecture on how to conduct affairs," countered Beaumont's claims. The IOC, said Luke, could not afford the travel costs involved in scheduling frequent meetings of the Finance Commission.<sup>51</sup>

The activities of Luke and Alexander also aggravated Berlioux, who had assumed direction of the IOC Secretariat. In November 1969, Alexander journeyed to Lausanne to undertake a further investigation of the IOC's finances. Alexander

discussed issues regarding the IOC's payroll and the production costs of its newsletter with representatives of the IOC's trust company.<sup>52</sup> Berlioux was offended by Alexander's activities. "I am perfectly willing to let you have any information you want," Berlioux scolded Alexander, but "as long as I am in charge of the administration I kindly ask you not to go over my head."<sup>53</sup> Berlioux reminded Alexander that she had not created the bookkeeping problems, rather she had inherited them.<sup>54</sup> She apprised Brundage of her displeasure over Alexander's conduct.<sup>55</sup> Alexander informed the angered IOC Director that he was simply carrying out a task assigned by Lord Luke. Luke surmised that Alexander's expertise as a chartered accountant might prove useful during a review of IOC bookkeeping and accounting procedures. It was Luke's hope that Alexander's investigation might result in a more streamlined, and less expensive, accounting process. Berlioux's protestations failed to elicit much sympathy from Alexander.<sup>56</sup>

Brundage concurred with Luke and Alexander on the wisdom of overhauling the IOC's accounting procedures. However, he grew impatient with their lack of progress. During Westerhoff's tenure as IOC Secretary General, IOC accounting costs rose to \$13,730 per year. He found this expenditure unwarranted in view of the fact that the IOC's yearly budget was a mere \$183,100.<sup>57</sup> Brundage summarily terminated the services of the IOC auditors, Arthur Young and Company<sup>58</sup> which attracted a predictable reaction from Luke. "I am greatly surprised at this unilateral action by yourself," noted Luke, "which makes one wonder whether it is worth having a Finance [Commission] at all if this is the way you treat it."<sup>59</sup> While Brundage, Luke, Alexander, Beaumont, and Berlioux traded barbs over financial issues, the IOC sought to improve its knowledge base concerning negotiations for television rights in order to enhance television's revenue potential.

During the 1966-1972 period, the IOC became less concerned with the negative aspects of commercialism pertaining to television revenue than it previously had been. At its inaugural meeting in September 1967, the IOC Finance Commission resolved to consult media experts in order to gain an understanding of the negotiation process involved in the sale of television rights to sport events.<sup>60</sup> "We are complete amateurs in this field," observed the Finance Commission's Vice-Chairman, Reginald Alexander.<sup>61</sup> "Little is known outside the trade about the real value of TV rights . . . we must therefore draw upon well experienced advice," he noted.<sup>62</sup> Improved satellite technology, observed Alexander, necessitated a more comprehensive IOC approach to television negotiations. Later, he informed the General Session of the Finance Commission's plan to supervise the sale of Olympic television rights in order to guarantee "maximum profit."<sup>63</sup>

The IOC Finance Commission consulted with numerous executives from media and entertainment sectors in order to advance the IOC's knowledge of the value of Olympic television rights and the negotiation process. These individuals included: Tom Gallery, former Director of NBC Sports; William H. Nicholas, General Manager of the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum; and Rodney W. Rood, Public Relations Manager of Atlantic Richfield.<sup>64</sup> The IOC, maintained Alexander, required sound advice concerning the value of Olympic television rights. The IOC failed to anticipate the extent of the increase in the value of television rights to the 1968 Winter and Summer Olympic Games as a result of advances in the satellite

communications industry.<sup>65</sup> The American Broadcasting Company (ABC) secured \$20 million in advertising revenue for the 1968 Mexico City Olympics from corporations such as the Coca-Cola Company, Ford Motor Company, Texaco, Pan American Airlines, and the Good Year Tire and Rubber Company.<sup>66</sup> ABC's acquisition of the U.S. television rights for \$4.5 million paid a handsome dividend. Discussion with media and entertainment executives had a noticeable effect upon the IOC's approach to television negotiations.

The attempts of the Sapporo and Munich Organizing Committees to maximize their shares of revenue resulting from the sale of the 1972 Olympic television rights in the U.S., while reducing the amount of money available to the IOC, NOCs, and the IFs, were destined to spark controversy. The IOC's diminished fiscal reserves increased its vigilance with respect to the negotiating efforts of the 1972 Organizing Committees. "[Television money] in the final analysis," observed Alexander, "is the life blood of our administrative existence and requires very special attention."<sup>67</sup> Georg von Opel, a member of the Finance Commission, had even suggested excluding future Organizing Committees from receiving any money for the sale of television rights.<sup>68</sup> It was a formula for confrontation.

In March 1969, the Munich Organizing Committee signed a tentative contract with ABC for exclusive U.S. telecast rights to the 1972 Summer Olympics.<sup>69</sup> A clause outlining the separation of the television rights payment from an installations fee was a source of discomfiture for the IOC. Although ABC had offered the Munich organizers a total of \$13.5 million, only \$7.5 million had been designated as the rights payment. The remaining \$6 million represented a payment for the required facilities and installations.<sup>70</sup> But the "Rome Formula," approved by the IOC Session in 1966, permitted the distribution of the rights payment only. At its June 1969 meeting, the Finance Commission deferred its approval of the ABC contract.<sup>71</sup>

The Sapporo Organizing Committee adopted the same approach with respect to contractual arrangements with the U.S. television networks. Japanese organizers concluded preliminary negotiations in the latter months of 1969. NBC pledged a total of \$6,401,000. Tomoo Sato, Secretary General of the Sapporo Organizing Committee, informed Lord Luke that the rights fee comprised \$5 million of this sum while the installations fee represented the remainder.<sup>72</sup> Luke was disappointed with the substance of the Munich and Sapporo contracts. Expenditure on facilities for television networks, said Luke, must be considered in the same vein as costs incurred for the construction of the various stadia.<sup>73</sup> These costs were the responsibility of the Organizing Committees. If the IOC agreed to the terms of the contracts, the IOC, IFs, and NOCs would be contributing to the construction of telecast facilities.

The IOC Executive Board was also dismayed by the precedent that the Organizing Committees were attempting to establish with respect to the U.S. television contracts.<sup>74</sup> A concerned Exeter told Brundage, "I do not think that any of us have ever visualized that they [Munich organizers] would not pay the proceeds gross to us, and in fact help themselves to 2 million dollars of the IOC, International Federation and NOC money."<sup>75</sup> Exeter confirmed that the IOC had passed a distribution plan in Rome favouring the Organizing Committees. The IOC, he feared, would receive a "tremendous hammering" from the IFs and NOCs who would perceive the acquiescence of the IOC to the Munich Organizing Committee's

proposal as a “breach of faith.”<sup>76</sup> The agreement of the IFs and NOCs to the “Rome Formula” had been contingent upon the division of the gross payment. The delegations from cities who had competed for the right to host the 1972 Summer Olympic Games would also have ammunition with which to criticize the IOC, speculated Exeter, since Munich had recanted on its agreement to abide by IOC rules with respect to television.<sup>77</sup> Brundage and the Executive Board determined that the Organizing Committees could not deduct installation expenses from the gross television payment provided by the U.S. networks.<sup>78</sup>

Willi Daume, President of the Munich Organizing Committee, was more resolute in his determination to resist compliance with the IOC on the U.S. television contract issue than Tomoo Sato. Sato and his associates deliberated on the contract matter during the initial nine months of 1970. In September 1970, Sato informed Luke that the Sapporo Organizing Committee would remit the entire payment from NBC to the IOC for appropriate distribution without deduction of an installations fee.<sup>79</sup> Daume, however, refused to flinch in the face of pressure from the IOC.

The economic reality of West Germany’s membership in the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) had a significant impact on Daume’s firm stance.<sup>80</sup> Nations affiliated with EBU which hosted events of world-wide interest were required to supply technical facilities to other member countries of the EBU at no cost.<sup>81</sup> Therefore, the Munich Organizing Committee was already committed to providing these facilities at its own expense. Daume defended the ABC contract because it conformed to the letter of the IOC rules on television and provided a realistic approach to television negotiations in light of developments during the 1960s.

Daume and his associates justified their position based on past precedent and financial exigencies. They submitted a detailed memorandum in defense of the contract with ABC to the Finance Commission.<sup>82</sup> “Our committee,” Daume told Luke, “has no intention of demanding anything that is not realistic.”<sup>83</sup> The portion of the ABC contract reserved for an installations fee did not represent profit for the Organizing Committee. Munich organizers reminded the IOC that Rule 49 (IOC television legislation) simply referred to the IOC’s access to payment for the right to broadcast... on television. Developments witnessed in Mexico City in 1968 provided further rationale for the contract terms. ABC paid \$4.5 million for the right to telecast the 1968 Summer Olympics. However, ABC also spent \$3.5 million on technical equipment necessary for the project such as cameras and videotape recorders, local and international television circuits, film processing, and telephone and telex costs. Daume claimed that the Munich Organizing Committee was simply including this necessary element of the network’s financial investment in the contract.<sup>84</sup> In the end, Daume’s persistence was rewarded. The Finance Commission recommended approval of the contract to the IOC Executive Board.<sup>85</sup>

The IOC Executive Board wavered in its consideration of the Finance Commission’s recommendation. It granted its approval, in principle, of the contract in February 1970. However, the Executive Board reconsidered its position in the months ahead. At the May 1970 IOC Session in Amsterdam, Lord Luke again tried to convince the Munich Organizing Committee to abandon its approach to the ABC contract by renewing the IOC’s desire for remittance of the entire \$13.5 million to the

IOC.<sup>86</sup> The IOC was concerned that the Munich Organizing Committee was determined “to see that the IOC should get as little as possible,” Luke advised Daume, “and this attitude is not conducive to the best of goodwill between us.”<sup>87</sup> Daume remained unmoved.

The compliance of the Sapporo Organizing Committee with the wishes of the IOC pertinent to the basis of television payments from the U.S. networks presented a further means for applying pressure on the Munich Organizing Committee.<sup>88</sup> But Daume, remaining firm, told Luke that the Munich Organizing Committee had previously supplied the IOC with interest-free loans, a less-than-subtle reminder of its financial assistance to the cash-starved organization. Daume knew only too well that the Finance Commission had previously approved the contract and that the Executive Board had balked at providing its final approval. Daume called for a meeting between the Munich Organizing Committee and the Finance Commission in order to find a resolution to the problem.<sup>8 9</sup>

After consultations, the Finance Commission and the Munich Organizing Committee reached a compromise agreement. In exchange for the acceptance of the ABC contract, Daume and his colleagues cancelled its previous loan of \$274,200 to the IOC.<sup>90</sup> Finance Commission member Jean de Beaumont, though not entirely satisfied, lamented that some action had been necessary.<sup>91</sup> Lord Luke expressed similar frustration when he reported to Brundage that a “deadlock” had resulted as the Munich Organizing Committee defended steadfastly its privilege to consummate a contract separating the rights payment from the installations fee.<sup>92</sup> In March 1971, the two-year discussion regarding the ABC contract drew to a close as the IOC Executive Board approved the Munich Organizing Committee-ABC contract.<sup>93</sup> The IOC’s concession had far-reaching effects on the negotiation strategies of future Organizing Committees.

While the IOC was embroiled in discussions with Daume and his associates, Brundage and the Executive Board approved a policy initiative that contributed significantly to the IOC’s heightened involvement in the negotiation process. The IOC established target television rights figures for the 1972 Organizing Committees to seek from television networks in a number of geographical regions.<sup>94</sup> The Munich Organizing Committee fell short of realizing the goals established by the IOC. The Finance Commission set the value of the Munich television rights for Western Europe (EBU), Eastern Europe (Intervision), Japan, and Latin America at a total of \$7.5 million, a figure equivalent to the rights portion of the contract with ABC.<sup>95</sup> However, negotiations yielded \$3,657,000. The Japanese network, NHK, signed a contract with the Organizing Committee for \$1 million, the figure established by the IOC. Despite the IOC’s desire for a total of \$1.5 million from the Latin American countries, Munich organizers settled for \$612,000. The EBU negotiators, not enamoured with the request of the IOC Finance Commission for \$3 million in exchange for exclusive television rights in Western Europe, offered \$1.7 million, that represented a 70% increase on its payment to the 1968 Mexico City Organizing Committee.<sup>96</sup> Both the Finance Commission and Daume considered the offer “ludicrously low” since the EBU served 27 countries.<sup>97</sup> The EBU turned aside the counter-proposal submitted by Lord Luke and the Munich Organizing Committee that called for a payment of \$2 million. The EBU’s monopoly resulted in the Organizing

Committee's acceptance of an offer of \$1,745,000.<sup>98</sup> This concession had a prejudicial impact on negotiations in Eastern Europe. The IOC, naively, anticipated a sale price of \$2 million for the television rights in this region. The Munich negotiators resigned themselves to a paltry \$300,000.<sup>99</sup>

There were other disappointments for the German organizers. The European negotiations had a dramatic effect on discussions with representatives of the Australian Broadcasting Commission. Contracts with other television networks in the Far Eastern market had been based on the concept of 10 cents per television set. As the Australia/New Zealand region had an estimated 3 million television sets in use, the Munich organizers sought \$300,000-\$350,000 for the television rights.<sup>100</sup> They considered the Australian Broadcasting Commission's offer of \$70,000 "very modest."<sup>101</sup> In an attempt to retain the support of the IOC during negotiations, Daume argued that any concession would limit the value of future television contracts in the Oceania region.<sup>102</sup> The Australians countered with the argument that favouritism had been accorded to the European television networks. If the ratio of money to television sets prevalent in the contract with EBU had been applied to the Australian/New Zealand market, observed the Australians, the Organizing Committee could have expected a return of \$45,000.<sup>103</sup>

Hugh Weir, an Australian IOC member, was concerned by the tenor of negotiations. Weir found the basis of the Munich position unhelpful in resolving the problem. Munich representatives, noted Weir, claimed that "Australia [was] a very rich country and was [very] sports minded." The Australian Broadcasting Commission, Weir reminded Luke, was government-controlled. The Australian government, concluded Weir, was duty bound not to "throw the taxpayers money around like a drunken sailor." He added that it was apparent that Australian network representatives were not willing to yield to the demands of the Munich Organizing Committee. The image of the IOC in the region, warned Weir, would suffer if an agreement between the two sides proved elusive.<sup>104</sup>

Lord Luke and the IOC Finance Commission supported the Munich agents' attempt to exact the desired \$300,000 from the Australians. Luke asked Weir to "use [his] good offices, as a member of the IOC, to get some sort of figure like this."<sup>105</sup> Lance Cross, an IOC member from New Zealand, was similarly troubled by the progress in negotiations.<sup>106</sup> Cross observed that domestic regulations restricted commercial time on telecasts to two minutes per hour, thereby limiting the amount of money that could be recouped from sponsorship fees. Cross presented a modified offer of \$72,250 to the IOC Finance Commission and Herbert Kunze, Secretary of the Munich Organizing Committee. An allowance should be made, said Cross, because Australia and New Zealand were "two of the most amateur countries belonging to the Olympic Movement."<sup>107</sup> Cross' plea offer was deemed unacceptable by Luke and his colleagues. The Finance Commission directed Kunze to continue negotiations.<sup>108</sup> The parties eventually reached a compromise agreement that called for a payment of \$82,000.<sup>109</sup>

Negotiations for the sale of Olympic television rights conducted by the Sapporo Organizing Committee were less troubled. Luke lauded the Japanese on their efforts.<sup>110</sup> The scope of the undertaking was minimal when compared to the task that had faced their Munich counterparts. The Munich Organizing Committee negotiated

27 television agreements while the Sapporo Organizing Committee derived income from 6 contracts.<sup>111</sup> Sapporo organizers had not aggravated members of the Finance Commission by pursuing an approach akin to the hard-nosed strategy of Willi Daume. They deferred to the dictates of the IOC with respect to the elimination of the provision for an installations fee in the contract with NBC.

However, Avery Brundage's resolute campaign to apply in rigorous fashion amateur policy to European skiers was a topic of discussion during negotiations between the EBU and the Sapporo Organizing Committee. "Athletes had for decades been tempted to accept small sums of money for advertisements painted or sewn on their equipment or clothing," observed historian Allen Guttman, "but the opportunity to reach a global television audience made advertisers frantic."<sup>112</sup> European skiers were prime (and willing) targets of advertisers during the 1960s.

Prior to the 1968 Grenoble Winter Games, Brundage reached an agreement with the Fédération Internationale de Ski (FIS). According to the terms of the accord, advertising trademarks were banned from participants' skis.<sup>113</sup> The skiers recoiled when informed of these restrictions. They claimed that "the procedure of unmarking would either upset the balance of the skis or, in the case of the marks on the under side, would interfere with the actual running of the skis." Marc Hodler, an IOC member and President of FIS, informed the IOC Executive Board that the skiers would not appear before the cameras with their skis. Although Brundage was not satisfied, the majority of Executive Board members accepted Hodler's proposition.<sup>114</sup> The skiers circumvented this agreement by appearing on camera with other ski equipment, such as gloves and headgear, which bore the trademarks of their sponsors. Brundage vowed to resolve the matter prior to the 1972 Sapporo Winter Games.<sup>115</sup>

Brundage's determination was unsettling to J.B. Broeks, President of EBU. If Brundage banned the premier European skiers from the Sapporo Games, Broeks believed that the value of the European television rights would be compromised. Although the EBU had agreed to pay the Japanese organizers \$1,233,800 in exchange for exclusive television rights in Western Europe, Broeks desired the right to renegotiate the amount if the European skiers were barred from the slopes in Sapporo. After Broeks was rebuffed by the Organizing Committee, he posed an alternate plan to Tomoo Sato. Broeks proposed that the payment should be reduced by \$20,000. The participation of the skiers would result in the restoration of the originally contracted sum. Sato and his associates rejected this proposal. Eventually, Broeks gained a measure of insurance for the EBU. The Sapporo Organizing Committee and the EBU agreed to renegotiate the contract in the event that any of the "major" EBU member networks cancelled their telecasts of the Sapporo Winter Games before June 10th, 1971. The need to renegotiate never materialized.<sup>116</sup>

The IOC, through the Finance Commission, intensely monitored the various negotiations conducted by the 1972 Organizing Committees. The heightened involvement of the IOC in the negotiation process reflected its desire to secure optimum prices for the television rights to the Olympic Games. Jean de Beaumont's words to Brundage cited in the preface to this paper were accurate as a profit/loss mentality had infiltrated the IOC.

While the Organizing Committees negotiated the 1972 Olympic television contracts, the Winter and Summer Games IFS searched for an allocation formula for

their shares of available television revenue.<sup>117</sup> The money available to the IFs had skyrocketed as a result of the implementation of the “Rome Formula.” In 1968, the Summer Games IFs had shared \$150,450 according to the tenet of Exeter’s distribution plan.<sup>118</sup> The Winter Games IFs received a portion of the \$30,000 provided by the Grenoble Organizing Committee. In 1972, the sums available for distribution to the Summer and Winter Games IFs were \$1,825,540 and \$1,274,653 respectively.<sup>119</sup>

The leaders of the Winter Games IFs found the task of providing a proposal for the distribution of television revenue to the IOC easier than their Summer Games counterparts. The Winter Games IFs’ plan for equal distribution of their share of the Sapporo television money received approval of the IOC Executive Board in 1970.<sup>120</sup> The rift between the dominant track and field federation and the other IFs was a significant barrier to an accord among the Summer Games IFs. The Summer Games IFs finally resolved to divide their share of the television revenue from the Munich Olympics into two parts in a classic compromise agreement. The initial half was divided equally among the IFs, while the second half was subject to distribution based on attendance. The schema was approved by a special commission of the three IOC Vice-Presidents during the Munich Games.<sup>121</sup>

## Conclusions

During the 1960s, Avery Brundage had warned his colleagues of the threat to Olympic idealism resulting from the availability of television money. The emergence of the IOC Finance Commission in 1967, and its intimate involvement in negotiations for the sale of 1972 Olympic television rights, reflected a more watchful approach to the management of the IOC’s financial concerns. The members of the Finance Commission, with the sanction of the General Session, pursued a policy of “maximum profit” regarding negotiations with the television networks. As he prepared to step aside in 1972, Brundage voiced his displeasure with these developments.

Brundage had envisioned the television medium as a vehicle for the promotion of Olympism. The emergence of satellite transmission during the 1960s had enabled sport enthusiasts throughout the world to enjoy “same day” or live coverage of the triumphs of Bob Beamon and Lasse Viren in track and field, Peggy Fleming in figure skating, Teofilo Stevenson in boxing, and Vera Caslavskva and Olga Korbut in gymnastics. The 1968 Grenoble Winter Games reached an audience of 500 million people. Four years later, one billion people watched the Munich Olympic Games. However, the strength of the message of Olympism, asserted Brundage, was threatened by the IOC’s corporate approach to television matters.<sup>122</sup>

In the waning months of his presidency, Brundage yearned for the re-establishment of an IOC approach to television revenue more compatible with his ideals. The arguments and disputes within the Olympic Movement regarding distribution of television money had been acute sources of aggravation for him. The IOC, IFs, and NOCs, said Brundage, had fulfilled their missions with distinction for many years without television money. He maintained that the IOC was not compelled to bankroll the IFs and the NOCs. Brundage believed that the television

negotiations and financial requirements of the IOC should be the responsibility of the Organizing Committees. The Executive Board listened politely to Brundage's homily, but failed to act upon his impassioned plea for financial reform intended to protect the reputation of the IOC and the Olympic Movement.<sup>123</sup> Brundage had lost control of his idealized amateur Olympics, in large part as a result of commercial television.

Brundage, who sought to shelter the Olympic Movement from commercial influence during this period which witnessed a significant trend of the commodification of sport, faced problems on three fronts. First, international athletes who discovered that sport equipment manufacturers were willing to supply them with funds for services rendered (with the display of their brandname equipment to a world-wide television audience representing one such service), heartily accepted their offer. Although Brundage ordered the expulsion of Karl Schranz, Austria's premier downhill skier, from the 1972 Sapporo Winter Games for accepting money from a ski equipment manufacturer, it proved little more than a futile act of desperation. Brundage's tirades against the commercial sponsorship of athletes were "impotent fulminations"<sup>124</sup> which failed to dissuade advertisers and athletes from continuing the practice. Second, Brundage's colleagues within the upper echelon of the IOC's administrative structure, including Exeter, Alexander, Vind, Killanin, and even Beaumont (despite his statement in the preface to this article) coveted commercial television revenue. They believed that the money would assist the IOC in executing its mandate to spread the Olympic message throughout the world. The IOC's dependence on television revenue resulted in the alteration of its infrastructure to include sub-committees responsible for the management of financial affairs and television concerns. Financial matters consumed an increasing amount of discussion time at IOC Executive Board meetings during the latter years of Brundage's presidency. "Distressed and disillusioned," concluded Guttmann, "Brundage watched as the IOC first adopted the financial procedures and then the fiscal attitudes of a modern corporation."<sup>125</sup> Brundage's own words penned prior to the signing of the "Rome Formula" leave no doubt as to his state of mind concerning the IOC and the IFs as he stepped aside. "One should be suspicious of any amateur organization that has money," wrote Brundage, "the minute this occurs its complexion changes and not for the better."<sup>126</sup> Third, Brundage had few options in his quest to temper the financial ambitions of the IFs, NOCs, and representatives of the Organizing Committees. Their cooperation was required in order to guarantee the celebration of the Olympic Games. He considered that a settlement with the IFs and NOCs concerning the distribution of television revenue might convince the leadership of these groups to abandon plans for the establishment of lobby groups which would seek a greater role in Olympic decision-making. His attempt to broker a compromise agreement with the NOCs and IFs paved the way for a substantial increase in the financial reserves of these organizations and failed to prevent the formation of umbrella organizations representing the IFs and NOCs (General Assembly of International Sport Federations and Association of National Olympic Committees). It was predictable that the Organizing Committees would attempt to maximize their share of income from television in order to offset increasing expenditures required to host an Olympic festival. A younger Brundage might have battled with Phillips, and

Coulon, and presented a more forceful argument to those within the IOC who wanted to chart a different financial course for the organization. In short, Brundage, an aging idealist, at odds with sport officials inside and outside the IOC chambers concerning financial matters, including the IOC's involvement with television, found the current of change too strong and was swept under.

Under the leadership of Lord Killanin, the IOC became even more intimately involved with the television industry. During the 1960s, the IOC Finance Commission initiated a policy of consulting media experts for advice on television negotiations and contracts. In 1974, representatives of the EBU and the U.S. network(s) holding the rights to the impending Winter and Summer Games became permanent members of the newly formed IOC Television Sub-Committee.<sup>127</sup> A working relationship with the networks was necessitated by the IOC's financial dependence upon the television industry. By 1974, the IOC drew over 98% of its income from the sale of television rights to the Olympic Games.<sup>128</sup> It was up to Lord Killanin and the IOC to rationalize this approach in light of the organization's long-standing, public repudiation of commercialism.

## NOTES

1. Count Jean de Beaumont (IOC Member, France and Member of the IOC Finance Commission) to Avery Brundage, 4 November 1971, Avery Brundage Collection, 1908-1975, Box 51 [hereafter cited as ABC], University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana. Although the original collection is located at the above location, the author has employed the microfilm copy housed at The University of Western Ontario (D.B. Weldon Library), London, Ontario.
2. See Shayne Quick, "Black Knight Checks White King: The Conflict Between Avery Brundage and the African Nations over South African Membership in the IOC," *Canadian Journal of History of Sport* 21 (December, 1990), pp. 20-32.
3. Allen Guttman, *The Olympics: A History of the Modern Games* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), pp. 115-123; David, Marquess of Exeter to Avery Brundage, 16 January 1967, ABC Box 55; Avery Brundage to Exeter, 23 January 1967, ABC Box 55; Rudyard H. Russell (President, Fédération Internationale de Boxe Amateur) to Exeter, 6 March 1967, ABC Box 55; Roger Coulon (President, Federation Internationale de Lutte Amateur) to Avery Brundage 10 March, 1967, ABC Box 207; Minutes of the General Assembly of International Federations, Lausanne, 21-23 April 1967, ABC Box 207; and Avery Brundage to W. Berge Phillips (President, Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur), 22 May 1967, ABC Box 207.
4. Guttman, *The Olympics*, pp. 128, 134.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 130-132.
6. For a synopsis of events between 1956 and 1966, see Stephen R. Wenn, "Lights! Camera! Little Action: Television, Avery Brundage and the 1956 Melbourne Olympics," *Sporting Traditions* 10 (November, 1993), pp. 38-53; and Wenn, "An Olympian Squabble: The Distribution of Olympic Television Revenue, 1960-1966," *Olympika: The International Journal of Olympic Studies* III (November, 1994), pp. 27-47.

7. Avery Brundage to Roger Coulon, 11 September 1967, ABC Box 207.
8. "Repartition des Droits de Télévision Verses aux Fédérations Internationales 1964-1976 (en Dollars US)," 1986, International Olympic Committee Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland [hereafter cited as IOCA]; Johann Westerhoff (IOC Secretary-General) to Exeter, 30 November 1966, ABC Box 55.
9. Avery Brundage to Ivar Vind (IOC Member, Denmark), 13 September 1965, ABC Box 64; Avery Brundage to Albert Mayer (IOC Member, Switzerland), 19 May 1966, ABC Box 60; Avery Brundage to Albert Mayer, 19 November 1966, ABC Box 60.
10. The principal functions of the IFs include: establishment and enforcement of rules pertaining to their respective sports; encouragement of the development of their sports throughout the world; and the assumption of the responsibility for technical control and governance of their sports at the Olympic Games. The NOCs manage the selection process for their teams, direct fund-raising projects, and serve a primary role in propagating the message of Olympism in their respective countries. They also transport, clothe, and feed the athletes that qualify for participation in the Olympic Games. Olympic Charter 1991 (Lausanne: IOC, 1991), pp. 29-32.
11. Wenn, "An Olympian Squabble," p. 38
12. Meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC, Rome, 21-24 April 1966, pp. 7-9, IOCA; and Minutes of the 64th Session of the International Olympic Committee, 25-29 April 1966, pp. 4-5, ABC Box 93. The formula was identical for the 1972 Sapporo Winter Games with one exception. The Winter Games were not expected to reap the same amount of television money for the Japanese. Hence, only the first \$200,000 was reserved for the IOC, IFs, and NOCs. The second and third (and each successive) \$200,000 portions were divided according to the formula described in the text.
13. Minutes of the 64th Session of the International Olympic Committee, p. 3.
14. Avery Brundage to Exeter, 18 January, 1967, ABC Box 55.
15. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Lausanne, 27-30 May 1972, pp. 7-8, IOCA.
16. Minutes of the Meeting of the General Assembly of International Federations, Lausanne, 21-23 April 1967, ABC Box 207.
17. Exeter to Avery Brundage, 16 January 1967, ABC Box 55.
18. *Ibid.*, Johann Westerhoff to Exeter, 7 March 1967, ABC Box 55; Exeter to Avery Brundage, 12 June 1967, ABC Box 55; and Exeter to Avery Brundage, 27 August 1967, ABC Box 55.
19. The writer would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers of a previous work published in *Olympika* ("An Olympian Squabble...") for this helpful description of Exeter's approach.
20. Exeter to Avery Brundage, 23 January 1967, ABC Box 55.
21. Rudyard H. Russell to Exeter, 6 March 1967, ABC Box 55.
22. Exeter to Avery Brundage, 12 January 1967 and 16 January 1967, ABC Box 55.

23. Roger Coulon to Avery Brundage, 10 March 1967, ABC Box 207.
24. Avery Brundage to Roger Coulon, 11 September 1967, ABC Box 207.
25. See "Report of the Meeting of 22 July 1967 at Winnipeg's Hotel Fort Garry Between Avery Brundage, Roger Coulon, and Charles Palmer (President, International Judo Federation)," p. 3, ABC Box 207.
26. Exeter to Avery Brundage, 27 August 1967, ABC Box 55.
27. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board with the International Sport Federations, Lausanne, 27-28 January 1968, p. 5, ABC Box 93.
28. Ibid.
29. Summarised Minutes of the Meeting of the Finance Commission of the IOC and Representatives of the International Federations' Commission and the Federations of Judo, Shooting, and Athletics, Mexico City, 6 October 1968, pp. 1-3, IOCA.
30. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Lausanne, 27-30 May 1972, p. 7, IOCA.
31. Lord Killanin, *My Olympic Years* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1983), p. 9.
32. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC, Teheran, 2-8 May 1967, pp. 4-5.
33. Ivar Vind to Avery Brundage, 30 April 1964, ABC Box 64; Vind to Avery Brundage, 24 January 1966, ABC Box 64; Exeter to Avery Brundage, 7 May 1966, ABC Box 55; and Exeter to Avery Brundage, 12 August 1968, ABC Box 55.
34. Georg von Opel to Lord Luke (Chairman, IOC Finance Commission), 17 December 1970, ABC Box 61.
35. See Richard K. Alaszkievicz and Thomas McPhail, "Olympic Television Rights," *International Review for Sociology of Sport* 21 (1986), p. 212; *Official Report of the Games of the XVIIIth Olympiad Tokyo-1964*, p. 382, IOCA; and Heinz-Dietrich Fischer, "From Cooperation to Quasi-Congruency - Interdependence Between the Olympic Games and Television," in Heinz-Dietrich Fischer and Stefan Reinhard Melnik, eds., *Entertainment: A Cross-Cultural Examination* (New York: Hastings House Publishers, 1979), pp. 213-221.
36. "Droits de Télévision Versés par les Organismes de Télévision pour les Jeux d'Olympiade (en dollars US)," 1986, IOCA.
37. It should be clarified that in the late 1960s and early 1970s Brundage was one of the few sport leaders who refused to acknowledge that Olympic sport was no longer a competition for amateur athletes. As one of the anonymous reviewers for this submission noted, "almost anyone competing at the amateur level was a "shamateur" and virtually every Olympic official except Brundage acknowledged that."
38. Avery Brundage to Reginald Alexander, 24 October 1967, ABC Box 98.
39. Avery Brundage to Lord Luke, 24 October 1967, ABC Box 98.
40. Avery Brundage to Lord Luke, 28 December 1967, ABC Box 98.

41. Lord Luke to Avery Brundage, 10 October 1967, ABC Box 98; Reginald Alexander to Avery Brundage, 31 October 1967, ABC Box 98; and Jean de Beaumont to Avery Brundage, 1 March 1968, ABC Box 98.
42. Lord Luke to Jean de Beaumont, 13 March 1968, ABC Box 51.
43. Jean de Beaumont to Avery Brundage, 21 March 1968, ABC Box 51.
44. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Finance Commission, Lausanne, 21 March 1969, Annex No. 2, IOCA.
45. Avery Brundage to Jean de Beaumont, 23 May 1969, ABC Box 51.
46. Ibid.
47. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Finance Commission, Lausanne, 21 March 1969, Annex No. 2, IOCA.
48. Lord Luke to Monique Berlioux, 9 October 1969, ABC Box 98. In September, Berlioux had informed Luke that the IOC had \$6,865 to "last until the end of the year." She predicted the actual spending requirements for this 90 day period to be \$35,000. Monique Berlioux to Lord Luke, 25 September 1969, ABC Box 98.
49. Jean de Beaumont to Lord Luke, 5 November 1969, ABC Box 98.
50. Avery Brundage to Jean de Beaumont, 19 November 1969, ABC Box 51.
51. Lord Luke to Jean de Beaumont, 20 November 1969, ABC Box 98.
52. Monique Berlioux to Avery Brundage, 24 November 1969, ABC Box 98.
53. Monique Berlioux to Reginald S. Alexander, 25 November 1969, ABC Box 98.
54. Monique Berlioux to Reginald S. Alexander, 15 January 1970, ABC Box 98.
55. Monique Berlioux to Avery Brundage, 24 November 1969, ABC Box 98.
56. Reginald S. Alexander to Monique Berlioux, 22 December 1969, ABC Box 98.
57. Avery Brundage to Lord Luke, R.S. Alexander, Jean de Beaumont, and Jose de J. Clark, 27 July 1970, ABC Box 98.
58. Lord Luke to Avery Brundage, 3 September 1970, ABC Box 98; and Avery Brundage to Lord Luke, 17 September 1970, ABC Box 98.
59. Lord Luke to Avery Brundage, 3 September 1970, ABC Box 98.
60. Minutes of the IOC Finance Commission, Lausanne, 24-25 September 1967, p. 3, IOCA.
61. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Finance Commission, Warsaw, 4,6-8 June 1969, p. 8, IOCA.
62. Reginald S. Alexander to Avery Brundage, 31 October 1967, ABC Box 98.
63. Minutes of the 66th Session of the International Olympic Committee, Grenoble, 1-5 February 1968, p. 5, IOCA.

64. Minutes of the IOC Finance Commission, Lausanne, 24-25 September 1967, p. 3, IOCA; Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Finance Commission, Warsaw, 4, 6-8 June 1969, pp. 4-5, IOCA; and Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Finance Commission, Lausanne, 20 February 1970, pp. 2-3, IOCA.
65. Exeter to Avery Brundage, 16 January 1967, ABC Box 55.
66. *New York Times*, 15 June 1967, p. 95.
67. Reginald S. Alexander to Avery Brundage, 12 March 1969, ABC Box 98.
68. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Finance Commission, Lausanne, 21 March 1969, p. 3, IOCA.
69. Herbert Kunze (Secretary General, Munich Organizing Committee) to Avery Brundage, 11 April 1969, ABC Box 98; and *New York Times*, 2 April 1969, p. 95.
70. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Finance Commission, Warsaw, 4, 6-8 June 1969, p. 1, IOCA. For a copy of the contract, see "Memorandum of Terms between the Organizing Committee for the XXth Olympiad Munich 1972 and the American Broadcasting Company, Inc.," p. 4, *Ibid.*, Annex #1.
71. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-10. The IOC Finance Commission also had hoped that the Munich organizers would have delayed signing a contract in hopes that a better price might have been obtained as the Games approached. The advice of media experts in the U.S. prompted the Finance Commission to adopt this position.
72. Tomoo Sato to Lord Luke, 2 October 1969; and Tomoo Sato to Lord Luke, 6 October 1969. Both letters are located in "Droits de T.V. Sapporo 1972" Binder, IOCA.
73. Lord Luke to Herbert Kunze, 3 November 1969, ABC Box 98; and Lord Luke to Shohei Sasaka (Member, Sapporo Organizing Committee), 3 March 1970, "Droits de T.V. Sapporo 1972" Binder, IOCA; and Lord Luke to Members of the IOC Finance Commission and Monique Berlioux, ca. 22 December 1969, ABC Box 98.
74. Minutes of the IOC Executive Board, Dubrovnik, 23-27 October 1969, p. 10, IOCA.
75. Exeter to Avery Brundage, 17 November 1969, ABC Box 55.
76. *Ibid.*
77. Exeter to Avery Brundage, 15 January 1970, ABC Box 55.
78. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Board, Dubrovnik, 23-27 October 1969, p. 10, IOCA; and Avery Brundage to Lord Luke, 7 January 1970, ABC Box 98.
79. Tomoo Sato to Lord Luke, 4 September 1970, "Droits de T.V. Sapporo 1972" Binder, IOCA.
80. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Finance Commission, Lausanne, 20 February 1970, pp. 2-3, IOCA.
81. Monique Berlioux to Avery Brundage, 6 February 1970, ABC Box 98.

82. "Memorandum Pertaining to the Distribution of the Proceeds from Television Between the International Olympic Committee and the Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXth Olympiad Munich 1972," IOCA.
83. Willi Daume to Lord Luke, 20 November 1970, ABC Box 98.
84. "Memorandum Pertaining to the Distribution of the Proceeds from Television Between the International Olympic Committee and the Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXth Olympiad Munich 1972, pp. 7-8, IOCA.
85. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Finance Commission, Lausanne, 20 February 1970, Annex #3, IOCA.
86. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Lausanne, 21-23 February 1970, p. 13, IOCA; and Minutes of the 69th Session of the International Olympic Committee, Amsterdam, 12-16 May 1970, p. 47, IOCA.
87. Lord Luke to Willi Daume, 28 July 1970, Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Finance Commission, Lausanne, 1 October 1970, Annex #2, IOCA.
88. Lord Luke to Willi Daume, 15 October 1970, Lord Luke Personal File, 1969-1978, "1970" Folder, IOCA.
89. Willi Daume to Lord Luke, 20 November 1970, ABC Box 98.
90. Minutes of the IOC Finance Commission Meeting, Munich, 28 January 1971, pp. 4-5, IOCA.
91. Jean de Beaumont to Avery Brundage, 24 February 1971, ABC Box 51.
92. Lord Luke to Avery Brundage, 10 February 1971, ABC Box 98.
93. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Lausanne, 13-14 March 1971, p. 20, IOCA.
94. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Finance Commission, Lausanne, 20 February 1970, pp. 3,5, IOCA.
95. "Memorandum Submitted to the Finance Commission of the IOC on the Present Position Regarding License Fees in Respect of Television Rights at the Games of the XXth Olympiad Munich 1972," Minutes of the IOC Finance Commission Meeting, Munich, 28 January 1971, Annex #3, p. 9, IOCA.
96. "Droits de Télévision Verses par les Organismes de Télévision pour les Jeux d'Olympiade (en dollars U.S.)," 1986, IOCA; "Memorandum Submitted to the Finance Commission of the IOC on the Present Position Regarding License Fees in Respect of Television Rights at the Games of the XXth Olympiad Munich 1972," p. 9; and Minutes of the IOC Finance Commission Meeting, Munich, 28 January 1971, pp. 5-6, IOCA.
97. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Finance Commission, Lausanne, 20 February 1970, p. 2, IOCA.
98. "Droits de Télévision Verses par les Organismes de Télévision pour les Jeux d'Olympiade (en dollars US)," 1986, IOCA.

99. Ibid; and “Memorandum Submitted to the Finance Commission of the IOC on the Present Position Regarding License Fees in Respect of Television Rights at the Games of the XXth Olympiad Munich 1972,” p. 9.

100. “Third Report for the Finance Commission of the International Olympic Committee on the Status of Television Rights Granted for the Games of the XXth Olympiad Munich 1972,” Minutes of the Meetings of the IOC Finance Commission, Sapporo, 29-30 January 1972, Annex #3, p. 22, IOCA.

101. “Memorandum Submitted to the Finance Commission of the IOC on the Present Position Regarding License Fees in Respect of Television Rights at the Games of the XXth Olympiad Munich 1972,” Annex #3, p. 12.

102. “Third Report for the Finance Commission of the International Olympic Committee on the Status of Television Rights Granted for the Games of the XXth Olympiad Munich 1972,” Annex #3, p. 22.

103. Minutes of the IOC Finance Commission Meeting, Luxembourg, 13, 16 September 1971, p. 7, IOCA.

104. Hugh Weir to Lord Luke, 10 February 1971, ABC Box 98.

105. Lord Luke to Hugh Weir, 23 March 1971, ABC Box 98.

106. Minutes of the Meetings of the IOC Finance Commission, Sapporo, 29-30 January 1972, p. 8, IOCA.

107. Ibid., p. 5.

108. Ibid., p. 8.

109. “Droits de Television Verses par les Organismes de Télévision pour les Jeux d’Olympiade (en dollars US),” 1986, IOCA.

110. Minutes of the IOC Finance Commission Meeting, Luxembourg, 13, 16 September 1971, p. 6, IOCA.

111. “Droits de Télévision Verses par les Organismes de Télévision pour les Jeux d’Olympiade (en dollars US),” 1986, IOCA.

112. Allen Guttman, *The Games Must Go On: Avery Brundage and the Olympic Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), p. 220.

113. “Meeting of the IOC Executive Board with Mr. Hodler (President, International Ski Federation),” 6 February 1968, Minutes of the Executive Board of the International Olympic Committee, Lausanne, 26-27, 29-31 January 1968, pp. 7-8, IOCA.

114. Ibid., p. 8.

115. Guttman, *The Games Must Go On*, p. 198.

116. Tomoo Sato to Lord Luke, 20 December 1970, “Droits de T.V. Sapporo 1972” Binder, IOCA.

117. See for instance, “Report of Commission No. 2,” Meetings of the GAIF-IFS-CIO, Lausanne, 31 May, 1-2 June 1969, p. 22, ABC Box 207.

118. "Répartition des Droits de Television Verses aux Fédérations Intemationales 1964-1976 (en dollars US)," 1986, IOCA.
119. Ibid; and Monique Berlioux to Avery Brundage, 10 December 1971, "Droits de T.V. Sapporo 1972" Binder, IOCA.
120. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Amsterdam, 8-16 May 1970, p. 15, IOCA.
121. "Meeting Between the Three IOC Vice-Presidents and the Representatives of the International Federations," Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Finance Commission, Munich, 17,28 August, 1 September 1972, p. 7, IOCA.
122. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Lausanne, 27-30 May 1972, p. 7, IOCA.
123. Ibid., p. 8.
124. Guttmann, *The Olympics*, p. 130.
125. Guttmann, *The Games Must Go On*, p. 219.
126. Avery Brundage to Ivar Vind, 13 September 1965, ABC Box 64.
127. Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Television Sub-Committee, Lausanne, 4 October 1974, Annex #2, "Composition, Terms of Reference and Powers of the Television Sub-Committee," p. 2, IOCA.
128. "Notes on the Work of the Television Sub-Committee," 23 June 1974; "TV Divers 1974- 1985" Binder, IOCA.