
Journal Article Reviews

John J. MacAloon, "Humanism as Political Necessity? Reflections on the Pathos of Anthropological Science in Olympic Contexts," **Quest**, Volume 48, 1996, 67-81. Reviewed by Gordon MacDonald.

As an anthropologist, what does one do when one finds oneself opposed in fundamental ways to the ideology of the institutions and people under consideration? MacAloon discusses this conundrum in this article. He examines 'doing anthropology' on Olympic themes and wrestles with the problem of what attitude to adopt "toward universal humanism in pluricultural contexts." Because he is uncomfortable with this ideology, MacAloon finds himself critiquing the Olympic ideology of "universal humanism", the leaders who embrace it, and the scientists of sport who reinforce the European versions of it. He also suggests a possible alternative as well as, theoretically, ways of promoting it.

He begins by arguing that it is critical for anthropologists to 'enter' institutions such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the Olympic Games if those scholars wish to do more than "the sort of analysis of postproduction public texts with which 'cultural studies' contents itself." However, that access is hard-won. Furthermore, over time people will come to know you, realize you are studying them, and may or may not attempt to use you. Thus, the "spiral of access and responsibility deepens another loop." MacAloon states that the scholar becomes a player, albeit a minor one. Inevitably the anthropologist faces the question (and the problem) of service in exchange for continued access to the objects of study. What, then, is the political relation between the investigator and the object of study? MacAloon devotes the rest of the article to an exploration of the theoretico-practical problems he has encountered in studying the modern Olympic movement.

Commencing with universal humanism as expounded by the IOC, MacAloon argues that he would like to change that ideology but knows his own limitations. Still, he argues, alternatives are possible (but he does not give these away just yet). He goes on to comment on universal humanism as a concept and its lack of definition amongst Olympic officials and documents. In particular, he cites the principles of the Olympic movement and their lack of clarity. For example, the only strong portions of the Olympic Charter are those that address the principle of non-discrimination. Even here, gender and sexual preference are not explicitly mentioned. Ruminating on the reasons for this situation, he postulates that sanctions against nation-states are tricky for the IOC. Hence, these issues tend to be "rhetorically negotiated" to avoid breaking one of the IOC's other major principles - that of political discrimination. Nonetheless, he suggests that the 'crime against humanity' may be one way for the IOC to get around this problem.

This tension also is present in gender and religion. MacAloon states that the IOC views women's rights as universal human rights, but have not included this in the charter yet. As an example of this tension between gender and religion, he cites issues raised at the Barcelona Olympics in 1992 about the lack of women in certain countries' athletic delegations. The IOC responded by pleading its inability to inter-

fere on religious and customs grounds.

According to MacAloon, the pragmatics of these situations are governed by the strongest positive principle of the modern Olympic movement - maximum participation. Participation is pursued relentlessly by Olympic leaders while being attacked by critics (e.g. Hoberman's charge of amoral universalism). Borrowing a Levy-Bruhlian concept, MacAloon prefers to describe this goal as 'participation mystique'. That is, for Olympic leaders, if everyone is present then moral universality is achieved because, otherwise, someone would not have participated.

Despite the differences in and around the Games (MacAloon cites torch relay peculiarities), for Olympic officials, universality is 'underneath' all of these. These officials make 'essence' arguments to explain it theoretically. They reason that, how do the Games even happen without some underlying essence? They are against anti-universalist, anti-essentialist positions - i.e. MacAloon's. Hence, though accepted in the discipline of anthropology, cultural relativism certainly is not in Olympic circles. For MacAloon, this makes life awkward.

Here he launches into a discussion and defence of the 'creed' of cultural relativism. That is, the study and acceptance (and, I suspect, celebration, though he does not say this) of diversity amongst cultures. This position is also a rejection of (western) social science attempts to reduce differences to the point where similarities can be seen. In contrast, he argues, commonalities are always unstable. Drawing from Ruth Benedict, he notes that paradoxically, however, this illusion of sameness actually may make the world safer for cultural differences. In sum, the Olympic Games should be used to promote these differences rather than trying to subsume them.

While tolerating difference fits well with some Olympic ideas, MacAloon worries that it is easy to distort to 'repressive tolerance'. That is, dismissing others while accommodating them. Indeed, he argues, if the Olympics only create interconnection through production of cultural diversity, and diversity only through production of interconnection, then it is indivisible and impossible to 'render scientifically'.

At this point MacAloon wonders whether to abandon his ideas of preaching(?) reform and confine his activities to the academy. The alternative is to seek other allies - MacAloon suggests culturism. He admits that it is a weak ally against universal humanism at present, particularly since its message gets twisted as it is put out. 'Same as we are, we are different' becomes 'different as we are, we are the same'. However, he argues, to withdraw from the game is to become marginalized. This is particularly the case with the Olympics because of their complexity and global reach.

These thoughts set up a discussion of the pragmatics of multiculturalism on a global scale. Here MacAloon notes the complexity of the Games, stressing that "the whole of the phenomenon is completely and permanently unknowable to anyone." The interpretive frames of observers are myriad, meaning that there are, from the culturist perspective, multiple Olympic Games. This is unacceptable, non-sensical to the Olympic leaders since their power and authority over the Games might be lost if they admitted the 'whole' was beyond them. Universal humanism thus can reassure them of their right to power, by providing an 'essential' Olympics.

Unfortunately for MacAloon, he has to struggle, not just against Olympic leaders, but also much of western thought. Though there are differences in western approaches to the study of physical culture and sport, most still reinforce "European versions of universal humanism by which those same leaders [IOC] understand the

world.” MacAloon provides general examples of why this is so (lack of fieldwork, positivist universalism theoretical base, Olympic support for biomedical or humanistic research).

All these factors make it (universal humanism) a position hard to argue against. Of course, for MacAloon, the “...situation is yet more impossible for one motivated as well by the ethos of political responsibility.” Agonizing about what to do, he fears that to “kick against the goad” would eventually lead to being “autodelegitimized” by his objects of study, thus preventing him access to them. (MacAloon’s position here assumes, first, that ‘they’ understand his criticisms and, second, that then ‘they’ consider MacAloon sufficiently harmful to ignore him or, even worse, deny him his researcher’s pass to the Olympics.) However, he goes on to imply that the fight should be carried on anyway, suggesting possible ways of doing this. More hopefully, he notes apparent exceptions to the trend of global standardization - cultures can survive it. Practical interconnection and cultural diversification may be seen as two sides of same coin. He suggests they are empty forms that can be filled with “diverse cultural meanings.” This is his interpretation of the “intercultural processes of the contemporary Olympic Games” and the view that he is attempting to spread. He finishes with a more long-term goal/dream. He concludes that the aforementioned empty forms may be intellectual too - culturism and universal humanism, for example. Thus, if humanism ceases to be “Eurocentrism in universalist guise”, becoming instead a “globally empty intercultural form”, then it will no longer need even to be opposed.

Norman Baker, “Sports and National Prestige: The Case of Britain, 1945-48,” **Sporting Traditions**, Vol. 12, No. 2, May 1996, 81-97.
Reviewed by Scott G. Martyn.

On 8 May 1945, five years and eight months after it started, the war in Europe was officially over, and with it the government of Winston Churchill. The architect of Britain’s wartime victory resigned as prime minister in July 1945, after his Conservatives were stunningly and soundly defeated by the Labour Party in parliamentary elections. With its first-ever majority, Prime Minister Clement Attlee’s government embarked on an extensive programme of nationalisation and expansion of the country’s social services. However, widespread shortages and a series of economic crises compelled the government to maintain, and occasionally extend, wartime rationing.

In the context of the extensive legislative program of the new government, the fragile nature of peace itself as the lines of the Cold War began to be drawn, the complexities of Imperial/Colonial relations, and the depth of economic woes which befell Britain, Baker examines the decline of British sporting prowess in the period immediately following the conclusion of World War II. According to Baker, sport was seen as relevant and associated with the more serious issues facing post-War Britain. Sport was not apart from, it was part of, the way in which the British saw themselves and their relations to others. Logically or not, national self-respect rested in part on

national competitiveness in sport. Baker argues that the relationship between national self-respect and competitiveness in sport rested on a particular role in world sport which the British believed they had played.

Despite an individual's political disposition or social class, Baker contends that all Britons believed that they had played a unique role as the "Founders of Modern Sport," and that, implicitly, this characterisation carried with it certain inherited privileges and responsibilities. Coupled with this belief was an assumption that, at some time in the late nineteenth century, Britain had "won practically everything," although the press of the 1940s often implied that their sporting dominance had run through to the eve of World War II. Whatever its substance in historical fact, Baker argues that the belief that Britain had once enjoyed a golden age of sporting success gained strength and certainty as mythology. He further argues that such convictions made it possible, even when recognizing Britain's contemporary weakness, to see athletic setback as only temporary. Thus, a notion of manifest destiny survived into the post-War era and substantiated a view that Britain's rightful competitive position was at the top as a major power in world sport.

Discouraged by its declining international competitiveness, Baker suggests that Britons took refuge in broad enveloping theories of amateurism and sportsmanship, virtues that provided a counterpoint to competitors' over-seriousness. However, the author states that the role of "Good Loser" did not always sit comfortably, even with traditionalists who still generally extolled the virtue inherent in such a position, often provoking a significant tension between the ideals of true sportsmanship and the desire for competitive success. Nevertheless, what was assumed to be the traditional British attitude still predominated. According to Baker, the gospel of the "Good Loser" and the practice of criticising the over-seriousness of others still held sway.

Britain's struggle to reconcile a glorious past with a tarnished contemporary performance and to rationalise, or ignore, the transition from one to the other, were brought into sharp relief as the one-time leaders of world sport hosted the Games of the Fourteenth Olympiad in London in 1948. According to Baker, there was fear within the Olympic Organising Committee (OCOG) and the Government that Britain's generally poor sporting performance would continue at the Games and leave the host nation internationally embarrassed. The *Daily Express* warned in May 1947 that "something must be done or the gloomy procession of British defeats since the War will reach the humiliating climax of the Olympics being staged in London without a single British victory." Philip Noel-Baker, who had been assigned a role as liaison between the Government and the OCOG, echoed these comments in a memorandum to Harold Wilson of the Board of Trade, stating "it is essential to our prestige that they should be a success."

Although numerous efforts were made to preserve Britain's national sporting prestige, the outcome, according to Baker, was unflattering. British athletes won only three gold medals, two in rowing and one in sailing. Explanations stressing diet, a lack of facilities, and the generally debilitating effects of sustained austerity, which had all been rehearsed over the preceding three years, were again brought forth. The poor results prompted renewed questioning of the traditional British philosophy that laid emphasis on participation over winning. Frank Butler of the *Daily Express*, observed that "[I]t's nice having the reputation of the world's best losers, but I'd like us to be world's worst winners for a change." Clifford Webb of the *Daily Herald*

expressed similar sentiments, when he conceded that “[I]n the Olympics the important thing may be taking part,” but countered that “it is also nice to win sometimes.” Nevertheless, Baker argues that the majority of press and officials focussed less on excuses or recriminations and more on the operation to salvage British prestige by laying strong emphasis on organisational achievement and displays of sportsmanship. He further states that these themes became the basis of an oft-repeated litany of achievement that other Britons recited as they sought to retrieve some element of self-respect from what had been, athletically speaking, a disappointing Olympics for the British.

It was not only the organisational success of the Games itself which was the object of praise, according to Baker, but also the manner in which it had been achieved. The organisational style of the British had been less nationalistic and strident than had been the case in Berlin in 1936, a comparison that the author contends reflected favourably on London. Though no longer a major force in athletic contests, Baker argues that Britons still saw themselves as occupying a special place within, and having made a special contribution to, the world of athletics.

In sum, Baker concludes that a compensatory rationale was developed stressing that Britons could still demonstrate sportsmanship, organisational skills and the ability to face, and overcome, adversity. No longer the world power it once was, Britain was, nevertheless, still capable of contributing technical and scientific expertise. In each of these spheres of activity an admixture of myth and reality went into the process by which Britons came to terms with, or explained away, their national decline in sport.

Martin Polley, “‘No Business of Ours’?: The Foreign Office and the Olympic Games, 1896-1914,” **The International Journal of the History of Sport**, Vol. 13, No. 2, August 1996, 96-113. Reviewed by Gordon MacDonald.

With this article Polley continues his examination of the connection between British Olympic leaders and the British Foreign Office. (He has previously written about the British Foreign Office and the proposed 1940 Olympic Games) In this study, Polley turns his attention to the British experience before the First World War. In particular, he asks how British Olympic “apologists attempted practically to link their ideals to the world of diplomacy...” By examining dialogue between the BOA (British Olympic Association) and the Foreign Office, he demonstrates that the former had difficulties convincing the latter of the efficacy of its aims (specifically those of international understanding and world peace). Polley also argues that his efforts help demythologize the BOA’s more recent claims of being apolitical. In fact, the BOA was patriotic and nationalistic, while trying simultaneously to be internationalist. It “...approached the government for help, but failed to appreciate the complexities of diplomacy that constrained the government’s desire or ability to provide permanent assistance.”

Polley commences with an exposition of the Foreign Office's limited connections with the Olympic Games prior to those in London in 1908. While the Foreign Office was aware of the Games in 1896, 1900 and 1904, its involvement was minimal. Indeed, the BOA was not even formed until 1905, so no group existed to lobby the government with respect to these early Games. According to Polley, the most significant intervention during this period occurred in connection with the so-called 1906 Inter-calary Games. At the request of the Greek government, an official representative was sent to observe the 1906 Athens Games. Polley argues that this set a precedent of governmental involvement (non-financial) with the Olympic Games.

Reports from the 1906 Games helped create the impression that Great Britain had underachieved. Sir Francis Elliot's (the government representative) report implied that Great Britain had not assisted its athletes the way other countries had. Similarly, Polley notes, BOA and Olympic team member Theodore Cook's writings about the Games amplified this image of underachievement. With the 1908 London Games only two years away, Cook was key in calling for governmental assistance in order to avoid a recurrence of this situation. Cook argued that the Games would promote the cause of international understanding, hence, the government should support them. Polley argues that the "Olympic apologists" continued to develop this line of thinking in the years leading to 1914. The government, however, developed its own less idealistic "discourse" with reference to the Games.

The London Olympic Games were linked to a Franco-British exhibition held that year. This fact ensured a governmental link as the British government approved of the exhibition as a way of strengthening ties with French. Hence, the Games received tacit government approval. Polley gives two examples of government involvement in, or awareness about, certain incidents - which, incidentally, were divergences from the international understanding and peace the BOA believed the Games should promote. In the first example, prior to the Games French rowers complained directly to the British Ambassador in Paris about their treatment by the Amateur Rowing Association in Britain. Though the British officials believed the matter was none of their business, they informed the BOA privately so that it could deal with the matter. Polley argues that the British government continued to use this semi-official mode of intervention in subsequent incidents. The second incident occurred during the Games and involved French cyclists and their anger about specific decisions by British referees. (In short, the British referees disqualified a French cyclist in one event. The French did not agree with the decisions and protests ensued.) Polley shows that the Foreign Office was aware of the nationalist passions raised by this particular incident. It reaffirmed its concerns about international sporting events and the potential diplomatic problems they could present for governments that became involved officially. Polley states that the Foreign Office began to develop the view that it should not jeopardize Britain's relations with other countries for the sake of sport. The cycling incident (as well as others, I am sure) at the London Games coloured the Foreign Office's later reactions to BOA requests for assistance. In closing his discussion of Foreign Office involvement in the 1908 Games, Polley adds that the Treaty and Commercial desks handled correspondence concerning the Games rather than the relevant political desks. Nonetheless, he argues that the level of Foreign Office involvement in the Games was a departure from previous years.

Polley notes that the results of the 1908 London Games led the BOA, once again,

to lament the lack of government support. Perceived under-achievement, particularly in track and field, prompted British Olympic leaders to criticise the government for its seeming indifference. Theodore Cook stuck to this theme in years leading to the First World War.

Despite Cook's efforts, governmental involvement was minimal in the years leading to the 1912 Games in Stockholm. The Foreign Office dealt with certain mundane legalities concerning the Dominions' relations with Sweden, as well as waiving import duties on publicity materials sent to the colonies. The Foreign Office was actually more involved in "encouraging army officers to compete in the equestrian events." Polley cites a War Office query to the Foreign Office about the potential benefits of allowing this to occur. The Foreign Office responded favourably, and the correspondence suggests that it was aware of the potential benefit to international relations. Polley suggests as well that the Foreign Office would likely have believed that military officers were of sufficient social standing to behave themselves. Thus, this was a pragmatic intervention. No subsidy was involved, nor was it official patronage of the BOA. Indeed, Polley argues, some members of the Foreign Office really were still not aware of the BOA. (He cites an example of programmes being sent to the Foreign Office. The official who received them did not know how to contact the BOA.)

After the Stockholm Games, for the third consecutive time, the BOA renewed its criticisms of the government when Britain again did not do as well as expected. Its official report attacked both the government and the public for their lack of interest. Indeed, the report actually suggested that Britain should consider withdrawing from the Games unless a better effort could be made. Polley argues that the BOA was angry that the government and the public were not buying into its "vision of the significance" of the Games. Some time later, in a fund-raising pamphlet, the BOA mentioned the idea of withdrawing from the 1916 Games. However, it did not really believe in this course of action since the pamphlet implied that to withdraw would mean being perceived as cowards by other nations. In essence, the BOA was trying to play on national pride in an effort to turn public opinion to its cause. Polley argues that this mood coloured the BOA's final pre-war dealings with the government.

Polley states that the Foreign Office stance on the Berlin Olympics in 1916 became "...increasingly hesitant as 1914 progressed..." He cites debates over whether British military personnel should participate in the modern pentathlon as evidence. In contrast to their position on military participation in Stockholm, the Foreign Office and the Army were not in favour of sending officers to Berlin. Again, Polley argues, this was a pragmatic appraisal of diplomatic realities given Britain's poor relations with the Germans.

Theodore Cook finally provoked a direct confrontation between the BOA and the Foreign Office. Polley cites a letter Cook wrote to the Foreign Office in early June 1914. Cook believed the government should be more involved in the upcoming Olympic Congress in Paris, as well as the Berlin Games scheduled for 1916, noting that other countries were. He argued that the Olympic Games were an important international event that, if ignored, would reflect badly on Britain's relations with Germany. The Foreign Office responded circumspectly to Cook, stating that it was not its position to get involved. Internally, Polley shows that Foreign Office officials were adamant about not being officially involved. They deferred any "deliberate

decision” about support to the elected members of the parliament.

Polley concludes the article with a discussion of the results of the First World War on the situation. Cook, who was also an IOC member in addition to his BOA responsibilities, resigned his position in the former body. Polley states that this removed a major Olympic proponent from the British cause. He notes as well that Cook’s international idealism disappeared with the war too. The Foreign Office continued to delay any “deliberate decision” about its role with respect to the Olympic Games. In fact, Polley concludes that the Foreign Office continued its piece-meal approach throughout the interwar years. This lack of decision, he argues, left the Foreign Office unprepared to deal with the “overt politicisation” of the Games in the interwar period.

Thus, despite the BOA’s more recent claims of being apolitical or independent of politics, as Polley’s use of government archives shows, the evidence from incidents prior to the First World War suggest otherwise. In fact, the BOA actively courted the government for support, patronage and money. The government, however, was reticent about supporting an enterprise that would not necessarily aid its relations with other countries.



David Whitson and Donald Macintosh, “The Global Circus: International Sport, Tourism, and the Marketing of Cities,” **Journal of Sport and Social Issues**, Vol. 20, No. 3, August 1996, 278-295. Reviewed by Scott G. Martyn.

International sporting festivals have long evoked the discourses and imagery of internationalism while serving as occasions for the advertisement of the host nation and city. The mere presence of such festivals enhances a city’s image and prestige. Some, such as the Olympic Games and soccer’s World Cup, help create favourable national reputations for their hosts. The authors argue that economic evidence examined by them indicates that despite that fact that grand scale sporting festivals produce short term windfalls, especially for local construction and tourist industries, public sector costs, such as those attached to security, transportation, and sanitation, to name a few, are regularly understated by host city bidders, calling into question the true economic gains of hosting international sporting festivals. The authors report that host city bidding authorities rationalize and justify understated public sector costs because of the importance in gaining the bid and establishing an identity as a “world-class” city. Finally, the essay argues that the benefits of living in a “world-class” city are unevenly distributed, and it raises questions on both economic and equity grounds about the urban strategy of promoting the city as a centre for leisure, tourism, and consumption.

Borrowing from Alan Tomlinson’s depiction of large-scale international sporting events, the authors devote the first section of this essay to establishing international sport as one of the most powerful and effective vehicles for the “showcasing of place” and for the creation of what the industry calls “destination image.” The authors con-

tend that this is the product of the increasing integration of news, entertainment, and promotion in contemporary popular culture. It is within this context that international sporting events have come to be seen as desirable and cost-effective ways to promote all manners of "world-class" products as well as the cities and states in which they take place.

A further contextual factor identified is the post-modernization of the industrial city, a phenomenon that the authors suggest affects cities around the developed world as flexible and mobile capital seeks more profitable investment opportunities. One aspect of this involves the departure of most heavy industries from their original locations in European and North American cities to other lower wage, lower cost economic regions. The result has been a shift toward an information and services economy, requiring that formerly industrial cities try to reposition and represent themselves as service centres.

Knowing that the demand is greater than the supply, fiercely contested competitions, both nationally and internationally, aimed at securing tourist attractions such as the Olympic Games, have, in recent years, become the norm. Yet, the authors point out that although business leaders and their political representatives routinely claim that international events benefit the city as a whole, the reality is that some groups are better positioned than others to take advantage an event's presence in a city and to benefit afterwards from the kinds of redevelopment such events stimulate. Unsurprisingly, local opposition to "grand plans" is not welcomed by elites who seek to represent their populations as united and enthusiastic hosts. Despite this, bid problems have become a matter of public concern, as recently witnessed in Toronto's unsuccessful efforts to secure the 1996 Summer Olympics. The authors contend that the benefits of mega-sport events are clearly far from being distributed equitably to all levels of a city's social strata.

The second section of this essay addresses the costs of Olympic Games-related developments and who benefits from the public spending associated with such activities. The authors note that the costs of hosting international games have risen exponentially since World War II, with each host city trying to surpass its predecessor in terms of "state-of-the-art" facilities featuring innovative architectural designs. Yet, although one of the standard arguments for hosting international games is that they leave a legacy of world-class sports facilities in the community, the apparently obvious benefit of having spectacular new facilities glosses over questions as to what parties actually uses them afterward and at what cost. The authors conclude that most feature facilities, such as the main stadium or arena, come to serve primarily as venues for professional sport.

Yet another significant form of senior government expenditure in support of the Games is the large sum spent on infrastructure improvements. Citing officials from a recent host city of the Commonwealth Games, the authors note that these funds often comprise the most significant infusion of money into a city's economy and suggest that this is among the most important of all reasons for bidding for mega-sport events. However, given the large sums involved, they point out that there is remarkably little detailed analysis of just how much economic benefit accrues from these subsidies, or, how such benefits are distributed around the community.

The third section of the essay focuses on the re-imagining of the host city, or, as previously stated, the creation of a "destination image." The authors attempt to high-

light the fact that leisure and tourism have become important avenues of capital accumulation as well as increasingly important factors in territorial competitions to attract and retain urban investment. The de-industrialization and economic restructuring have left many cities, in what used to be the affluent West, with few options, other than competing with each other to be centres of shopping and entertainment. Despite this official belief in a city's image value, the authors argue that there is little evidence of the Olympic Games making a significant and long-term difference to urban tourism, suggesting the imaging effect is too small and the competition is too great.

The final section of the essay attempts to establish a base of knowledge by which we can address the question, "Is the city a product to be sold on the tourism market and/or as a location in which to invest money? Or, is it a community where people - including those without much disposable income - can live, work, play, and belong?" The authors contend that for those able to participate in the property markets, whether as sellers or landlords, the gentrification that often precedes mega-sport events means opportunities for considerable profits. Yet for the poor, these same developments mean that many are forced to relocate to suburbs that may be far from their work and their social networks, whereas those who remain must survive in a neighbourhood whose shops and services are now aimed at a different clientele. The authors remind us that although the invitation to membership in the "world-class" city is extended rhetorically to the collective "we," developments that add to the attractions of a city for those who can afford them can leave many others on the street in a second class environment.

The authors conclude the essay by arguing that the celebration of the economic and cultural changes of the last decade, and the construction of an official and media common sense that celebrates markets and the downsizing of government, is a story told by affluent people and further, is one that obscures the sharpening divide between an increasingly affluent minority and growing underclass for whom participation in the "world-class" city is limited to looking in the shop windows or to disrupt bourgeois pleasures.

Depending largely on secondary sources, the authors' essay adds perspective to the ongoing discourse associated with the bidding for and hosting of international sporting events. Unfortunately, their analysis is limited to research based on the Canadian experience and does not attempt to address the individual economic impact of each international sport event. However, the authors argue that the integration of international sport with tourism and with the re-imaging of the city in Canada, underscores the global reach of contemporary culture and its connections with promotion and consumption.

Don H. Catlin and Thomas H. Murray, "Performance-Enhancing Drugs, Fair Competition, and Olympic Sport," **JAMA - Journal of the American Medical Association**, Vol. 276, No. 3, July 17 1996, 231-237. Reviewed by Gordon MacDonald.

In this article, Catlin and Murray provide a general overview of the drugs and drug control procedures surrounding Olympic sport and offer a brief justification for them. The article is divided into five sections dealing with, respectively, general classes of prohibited substances, drug testing procedures at the Olympic Games, results of drug testing by the IOC and agencies in the United States, procedures followed upon positive results to drug tests, and ethical issues surrounding drug testing and the pursuit of fair competition. Catlin and Murray bring impressive qualifications to their analysis of these issues, the former being based at the Department of Molecular and Medical Pharmacology and Medicine, University of California, Los Angeles, and the UCLA Olympic Analytical Laboratory; and the latter at the Center for Biomedical Ethics at Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio.

Throughout the article the authors assume that the need for elaborate administrative and technical drug-testing apparatus is the result of pharmacological methods created and used "...to enhance athletic performance in ways that threaten the integrity and meaning of Olympic competition." However, they do not define the latter part of this statement, even when they discuss an "...ethical foundation for drug control in Olympic sport" in the last section of the article.

In their first section, Catlin and Murray provide an excellent overview of those substances banned by the IOC. While the authors do not delineate exactly how the IOC chooses which drugs to ban, they do state that the process must balance the interests of athletes and physicians in having drugs available to control various conditions, versus the athletes' interests in ensuring a level playing field. Following this line of thinking, Catlin and Murray are then able to state that banning some drugs is easier to justify than others because they are known to confer advantages but are not often used to treat medical conditions. Most specifically, they argue that justifying a ban on anabolic androgenic steroids (AASs) is easy because these substances are known to confer an advantage but are rarely prescribed for medical conditions. Stimulants, in contrast, are different because they are widely available in over-the-counter (OTC) preparations, their benefits are more suspect, and they may benefit one sport while not another. Interestingly, the authors mention in passing that athletes moved from amphetamines to OTC stimulants after sports authorities developed tests to control the former effectively. (Of course, this situation was merely symbolic of a condition in which athletes attempted to stay one step ahead of the detectors. As the authors show later in the article, the situation has not changed.) Indeed, the authors argue that banning OTC stimulants is more controversial because less evidence exists for their effectiveness. Despite this, Catlin and Murray advocate bans on OTC stimulants, arguing that large doses do indeed act like amphetamines. They note that, under current practices, test samples that contain OTC stimulants are not reported unless they are higher than a pre-determined threshold.

In contrast to most substances, narcotics tend to be banned more because of their "reputation and dangers when used as illegal drugs than their performance-enhancing

potential.” Catlin and Murray note that, in fact, narcotics generally harm performance, although some may be used as pain killers. In addition, anti-asthma drugs - some of which are steroidal - have become an object of debate because many are used to treat medical conditions. IOC officials have decided to limit amounts to those unlikely to cause “anabolic effects”. (The authors even cite the procedure for athletes to declare their use of certain of these drugs.) Furthermore, primarily because of their ability to diminish the accuracy of tests for banned substances, diuretics are banned. Finally, the authors describe new substances - peptides and glycoprotein hormones and analogues - for which accurate tests are still being developed.

To conclude the first section of their article, Catlin and Murray review some of the prohibited methods athletes use. They state that blood doping testing remains controversial since accuracy demands blood tests. Though the authors do not elaborate, presumably the controversy arises because this type of testing is perceived as being more invasive. They also discuss briefly classes of drugs subject to certain restrictions. These include anti-tremor substances such as ethanol and beta-blockers as well as certain restrictions on local anaesthetics and glucocorticoids.

The second section of the article discusses procedures surrounding drug testing at the Olympic Games. Catlin and Murray explain that there are three functional categories in which drugs are used: those taken immediately before an event; those taken over time to aid training; and those taken to hide drugs taken previously. The authors argue that short notice testing is the best deterrent since risk to the athletes is always present. While describing the process of choosing samples and administering tests for the 1996 Olympic Games, they state that plans called for 18% of the athletes to be tested.

The article’s third section provides some results from drug testing both by the IOC and in the United States. Reports from the United States are much more detailed than those from international sources, reflecting the authors’ US base. Catlin and Murray provide information from major sports organizations in the United States, including the USOC, NCAA and the NFL. Most interesting is their admission that the “true rate of AAS use is difficult to determine for any sport.” Furthermore, they confess that “[e]ven though the use of testosterone remains the most difficult to detect, it remains the most commonly detected AAS in the United States today.” This implies that the drug is, in fact, more widely used than many of the others for which *there* are tests. Obviously athletes are logical about their drug use too - if you, as an athlete, have decided to use banned substances, then the drug most difficult to detect is the safest choice.

Catlin and Murray’s fourth section initially outlines procedures followed when drug tests give a positive result. Typically athletes’ defences fall into two categories: inadvertent use or outright denial. Athletes caught using OTC drugs typically fall into the former category while those testing positive for testosterone tend to fall into the latter. Those who deny usage generally cite several reasons for their positive test. Not surprisingly, Catlin and Murray refute the validity of most of these excuses. They do note that athletes are entitled to appeal, listing the different routes athletes can follow to appeal positive tests. They also offer an oblique critique of governing bodies and their testing procedures, noting that some are highly sophisticated while others are haphazard and confusing. However, they appear optimistic about the ability of testing to ‘win the day’, stating that given “the spread of doping, highly publi-

cized cases, and powerful pleas by athletes to level the playing field, most of the severely affected sports have responded with funding and genuine efforts to curtail this major problem.”

In their final, and weakest, section, Catlin and Murray examine some ethical issues behind drug testing and the pursuit of fair competition. To begin, they outline criticisms of drug testing, underscoring unfairness and inconsistencies of punishments. Then they move to the ethical arguments against drug testing, outlining the two main concerns - that is, paternalistic and liberty infringements; and the inability to distinguish between technologies of performance enhancement. Surprisingly, throughout this summary, the authors never cite any of the extant philosophy of sport literature on the topic. In their defence of testing, Catlin and Murray mount (unsuccessfully in my opinion) a counter-argument against those who criticise drug testing because of its infringements on personal liberty. While there may, in fact, be an argument for infringing on liberty in this case, the authors' comments are too cursory to be helpful. Similarly, their argument in defence of distinguishing between technologies of performance enhancement does not ring true. They argue that “[t]he primary reason for drug testing in sports has to do with enhancement technologies and the meaning of sports.” This is a vague statement at best and their attempts to explain it offer nothing substantive. In effect, their ethical arguments are too brief to be effective.

In sum, the article provides a good introduction to the basics of drugs and drug-testing in the Olympic Games and, to a lesser extent, international sport. Through the article's first four sections the authors give us a reasonable amount of information about banned substances in a manner that is easily grasped by the non-expert. While Catlin and Murray are in favour of continued testing, their attempts philosophically to justify the process are weak. In fact, the final section of the article seems to be almost an afterthought. Those looking for more rigorous arguments for and against drug testing would be better served by examining philosophy of sport literature on the subject.

Nigel B. Crowther, “‘Athlete and State’: Qualifying for the Olympic Games in Ancient Greece,” **Journal of Sport History**, Vol. 23, No. 1, Spring 1996, 34-43. Reviewed by Scott G. Martyn.

In this article, Crowther attempts to discuss a number of questions concerned with the ancient relationship between the Greek city state, the *polis*, and its aspiring Olympic athletes. He further attempts to reference these queries to the modern Olympic Games. In doing so, he argues that in the ancient games, unlike in the modern, religion and ritual were important aspects in the qualification and preparation of athletes.

Crowther begins by suggesting that ancient cities rewarded athletes who were victorious in the ancient games and thereby brought prestige to the city. In support, he notes the cities of Athens, Sparta, Croton, and Sybaris, each of which lavished considerable rewards on successful athletes, rewards, the author notes, that could be

either monetary or honorary or both. So great was the desire to gain political prestige through athletic victories, that cities, rather than individual athletes, sometimes entered competitions at the Games in equestrian events. Citing numerous examples, some Greek cities even took to recruiting athletes from other cities, again for reasons of city-state prestige.

Although the evidence supports the fact that ancient cities rewarded victorious athletes, it is less clear as to what extent they were subsidized or provided with assistance before they attained any degree of success. Crowther notes that there were, of course, athletic facilities provided free for citizens and others, where those who intended to compete in the Games could train. He also argues that if we are to believe that the Olympic Games were open to all classes of people for most of their history, and that victors came from a cross-section of society, there must have been considerable subsidies either from the state or from private individuals. Although the sources are remarkably silent on this topic, Crowther notes two such examples regarding the Ptolemies in Egypt and the great city of Ephesus in Asia Minor. There are, however, several known instances where cities rewarded their athletes handsomely, but only after the games were over and triumph had been achieved. Yet, there is scant evidence that the city state in Greece rewarded an athlete during the Games themselves. Although no ancient source mentions the reason for this, Crowther speculates that city states respected and honoured the fact that the Games were outside their jurisdiction during their staging.

Crowther notes that several cities sent an official delegation to the Games, a *theoria*, which represented the *polis* in certain Olympic festival matters. These "theoretic embassies," being largely religious, were given limited power as the official delegates of cities. However, even when the *theoria* clearly represented the city-state at the Games, it did not become involved in the selection of athletes. In this respect, Crowther argues that the *theoria* did not perform the functions of a National Olympic Committee (NOC), explaining there is no evidence that they ever safeguarded the interests of athletes during the time of the Games. He concludes that the prime reason for the attendance of the *theoria* at the Games was not to look after the well-being of its city-state athletes, as NOC delegations look after its athletes today, but rather to promote the state by taking part in the sacrifices at the festival. As such, the duties of these officials primarily, if not entirely, focussed on the interests of the state at Olympia and at other festivals.

Without the structure found in today's rigorous selection process, the author argues that it is apparent that ancient athletes were free to enter the Games at Olympia or other festivals on their own initiative. However, Crowther is quick to point out that unlike the Modern Olympic Games these festivals were Greek and officially excluded all non-Greek athletes. Slave, thieves and those of ill character were also excluded from the Crown Games, although they could enter some local festivals. Individuals at Olympia could also protest against the qualifications of an athlete, who in turn had to prove that he was eligible before being allowed to compete. Athletes could also be denied registration in the Olympic Games simply because their home city was excluded. Finally, although there were no specific athletic standards that an athlete had to attain before he could compete at Olympia, many factors ensured that only the best athletes competed. Such factors included the thirty-day training period at Elis prior to the Games, the distance of the journey to Olympia from many Greek commu-

nities, and the fear of shame at not finishing first in athletic competition.

In sum, Cowther concludes that, unlike today where nations take great interest in athletes preparing to compete in the Olympic Games, the *polis* in ancient Greece was little concerned with aspiring athletes, at least until such time as they were actually victorious in competition and thereby brought honour to the city. In other words, it was not how well one might do, but rather, how well one actually did that undergirded city-state supported and reward for athletes.

Susan Tyler Eastman, Robert S. Brown, Karen J. Kovatch, "The Olympics That Got Real? Television's Story of Sarajevo," **Journal of Sport and Social Issues**, Vol. 20, No. 4, November 1996, 366-391. Reviewed by Gordon MacDonald.

American television viewers of the 1994 Lillehammer Winter Games were exposed to multiple references to the Sarajevo Olympic Winter Games of a decade earlier. As the capital of the former Yugoslavia, Sarajevo became a focal point in the civil war that had broken out with the fall of centralized communist control. Much of the city was damaged by the fighting, including most of the facilities used for the 1984 Winter Games. The destruction touched a cord with Olympic leaders, prompting the IOC President himself to call for a cessation of hostilities. Television as well took an interest in the situation in Sarajevo. In this article the authors examine American television's treatment of Sarajevo.

Hence, "how did American television commentators who announced and reported on the 1994 Olympic Winter Games in Lillehammer contextualize the 1984 Winter Olympics in Sarajevo? What did the valence and context of references to Sarajevo imply about their potential relevance to the American political agenda?" The authors asked these questions of Columbia Broadcasting System's (CBS) television coverage of the 1994 Games. (Unfortunately, the reader does not see these questions until nearly the middle of the article.) After taping CBS coverage, analysing commentators' references, and interviewing CBS production executives, they found that frequently commentators referred to the 1984 Sarajevo Olympic Winter Games in more than just a sporting context. They argue that commentators' references to the 1984 Winter Games revealed CBS' "implied sanctioning of a political message" about Sarajevo.

In their introduction, the authors provide examples of CBS commentary during broadcasts of the Games concerning the war in the former Yugoslavia. This commentary provoked their central questions of whether CBS covered the Sarajevo situation "with the intention of creating sufficient sympathy to provoke world military action? Or was the contrasting of Lillehammer and Sarajevo solely a dramatic ploy to raise ratings?" The authors believe that CBS used the war to boost its ratings, stating that their research shows how a social concern could become coopted. They argue that understanding these media power workings will protect viewers from future exploitation.

The authors begin the main section of their article by arguing that media can have an effect, at the very least, upon issues about which the public thinks. Agenda setting theory argues that sustained coverage of an event can make it a matter of public concern. Public concern, in turn, can influence policy as a government attempts to act on the public's interests. While the authors admit that public interests are difficult to discern, they neglect to mention that governments attempt to influence public interests too. The influence is not a one-way process.

With reference to the Olympic Games, the authors state that politics have always been present. Eastman, Brown and Kovatch list a number of international political incidents that have occurred in connection to the Games. As a result, they argue that the Games can be implicated in foreign policy directions within the United States. They also assert that the media have placed emphasis on national rankings at the Olympic Games in recent years. (While this is true, national rankings have, in fact, been a part of the Games since very early in their history.) With these thoughts in mind, the authors contend that the media can have an impact on U.S. foreign policy, providing the single example of the government's humanitarian response to the Kurdish situation in the early 1990s. (Although helping the Kurds could also be a way for the government to 'show' it was listening to the concerns of American citizens.)

For CBS, the authors argue, Sarajevo may not have been politically interesting. They posit that its interests were more likely commercial. (This does not seem to be a great leap of logic. Commercial television stations are not generally in business for humanitarian reasons.) The authors note that television executives are well aware that human interest stories raise ratings. Juxtaposing footage of the Sarajevo Olympics and the then current situation in the city provided compelling images. Rhetorically, the authors ask whether Bosnian athletes' stories were "merely hardship/heroic stories or part of a larger narrative context with political or profit implications?"

After this long lead-in, the authors finally state their two research questions cited above. To say the least, this is somewhat confusing for the reader, given their previous "central" questions. Eastman, Brown and Kovatch go on to detail the process by which they examined the coverage. They found that the most common references to prior (or future) Games were to the Winter Games in Albertville, France in 1992. Sarajevo was second. More importantly, however, was the fact that many of the Sarajevo references were valent - that is, to issues surrounding the Bosnian war.

The authors grouped CBS' references into several categories, which included: commemorations, calls for help, extraordinary efforts, war's devastation, and calls for stopping the war. Thus, commentators often made reference to remembering the Games in Sarajevo. They also took part in the calls for assistance to Sarajevans, promoting the Olympic Aid Relief Fund in particular. The authors show that CBS producers were well aware of the power of such appeals to raise ratings. The category the authors call 'extraordinary efforts' detailed the efforts of Bosnian athletes to train and then get to the Games to compete. Those categories entitled 'war's devastation' and 'calls for stopping the war' are self-explanatory. In all these categories, however, the authors argue that CBS producers knew the subject matter would enhance ratings.

The authors' interviews with five CBS producers appear to be the source of many of these latter conclusions. Indeed, although the CBS personnel tended to focus on technology and production changes from the previous Games, four of five cited the Sarajevo story as one that enhanced ratings. Similarly, all were aware of the scale and

importance of the production to CBS. Eastman, Brown and Kovatch also inform us that many of the anchor-hosts' comments were scripted which, in effect, gave them the "imprimatur of the network." Finally, among the some 200 feature stories presented during the Games, many had been completed months prior to their opening. Many of the stories on Sarajevo would be included in this number.

In their conclusions, the authors argue that the IOC was actively political in calling for a cessation to the hostilities in Sarajevo. CBS picked up the theme and promoted it. Despite this intervention, the United States did not soon intervene in Bosnia. However, Eastman, Brown and Kovatch do admit that the war in Bosnia was significantly different from the Kurdish situation two years previous. That is, the United States had fewer strategic interests in Bosnia. Furthermore, they note that involvement in Bosnia would have meant sending American troops, whereas the Kurdish situation involved drops of humanitarian aid materiel. (From my perspective this is a huge difference.)

Significantly, though, the authors note that the context of CBS' messages was different. Hence, the statements tended to mourn destruction of the city, rather than the on-going conflict. Stories about individuals tended to separate them from the broader context of the war. After portraying the situation in these ways, the usual outlet presented for an emotional response was through charity, which, the authors suggest, possibly defused calls for more official (military) interventions. They conclude that CBS' motives were "almost wholly commercial." The Sarajevo story contributed to CBS' success and the authors project that similar "increasingly impassioned and ennobled telecasts" will appear during future Games. Unfortunately, for the American public the context of the message "defused its immediate political potency."

That the authors should conclude CBS' motives in focussing upon Sarajevo were mostly commercial is not, intuitively, that surprising. After all, commercial success is the reason for the network's existence and initiatives. Focussing on the broader context of, at least for outsiders, the extremely complicated Bosnian situation would not have been productive from a ratings perspective. That the American public would not be spurred to call for more active intervention is similarly unproblematic. The authors argue that public interest may have an influence on foreign policy. If this is so, then I would suggest that the American public would be much more amenable to choosing the "safe" and "innocuous" (as the authors phrase it) route of making charitable donations, rather than placing American troops at risk in a foreign civil war. Thus, the American government may in fact have been acting in the public interest by not getting involved.

Beyond these comments, a couple of editorial comments are in order. That is, the article is not particularly well ordered. Specifically, having the major research questions appear as far into the article as they do is confusing. Finally, a number of smaller errors appear. For example, several times commentator Greg Gumbel's name is also spelled Gumble. Minor as they are, these detract further from the article.

Kristine Toohey, "Australian Television, Gender and the Olympic Games," **International Review for the Sociology of Sport**, Vol. 32, No. 1, March 1997, 19-29. Reviewed by Scott G. Martyn.

Pierre de Coubertin believed strongly that women belonged within the confines prescribed by nature. Carved from "his" clear view of ancient Hellenistic culture and the ethos of Muscular Christianity, Coubertin's model of Olympism was clearly a product of his own time. As Coubertin proclaimed ". . . no matter how toughened a sportswoman may be, her organism is not cut out to sustain certain shocks. Her nerves rule her muscle, nature wanted it that way." Despite Coubertin's adamant opposition to the question of women competing in the Olympic Games, some authors have concluded that the "traditional antinomy between sport and femininity has been dealt a final blow." In spite of evidence to the contrary, all would agree that the entrance of women into the Modern Olympic Movement was characterised by a long and arduous process, the foundations of which were laid by an earlier generation of emancipators.

Since their beginning in 1896, the Modern Olympic Games have grown into a spectacle of unprecedented global proportion. According to the International Olympic Committee (IOC), broadcasters offered viewers in over 214 countries and territories the opportunity to view, via satellite, the Centennial Olympic Games in Atlanta, Georgia. Out of a potential global television audience of 3.5 billion viewers, an unparalleled audience of more than 3.2 billion people watched the Olympic Games in 1996. By adding those individuals who read about the Games through various daily newspaper sources, the figure easily exceeds half of the world's total population. With such an opportunity to shape public opinion through their choice of sports programming, some scholars argue that the media actually does more than simply reflect the sporting environment they cover.

Focussing on Australian television coverage of the 1988 and 1992 Summer Olympic Games, Toohey's study may provide "a key to breaking existing patterns of sports programming and thus reduce gender inequities by demonstrating that during the Olympics female sports rank highly in terms of viewer popularity, as well as in terms of increased air-time." According to Toohey, previous studies investigating media coverage of sport in Australia during normal programming indicated that women's sport receives less than 10 percent of the air-time given their male counterparts. However, in her 1988 and 1992 studies, the author found that female events received 32.8 and 29.7 percent, respectively, of the time given to coverage of male events.

Toohey acknowledges that studies investigating the relationships between women's sport and the media are neither new, nor limited to Australia. Yet, she points out that each of these studies conclude a consistent set of findings, that is, that female sport is under-represented in newspaper, radio and television coverage. Also apparent, in the Australian context, is the fact that this research has had little if any impact on reducing existing inequities and changing the attitudes of those who decide what is to be seen, heard and read in the media. Importantly, Toohey argues that these findings are especially disturbing when one considers the media's pervasive influence on today's society.

Although research has demonstrated that participation in sport, from grass-roots to elite levels, can have a positive impact on women and girls, as well as men and boys, the author points out that girls and women in Australia have a paucity of female sport heroes on whom to model themselves, not because females are not participating and succeeding in sport, but rather because their achievements have largely been ignored by the media. According to Toohey, this is despite the fact that their successes often outrank those of their male counterparts. However, there is mounting evidence that the Australian public is becoming interested in watching women's sport. Toohey's content analyses of media coverage during the 1988 Summer Olympic Games found that television coverage of women's events totalled 21.5 percent of total broadcast time and 32.8 percent of sports coverage. Although these Olympic related figures may be disappointing considering the success rate of female athletes, they are significantly higher than those found during regular broadcasting periods. Unsurprisingly, a survey of television viewing practices during the 1992 Barcelona Olympics produced similar results and attitudes.

Success does, however, influence media choice of which sports to broadcast. Thus, Toohey argues that while the high success rate of Australian women athletes partly explains their visibility on television during the Olympic Games, it is not the complete answer, noting that Australian women are also successful in other international events which do not receive air-time on commercial television. Although links can be drawn between nationalism and increased coverage of women's sport during the period of the Olympic Games, success does not always translate into viewer preferences for what they rate to be the most enjoyable female sport to watch. Toohey concludes that this suggests that arguments for continuing invisibility of women's sports, based on lack of viewer interest and/or excitement, are specious.

The 1988 and 1992 studies which produced the previously mentioned results were similar in methodology, but varied in sample size. Data was collected live and from videotape from Channel 8-9 Prime Tamworth, New South Wales, a regional broadcaster taking Network Ten feed (1988) and ATN7 Sydney (1992). Hand-held stop-watches timed events covered to the nearest second. For the 1988 Olympic Games the entire broadcast, excluding days one and sixteen, were recorded from Channel 8-9 Prime Tamworth broadcasts, and subsequently analysed. This channel, the only commercial broadcaster in northwestern New South Wales, did not broadcast the entire Network Ten coverage. A different approach was adopted for the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Study. Only the broadcasting of Network Seven's ATN Sydney's 'Highlights' programme, a synopsis of the previous day's events, was analysed, rather than the entire coverage. However, as with the previous study, days one and sixteen were not included.

Toohey concludes the article by stating that her findings indicate that the "female deficit model," which reflects that women's sport is judged by comparing it to men's and consequently is often considered to be lacking speed and strength and thus excitement, is not all pervasive. Consequently, this may indicate that the key to breaking existing patterns of sports programming lies through promotion of female sport at major events. While this article does not extend beyond its original content analyses, the author herself argues that a combination of both qualitative and quantitative analyses is needed to provide a more complete picture of the interaction between Australian television, gender and the Olympic Games. In effect, Toohey's article is but a

modest step forward in the greater breadth of studies investigating the relationships between women's sport and the media. Nevertheless, its value should not be discounted by those of us interested in reducing the gender inequities that such studies so clearly demonstrate.

Michael Bar-Eli, Adara Spiegel, "Israeli Women in the Olympic and Maccabiah Games, 1932-1992: Patterns of Stability and Change," **International Review for the Sociology of Sport**, Vol. 31. No. 4, 1996, 385-406. Reviewed by Gordon MacDonald.

In this article Bar-Eli and Spiegel report the results of their investigation of Israeli women's participation patterns in the Olympic and Maccabiah Games. In short, they found that the number of Israeli women participating in these Games has increased. However, the number of Israeli women participants in proportion to Israeli men participating in these Games has remained relatively stable. They explain this stability theoretically by using "the segmentation of the labor market approach." This approach argues that women in the labour market are often channelled into 'female-typed' occupations. Bar-Eli and Spiegel suggest that it explains the results of their study as well. Thus, though Israeli women have participated in a growing number of sports over time, differentiation between the genders still exists. This was particularly the case for the Olympic Games. The authors also suggest that "professionalism seems to play a major role in explaining these tendencies."

In a deftly worded beginning, Bar-Eli and Spiegel review two competing approaches to the study of the labour market and gender. The first, modernization, suggests that societies will have less segregation by gender as they become more industrial and technocratic. That is, as labour becomes more specialized, gender becomes less meaningful and occupations are filled by whomever is available. In contrast, labour market segmentation suggests the opposite. Hence, 'female-typed' occupations gain more women workers over time. In effect, women are channelled into 'female-type' occupations. The authors apply the latter approach to elite Israeli athletes to determine the "state of women in Israeli competitive sports."

In the second section of the article, Bar-Eli and Spiegel outline their method. They retrieved the numbers of Israeli athletes who participated in the Olympic and Maccabiah Games between 1948-92 for the males and 1932-89 for females (except the 1961 Maccabiah Games for which they could find no numbers). Then they calculated the proportion of males to females, as well as the frequency and percentage of participation of both genders in the Games. They use the 'Index of Dissimilarity' to determine whether occupational segregation of women by sport increased or decreased over time. As noted, the labour market approach suggests females are likely to be concentrated in 'female' sports. To determine this classification, Bar-Eli and Spiegel computed the percentage of women out of the total number of participants in each Games. 'Female' sports were those in which the percentage of females was higher than the percentage of females in those particular Games as a whole.

Hence, the authors created two categories: the 'Observed' category, or percentage of total women competing who did so in 'female' sports, and the 'Expected' category, or percentage of women who would have been in these 'female' sports if the proportions had matched overall female participation rates in each of the Games. The critical value was the ratio between the two categories.

The results of their study are presented in tabular form. Bar-Eli and Spiegel found that the frequency and proportion of females participating in the Games were lower than for males. Women represented 17.7% of Israeli athletes in the Olympic Games and 26% of Israeli athletes in the Maccabiah Games. Large, stable differences existed over time. Only in the 1980s did participation percentages begin to equalize between the two Games. (The ratio of male to female athletes tended to be 3-4:1 for the Olympic Games versus 3.5:1 for the Maccabiah Games.) The authors argue, however, that "there is no increase in the rates of female athletes participating in the Olympic and Maccabiah Games." In my opinion, this is the authors' most significant finding.

When the authors applied the Index of Dissimilarity to the data they found that differentiation or segmentation was high in the Olympic Games and average in the Maccabiah Games. The indices of dissimilarity of the two approach one another because of a decrease over time in the Olympic Games and a slight increase in the Maccabiah Games. The general picture, they argue, is one of stability. In the Olympic Games, females participated in 'female' sports exclusively. This was not the case in the Maccabiah Games. Hence, the concentration of men and women in different types of sport has been consistent even though the types of sport for women expanded in both Games over time. Furthermore, women tended to compete in sports classified by the study as 'female'. Indeed, 86% of the women in the Maccabiah Games participated in 'female' sports. Incidentally, it should be noted that Bar-Eli and Spiegel's categories of 'female' sports are derived solely from the numbers of male and female Israeli athletes participating in those sports. Hence, they find that, depending on the Games surveyed, sports such as bowling, rifle shooting, and rowing appear as 'female' sports.

In their discussion, the authors state that the results are mostly what one would expect. Participation rates for Israeli athletes in the Olympic Games averaged 4.5 men for every woman, while the ratio was 3:1 for the Maccabiah Games. (The authors suggest that fewer women participated in the Olympic Games because they had yet to reach the standards of performance required.) Over time this distribution has not changed significantly, even though women are now competing in more sports. However, the distributions of the two Games have become more similar in recent years to settle at approximately 3-4 men for every woman. According to Bar-Eli and Spiegel, these results are consistent with general trends in the Israeli labour force. This supports a labour-market approach and its segmentation interpretation. Hence, they conclude that women are indeed "disproportionately channelled to 'female' types of sport." The authors do not offer reasons for this 'channelling' other than to make the fairly obvious suggestion that broader societal forces are at work. For example, they argue that the centrality of Israeli family structures may limit women's opportunities to pursue a career in sports. That is, women traditionally have been expected to provide much of the care within the family. This limits their opportunities to practice sport at an elite level. In addition, Bar-Eli and Spiegel feel that work

needs to be conducted in other areas to determine the importance of factors such as the influence of sporting role models on Israeli girls.

Of course, elite sport in the twentieth century is different than the labour market in some important and, indeed, critical, ways. For example, in the Olympic Games, sports for women have been limited historically to those the IOC (men) considered appropriate. Thus, 'female' sports as defined by the study are almost inevitable when a few sports are designated specifically as having female categories. For example, that is, if there are fifteen sports on the program but only four have female categories then those categories nearly always end up being 'female' sports, because only a limited number of total competitors from each country are allowed to enter. Technically, this is not the case in the labour market where most jobs are not designated as being strictly female or male (although, as the labour market approach suggests, women tend to occupy certain types of jobs rather than others). Thus, the force of labour market approach conclusions in this case is weakened somewhat because of the peculiarities of the Olympic and Maccabiah Games. Nonetheless, Bar-Eli and Spiegel's research is significant because they show that (Israeli) women do participate more frequently in some sports than in others. More importantly, this situation has remained largely stable over time despite the fact that the gross number of (Israeli) women competing in the Olympic and Maccabiah Games has grown.



Robert E. Rinehart, "Fists flew and blood flowed': Symbolic Resistance and International Response in Hungarian Water Polo at the Melbourne Olympics, 1956," **Journal of Sport History**, Vol. 23, No. 2, Summer 1996, 120-139. Reviewed by Scott G. Martyn.

The most memorable event of the Games of the Sixteenth Olympiad was the semifinal water polo match between the Hungarian and Russian teams. Rinehart argues that this crystallized moment of conflict became a symbol of Hungarian national identity and rebellion against the Soviet-directed regime in Hungary. The article provides an examination of the emergence of this crystallization of national identity for Hungarians as played out in the 1956 Olympic Games in Melbourne, Australia. Extending the metaphor of evolutionary change, the author suggests that these crystallized moments of national identity might be seen as clear and dramatic mutations of the original which, in retrospect, are epiphanic definers of a new way for nation-builders or citizenry to view the world.

On the evening of 23 October 1956 in Budapest, thousands of Hungarian students, responding negatively to the policies of the Communist Party, took to the streets in mass protest demonstrations. Demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, free speech, free elections, and the return of power to Hungarian political reformer Imre Nagy, the protesters marched toward the state radio station. When police fired on the crowd, the demonstration quickly evolved into a popular uprising, spreading swiftly throughout Hungary. Hungarian security forces and Soviet troops stormed Budapest, but the Hungarian army disbanded, many of its soldiers taking

their weapons to the rebel side. Shortly thereafter the Communist government collapsed, and within a day the Hungarian Communist Party named Nagy premier. Soviet troops pulled out of Budapest. But the jubilation lasted only one week. On November 4, some 2,500 Soviet tanks moved into the Hungarian capital. Thousands of resisters died in street fighting, while an estimated 126,000 more fled across the border to Austria.

During the bloodshed in Budapest, the Hungarian team was on its way to Melbourne aboard the Soviet steamer *Gruzia* for the opening ceremonies on 22 November. The International Olympic Committee's (IOC) reaction to the events in Hungary came as no surprise. "Every civilized person recoils in horror at the savage slaughter in Hungary," proclaimed Avery Brundage, "but that is no reason for destroying the nucleus of international cooperation and good will we have in the Olympic Movement. The Olympic Games are contests between individuals and not between nations." Despite Brundage's plea and possible IOC reprisal, teams from Spain, Switzerland, and the Netherlands withdrew from the Games in support of Hungary. When the Hungarian athletes arrived in Melbourne, a crowd of 500 cheering "Free Hungarians" greeted them.

Rinehart notes that the 1956 Hungarian water polo team, ready to defend its 1952 Olympic gold medal, was made up of athletes torn between yearning for a free Hungary and fearing Soviet reprisals. The Hungarians were bracketed in Group B, with the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in Group A. The top two teams in each group qualified for the final group. The final qualifiers were Yugoslavia (3-0) and the Soviet Union (2-1) from Group A; Hungary (2-0) and the U.S.A. (1-1) from Group B; and Italy (2-0) and Germany (1-1) from Group C. The Hungarians dominated Italy (4-0), Germany (4-0), and easily beat the United States (6-2). With the Soviet Union match next, 5,500 spectators, many of them Hungarian expatriates, crowded into the natatorium. Hailed as an underwater boxing match, the play that ensued was so rough that at times blood stained the water red. Behind by a score of 4-0, the Soviets decided to forfeit the match they were unlikely to win. Clearly, Rinehart notes, this was not a typical Olympic moment. All but assured of the gold medal, the Hungarians remained undefeated by overcoming the Yugoslavs (2-1).

Rinehart argues that the 1956 Melbourne Olympics created high visibility and opportunity for Hungarian athletes, which in turn meant that their participation and subsequent victories could form oppositional signs of political resistance to the Soviet regime in Hungary. The athletes believed they could demonstrate Hungary's resilience to the world. He also notes that Hungarian expatriates exploited every symbolic opportunity to show the world Hungarian tenacity and pride.

The article concludes with a discussion of the symbolic messages exuding from the Hungarian water polo team's victory over the Soviet Union. Rinehart argues that the victory, and the context surrounding it, restated to the world that the politically-significant terrain of sport still nourishes forms of resistance. The victory served to unify, if not a whole nation embroiled in a life and death struggle, at least the Hungarian refugees and athletes in Australia. As a result, the victory became an indirect icon for the revolutionary movement, and a symbolic sign of resistance to the Soviet-directed regime in Hungary. Unfortunately, the author has severely limited discussion of historical context. Instead, he examined current resistance literature and offered a brief theoretical discussion of signs and symbolism. Depending on both pri-

mary and secondary sources, Rinehart's article opens the door to discussion and greater consideration of the political significance and impact of the Olympic Games in particular, as well as sport in general. Indeed, he has given the reader a limited glimpse into the crystallization of national identity using sport as the catalyst.
