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# Charisma and the Rational- Legal Organization

## A Case Study of the Avery Brundage - Reginald Honey Correspondence Leading Up to the South African Expulsion From the International Olympic Movement

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### Introduction<sup>1</sup>

In recent years, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) has seen its profile tarnished as the guardian of amateur sports. Rather than an organization with a worthwhile and dignified mandate (Olympism),<sup>2</sup> its Olympic Games have been described as a 'plaything' for corporate sponsors; the IOC leadership, as a self-perpetuating oligarchy who travel the world like kings.<sup>3</sup> Its most vocal critics consider the Olympic movement an anachronism in a world that has long since eschewed the IOC's philosophy of sport.

Through myriad difficulties, the IOC leadership generally has been portrayed in two diametrically oppositional ways; in Hoberman's words, the "defenders and detractors of Olympism."<sup>4</sup> On the one hand, for the detractors, the Olympic leaders are arrogant, autocratic men (since there are few female administrators in the Olympic organization), seemingly oblivious to the criticism of their movement. These leaders are thought to handle controversy in typical IOC fashion. Cost over-runs in the construction of Olympic Games facilities are the consequence of local inefficiency. Bribery scandals are dismissed as a lapse of judgement on the part of weak-willed individuals. Organized criticism to block bid committees' attempts to win the Olympic festival is the action of misguided spoiled sports.<sup>5</sup> The IOC as a transnational organization is seldom at fault. On the other hand, for the Olympic defenders (usually the IOC membership itself), the leadership is portrayed as the keeper of a sacred movement that, while fraught with occasional difficulties, is vital in a secular world of excess. As Avery Brundage, in speaking about Coubertin, put it, the Baron "did not...revive the Games for the journalist, the cinema or the counting house."<sup>6</sup> For the

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Olympic defender, the IOC with its philosophy of Olympism is an indispensable moral agent. In truth, there is validity to both positions but in and of themselves, they are incomplete.

This study is an attempt to more fully explain the *raison d'être* of decision-making within the International Olympic Committee. What is it about the IOC that allows it to retain its position as arguably *the* global mega-sport promoter, despite on-going controversies that try the confidence of the staunchest Olympic supporter? In paraphrasing the work of Edward Shils, it might be asked, within the IOC, what relationship still exists between the charismatic idealism of its founder Pierre de Coubertin, and the highly bureaucratized apparatus of an expansive transnational organization?<sup>7</sup> The thesis put forward is that the IOC's resiliency can be partially explained by the link that connects the charisma of the Olympic founder Pierre de Coubertin to the contemporary, highly rationalized IOC administration.

It should be made clear that in the use of terms like *charisma* and *rational*, the basis of the argument comes from the theoretical considerations of Max Weber. This is not fortuitous, for as Samuel N. Eisenstadt notes, the bequeathing of personal charisma to *the office* has "been used by Weber to denote the process through which the charismatic characteristics are transferred from the unique personality or the unstructured group to orderly institutionalized reality."<sup>8</sup> The challenge in this paper is to demonstrate how decisions made by the IOC leadership may be controversial, misguided and self-serving, but they are not solely based on "mere hypocrisy, mendacity or stupidity."<sup>9</sup> A strong connection can be demonstrated between the charismatic legacy of Coubertin and the decisions taken by the IOC leadership.

Necessarily, a brief account is given of what Weber meant by the important theoretical concepts and how charisma and the bureaucratic organization come together as institutionalized charisma. This is followed with an analysis of how institutionalized charisma is manifested in IOC decision-making. Specifically, evidence is cited from one of the most critical periods of recent IOC history--the debates that led to the expulsion of South Africa from the Olympic movement because of the white regime's apartheid laws.

Extensive research that deals with this topic, already in print, is not repeated.<sup>10</sup> Rather, utilizing the correspondence between the former IOC President Avery Brundage and the South African representative to the IOC (Reginald Honey), the connection between charismatic leadership and routinized rational decision making is demonstrated. The paper ends with some general observations about the IOC as a rationally organized transnational organization, albeit one with a strong undercurrent of institutionalized charisma.

## **The Theoretical Concept of Charisma**

Invariably Weber is cited, as either a positive or negative identifier, when it comes to an investigation of the contemporary administrative organization. Much of what he wrote in the early twentieth century on the rationalized bureaucratic structure still remains relevant. Utilizing his ideal-typical methodology, Weber sought to understand both the sociological basis of authority and the corresponding administrative structure.<sup>11</sup> He observed a trend towards a more formal administrative structure, organized around carefully considered rules and regulations that paralleled the rise of

the industrialized nation state. Corresponding to this structure was an equally rational pattern of authority relations. As Weber defined it, the rational-legal authority implied "a belief in the *legality* of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands."<sup>12</sup> Hence, leadership was more likely to be earned than granted and came about because of education, experience, and expertise -- the technologically able. But Weber also saw the continued presence of the charismatic leader within society. The charismatic as he defined it:

applied to a certain quality of individual personality by virtue of which he/she is set apart from ordinary men or women and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities.<sup>13</sup>

In the steady and perceptible movement towards rational legality in all areas of life what did the future hold for charismatic leadership? Weber surmised that with its basis in the demonstration of the extra-ordinary and exceptional it was more fragile and less sustainable than the rational-legal. This fact troubled Weber and he often spoke of the *iron cage* rigidity that rational authority implied.<sup>14</sup> Specifically, Weber wondered if the innovative creativity of the charismatic individual could exist in the rationally organized institution and if so, how?

Weber alludes to the relationship between the charismatic and the rational-legal in his 1948 essay "Politics as a Vocation." The charismatic politician, Weber argues, can demonstrate intentions of a noble character whose style of governance is conducted in a spirit of sincerity and virtue. But the adoption of such a position cannot be taken lightly. As he put it, "it is not a cab which one can have stopped at one's pleasure; it is all or nothing."<sup>15</sup> An irreconcilable chasm between charisma and routinized activity is assumed since few politicians adopt such an absolutist ethical stance. Most, Weber notes, govern by an "ethics of responsibility, in which case one has to give an account of the foreseeable results of one's action."<sup>16</sup> Nonetheless, it does not negate the presence of the ethical charismatic in a rationally organized political party. There are those who will make decisions based on uncompromising ethical grounds. Weber scholars like Eisenstadt and Shils have taken his treatise on politics to demonstrate how the charismatic can, and does still, operate in the rational legal organization generally. Eisenstadt goes as far as categorically stating that charisma, far from being incompatible with routine procedure, is inherent in the organization.<sup>17</sup> Shils concurs with this observation. He goes on to suggest that, within the rational-legal administration, charisma remains present. However, its form is much less intense and more widely dispersed.<sup>18</sup> In Shil's words, the charismatic:

may be manifested intensely in the qualities, words, actions and products of individual personalities. But they may also become resident, in varying degrees of intensity, in institutions--in the qualities, norms and beliefs to which members are expected to adhere or are expected to possess.<sup>19</sup>

Further, both Shils and Eisenstadt argue persuasively that charisma is not concentrated in any particular person within the rational-legal bureaucracy but rather is diffused throughout the entire organization.

Their allegiance to this position comes directly from Max Weber himself. Weber

argued that the charismatic leader, while alive, could not rely totally on his/her ability to manifest extraordinary behaviour; and with death came the inevitable problems of succession. There had to be some means by which personal charisma could be formalized so that group/leader continuity could be assured. Weber formulated the concept of the “charisma of the office” or *institutionalized charisma* but realized it had to be demonstrated as authentic.<sup>20</sup> This he did in his famous treatise *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*.<sup>21</sup> The early captains of industry organized the workplace around the teachings of the charismatic religious leaders Martin Luther and John Calvin. One pursued work in the highly secular economic sphere in the spirit of the religious ‘calling’ as espoused by Luther and Calvin in their respective theologies.<sup>22</sup> The result was the rational organization of business grounded in religious piety.

Shils built upon Weber’s observations and described this institutional charisma as the manifestation of a larger more nebulous sense of power, “enveloped in the vague and powerful nimbus of the authority of the entire organization.” Institutional charisma does not “completely saturate the entire corporate structure.”<sup>23</sup> Rather, charismatic deeds are usually attributed to the individual acts of any one of an organization’s representatives. In organizations like the IOC, this representative is the Chief Executive Officer or President since it is this person who comes to symbolize the organization.

For his part, Eisenstadt explained what he called *the test of charisma*. This entails answering questions concerning two standards of measurement and connects personal charisma to the ongoing administrative structure. First, has the charismatic leader, through his/her actions, managed to bring about a momentous single event or to initiate the start of a great movement? Second, has the charismatic succeeded in leaving some sustaining impact upon an institutional structure? Eisenstadt poses the query in this fashion:

Has the charismatic been able ‘to transform any given institutional setting by infusing into it some of his [sic] charismatic vision, by investing the regular, orderly offices, or aspects of social organization, with some of his [sic] charismatic qualities and aura?’<sup>24</sup>

Few sport scholars would disagree that Pierre de Coubertin has passed the charismatic test with flying colours. Borrowing ideas liberally from other sport festivals and exposition-type events, he not only conceived the image of an international sporting festival, he went about creating the organization to bring the image to fruition.<sup>25</sup> On the issue of organization, Douglas Brown has noted that the Baron would scarcely recognize the contemporary Olympic Games as the mega-sports festival it has become.<sup>26</sup> Coubertin’s Games consisted of “an odd array of cosmopolitan European and American sports enthusiasts” all with their own sporting agendas.<sup>27</sup> Coubertin worked to create his philosophy of Olympism and to convince others of its authenticity. This was no easy task. Greece was intent on appropriating the Olympic Games as the nation’s historical and cultural right. The Athens experience convinced Greek authorities and others (members of the American team signed a petition in favour of this move, for example) that Greece should be the permanent site of the Games. Coubertin disagreed and noted:

Given the sort of mental solitude in which I had been left, I had plenty of opportunity to examine the basis for these aspirations. To me, they seemed utterly unreasonable, from the point of view of the institution itself and of the goal that I had sought in restoring the Games. It was viewed as a dazzling one-time curiosity, but not as an institution whose future conditions were worth discussing. Of all the fears I felt about going forward, this one, the fear of hostility and of the pressure of universal public opinion, was the strongest. I decided to disregard it, and I did well to do so.<sup>28</sup>

In short, it was the charismatic leadership of Pierre de Coubertin, and his idealist vision of Olympism that was to win the day. The challenge here, then, is to demonstrate that his personal charisma was infused in the organization that emerged from his personal vision.



Implicit in Eisenstadt's *test of charisma* is the logic that any sustained succession must be carried out by those who work in and for the organization. Is there any evidence of this? Hoberman argues effectively that the Olympic movement benefits from the "benign myths" that surround Pierre de Coubertin.<sup>29</sup> It is important to recognize that myth is not an outright lie. Elements of the truth are elevated to mythical (charismatic) status and then embellished to give them extra-ordinary stature and power of persuasion. Despite the acrimony, political wrangling and intrigue, the controversies, boycotts, cheating, negative environmental impact, and exorbitant price tag for construction, the Games do go on. Even critics like Christopher Hill will admit, "the

world needs the Games, because it needs to be reminded of what human beings can do.”<sup>30</sup> It follows then, that those who manage IOC affairs cannot be totally deceitful, hypocritical, or cynical. There must be to a greater or lesser degree, some acknowledgement of the mythical charisma of Coubertin. Applying Weber’s notion of the ethical politician, there will be those within the IOC who hold office as an avocation as opposed to those whose office is a professional career. As a rough approximation, the latter would be members of the permanent Olympic administrative staff. The former represent those like the two men whose correspondence is the basis of this paper, Avery Brundage and Reginald Honey. Therefore, before applying Weber’s notion of charisma to the IOC, it is important to sketch, briefly, the biographies of the two IOC members heavily involved in the South African issue of apartheid in sport.

### **Avery Brundage and Reginald Honey**

Arguably, one of the most significant IOC Presidents, next to founder, Pierre de Coubertin, was Avery Brundage. Brundage was born in 1887, attended the University of Illinois where he attained a certain level of recognition as both a good student in civil engineering and as an athlete of some prowess. He went on to compete in the 1912 Olympics in the decathlon and pentathlon, and was the American All-Round Champion in 1914, 1915, and 1918.<sup>31</sup>

During the same time period (circa 1915) Brundage established his own Chicago-based construction firm. The sporting engineer had become a self-made millionaire by 1927, earning himself the nickname “Honest Ave” in his approach to business.<sup>32</sup> Brundage’s background in business and sport positioned him well when he turned his attention to sports administration. His first major appointments were as President of both the Amateur Athletic Union of the United States (AAU), and the American Olympic Association (AOC). Brundage was appointed to the IOC in 1936 and has been referred to as “one of the keenest advocates of the Olympic ideal until his death in 1975.”<sup>33</sup> In 1952 Brundage attained an important personal goal when he was elected President of the IOC. Guttmann provided some insight into Brundage’s personality when he suggested that the latter’s ascension to this position was the direct result of “his organizational ability, his energy, and his devotion to Olympism, not for his gregarious charm, his modesty, or his tactfulness,”<sup>34</sup> none of which he demonstrated. The key is the devotion to Olympism since it implies knowledge of, and commitment to, the ideals expressed by Coubertin.

Lord Killanin, who succeeded him as President of the IOC, described Brundage as “a man with absolute ideals who would not deviate from them.”<sup>35</sup> Brundage was best defined, perhaps, by his fervour to guard and to protect, at any cost, the 19th - Century ideals of Olympism.<sup>36</sup> *Inter alia* was his dogmatic belief in the separation of the Olympics from the political and social realities of the world. This was clearly evident in 1954, when as President of the IOC, Brundage wrote a confidential circular letter to IOC members. He was adamant that the IOC had to *select* members to its Olympic family, for only the chosen were able to “be free from obligations or ties of any kind.”<sup>37</sup> Such an unequivocal position was eventually to place not only Brundage but also the IOC in a position of inevitable conflict with a changing world, as the Olympic movement came face to face with the integration of diverse global cultures.<sup>38</sup> Undeniably Avery Brundage was a political figure, with an undisguised per-

sonal agenda to further his ambitions over others. But it is critical to embed his personal interests both in his resolute commitment to Olympism and his interpretation of what this meant. Brundage did typify the ethical politician whom Weber described. He did, despite glaring contradictions in his personal life, believe fully in Olympism.



In 1948 Reginald Honey, the other main protagonist, became the fourth person from South Africa to be elected to the IOC.<sup>39</sup> From 1950 until his death in 1982 Honey was the only South African member of the IOC. Over his 34 years in the Olympic movement, Honey became the longest serving member of the IOC.

Notwithstanding, Honey evidently left little in the way of a legacy on the overall operations of the IOC. However, he appeared to be one of those individuals who willingly volunteered a good deal of his time to sport. Avery Brundage might well have had the South African member in mind when he wrote about the “dedicated amateur sport lovers” who freely gave “time, energy and money” to the Olympic movement “without mercenary motives and solely because of their devotion to Olympic ideals.”<sup>40</sup>

By profession, Honey was a banister to the Supreme Court of South Africa as well as serving as director of several South African companies. His background in sport was administratively based. Honey was a founding member of the Council for Physical Education in South Africa and also served as its President. In 1930 he was named President of the South African National Olympic Committee (SANOC). In recognition of his years of service to SANOC, he later was awarded the title of Life

President.<sup>41</sup> In other words, Honey was a dedicated amateur sports lover in the milieu of white South African sport.

Undoubtedly, Honey's most formidable challenge during his tenure on the IOC occurred during the period of 1959 to 1970 when he was presented with the impossible task of defending the white regime's racial policies related to sport in his native South Africa. Honey's overall influence *vis-à-vis* the IOC and South Africa became apparent after South Africa was expelled from the IOC. Both Brundage and the leaders of the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC) urged Honey to remain an IOC member. In this capacity he would continue to mediate between the IOC and South Africa.

There are three observations that can be made about these two individuals. First, they were typical of IOC members of their time and generation, very conservative, devoted adherents to the gentlemanly amateur ethos, and deeply involved in the Olympic movement through a long-standing commitment to amateur sport. Second, they were heavily imbued with their personally conceived spirit of Olympism and were quite willing to volunteer much time and effort in order to further the Olympic cause based on this conception. Third, both were typical of the men who were appointed to the IOC for at least the first sixty odd years of its existence: white, male, well-educated, economically privileged, and subscribing completely to the *Weltanschauung* of western industrial capitalist hegemony while naively maintaining that they were not influenced by politics.

What is important about these men is that both Brundage and Honey personified the composition of the IOC of their times and clearly, having such a homogeneous group organization, contributed to the IOC's ability to operate as a charismatic organization. This influence was possible because of the critical position that Brundage held as President of the IOC. He was highly suspicious of those holding membership in the IOC for reasons other than allegiance to Olympism: the Soviet bloc government appointees, and the members who desired a more liberal definition of amateurism, in particular. And in his characteristic autocratic leadership style, Brundage rejected the rationally based arguments that often emanated from such members. The consequences of this will be made evident below; but first it is necessary to more fully understand how the IOC operates as a charismatic institution in terms of Weber's theoretical concepts.

## **The IOC as a Charismatic Organization**

Charisma, in its pure form, Weber saw as emanating from the personal, i.e., those extraordinary actions of individuals that clearly distinguished one from the group.<sup>42</sup> As already noted, Weber believed that charismatic action was tenuous and as such, very quickly might be *routinized*. Routinization came about because of the strong desire of the leader and followers to maintain their community and, more importantly, to stabilize the material benefits which accrued from the relationship between the charismatic leader and the followers [whom Weber called *disciples*].<sup>43</sup> In other words, the extraordinary action of the charismatic is transformed into normal everyday activity. In the words of Arthur Schweitzer, the nature of charisma was such that it would eventually be *smothered* by bureaucracy or *suffocated* by a traditional regime.<sup>44</sup>

How then, Weber rhetorically asked, could charisma be maintained? His mus-

ings on this question led him to the conclusion that personal charisma could become *institutionalized*. Gradually, but resolutely, the sacredness and awe that disciples felt towards their charismatic leader would be reified in a particular organizational structure. For Weber, particularly within the industrial capitalist state, this would be the rational-legal administration. The consequence was that the institution was venerated as if it possessed the charismatic qualities.<sup>45</sup> This is exactly what existed with the organization of the IOC.

The personal commitment of Pierre de Coubertin, as founder of the Olympic movement, has been widely documented in numerous pieces of work.<sup>46</sup> John MacAloon writes:

To multitudes around the world he [Coubertin] was and is known as *le Renovateur*, the man who resurrected the Olympic Games, guided their rebirth, and set them on the road to becoming a global cultural institution of unprecedented kind and proportion. Though the idea was not his alone and did not originate with him, though many others assisted his labors at every step, no modern institution of comparable significance owes so much to a single man.<sup>47</sup>

In other words, the charismatic vision of Coubertin has led to the global sporting festivals of the summer and winter Olympic Games. It is critical to recognize the scandals of bribery, athlete doping, and environmental damage that plague the IOC.<sup>48</sup> It is also clear that Coubertin's charismatic vision of Olympism has been institutionalized into the IOC as a value structure from which decisions emanate. Historian John Lucas, speaking about the contemporary IOC writes: "Even in the glare of the Olympic world, there is a way of melding high idealism with practical diplomacy and hard-headed, honest business negotiations with many of the world's biggest corporations."<sup>49</sup>

Both Eisenstadt and Shils have observed that even though everyday life experiences are generally routinized, the individual may remain drawn to a greater or lesser extent, to the charismatic legacy. It is almost a truism to state that no one (competitor, coach, or spectator) who has experienced the Olympic Games has not felt, at least in part, the vision of Coubertin. To paraphrase Shils, Coubertin's charismatic property, in the guise of the Olympic movement, has come to permeate the organizational structure, the ideology, and the representatives of Olympism; this sporting celebration is centred on the "idea of the holy."<sup>50</sup> Brundage, too, preached his own version of Olympism, one that was significantly more obsessive over the notion of amateurism. Lucas, in commenting on Brundage's beliefs, writes: "For him [Brundage] as well as his moral mentor de Coubertin, no religion or philosophy preached loftier sentiments."<sup>51</sup> Brundage himself referred to the "religious significance"<sup>52</sup> of the Games, as a "festival of peace" and "chivalrous competition."<sup>53</sup> Arguably this dispersed institutionalized charisma -- the sense of the holy -- has two important ramifications for the post-Coubertin Olympics: how Olympic representatives are perceived by each other, and how the organizational structure is understood by the membership. Insight into the latter perception can be gleaned from excerpts of a speech given by Brundage at the 62nd Session of the IOC in Tokyo:

The Olympic Movement is a twentieth century religion. A religion with a universal appeal, which incorporates all the basic values of other religions, a modern, exciting, virile, dynamic religion attractive to youth, and we the IOC are its disciples.<sup>54</sup>

But what Brundage came to realize with the South African crisis was that there were other equally valid perceptions of Coubertin's Olympism, which countered his. These had their basis in defining fair play as representative democracy, and that non-discriminatory sport included black South Africa. Finally, there was an internal tension brewing between those who were affiliated to the IOC as employees and those, like Brundage and Honey, who considered it a private social club. While it is evident that the latter gained dominance under the leadership of Juan Antonio Samaranch, both visions share some commonality. Ultimately, the Olympic Games are viewed as being something both unique and special. When the Games begin, unlike any other sporting event, the Olympic competition displaces other sports from public interest and scrutiny.<sup>55</sup> An Olympic medal may mean millions of dollars in advertising endorsements, but to most competitors (and often the interested public), it is something more.

It is this nebulous ethereal feeling that is an integral part of the institutional charisma of the Olympics, giving the entire organization a widely accepted power of authority. But this authority is not without its price. Like other charismatically-embued organizations, the Olympic movement "must incorporate a standard of justice...beyond that already realized in existing institutions."<sup>56</sup> The IOC must ensure that its fundamental aims are carried out as the charismatic Coubertin would have wished. It is expected that when charisma is institutionalized, the organization takes on the mantle of extraordinary behaviour.

Brundage wrote to IOC members of this lofty responsibility in a 1960 Circular Letter. He reminded members that they represented both their countries and the Olympic movement. They should conduct themselves with "dignity and modesty," for the entire IOC would be judged by the actions of the individual member. He cautioned that "proper social behaviour and attention to financial obligations, on the part of the members, were essential if the IOC was to command the respect of the public."<sup>57</sup> It is no mere verbal posturing that Olympism is expected to "improve the human race, not only physically. but to give it a greater nobility of spirit. and to strengthen understanding and friendship amongst peoples."<sup>58</sup> As a charismatic organization, it *must* strive to deliver its message of sporting salvation.

For Olympic members, Coubertin's charismatic legacy is a weighty burden that is to be carried with pride. Although the rational-legal organization does not depend on charismatic individuals for its day-to-day functioning, the institutional charisma, as Shils observed, is dispersed in the qualities, norms, and beliefs of organizational representatives. Like the movement that he/she represents, the IOC member must be seen to be functioning with a greater sense of justice, and must be seen to carry out his/her duties in the spirit of Olympism. As Weber observed, it is not a taxicab that can be stopped as one wishes. In theory, IOC members as devoted disciples "could be counted on to support whatever was in the best interest of the Olympic movement, even against their own country. Their first allegiance was to a principle and an idea."<sup>59</sup>

This is important, for the IOC as a secular religion demands a particular devotion to duty that symbolizes the true Olympian. But there is a paradox here. Just as different religions have different philosophies of life so too are there alternative notions of the true Olympian. Throughout his tenure as IOC President, Brundage resisted the inroads of alternative notions of his brand of Coubertin's charisma. He demanded that members be carefully selected on individual character and their unwavering loyalty to his vision of Olympism. Place of birth presumably was not important, but financial independence and freedom from political pressure were. Finally, Brundage anticipated the dispersal of Coubertin's charisma with his wish that IOC members "should be preferably leaders in their own country with considerable knowledge of and experience with amateur sport, men of strong character, national prestige, international understanding and independent spirit."<sup>60</sup> In other words, Brundage was wont to find men like himself.

Once commitment and undying loyalty to Olympism have been demonstrated, length of service within the Olympic family plays a significant role in the decisions that the President and his Executive Committee choose to make. Given the intertemporal dynamics and politics that occur in any organization, one may well anticipate the decisions that are forthcoming from the IOC on contentious issues. Take for example, the concerns raised about the South African policy of apartheid in sport. Would the decisions favour Black Africa, the last major group to be admitted to the Olympic movement? Or would they favour the white regime in South Africa, with its long unbroken membership in the IOC?<sup>61</sup> In the context of the correspondence, hindsight tells us it was the latter. And so, it is within the context of institutional charisma that Avery Brundage and Reginald Honey corresponded with one another.

### The Brundage-Honey Discourse

What was the context in which Brundage and Honey exchanged communication? On the one hand, like any of their contemporaries, the duo was oriented towards a "bureaucratic consciousness," in which it was deemed necessary to take care of business in efficient and orderly fashion.<sup>62</sup> On the other hand, Brundage and Honey also functioned with a "settled orientation," that is, an accepted view of society, the organization of which "best suits their own orientation and goals."<sup>63</sup> Brundage and Honey shared a common, settled orientation. Both accepted their class and social privilege as just and proper, Both had a commitment to voluntarism in which their organizational skills and administrative acumen had been honed. And underlying this there was the vague sense of satisfaction and well being that in carrying out their duties for the IOC they were faithful to the legacy of Coubertin - the institutional charisma to which they were bound to pay homage.

The correspondence must be viewed in this context for it was not only the routinized institutional procedures that are relevant, but also the philosophy of sport (and life) that was articulated. It is a correspondence underpinned by an unwavering testament and allegiance to the spirit of Olympism as interpreted by the men. Brundage, as the IOC President, was particularly obliged to wear the cloak of institutional charisma, for it was he who had been chosen "first among equals" and had to display to the IOC *disciples* the infallible oracle of Coubertin.<sup>64</sup>

Most of this correspondence preceded the expulsion of South Africa from the

Olympic movement and represented the attempts of Reginald Honey to reassure the IOC that SANOC was the legitimate heir to disseminate the spirit of Olympism in his country. Honey not only wished to offer assurances that this privilege was SANOC's birthright, but he had also to *de-legitimize* the efforts of those individuals and groups who would challenge his IOC entitlement.

### The IOC Birthright Claimed

The issue of politics in the Olympic movement has been a thorny subject since the formative years of the IOC. At a philosophical level, the IOC has espoused a naïve anti-political stance. This position stemmed from Coubertin, himself, who conceptualized a very apolitical, specific role for the IOC. According to Guttmann:

His [Coubertin] aristocratic conception was that the IOC, an organization free from all political ties, sent its [emphasis in original] delegates out to the various countries of the world to stimulate Olympic ideals and to encourage the formation of national Olympic committees. In no sense were the distinguished members of the IOC to be considered representative of governments or nations.<sup>65</sup>

While this, perhaps, was laudable, it was overly idealistic and almost always unfounded.<sup>66</sup>

However, the idealism of Coubertin had a profound effect on one of his most disciplined followers, Avery Brundage, who endorsed it with zealous tenacity. Despite Brundage's personal involvement in political issues related to the Olympics, he maintained an abhorrent disregard for the political realities of the day; and it is too simple and crude to suggest that Brundage was guilty merely of a privileged class-based naiveté. Guttmann best describes the tightrope that Brundage walked between Olympism and politics. He was paranoid in his distrust of communism yet worked tirelessly to ensure that the Soviet Union would be admitted to the Olympic family.<sup>67</sup> Brundage personally condemned apartheid in South African sport but would have nothing to do with those who would use sport to fight apartheid in everyday South African life.<sup>68</sup>

Operating from this philosophical perspective placed the Brundage-led IOC in a precarious position when it was forced to deal with the issue of apartheid in South African society. On the one hand, as Quick points out, "IOC members believed that if the organization was to continue as a viable entity in the world of international athletics it was imperative that it not become involved in the politics of any country."<sup>69</sup> In this way, the IOC was able to legitimize its delay in dealing with the racist policies of the white South African government.

On several occasions Brundage expressed his belief that the issue of apartheid in South Africa was a government (political) matter only.<sup>70</sup> The lack of comment forthcoming from the IOC President on receiving Reginald Honey's observation that "we [White South Africa] are quite right in our view that the Blacks are quite unable to run a state," suggests that Brundage implicitly agreed with his South African colleague.<sup>71</sup> As early as 1961, Brundage sent Honey a newspaper editorial espousing undisguised Afrikaner racism, with the comment that the description "explains the situation in

South Africa so well that I thought you would like a copy."<sup>72</sup>

However, the IOC in its promotion of Olympism as a secular religion must be seen as *doing right*; and Brundage wrote, "when the letter and spirit of the Olympic rules are not followed, [it] is for the rest of the world to refuse to play with countries which are in violation of Olympic principles."<sup>73</sup> The apartheid policies of the South African government were steadily applied to every facet of South African life, including sport, which conflicted with IOC principles. This can be gleaned from a letter Honey wrote to Brundage:

I am afraid that things from an Olympic point of view are not going well in this country. The formation of a Ministry of Sport by the government has met with the approval of most of the sporting bodies. I spoke against it, but was a voice calling in the wilderness. Our Prime Minister who is really quite an able man has become a fanatic for *apartheid*. I don't like fanatics. In my view an amateur plays and associates with whom he wants to. It is not the function of a government to legislate in such a subject.<sup>74</sup>

Three observations can be raised from this letter. Honey reaffirms the conviction that Olympism was above politics. Second, the naivete and cynicism of such idealism was evident, since South Africa's sporting bodies and amateur sportsmen were always white and male. During the 1960s the South African government, with support from sporting federations, was moving toward the control of South African sport. As such, SANOC was destined to become an extension of the government. As early as 1962, the IOC realized that some members of SANOC were appointees of the South African government.<sup>75</sup> Third, implicit in Honey's idealism is an acceptance of racial discrimination but distaste for a fanatic demonstration of such behaviour.

On numerous occasions during the early 1960s Honey gave assurances to his fellow IOC members that the matter of racial discrimination in sport would be dealt with by SANOC and thereby it could continue the facade as adhering to Olympic principles. Initially, Honey, as the trustworthy disciple, was able to defuse the matter by conveying to his colleagues that until the issue of apartheid had been raised at the IOC meetings, the reason underlying the poor representation of Black South Africans in international competition was the lack of interest in sport on their part. Despite such assurances, in time, the South African government involvement in sport became increasingly obvious. It compelled Otto Mayer to write to SANOC:

in 1960 we were assured that your Government would permit the inclusion of coloured athletes on your [Olympic] team. Now we understand the situation has changed and that your Government has forbidden such a mixed team. In this event, you cannot fulfill your obligations as a National Olympic Committee.<sup>76</sup>

An earlier note to Brundage precipitated Mayer's letter in which Honey writes:

We Olympic people in S. Africa get into more and more trouble as time goes on. The government of this country is steadily becoming if I can so express it, more and more *apartheid minded*. I can only say that our NOC is doing its best to observe the rules of the IOC in every way.<sup>77</sup>

After many concessions, and faced with the reality that little was being done to alter the situation in South Africa, the IOC had no choice but to withdraw its invitation to South Africa to compete in the 1964 Games.

Over the next four years leading up to the 1968 Games, Honey continued to lobby the IOC, on behalf of SANOC, to permit South Africa's participation. Following the presentation of the report made by the IOC Commission, and its visit to South Africa, a postal vote of Olympic members was held. The decision favoured South African participation in the Mexico City Games. The elation felt by the South Africans was short-lived as both internal and external pressures were brought to bear upon the IOC to change its decision. When the possibility became strong that the South African invitation to compete in the Games might be rescinded, Brundage and Honey heightened their efforts to quell these forces within the IOC. In a letter to Honey urging him to prepare a submission to the IOC rebutting these challenges, Brundage wrote:

Positions are being circulated for an extraordinary session of the Committee [IOC] under Rule XVIII. The quicker your statement is received, the better. I am sending a copy of this letter to President Braun [President of SANOC].<sup>78</sup>

Obedying his President's directive, Honey presented a brief to the IOC based on a rational-legalistic interpretation of its charter, outlining the rules of law by which it would be inappropriate for the IOC to rescind its invitation to South Africa to participate at Mexico City. Therein, Honey also reminded the IOC Executive Board of the link between Coubertin charisma and the unbroken devotion of the South African disciples:

The South African Olympic Committee was invited for the first time to send a team to the 1908 Olympic Games (when the founder of the Games, Pierre de Coubertin, was the President of the I.O.C.) and continued to partake until 1960 without question. The situation which obtained from 1908 to 1960 is no different from the situation which prevails to-day.<sup>79</sup>

Just as the wayward apostate is to be welcomed back to the fold, Brundage was consistent in his unconditional acceptance of those who would commit to his personal interpretation of Coubertin theology; and as Guttman so graphically describes, such unwavering faith continually got the President in trouble.<sup>80</sup> Brundage made it known where his allegiance resided as the threat of a boycott of the Mexico Games escalated. He was insistent on bringing South Africa back to the fold and threatened that the 1968 Games would be held even if only he and South Africa attended.<sup>81</sup> He made a hurried trip to South Africa in an attempt to stave off the planned emergency meeting of the Executive Board in April 1968, expressly organized to deal with the potential threat of a forty-plus nation boycott of Mexico City.<sup>82</sup> These administrative actions were grounded in the distorted belief that the white South Africans remained devout adherents to Olympism. Brundage put his faith in Honey when the South African wrote about the Mexico Olympic Games team, "I am sure that you and my colleagues will be satisfied with our selection of the team. It will all be fair and above board."<sup>83</sup>

At the same time, Honey, who was becoming frustrated by the turn of events,

took matters into his own hands. He issued to the Secretary-General of the IOC a proposal for a vote of non-confidence in the Executive Board.<sup>84</sup> (To paraphrase Weber, the disciple was questioning the institutional charisma of the IOC.) In response to this proposal Brundage gently chastized Honey; it was his opinion that the South African proposal “would be a mistake.”<sup>85</sup> Brundage ended his letter, reminding Honey that he, too, was seen as carrying the legacy of Coubertin and would be protected: “Don’t forget that the South African Olympic Committee has some friends and supporters who will protect your interests.”<sup>86</sup>

Guttman documented the religious tenacity with which Avery Brundage carried out his presidential duties.<sup>87</sup> In this context, Honey responded almost immediately to the secular *prophet*:

I am quite satisfied to leave the matter in your hands. I can only express my view is that all peoples should be allowed to compete at our Games. That I can assure you is the view of all races in South Africa.<sup>88</sup>

Honey not only reaffirmed the right of his President to act on behalf of South Africa, but also re-consecrated himself as part of the Olympic family, able to speak for all citizens of his country.

Despite Honey’s confidence in Brundage and the latter’s ability to deal with the matter, Brundage’s role as the legitimate communicator of Coubertin’s institutionalized charisma was beginning to erode. As Quick correctly observes, the inevitable IOC decision to withdraw its invitation to South Africa was for Brundage “a shattering personal defeat. He [Brundage] had entered the meeting [Executive Board] openly opposed to any change in the original vote and emerged a broken man.”<sup>89</sup> The prophet had lost the respect of the faithful.

And herein lies the *smothering* effect of a rational-legal administration upon charisma. When Soviet IOC members Konstantin Andrianov and Anatoli Romanov first began to bring forth proposals to democratize the Olympic movement, Brundage was the champion of autocratic rule and could not conceive of the IOC functioning in any other way. As far as Brundage was concerned, democracy would get in the way of Coubertin’s charismatic vision. One came to Olympism not as a government appointee or career sports administrator as the Soviet members did, but as a true believer in the secular sporting religion as the President conceived it.

When the inevitable occurred and SANOC was found wanting in its ability to carry out the mission of Olympism, Honey requested a direct audience with the IOC inner circle, the Executive Board. In writing to Brundage, Honey asserted, “My own view is that when one is threatened with dire banishment he is entitled and should be heard. The principle is known as one of elementary justice.”<sup>90</sup> Despite Honey’s efforts to plead the case of white South Africa, his pleas fell on deaf ears. More importantly, the institution had to re-affirm its charismatic character to escape from rational-legal smothering; the IOC itself had to be seen to be proactive in dealing with the injustice of apartheid. For the most part, the pressure on the IOC came from internal sources: the African NOCs, the Soviet bloc, and the Third-World member nations. The *elective affinity* towards select Olympic ethical/philosophical principles<sup>91</sup> of the “Communist Afro-Asian sport front,” as Honey referred to them, was decidedly oppositional to those of the autocratic Brundage.<sup>92</sup>

When the IOC met for its Amsterdam Session in 1970, it was faced with dealing with the resolution advocating the expulsion of SANOC from the Olympic movement. Brundage recalls,

The presentation by the black Africans was excellent but the defense by South Africa was, in the circumstances, somewhat arrogant. I even had to reprove President Braun [of SANOC] at one point. At another, Mr. Honey exclaimed loudly something to the effect "if you don't want us throw us out."<sup>93</sup>

Brundage implicitly acknowledged the organizational authority that he as President of the IOC wielded, and the risk one took when *the faithful* were attacked. He chastised Honey for his lack of appreciation for the time and effort that the IOC Executive took in arriving at a very difficult decision to expel South Africa and concluded: "The attacks on the IOC in President Braun's presentation . . . undoubtedly cost South Africa some votes."<sup>94</sup>

After the expulsion of South Africa, Honey considered submitting his resignation to the IOC. Subsequent to consultation with his colleagues, including requests from Brundage and the African NOCs that he reconsider, Honey once again demonstrated his commitment to the charismatic legacy. He wrote to Brundage, no longer as the *disciple* addressing him as "*My Dear Avery*," but as the *apostate* writing to the Dear President:

Having the opportunity to discuss the matter with my friends in South Africa, I have decided not to resign from the IOC. Personally I feel the course as set by de Coubertin is a proud one and if I and my fellow countrymen can advance it we shall be delighted.<sup>95</sup>

Honey concluded his letter with the warning that the charismatic movement must only recruit a chosen few:

I still feel that if we go on increasing the number of our members, we must inevitably crash. We want honourable men who are well versed in the doctrines of amateur sport and not government nominees.<sup>96</sup>

In sympathetic support of the concerns of one of the "*brethren*," Brundage replied:

You have made a wise decision, in my opinion, by not resigning from the IOC, especially in view of the existing circumstances, and I hope you will be able to attend many more sessions and lend your wisdom to the proceedings. You are quite right when you mention the dangers which are faced by the Olympic Movement. In a way, we violated our own rules in taking in members from countries where the government is all powerful and we must not permit the percentage to become any larger than it is now. You may imagine the pressure to which I am being subjected!<sup>97</sup>

Two inferences can be made from this letter. First, Honey was addressed as a fellow disciple, who despite the expulsion of his NOC, remained a stalwart follower of

the Coubertin charisma. True to the end. Brundage trusted Honey as much as he remained suspicious of those government-backed appointees to the IOC. Second, Brundage was also fearful that the long-time power base of the Olympic movement in the hands of a select few would be lost to individuals not worthy of this privileged responsibility, most notably Honey's foe, the Communist Afro-Asian front.

### The Interloper Denounced

In this same set of letters, Honey not only had to reaffirm himself and SANOC as the true heirs of the charismatic legacy, but also he had to denounce the interlopers. Institutionalized charisma requires that the followers demonstrate their worthiness of the legacy. If, on the other hand, outsiders can unmask the incumbent as a fraud, then the assumed charismatic link is threatened. Removal of the infidel permits the *true believer* to take his/her rightful seat at the altar of sport. In the futile attempt to reaffirm the privilege of white South Africa, Reginald Honey's interlopers were many, both internal and external to the IOC. They included the government-appointed *Russians*, the Black African nations. Third-World member nations, and anti-apartheid sports organizations such as the South African Sports Association (SASA) which was later to become the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC). His denouncement of the interlopers, without exception, had its basis in the vision that he and Brundage shared concerning Coubertin's charismatic authority. Unless one truly believed in the doctrine of amateur gentlemanly sport, as Honey believed only he and his like did, then one could not share the charismatic legacy. According to Brundage and Honey, those who visibly and willingly mixed politics with sport could not link themselves to Coubertin and must be seen as interlopers.

Honey displayed a profound fear of the interlopers. We see this apprehension as early as 1959 when Honey wrote to Brundage:

Times are going to be difficult with the Russian proposal [the undemocratic nature of South African Olympic team selection] hanging over our heads and I have no doubt that Central Africa will go black in the near future and they will become willing lichens to our Russian friends.<sup>98</sup>

Similarly, in a later letter, Honey castigated the interlopers whom he did not believe fitted the mould of those individuals who deserved to be involved in the charismatic institution. He wrote:

I certainly do not want amateur sport to be controlled by non-white bodies. Should that happen, it will die in this country and the Olympic Games will only become an entrance exam for professionalism.<sup>99</sup>

Plainly, in this passage Honey revealed his own discriminatory privilege as a white South African. The *other*, i.e., the Black South African majority, he warns, was not capable of administering sport and most definitely had no claim to the institutional charisma of the Olympic movement. Finally, and in keeping with his conviction that the infidel had infiltrated the holy shrine. Honey ends his 2 September 1966 letter with: "I am afraid that [paid state amateurism] is happening in other countries who [sic] are members of the IOC."<sup>100</sup>

Two years later, with the Mexico Games on the horizon and the threat of a boycott looming, Honey once again not only confirmed his belief that he had the pulse of the South African community, but also conveyed his fear of the interloper in the Olympic movement:

Generally the people of all races in South Africa are dismayed at the attention of what I call the Communist Afro Asian Front. Should we give in to their blackmailing activities we may as well shut up shop.<sup>101</sup>

The next fortnight when Honey realized that the Mexican government was planning to withdraw the South African invitation to the XIXth Olympiad, he wrote to Brundage:

I hope that these notes and 'Submission' will assist you and save the members of the IOC from making fools of themselves. The whole population of South Africa is distressed at this new step, but notwithstanding are preparing for the XIXth Olympiad.<sup>102</sup>

In 1969 when it was almost certain that South Africa would be expelled from the Olympic movement, Honey expressed his regret "that the expulsion of South Africa from '*the family*' [emphasis added] is again being brought up."<sup>103</sup>

In the final letter of this period, Honey commiserated with Brundage. His Olympic world had crashed around him and he sensed that Avery Brundage's interpretation of charisma was now viewed as the ravings of a tired old man. But, like the President, Honey *knew* he was correct in his unwavering support for Coubertin's Olympic ideals. He wrote to Brundage:

I am sorry I was not in Japan to support you in your fight against professionalism. We prefer 'Amateurism,' in fact it is a basic principle and there can be no room for compromise on a question of principle.<sup>104</sup>

Despite this brave front, Honey went on to empathize with his colleague: "It seems that you and I are coming to the end of our usefulness. In fact I feel that I, at any rate, should go from the I.O.C. at Munich."<sup>105</sup>

## Conclusion

It is far too simple to dismiss controversial pronouncements of IOC members as the ravings of misguided men and a few women. If this were the case, it would be relatively easy to replace these persons with more reasonable sports figures. The statements emanating from the IOC leadership are much more complex and, as we have argued, can be seen in the context of institutionalized charisma. Following Guttman, whether we think of the IOC as "idealistically inspired or as quixotically unrealistic" the Games have gone on.<sup>106</sup>

One can react with moral indignation to the condescending tone and reactionary position expressed in the Reginald Honey - Avery Brundage correspondence. We have attempted to go beyond indignation and to more fully understand why Honey and Brundage acted as they did, and in so doing, to imply how the contemporary IOC

functions.

It is our contention that Honey and Brundage wrote from a world in which they as “*the chosen*” were expected to remain true to the charismatic vision of Coubertin. Of course. Brundage and Honey performed their duties in a rational-legal way, as would any administrator of their ilk. Of course, they lived a life of privilege that was denied to the majority and both men could, and would, justify their right to such privilege.<sup>107</sup> But they also lived a life of commitment to their vision of the spirit of Olympism and all that entailed.

The consequences of this commitment are obvious. Both men were adamant in their right to control amateur sport in the way that they were convinced Coubertin would wish. The dilemma which they faced, and which eventually destroyed their world was that others, in the IOC and beyond its jurisdiction, had a different view of the Coubertin legacy. The latter also *knew* what the charismatic legacy entailed. Such is the quirk of faith and the call to action based on a selected affinity to faith.

Weber’s concept of institutional charisma is important in understanding the IOC and its executive officers. The organization that bore the stamp of Brundage is far different from the one led until recently by Juan Antonio Samaranch. Avery Brundage never had to deal with the rational-legal *smothering* effect of a widely televised Olympic Games. Brundage would never have tolerated the inclusion of professional sports entertainers in *his* Games.

Obviously the vision of Coubertin that Brundage held is not the same as that of his successors.<sup>108</sup> Notwithstanding, it can still be maintained that the contemporary IOC operates transnationally because it can and does make direct links to an interpretation of the Coubertin vision. These charismatic links have obvious ramifications in the organization of any Olympic Games. While the administrative bricks and mortar demonstrate the rational efficiency of the contemporary IOC, it is Coubertin’s institutionalized charisma that also privileges the IOC as an organization. There are those IOC members who insist that they faithfully follow the charismatic legacy. It is truly believed and may have been graphically demonstrated in the choice of Juan Antonio Samaranch’s successor. No trivial *throwaway* for some in the Olympic movement is the unwavering belief that if any nation and its citizens will but only receive IOC affiliation, they too will experience the awe and beauty of sport that Coubertin envisaged. The paradox is that the legacy that is followed by any given IOC member may be diametrically opposed by another member. Nonetheless, all members would agree that the IOC is the legitimate benefactor of the Olympic Games because “*the true path*” has been bestowed by Pierre de Coubertin. Such unbending conviction makes other diplomatic tasks pale by comparison and helps explain how any IOC leadership typically handles controversy.

## Endnotes

1. We appreciate the assistance of the Documentation Services staff, Olympic Studies Centre, Lausanne, Switzerland and the financial support from the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and Queen’s University that helped fund this research. We also acknowledge the leadership of the late Donald Macintosh who was the Principal Investigator on our research project Sport and Foreign Policy from which some of our evidence came.

2. The IOC states in its *Principles*, that Olympism is a philosophy of life calling for the holistic development of body, will, and mind. It is the fusion of sport, culture, and education within the acceptance of universal ethical principles. Its goal is to contribute to world peace through sporting competition, competition that is to be non-discriminatory and participated in a spirit of friendship, solidarity and fair play (International Olympic Committee n.d.).
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4. John Hoberman, "Toward a Theory of Olympic Internationalism." *Journal of Sport History* Vol. 22, No. 1, 1995, p. 2.
5. See Helen J. Lenskyj, *Inside the Olympic Industry: Power; Politics and Activism* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2000).
6. *Confidential Circular Letter to Members of the IOC - 2 May 1957*, p. 1. Avery Brundage Collection. (Lausanne: Olympic Studies Centre).
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8. Max Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers*. Edited and with an introduction by Samuel N. Eisenstadt (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. xxi.
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13. Weber, 1968, p.48.

14. See Arthur Mitzman, *The Iron Cage: An Historical Interpretation of Max Weber* (New York: Alfred A. Knof, 1969).
15. Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," In Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948) p. 119.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 120.
17. Weber, 1968 p. xxii.
18. Shils, 1965 p. 200.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 202.
20. Weber, 1947, pp. 334-342.
21. Max Weber. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Translated by Talcott Parsons and with a forward by Richard H. Tawney (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958).
22. Walter L. Wallace, *A Weberian Theory of Human Society: Structure and Evolution* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1994).
23. Shils, 1965, p. 206.
24. Weber, 1968, p. xxi.
25. See Hoberman, 1995.
26. Douglas A. Brown, "Theories of Beauty and Modern Sport: Pierre de Coubertin's Aesthetic Imperative for the Modern Olympic Movement, 1894-1914," Ph.D. Thesis, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, 1997.
27. Brown, p. 1.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 348-349.
29. Hoberman, 1995, p.3.
30. Christopher R. Hill, *Olympic Politics: Athens to Atlanta 1896-1996*, second edition (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996,) p. 264.
31. Allen Guttman, *The Games Must Go On: Avery Brundage and the Olympic Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984); Shayne Quick, "Black Knight Checks White King: The Conflict Between African Bloc Nations and Avery Brundage During the 1960s," M.A. thesis, (The University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, 1987).
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33. International Olympic Committee, *The Olympic Movement* (Lausanne: International Olympic Committee, 1984). p. 25.
34. Guttman, 1984, p. 112.
35. Quick, 1987, p. 43.
36. R. Pariente, "On the Threshold of the XXist Century," *Olympic Message*, Vol. 23, 1989, pp. 21-29.
37. *Confidential Circular Letter to Members of the IOC*, 30 January 1954, Avery Brundage Collection (Lausanne: Olympic Studies Centre), p. 4.
38. Quick, 1987, p. 48.
39. IOC Archives, Honey-Brundage Correspondence, Microfiche Box 58 (hereafter noted as H-B 58).
40. *Circular Letter to Members of the IOC*, 22 August 1957, Avery Brundage Collection (Lausanne: Olympic Studies Centre).
41. IOC, 1984, p. 67; H-B 58.
42. Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, eds. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 1112.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 246. Weber dealt with charisma most fully in his comparative sociology of religion research. We have used religious terms (in italics) throughout the paper to reinforce the notion of the IOC as a secular religious institution.
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45. *Ibid.*, p. 396.
46. See for example. John Lucas, *The Future of the Olympic Games* (Champaign, Illinois: Human Kinetics Press, 1992) and John MacAloon, *This Great Symbol: Pierre de Coubertin and the Origins of the Modern Olympic Games* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).
47. MacAloon, 1981, p. 3.
48. See Hart Cantelon, and Michael Letters, "The Making of the IOC Environmental Policy as the Third Dimension of the Olympic Movement," *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, Vol. 35, No. 3. 2000, pp.294-308; Andrew Jennings, *The New Lords of the Rings: Olympic Corruption and How to Buy Gold Medals* (London: Pocket Books, 1996); Simson and Jennings, 1992.
49. Lucas, 1992, p. 15

50. Shils, 1965, p. 205.
51. Cited in Quick, 1987, p. 48.
52. Brundage. *Confidential Circular Letter*, May 20, 1957, p. 1
53. Avery Brundage, *Circular Letter to Members of the IOC*, 22 August 1957, Avery Brundage Collection (Lausanne: Olympic Studies Centre), p. 1.
54. Quick, 1987, p. 47.
55. Some might argue that FIFAs World Cup rivals the Olympics as *the* global sporting event. There is no denying the importance of the World Cup and the massive audience that it attracts. However, given the relative unimportance of soccer football in North America in comparison to the American game, the Olympic Games must be seen as the global sports leader.
56. Shils, 1965, p. 207.
57. Avery Brundage, *Circular Letter to Members of the International Olympic Committee* - 18 October 1960, Avery Brundage Collection (Lausanne: Olympic Studies Centre), pp. 1-2.
58. IOC, 1984, p. 9.
59. Cited in Quick, 1987, p. 55.
60. *Confidential Circular Letter to Members of the IOC*, 30 January 1954, Avery Brundage Collection (Lausanne: Olympic Studies Centre), pp. 1;5.
61. See Guttman, 1984.
62. See Peter Berger, Birgitt Berger, and Hansfried Kellner, *The Homeless Mind* (New York: Vintage Books, 1974).
63. Weber, 1968, p. xxxix.
64. Weber, 1978. p. 231.
65. Guttman, 1984, pp. 170-171.
66. For extensive discussion about the relationship of the Olympic Games to political issues see Richard Mandell, *The Nazi Olympics* (New York: Putnam, 1971; Espy, 1979; Quick 1987; Guttman, 1984; Simson and Jennings, 1992; Jennings, 1996.
67. Guttman, 1984, p. 134.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 244.
69. Quick, 1987, p. 23.

70. Wolf Lyberg, *The IOC Sessions: 1956-88* (Stockholm: National Olympic Committee of Sweden, 1988-89).
71. H-B 58, 11 October 1966.
72. *Ibid.*, 17 January 1961.
73. Avery Brundage, *Circular Letter to I.O.C. Members on Rule No. 25*, 12 February 1954, Avery Brundage Collection (Lausanne: Olympic Studies Centre).
74. H-B 58, 2 September 1966.
75. Jan Botha, *Bothn-Moyer Correspondence*, 20 September 1962, Avery Brundage Collection, Box 144 (London, Ontario, University of Western Ontario).
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77. H-B 58, 13 February 1962.
78. H-B 58, 9 March 1968.
79. H-B 58, 28 March 1968
80. Guttman, 1984.
81. Quick, 1987, p. 94.
82. *Ibid.* pp95-96.
83. H-B 58, 29 March 1968.
84. H-B 58, 27 August 1968.
85. *Ibid.*
86. *Ibid.*
87. Guttman, 1984; see for example pp. 97; 116; 254.
88. H-B 58, 4 September 1968.
89. Quick, 1987, p. 97.
90. H-B 58, 30 April 1969.
91. Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait* (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1959).
92. H-B 58, 20 March 1968.

93. H-B 58, 10 July 1970.
94. Ibid.
95. H-B 58, 30 July 1970.
96. Ibid.
97. H-B 58, 6 August 1970.
98. H-B 58, 19 June 1959.
99. H-B 58, 2 September 1966.
100. Ibid.
101. H-B 58, 20 March 1968.
102. H-B 58, 29 March 1968.
103. H-B 58, 30 April 1969.
104. H-B 58, 3 February 1972.
105. Ibid.
106. Guttman, 1984, p. 261.
107. Ibid.
108. See Lucas, 1992.

