
Terror Games:

Media Treatment of Security Issues at the 2002 Winter Olympic Games

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Terrorism, violence, and the need for tight security are issues hardly new to the Olympic Games. Widely reported incidents, such as taking hostages and killing Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Games¹ and the explosion of a pipe bomb at the 1996 Atlanta Games,² likely stand out in the public memory but, in fact, the modern Games have been regular targets of threatened and actual violence.³ Still, the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, and subsequent political-military maneuverings across the world, have substantially heightened the need for anti-violence and anti-terrorist security procedures at high profile sports events.⁴ Indeed, as the first major international sports event held following '9/11', the 2002 Winter Games in Salt Lake City pushed security measures to unprecedented levels. This included spending in excess of US\$310 million on 'securing' the Games - approximately one quarter of the overall event budget and the highest amount ever for an Olympic Games.

Sociologically, such security concerns and related preparations do not take place in a vacuum. As with other forms of sports-related 'knowledge,' the understandings that we have of the circumstances of threat surrounding the Games and subsequent policing responses are rarely innocent or unmediated; rather, they are the product both of first-hand information delivered by powerful 'primary definers' (i.e., autonomous persons and involved stakeholders of high social, political or occupational status) as well as 'news' emerging more indirectly (and often less reliably) via 'secondary definers' such as the mass media.⁵ Using media sources from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, and pursuing recommendations that existing analyses/definitions of 'sports-related violence' need broadening,⁶ this paper examines media interpretations of, and responses to, security issues at the Salt Lake

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City Games. Attention is given to media representations of the security strategies and practices implemented at the Games, and the coverage of both anticipated and actual security incidents associated with the Games. Of particular concern are the ways in which Olympic security was discursively configured prior to, during, and immediately following the Salt Lake Games. We underline the interface between terror(ism), political ideologies, mass media, and sport emerging in this discourse and explore how themes such as victimization, fear, patriotism, and national strength were assembled as a type of 'social drama'⁷ selected Western media. More specifically, we argue that segments of the western media both justifiably and opportunistically 'framed' the 2002 Winter Games as an international summit wherein 'established' and 'outsider' relationships in the 'new war on terrorism' were plainly evident. We examine how the process of 'securing' the Games became deftly constructed through the media as a symbolic metaphor for the struggle to 'secure' America and the rest of the 'free' world.

Theoretical Underpinnings

Sociologists have traditionally limited their study of 'sports violence' to the aggressive behaviours of either athletes or spectators. The burgeoning literature on sports violence has interrogated a number of dimensions of the phenomenon, including: players' violent proclivities during athletic contests;⁸ abusive and coercive activities of players away from competition such as hazing, sexual assault, and interpersonal abuse/battery;⁹ as well as forms of fan misbehaviour including football hooliganism¹⁰ and other brands of aggressive and threatening conduct.¹¹ As Young¹² argues, however, with the notable exception of some (but not all) football hooliganism research, few sociologists have inspected the ways in which actual or threatened acts of violence may be *associated with* sporting practices and sport cultures, but not directly prompted by action on the playing field; that is, few have explored the ways in which violence or threatening acts may be socially embedded in or linked to the sports process for more obscured reasons. Arguably, it may be sociologically and practically useful to explore a more panoramic spectrum of 'sports-related violence' and to ascertain how violent action in the sports process may interface with goals, identities, and behaviours in other social spheres, including criminal contexts. In doing so, we might uncloak how sports practices are interlaced with broader social structures, processes, and social struggles, as well as identify how sport may be used exploitively in such struggles for political and economic gain.

As only one possible empirical example, acts of terrorism -- often described as the violence committed by political groups against unarmed civilians in a particular social territory or region¹³ -- have rarely been studied alongside sports practices.¹⁴ While sports may seemingly share few conceptual links with acts of terrorism upon first glance, we cannot ignore how sports events may become targets of terrorism and/or political violence in and of themselves, or the contexts within which terrorist behaviours become encoded with social meaning. For many reasons, individual terrorists or terrorist organizations might find suitable targets in athletes participating in games, spectators attending the events, or selected corporate sponsors of sports contests.¹⁵ Especially in those situations where athletic contests draw sizeable international audiences in geographical settings already embroiled in strife, sport can be

utilized as a vehicle for political sparring, and waging and disseminating forms of political violence against others. In this context, terrorist activities may also be juxtaposed against the spirit or philosophies underpinning sports contests -- whether it be 'innocent' philosophies such as civil liberties and human freedoms or more contrived goals such as nation-building, commercialism, and the hegemonic rule of the mighty -- as a means of illustrating deeper social conflicts between terrorists and their intended targets. In a compounding way, since sport receives huge media attention around the globe, international sports events are prime targets for terrorism, and political claims-making by and about terrorist groups.¹⁶

Importantly, then, media coverage of mega-events such as the Olympics represents a locus of claims-making about 'terrorist' or 'anti-terrorist' ideologies, sentiments and practices. Following the events of September 11, 2001, much media speculation arose about impending terrorist incidents at the Salt Lake City winter Games. Since the Games were to be held only five months after what many media sources dubbed the "attack on America,"¹⁷ sports authorities and media agents were quick to hypothesize that the Games could be a potential site for a subsequent attack. Tulloch aptly refers to the Olympics as a "big killing television event." Given the mass cultural appeal of the Olympics and the global media coverage of the event, he argues that the Games provide a stage for international and political forms of violence. Furthermore, as the media adopt an active role in systematically, albeit selectively, emphasizing the attractiveness of the Olympics as a target for terrorists, media producers help create the idea that the Games are a "legitimate" context of violence. In the particular context of Salt Lake, concerns about America's ability to defend itself and its international guests germinated, and some from both within and outside the sports community called for an immediate cancellation of the Games. While emergent media discourses justifiably focused on the threats to the safety of athletes and spectators posed by the "new war on terrorism,"¹⁸ increased media attention also homed in on the meaning of the Games in reference to American ideologies, lifestyles, military strength, and foreign policies. In brief, media coverage of the Olympics, the potential for violence at the festival, and requisite security needed to protect the Games, prompted a sustained international dialogue about terrorism, counter-terrorism, and civility, all aired through the popular media.

A major analytical impetus for this article is critical media theory,¹⁹ whose by-now familiar cornerstone argument is that news, as MacDougall puts it, "is socially produced."²⁰ News is not intrinsic to any act or event, nor is it something that emerges anonymously or 'naturally' out of social life, but is prey to a web of journalistic devices and processes through which it undergoes forms of modification, refraction, and censorship. It is in this process that purveyors of news can "cover, select and disseminate stories about items identified as either interesting or important,"²¹ and thus steer such stories in ways compatible with the conventions and ideological goals of the news organization and source.²²

As a pioneer in this school of thinking, Stuart Hall has shown, for example, how newspaper accounts, opinions, and editorial commentaries may be expressed in such a manner that they appear to be those of the public at large, or as Graham Knight has stated, "the natural standpoint for a society as a whole."²³ This procedure, known as "taking the public voice,"²⁴ involves a number of often subtle journalistic devices. For instance, Hall et al demonstrate that by gingerly using phrases such as "we

believe...,” “the public wants...,” or “as a nation we feel...,” the reader is given the impression that the presented account is an accurate and relevant one, possibly even similar to her/his own feelings on the matter. An outgrowth of this process is that the news production system may be partly responsible for diverting public attention to the symptoms of behaviours rather than the root causes.

In brief, and as Cohen²⁵ has observed, the media can play a participatory and sometimes central role in shaping social ‘facts,’ including social problems: “The media have long operated as agents of moral indignation in their own right; even if they are not self consciously engaged in crusading or muckraking, their very reportage of social facts can be sufficient to generate concern, anxiety, indignation or panic.” To illustrate the point in the connection of the present work, public anxiety may be amplified by punctuating discourses with certain moral directives or rhetorical devices, such as by asking questions like “Where will it end?“, “Who will be the next victim?“, or (poignantly, in regard to ‘9/11’) “Are the perpetrators lurking in your community?”

Hall et al point to two characteristics which generally constitute ‘cardinal’ or significant news value.²⁶ First, the media tend to hyperbolize the ordinary, to make it somehow dramatic, shocking, tragic, or incredible. Second, if this extraordinary aspect of an issue or event can be combined with an element of unexpectedness, and possibly further bolstered with negative consequences, then it is likely that that subject will contain considerable ‘news potentia.’ Clearly, this is not a unilinear pattern, but varies according to the conventions and formats of the many and varied media, as Young has empirically demonstrated in his studies of the 1985 Heysel Stadium riot and treatment of aggression in football and ice hockey in the Canadian press.²⁷ Events or issues such as assassinations, earthquakes, and human tragedies apparently rate so highly on scales of newsworthiness that they warrant interruption of more mundane media routines, sometimes for an extended period. Clearly, threatened or actual terrorist attacks contain all of the ingredients for such ‘cardinal’ news.

In the sociological literature on terrorism, considerable attention has been directed toward the media’s role in covering and/or promoting ‘pro’ or ‘anti-terrorist’ sentiment²⁸ through a process of what Goffman calls ‘frame alignment.’²⁹ Rather than benignly or objectively constructing political violence, media narratives articulate “culturally preferred readings”³⁰ of terrorism and terrorist violence. As Dobkin and Steuter³¹ suggest, journalists and other media personnel often act as “ideological state apparatuses”³² of the ruling power bloc, portraying those individuals involved in situated events of terrorist violence as either antagonists or victims. For example, Lenart and Targ’s³³ analysis of media constructions of terrorist acts indicates that dominant ‘media frames’ portray Westerners as more often the victims of terrorism rather than its perpetrators -- underscoring the need to guard the ‘free world’ against terrorists, the need for the liberated to protect the oppressed, and the cultural logics that rationalize why governments and militaries are entrusted to adjudicate acts of terrorism.

Iyengar’s research on media discourses about terrorism also points to the ways in which terrorism is routinely defined as anti-democratic activity.³⁴ Through the careful selection and presentation of specific ‘episodes’ of terrorism to Western audiences, media accounts of terrorist activities construe them as fundamentally contradictory to the philosophies of freedom, liberty, and economic expansion upheld

in countries like the United States and Great Britain. A finding supported by Simmons and Lowry,³⁵ such acts of terrorism become defined as 'senseless' or 'purposeless,' further couched as affronts to the values of peace-loving and freedom-cherishing democratic peoples. Not only, then, are violent attacks against Western nations viewed as threats to the physical safety of people, the attacks and the cultures their perpetrators represent are perceived as challenges to the core ideologies of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness buttressing such lifestyles.

In a related way, media representations of terrorism, especially those in the tabloid press and electronic media, typically follow a pattern of seeking to invoke emotional responses in audiences -- particularly, feelings of anger, confidence, distrust, emotionality, and fear.³⁶ Through exposure to the dominant media frames given as decodings of terrorist acts, individuals within specified social spaces (such as countries, states, or regions) or members of specific groups (such as political, religious, ethnic, class, and gender groups), are encouraged to experience controlled emotional responses to terrorism, to the violence enacted by 'outsiders' who wish to inflict harm upon them. Here, the tone, content, and style of the story being reported play significant roles in the ways in which emotions are stirred, and how people interpret acts of violence as 'terrorism.' In this regard, Kamalipour comments that the media often draw upon enduring cultural stereotypes about or hostilities held toward feared 'Others' in depicting them as terrorists, thereby exacerbating labels of 'Otherness' they are attributed within specific settings.³⁷ Normatively, claims are made about the threat posed by terrorists to a collective way of life to provoke sentiments of togetherness and defensiveness among mutually-identified targets -- often stirring concomitant feelings of jingoism and xenophobia in them.³⁸

Given the possible outcomes of such journalistic traditions and styles, the media's impact upon knowledge of, and public opinion about, security events at the Salt Lake City winter Olympic Games justifies critical analysis. As sociologists have illustrated through case studies of football hooliganism, sports crowd disorder and player violence conducted in varied national settings, the media play a central role in framing how sports violence is perceived and interpreted.³⁹ This role has been shown to be complex in that it can help both amplify and de-amplify the phenomena under consideration.⁴⁰ In the case of the 2002 winter Olympics, we asked, how would the apparent terrorist threats to the United States become associated with the Games in the popular media, and discursively articulated as part of the 'new war on terrorism.'⁴¹ If the media are a primary social resource for interpreting acts of terrorism, and sporting events like the Olympics are widely viewed as attractive targets (real or perceived) for terrorism, we must seek to uncover what messages about terrorism and sport are situated in these media, and the ways in which such potential sports-related violence is understood in this sphere.

In what follows, then, we investigate selective Western media constructions of 'security' at the Salt Lake City winter Games as a means of exploring terrorism as a dynamic conceptual example of threatened sports-related violence. More specifically, we examine media predictions about security (and terrorist events) prior to the 2002 winter Games in Salt Lake City, themes about terrorism highlighted in media reports about security during the Games, how political ideologies were intertwined with media accounts of security at the Games, and the discursive devices employed in media reports to frame security issues at the Games as both locally relevant and polit-

ically consequential on a global scale. In doing so, we outline how media discourses about security at the Games presented terrorist threats as situationally pressing for athletes and spectators, but equally emphasized three salient cultural frames for understanding American society during a moment of great uncertainty: the United States as a nation of power, authority, and resolve; the United States as a victim of terrorism; and the United States as an enemy of 'foreign' aggressors.

Method

Data for this paper were collected from varied print and electronic media sources in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom between July 2001, and April 2002.⁴² Essentially, media accounts of security issues at the Winter Games were sought out as a means of exploring the impact of the events of September 11 on discourses about possible violence at the Games -- most notably, the threat of further terrorist attacks. Although no rigid selection criteria guided the sampling process (except for the fact that each of the media accounts had to consider some aspect of 'security' at the Games), focus was given to newspaper and magazine articles (n=76), world wide web postings (n=52), and television programmes (n=18) detailing security matters at the Salt Lake City Winter Games. Therefore, the procedure employed in this study would best be described as a convenience sampling approach. Unsurprisingly, the bulk of our collated media stories about security and terrorist threats at the Games (76% in our sample) emanated from American sources. Therefore, we do not present our 'reading' of the data as a totalizing representation of security and terrorism discourses at the Olympics, nor do we claim our understandings as the only audience deconstruction of these discourses.

The majority (95%) of the newspapers drawn upon to create the sample were daily and national publications (such as *The Globe and Mail* in Canada, *USA Today*, and *The London Times*), and the magazines tapped into were weekly, bi-weekly, or monthly publications (such as *Sports Illustrated*, *Time*, and *Maclean's*), all of which published special reports on security at the Games. Of central interest were the ways in which particular attitudes or opinions about security/violence at the Games were privileged or portrayed in media reports. Broadcast news on major television networks (such as NBC, CBS, and ABC in the US, BBC and ITV in the UK, and CBC, and TSN in Canada) were also explored, as were 'specialty' television programmes or segments of programmes solely devoted to security at the Winter Games such as 'Extra' and '60 Minutes' in the US, and 'The Sports Journal' or 'The Business of Sport' in Canada. To complement data derived from these sources, press releases (n=6) from the White House and other American government agencies, along with security information provided by the Salt Lake City Organizing Committee (SLOC), were collected to allow for an examination of 'official' state or executive committee positions on security at the Winter Games.

Each of the media sources utilized in the sample were critically analyzed for both latent and manifest themes relating to security, violence, and terrorism. Through a constant comparative method of textual/narrative analysis involving 'open' and 'axial coding',⁴³ we bracketed excerpts from each of the stories about security into three main thematic categories which emerged early in the analysis phase: stories underscoring the ability of the United States to protect its citizenry; stories evidencing the

(recent or potential) victimization of Americans and/or their foreign guests; and stories making a case for the ‘new face’⁴⁴ of global terrorism. To explore and develop each of these emerging categories in the analysis, we rigorously inspected the discursive links made between sport, violence, and terrorism at the Salt Lake Games.

In most cases, we feel that the messages encoded around the aforementioned themes were intended and explicit in the media texts selected. However, decoding the subjective essence of each media text examined in this study (or in any other) is never a straightforward task, and it is possible that we may have overlooked other dominant themes in the data. Semioticians would quickly add that audience deconstructions are inevitably heterogeneous. We acknowledge these important cautions, but note that our qualitative assessment of the discourses contained in the data is of course informed by existing research on sports-related violence, media representations of terrorism, and more general sociological theory as summarized in the previous section.

Security and Terrorism at the Salt Lake Games: Media Images, Themes, and Frames

Dominating discourses about the Salt Lake Games until the materialization of the ‘Skate-Gate’⁴⁵ controversy involving Canadian and Russian pairs figure skaters, security issues, and the perceived threat of terrorist attacks were comprehensively reported on in the Western media. We organize media coverage on security and terrorism at the Games around the conceptual themes introduced in the previous section. Following Goffman and Lenart and Targ,⁴⁶ we refer to and analyze these categories of media discourses as preferred cultural ‘frames.’ While there is a degree of overlap and interdependency between each of the frames, there is sufficient conceptual distinction to deal with each one individually.

America the Strong - “The Safest Place in the World”

The most dominant frame evident in media discourses relating to security at the winter Games underscored the ability of the United States to defend itself (and its allies) against terrorism. Taking the winter Olympics as a case example of how the structuring and organization of the newly appointed ‘homeland security’ office was needed to sustain a ‘free’ way of life in a post-September 11 world, media discourses overwhelmingly pointed to the massive military and policing effort undertaken by the US Government and other groups in securing the Games. By highlighting the extensive co-operation between federal, state, municipal, military, corporate, and private agents, media reports about security at the Games drew attention to the temporarily shaken but resolute ‘strength’ of American society.

Over 80% of all media accounts of security/violence matters characterized Salt Lake City as a type of ‘military state’ during the Games. Through the emphasis placed on the US\$310 million spent on protecting the participants and spectators,⁴⁷ the 16,000 security personnel employed during the Games, the continuous surveillance of the city by F-16 fighter jets and Blackhawk helicopters, the 45 mile ‘no fly zone’ encircling the city, the integrated efforts of US military/intelligence ground personnel (FBI, CIA, ATF, US Marshals, CDC, National Guard, Army, and Marines) and their advanced anti-terrorism training, and the expansive list of detection technol-

ogies utilized to monitor every person's move in and around the events of the Games (e.g., biometric scanners, portable X-ray equipment, metal detectors, surveillance cameras, computer monitoring systems, and other identification technologies), people were reassured that "America would be ready" for any terrorist contingency, or "ready for anything."⁴⁸ This view was apparently absorbed with extreme confidence at every level of participation. For example, when asked about the police/military atmosphere at the Games, American cross-country skier, Nina Kempel noted assuredly, "It's like when I crawl in bed at night and I have my down comforter. It's that kind of comfortable, fuzzy feeling."⁴⁹ In what might be seen as an extraordinarily smug boast of readiness given the events of '9/11' for which the US authorities were clearly unprepared, Federal Aviation Association spokesperson Mike Fergus commented, "If you violate the restrictions [no fly rule around Salt Lake City] you will be able to tell your children and grandchildren you flew formation with the Department of Defense."⁵⁰ Robert Flowers, head of the Utah Olympic Public Safety Command, underlined the point less ambiguously, "If you fly in our airspace, we're going to shoot you down."⁵¹

Complementing the pre- and post-Games emphasis on the capability of the American protection/intelligence community to secure the event, comments by senior American government officials, including President George W. Bush, Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge, Attorney General John Ashcroft, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Utah governor Michael Leavitt, were utilized by the media to assure audiences around the world that America would continue to be "the safest place in the world"⁵² -- insisting that people would be so impressed by American security, a case would be made to adopt Salt Lake City as the permanent site for the winter Olympics.⁵³ International Olympic Committee (IOC) President Jacques Rogge underscored the international sports community's confidence in American strength, first by refusing to cancel the Games despite pressure and, second, by publicly commending American security efforts. According to Rogge, "The [Olympic] village is the most secure place in the world...from a security point of view, you could not be better protected."⁵⁴ A common trend across the different media was for stories to be punctuated by statements brimming with confidence made by participating athletes and spectators:

- "After the attacks [of September 11, 2001], I thought we should cancel, but now I think we should proceed and not let the terrorists intimidate us" (Lynn Ragner, Olympic spectator).⁵⁵
- "A lot of people say it will be dangerous, but to me this is going to be the safest place in the world...People who want to scare Americans or the rest of the world are not succeeding. The Olympics are happening and they are going to be a success" (Catriona Le May Doan, Canadian speed skater).⁵⁶
- "It's very intense security but it makes you feel safe" (Gail Stem, Olympic spectator).⁵⁷

Further, the modest degree of coverage of 'minor' security incidents arising prior to or during the Games also reinforced the perception of America's state of readiness to defend itself and the international sports community. Reports of approximately two dozen planes receiving military escorts away from Salt Lake City prior to or during the Olympics,⁵⁸ over 600 bomb or 'suspicious package' scares in the downtown core,


and one anthrax hoax at a local airport illustrated the rigour of American defense personnel in dealing with potentially problematic security situations.⁵⁹ Not until the final night of the Games did a security violation become widely publicized; this involved, relatively unthreateningly it must be said, the drunken brawling of approximately twenty spectators outside of a Budweiser beer tent in the Olympic village.⁶⁰ Referring to the Games as the safest on record, many cited the show of 'force' at the event, and lack of terrorist incidents there, as growing evidence of America's re-invigorated ability to protect its citizens as well as visiting guests from overseas.

In a different but related articulation of US strength, media reports of security also took the opportunity to underscore the economic benefits of the Games to the United States, and the importance of spending money at the Games as a means of stimulating the fractured American economy post-'9/11.' Spectators were recurrently implored to visit and spend at the Winter Games, not only as a means of supporting the international athletes, but as a tool for bolstering the American economy, despite polls suggesting one in three Americans feared a terrorist attack at the Games.⁶¹ To this end, media reports about the lack of hotel, air transportation, and event ticket cancellations served as testimony to America's unwillingness to be intimidated by foreign threat. Repeatedly packaged by phraseology such as "doing so would let 'them' win,"⁶² discourses subtly emphasized ideologies of capitalism underpinning the Games. To this end, and emphasizing the symbiotic relations between international sport, the economy, and the state, corporate representatives from companies such as Coca-Cola, Nike, AT&T, McDonald's, and Visa also took the opportunity to use the media to ensure visitors that their respective corporate pavilions or hospitality suites would be fully operational and safe.⁶³ By drawing attention to the economic significance of the Games for American corporate sponsors who had aggregately made a US\$1 billion investment in the winter Games, people from around the world were encouraged to inject the American economy with a much needed inoculation against recession.

Through the recurrent media framing of Olympic policing as a daunting but achievable task in Salt Lake City, preference was also given to the ways in which Americans appeared ideologically or interactively 'unphased' by the September 11 attacks. In President George Bush's much-quoted words, "We will show the world we can safeguard the Olympics without sacrificing our American ideals -- openness, mobility, diversity, and economic opportunity . . ." ⁶⁴ From the coverage of the massive display of military strength at the Olympics and America's unwillingness to be "frightened away"⁶⁵ to cultural practices like sport, the American media emphasized the resiliency of the United States. Such was summarized in a special segment on the American television programme 'Extra.' about terrorism at the Games (entitled 'America Under Siege,' September 27, 2001) -- "many believe cancelling the Games would be giving the terrorists exactly what they wanted. A safe and successful Winter Olympics will prove they can never defeat America."

The media's role in extending such hegemonic images of America's strength and ability as a global leader was also apparent in media discourses on security and terrorism at the Games. As Giroux observes, media agents may be seen as extensions of the hegemonic power bloc in this sense, helping to shape public opinion about security, social efficacy, and cultural stability in the face of terrorist threats.⁶⁶ While the ability to protect athletes and spectators attending the Games was the surface issue presented

in most media reports, there was an implicit understanding that the Olympics were a test of America's ability to police political violence effectively within its domestic shores. By describing the threat of terrorism at the Olympics as but one 'episode'⁶⁷ of national security, media reportage demonstrated how the sports process becomes embedded in terrorist and anti-terrorist discourses.



SLOOC Headquarters - Post '9/11' Flag

America as Recovering Victim - "We are a Different Country Now"

Although media coverage of security at the Salt Lake Games consistently depicted the United States as a powerful and proud nation, an equally dominant media frame organized an image of America as a recovering victim of senseless and meaningless violence. Tapping into the 'natural' arousal of emotions common in sports events like the Olympics, event organizers and media agents deftly linked surging feelings of victimization in the American populace to the feelings regularly stirred by athletic competitions such as excitement, doubt, sorrow, frustration, anger, and fear. In doing so, athletes and their endeavours became metaphors of the American people's resolve to fight against terrorism, individuals who would continue to compete despite their fear of further atrocities at the hands of terrorists. Rather than passively accepting the threat to national security posed by international terrorists at the Games, the American people's determination to combat victimization was showcased through their athletes. Insinuating that the Olympics were an example of the level of 'new' social cohesion and patriotism spawned by the September 11 attacks, the media helped frame the Games as a stubborn and unyielding response to violent bullying by 'barbaric' states.

Elias and Dunning⁶⁸ suggest that sport events like the Olympics create a nexus of interaction within which individuals are allowed to experience emotions typically repressed in other social spheres. To them, sport contests provide an interactive scenario that facilitates a "controlled decontrolling" of emotions among participants and spectators.⁶⁹ One of sport's primary roles within complex social figurations is to de-

routinize life in this manner.⁷⁰ Rather than hiding or repressing affective display, participants are encouraged to experience a full gamut of emotions through sports contests. Arguably, the 2002 Winter Games in Salt Lake City were partly transformed from a celebration of international athletics into a stage for venting and recasting feelings of victimization. In particular, in drawing parallels between emotions aroused by terrorist attacks on the United States and the threat of terrorism at the Games, the media assisted in stirring American patriotism, reaffirming cross-national loyalties, and engendering a state of emotional readiness for the ‘real’ war on terrorism.

Media treatment of security in Salt Lake was replete with sentiment about reinvigorated patriotism in America. In the wake of perceived terrorist threats to the Games, the media underscored how Americans were living through a period of anxiety, shock, and suspicion. While confident but concerned about security. SLOC reminded citizens around the world that the United States could be attacked by rogue terrorists at any time.⁷¹ For this reason, considerable leeway was given to Americans and their displays of patriotism. For instance, in an unprecedented exhibition of patriotism by a host nation, the US was granted special permission by the IOC to present the American flag found in the World Trade Center rubble during the opening ceremonies. Contrasting the tattered (but still intact) symbol of American nationalism with the pageantry and celebration of the Games, comments offered in the media likened the resulting imagery to a universal statement of victims’ rights:

- Anita DeFrantz, IOC member from the United States suggested, “The Olympic movement around the world has expressed its sympathy for the victims of September 11th in many ways since that tragic day. Showing the flag in this respect is just one more way.”⁷²
- “I think it’s important that the flag comes in simply because it’s a part of each and every American now. It’s part of who we are” (Amy Peterson, American speed skater).⁷³
- “Fireworks ushered in the entrance of [President] Bush and the World Trade Center flag. Organizers hoped to raise the banner during the opening ceremony, but its frail condition made that impossible...A 12-year-old boy, symbolically known as the Child of Light, was then introduced to the world. The child, representing the ability of the human spirit to overcome life’s adversities, will remain a theme throughout the Games.”⁷⁴

Such displays of patriotism and resolve, often structured in newspaper and televi- sional reports using dramatic images and rhetoric of disturbing human sadness and pathos, were justified by media agents and excused by sports commentators as natural expressions of feelings of defensiveness and fear about terrorism in America. Importantly, then, the Games evolved into a context in which American patriotism could be discursively organized as a collective healing opportunity for all victims of terrorism:

- “For those from elsewhere who pass verdict [on displays of American patrio- tism], kindly remember this is a different country than it was September 10. That will show in the next 17 days. It must.”⁷⁵
- “Olympic organizers, more determined than ever to market the meaning, began talking about the Games as a chance for restoring America’s hope. There were recollections of the 1980 US hockey team that won its proxy war against the Soviets, who themselves were then at war in Afghanistan. These Games would

transcend even politics and patriotism on their way toward therapy. 'This is an important event under any circumstance,' Utah Governor Mike Leavitt had said a few weeks after the attacks, 'but fate may have fallen upon this state and city to host an event where the world will come together to heal.'"⁷⁶

Equally inspiring in stories about the Games were statements made by international athletes who seemingly flouted security concerns and threats. Stating that they simply wanted to "be there" in a collective show of sympathy and support for the U.S., the Games were heralded as a universal statement of resolve by athletes against terrorism. Athletes and Olympic delegates were regularly quoted expressing their feelings in this way:

- "It is at this time more important than ever that the Olympic Games in Salt Lake should go ahead. The world needs the message that the Olympics in Salt Lake will send. Athletes want to compete and spectators around the world want to see good triumph over bad" (Sergei Bubka, Russian pole-vaulter).⁷⁷
- "Nobody has expressed the wish not to go to Salt Lake or America. The athletes have prepared themselves [for security risks] and they want to go and compete. If we give in to terrorism, the whole society is lost" (Gunilla Lindberg, IOC member and head of the Swedish Olympic Committee).⁷⁸

In these ways, athletes, as public spokespersons and national representatives, gave voice to the millions fearful of ongoing security threats. The terror aroused by security concerns during the Games became counter-balanced by these 'representative' victims coming forward and striking a symbolic blow against terrorist fear-mongering. Instead of employing a standard media tactic of sending 'video postcards' back from the battlefield as a means of engendering sympathy for victims of war,⁷⁹ sound bites and quotations from athletes were utilized to promulgate images and ideologies of victimization and courage.

Through the collective sympathy directed toward America and its people during the Games, and appreciation offered for the extensive security measures taken to protect those involved, the Olympics also evolved into a context for reaffirming political, cultural, and economic loyalties between nations. Revolving around the need to protect 'one's friends' from similar victimization, the American media aided in the creation of new, anti-terrorist "imagined communities" through the Games.⁸⁰ Support of American initiatives and abilities to protect the Games and prevent further victimization were emphasized in the media as confirmatory evidence of international alignment with the American anti-terrorist war campaign -- tacitly apparent, in and of itself, by the continuance of the Olympics:

- IOC president Jacques Rogge commented, "The Olympic Games are an answer to the present violence and should not be a victim of violence. The Olympic Games in America are the best message of brotherhood, fraternity, and universality. There is no better symbol of the world uniting together around the cause."⁸¹
- Suggesting that the Olympic Games celebrate "American" ideals, President Bush stated, "We believe that these ideals -- liberty and freedom -- make it possible for people to live together in peace, and the Olympics give us a chance in the middle of a difficult struggle to celebrate international peace and cooperation...All people appreciate the discipline that produces excellence and the character that creates champions."⁸²

Suggesting that everyone participating in the Games (i.e., IOC members, athletes, foreign fans, and corporate sponsors) sympathized with the US about security and terrorism, media accounts and documentaries painted international responses to security and the Games with a decidedly uniform brush. Thus, a master media frame categorizing all participants of the Games as potential victims of violence -- and as those who should emulate America's lead as a nation of people undeterred by, in President Bush's now familiar terms, "the evildoers" -- emerged. In this process, the very ideals underpinning the Olympic Games were connected with America's resolve not to succumb to the threat of terrorism at the Games, or in any other context.⁸³

Perhaps most interestingly, media coverage of security issues in Salt Lake City routinely implied that all members of Western democratic States should be prepared for victimization by terrorists.⁸⁴ Insisting that terrorism or the threat of terrorism is now a concern for all nations, the media signalled that 'We' must exist in a condition of emotional readiness for 'real' war. While the Olympic Games were described as a mega-event prime for symbolic terrorist "statements," the Games were discursively constructed as a context where members of many nations could potentially be targeted for further attacks. U.S. Olympic Committee Chief Executive Officer, Lloyd Ward, was quoted as saying, "There's no question that after September 11, our view of security in the United States, and I would suggest in the world, must be different."⁸⁵ Hence, the support for America offered through the Olympic Games, and concomitant concerns about security 'managed' by the media during the event, helped place individuals from ideologically and culturally diverse nations on a similar emotional playing field. Rallying around the recent victimization of the host nation, members of the international sports community were seen to validate Americans' feelings of victimization, reclaimed patriotism, and ideological cohesion through the media.

Enemies of the State - "These are Our Games"

A third frame dominating media accounts of security at the Salt Lake Games highlighted preferred Western constructions of the terms 'terrorism' and 'terrorist', and underlined the distance between what process-sociologists would call 'established' and 'outsider' groups.⁸⁶ At the forefront in media coverage of security risks at the Games were concerns about the types of individuals who might exploit the event for purposes of political terror, as well as the cultures those individuals might represent. Engrained within such constructions were dominant understandings of the new 'face' of terrorism -- at this point in time, notably al-Qaeda or other fundamentalist middle-eastern groups. Here, the Western media seized a critical opportunity, given the timing of the event, to emphasize established ideologies about terrorism and terrorists held within many Western nations. By attaching the winter Games (held, in principle, in the spirit of peace, harmony, and cultural exchange) to the global struggle against forms of political violence like terrorism, the media coverage of the Games played a key role in drawing out international axes and alliances following '9/11', and in conveying cultural and ethnic stereotypes in a process to which Gitlin's concept of 'inferential racism' may be applied.⁸⁷ Importantly, media analyses of security at the Games contained clear understandings of the new nation-state alliances (e.g., the United States, Britain, Canada, France, etc.) and their rogue enemies (e.g., the Taliban and al-Qaeda) in the new war on terrorism. In process-sociological terms,

the Olympics were transformed into a political summit demarcating clear boundaries between the globally 'established' and the deviantized 'outsiders.'⁸⁸ Through the analysis of media narratives about security at the Games, it is evident that 'established' constructions of terrorism were normalized in Western media analyses, while outsiders were constructed as potential threats to security.

For Elias and Scotson, established social groups are deeply embedded in both the base and super-structural segments of social figurations, and consequently control many ideological state apparatuses, such as the media.⁸⁹ Established groups have greater access to, but not outright ownership of, varying institutional chances to shape social discourse.⁹⁰ In the case of the 2002 winter Olympics, since the United States hosted the Games, the voice of Americans became established there -- not explicitly as political leaders, but as members of the host nation. Almost immediately following the declaration that the Games would continue despite mounting security threats following September 11, for instance, the American and Canadian media repeatedly offered classic cases of what Hall calls 'taking the public voice'⁹¹ constructing the Olympics as "our Games," describing them, for example, as "A Homeland Winter Olympics: With a Few Guests."⁹² IOC delegates, politicians, and athletes subsequently followed the party line and consented to the Americanization of the Games in Salt Lake City around this central theme. Participation in the Olympics at Salt Lake City, then, became interpreted in the media as acceptance of American-led 'established' groups of mutually-identified nations fighting in a cooperative coalescence against terrorism and terrorist states.

Conversely, and also in process-sociological terms, outsider groups are the more marginal members of a social figuration, less embedded in power positions and dominated on the basis of their limited statuses. Outsiders are excluded from participation in socially prestigious or influential power structures of a figuration, and their 'voices' or ideologies are mainly silenced in the media.⁹³ In terms of the application of this line of thinking to sport, in his analysis of the relationship between television and "mega-events," Roche outlines how the Olympics, as a television spectacle, bring people together into a similar cultural space to experience Olympic philosophies and ideals. By contending that the Olympics are of "quasi-religious cultural significance" to audiences on these grounds and others, he underlines how outsiders to the Games and its related philosophies become defined as outsiders to the international community. Through this process, those excluded from sporting practices are further separated from political-economic networks and structures spanning international borders.

With regard to our media analysis of security at the winter Olympics, few outsider constructions of terrorism were uncovered in news stories in any of the three national settings studied, a remarkable fact given the clearly non-unilinear and non-homogeneous politics (on matters of how to understand or deal with terrorism) of any of the countries involved. One of the only dissenting voices on matters connected to the Games came from Gerhard Heiberg, Norwegian IOC member, who commented that, "a country at war cannot organize the Olympic Games."⁹⁴ Heiberg's comments immediately appeared in media around the world, but such was the weight of the resulting critical media response that he later felt obliged to apologize for his comments and rescind them. Indeed, as quickly as Heiberg's words appeared in international newspapers, they soon vanished. After the initial statement-reaction, and Jacques Rogge's subsequent dismissal of the comments, no reference to Heiberg's

dissenting views would appear in any of the mainstream media coverage of the Salt Lake Games.

Quite clearly, with Afghanistan's exclusion from the Salt Lake Games on the basis of the ruling Taliban's prohibition against female participation in sport, there would be no main 'opposing' viewpoint about terrorism offered by those described as the main enemies of the American State at the Games.⁹⁵ Solidifying the impression that [such] terrorist groups are outsiders of the international community in every respect, and again despite clear evidence that no one religion, ethnic group or nation is entirely homogeneous in its belief systems, including those nations feeling most 'victimized' by terrorism, those groups excluded from the Games were represented as 'Others' practising unacceptable forms of cultural control. The Taliban oppression of women in Afghanistan became evidence of 'Their', i.e., Taliban and al-Qaeda, terrorist mentality, and the IOC's position on them was used to reaffirm American attitudes about the group as violent and unjust outsiders. Members of the IOC like Jacques Rogge were outspoken in their condemnation of the Taliban for such social policies. In his words, "[Afghanistan's reinstatement] will only be possible when there is a stable government in place. and when all the conditions that are put by the IOC are fulfilled."⁹⁶ Confirming the image of terrorists or terrorist nations as outsiders, other media coverage of Olympic security reported on the threats of violence issued by 'Them,' and how security officials at the Games tactically distributed several thousands leaflets to spectators identifying suspected terrorists from middle-eastern nations as a precautionary measure.

As Kamalipour⁹⁷ leads us to predict, established representations of terrorism at the Games also drew attention, often using racist stereotypes, to the cunning, surreptitious, and underhanded strategies typically employed by terrorists from 'Other' cultures in waging violence. In describing their predilections for warfare as "cowardly" (President Bush) or lacking any code of military honour. attention was directed toward how these outsiders do not abide by the standard rules of 'civilized nations.' In press coverage of security at the winter Games. audiences were warned about rogue, foreign terrorists seeking to sully the message of harmony cultivated over the last century by the Games. Through a description of one particular bomb scare in Salt Lake City, for example, the incident became discursively constructed as a 'sneaky terrorist test' of American security systems.⁹⁸ In other accounts, and exploiting the newsworthiness of widely documented reports of how persons involved in the terrorist attacks of '9/11' had resided in 'ordinary' American neighbourhoods, citizens were warned that suspected terrorists may be living in isolated areas of their communities, hiding with malevolent intentions disguised until the Games commenced. As such, Americans were encouraged to be vigilant in their own neighborhoods as a type of informal and 'volunteer' extension of security protections against terrorism.⁹⁹

Finally, with the clever intermingling of Olympic ideals on questions of humanity with American ideals about the appropriate responses to security and violence at the winter Games, a consistent 'established' message about terrorism became formed. By substituting 'the American' standpoint on terrorism and defense with the 'Olympic' perspective in the popular media, dominant American ideologies became translated into international sports discourses. Again, the influential views of IOC members such as Jacques Rogge were frequently cited in media accounts as evidence of the ideological partnership between America and the rest of the world. "Your

nation is overcoming a tragedy, a tragedy that has affected the whole world. We stand united with you in the promotion of our common ideals, and hope for world peace," stated Rogge.¹⁰⁰ Therefore, the established American political views on terrorists or 'enemies' of the State became absorbed, regurgitated, and promoted to sports audiences around the world by groups like the IOC.

Discussion

If there is one thing that can be said of existing examinations of sports violence, it is that sociologists have conceptualized aggression and violence related to sport rather narrowly. If we are to understand the full range of sports-related violence and its multi-layered relevance *inside and outside* of the sports process, we must begin by acknowledging that violence is simply not restricted to the subcultural realms of professional athletes and their fans. With the notable exception of research on football hooliganism, sociologists of sport have in the main neglected those forms of sports-related violence occurring off-field, or those not immediately tied to actions on-field. Following Young's conceptualization of sports-related violence,¹⁰¹ we argue that in order to understand the relational sequences of social action¹⁰² underpinning instances of threatened or actual violent acts linked to sport and how they become socially constructed by audiences, sociologists should examine the interconnections between sports violence and aggressive forms of behaviours in other social spheres. An examination of the role of the media in conveying and helping to confirm the nature of these interconnections is vital. This is not to say that there are no existing empirical cases of how 'outside' social conflicts are inscribed into sports violence scenarios, and how these conflicts become discursively configured via the mass media. This is not the case, as Palmer's study of French nationalism, Hutchins and Mikosza's study of Australian politics, and Bairner's work on Irish independence quickly attest.¹⁰³ Nevertheless, our view is that sociologists of sport could benefit from conducting more research on the diverse ways that, and contexts in which, such interconnections are created and endure.

In the present work, the case of terrorist threats and related security issues at 2002 winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake City illustrates the intersection between sport and forms of political violence having little to do with athletic participation per se. In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, the Games became inserted into a far broader canvas of social, cultural, and ideological struggle. Athletes and spectators at the Games were believed to be targets of terrorism, not only for their capabilities as athletes or for their national, ethnic, or political affiliations, but also for their complicity in a mass public gathering held on American soil that captured, as Olympic audiences have come to do, colossal global audiences.¹⁰⁴ Concern about security at the Olympics closely paralleled American (and indeed global) fears about terrorism and the degree to which systems of civil protection could be breached by foreign aggressors. For these reasons, Olympic security issues, reported and considered widely in the Western media, evolved into a metaphor of Western societies' abilities to defend their social institutions, cultural practices, ideological systems and, of course, citizens. Stated simply, a 'safe' Games would signal a victory for those committed to fighting terrorism around the world. In a related way, those participating in the winter Games formed new or reinvigorated national interdepen-

dencies and, in the process, underlined the social position of 'outsiders' in the new war on terrorism.

Our argument is that while the media caused neither popular understandings about '9/11' nor the circumstances prompting rugged security practices at the Salt Lake Winter Games -- both of which were clearly severe in their impact and implications and which, to be fair, the media had no choice but to report upon -- they nevertheless played a central role in shaping interpretations of security matters at the Games. Offering a series of 'frames' depicting the effective management of security at the event as symbolic of American strength, resolve, and hegemony, the media helped to confirm 'established' readings of terrorism and terrorists, as well as galvanizing pre-existing racist stereotypes about 'outsider' cultures, ethnicities, and religions. Consequently, this particular event became tacitly engaged in the ongoing media construction of America's new war on terrorism. Revealing the interdependency between sport and other forms of social interaction, the Western media utilized the global popularity of the Games as a medium for proffering counter-terrorist ideology and sentiment. Highlighting the discourses about the Games generated by athletes, spectators, government officials, Olympic delegates, and 'everyday' citizens, the media represented concerns about security at the Games (and in America) as a matter of international importance.

Finally, the data we collected before, during, and after the Salt Lake Games lead us to conclude that the media continue to operate as agents of moral indignation as Cohen¹⁰⁵ argued some thirty years ago, and are eminently willing to employ codes of 'inferential racism' to do so.¹⁰⁶ The news production process does indeed reflect wider relations of cultural, economic, and social power in a relatively uncritical way. Sports events such as the Olympic Games can be used opportunistically and exploitively by primary and secondary definers in this process. In this particular case, our data suggest that media coverage of security issues at the 2002 Salt Lake Games served precisely this purpose, consolidating the interface between hegemonic Olympic philosophies on the one hand and, on the other, the Western capitalist and multi-corporate agendas that we know underpin them.

Endnotes

1. W.M. Leonard II, *A Sociological Perspective of Sport* (New York: MacMillan, 1988).
2. S.L. Price, "Stained Games," *Sports Illustrated*, August 5, 1996, pp. 22-31.
3. On September 5, 1972, a Palestinian group known as 'Black September' stormed the Olympic Village at the Munich Games, shooting dead Israeli wrestling coach Moshe Weinberg and weightlifter Yossi Romano, and holding others hostage. They demanded the release of approximately 200 Palestinian prisoners held in Israel. Following a 20-hour stand-off, and during a failed rescue attempt by the German authorities at a nearby airfield, nine further Israeli athletes were killed, along with one German police officer and five of the terrorists. The event, known as the 'Munich Massacre', led to the withdrawal of several Arab countries including Egypt, Kuwait and Syria, all fearing retaliation. On the morning of July

27, 1996 and during the Atlanta Games, a bomb exploded near a bandstand in the city's Centennial Olympic Park. Two people were killed and over 100 others injured. Though a 33-year old security guard, Richard Jewell, was originally held in connection with the bombing, he was subsequently cleared as a suspect. Unlike the earlier Munich incident, little further information on the Atlanta case has reached the public. For a wider discussion of the Olympics and political crises, see: A. Guttman, *The Games Must Go On: Avery Brundage and the Olympic Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984); J. Hoberman, *The Olympic Crisis: Sport, Politics and the Moral Order* (New Rochelle: A.D. Caratzas, 1986); A. Senn, *Power, Politics, and the Olympic Games* (Champaign, Illinois: Human Kinetics, 1999); K. Wamsley, "The Global Sport Monopoly: A Synopsis of 20th Century Politics," *International Journal*, Vol. LVII, No. 3, 2002, pp. 395-410.

4. *Stadia*, December 2001, p. 8.
5. S. Hall, "The Treatment of Football Hooliganism in the Press," in *Football Hooliganism: The Wider Context*, R. Ingham, ed. (London: Inter-Action Imprint, 1978), pp. 15-37.
6. K. Young, "Sport and Violence," in *Handbook of Sports Studies*, J. Coakley and E. Dunning, eds. (London: Sage, 2000), pp. 382-408.
7. E. Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (New York: Doubleday, 1959); E. Goffman, *Interaction Ritual* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967).
8. M. Smith, *Violence and Sport* (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983); M. Messner, "When Bodies are Weapons: Masculinity and Violence in Sport," *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, Vol. 25, 1990, pp. 203-221; N. Theberge, "It's Part of the Game: Physicality and the Production of Gender in Women's Hockey," *Gender and Society*, Vol. 11, 1997, pp. 69-87; and J. Coakley, *Sport in Society: Issues and Controversies* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001, 7th ed.).
9. J. Benedict, *Public Heroes, Private Felons: Athletes and Crimes Against Women* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1997); J. Bryshun and K. Young, "Sports-Related Hazing: An Inquiry into Male and Female Involvement, in *Sport and Gender in Canada*, P. White and K. Young, eds. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 269-293; and L. Robinson, *Crossing the Line: Violence and Sexual Assault in Canada's National Sport* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1998).
10. E. Dunning, P. Murphy and J. Williams, *The Roots of Football Hooliganism* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1988).
11. E. Dunning, *Sport Matters: Sociological Studies of Sport, Violence, and Civilization* (London: Routledge, 1999); S. Mihailovic, "Sports, Fans, Violence," *Kultura*, 1990, Vol. 88-90, pp. 9-16; and K. Young, "Standard Deviations: An Update on North American Sports Crowd Disorder," *Sociology of Sport Journal*,

Vol. 19, 2002, pp. 237-275.

12. K. Young, 2000; K. Young, "Toward A More Inclusive Sociology of Sports-Related Violence," unpublished paper presented at the North American Society for the Sociology of Sport, San Antonio, Texas, 2001, October 31-November 4.
13. J. Wittebols, "The Politics and Coverage of Terrorism: From Media Images to Public Consensus," *Communication Theory*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1991, pp. 253-266; and J. Wittebols, "Media and the Institutional Perspective: U.S. and Canadian Coverage of Terrorism," *Political Communication*, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1992, pp. 267-278.
14. Especially since the violent events of September 11, 2001 in the United States (which included two hijacked commercial planes flying into and destroying the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New York, another crashing into the Pentagon, and a fourth plane crashing in rural Pennsylvania), the terms 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' have become hotly debated and stir the emotions easily. It is not our intention in this paper to wade through a litany of definitions of the terms or to pass partisan judgement on any incident or set of cases. Rather, our interests lie in sociologically interrogating the links between sport, violence, and the media, in this case semiotically using the context of an Olympic Games. Therefore, we make no judgement about, nor imply any disrespect for, perpetrators or victims of politically motivated violence in America or elsewhere.
15. P. Ryan, "Ready for Anything: Venue Security Since 11 September," *Stadia*, July 2002, pp. 17-20.
16. The terrorist attacks on the USA of September 11, 2001 dramatically emphasised the need for careful planning and security preparations for sports events, inside and beyond the U.S.. Examples of the subsequently bulked-up security arrangements in the world of sport include golf's Ryder Cup and the New Zealand Open ("Cancelled: Ryder Cup," *Daily Express*, September 17, 2001, p. 79; and "Cyanide Threat to New Zealand Open," *The Independent*, January 7, 2002, p. 6); Wimbledon and the U.S. Open in tennis ("Big Sports Grounds in Germ Alert," *Daily Express*, March 22, 2002, p. 31; and "Farewell to Carefree Flushing Meadows," *The Independent*, September 18, 2001, p. 21); European club soccer and the World Cup of soccer ("Terror Risk for Chelsea," *Daily Express*, September 29, 2001, p. 106; and "World Cup Terror Alert," *News of the World*, September 23, 2001, p. 79); and the Commonwealth Games held in Manchester 2002 ("Security? What Security?," *Daily Express*, July 15, 2002, pp. 6-7). Peter Ryan, the commander-in-chief of all security operations for the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games describes the concerns of planning and policing authorities: "Operators of sporting venues all over the world are now revising their security risk assessments...to factor in the previously unimaginable...Can one imagine the carnage of a suicide bomber, strapped with high explosives and ball bearings, self-detonating in a crowded stadium, especially on the close-packed terraces of a premier league soccer match?" (Ryan, 2002, pp.17-20). While the threat of terrorism at sports events is not new, it is more real in its impact than ever before, with clubs,

franchises and leagues in many countries not only spending far more on increased security arrangements, but in many cases encountering severe financial difficulties due to related soaring insurance costs. On the issue of fear of crime and violence at the Olympics, also see J. Tulloch, "Terrorism, 'Killing Events', and their Audience: Fear and Crime at the 2000 Olympics," in *The Olympics at the Millennium: Power, Politics and the Games*, K. Schaffer and S. Smith, eds. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2000), pp. 224-240.

17. www.cnn.com, September 18, 2001. See also Tulloch, *Ibid*.
18. "Bush to Bomb Through Olympics," *The Next York Times*, November 27, 2001, p. A12.
19. S. Hall, C. Critcher, T. Jefferson, J. Clarke and B. Roberts, *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order* (London: MacMillan, 1978); Glasgow Media Group, *Bad News* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976); Glasgow Media Group, *More Bad News* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980); G. Knight, "News and Ideology," *Canadian Journal of Communication*, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1982, pp. 15-41; P. Elliot, G. Murdock and P. Schlesinger, "Terrorism and the State: A Case Study of the Discourses of Television," *Media, Culture, Society*, Vol. 5, 1983, pp. 155-177.
20. C. MacDougall, *Interpretative Reporting* (New York: MacMillan, 1978).
21. G. Tuchman, *Making News* (London: Free Press, 1978).
22. Glasgow Media Group, 1976, 1980.
23. G. Knight, "News and Ideology," *Canadian Journal of Communication*, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1982, pp. 15-41.
24. S. Hall et al., 1978.
25. S. Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers* (St. Albans, UK: Paladin, 1973).
26. S. Hall et al., 1978.
27. K. Young, "The Killing Field: Themes in Mass Media Responses to the Heysel Stadium Riot," *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, Vol. 21, No. 2/3, 1986, pp. 253-267; and K. Young, "Treatment of Sports Violence by the Canadian Mass Media," Report to Sport Canada's Applied Sport Research Program, Ottawa: Government of Canada, August, 1990.
28. R. Crelinstein, "The Impact of Television on Terrorism and Crisis Situations: Implications for Public Policy," *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1994, pp. 61-72; E. Herman, "Western State Terrorism and its Apologetics," *Monthly Review*, Vol. 42, No. 11, 1991, pp. 52-57; D. Kellner, "September 11, Terrorism, and Blowback," *Cultural Studies - Critical Method-*

- ologies, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2002, pp. 27-39; B. Simmons and D. Lowry, "Terrorists in the News, as Reflected in Three News Magazines," *Journalism Quarterly*, Vol. 67, No. 4, 1990, pp. 692-696.
29. E. Goffman, *Frame Analysis* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974).
 30. S. Hall et al., 1978.
 31. B. Dobkin, "Paper Tigers and Video Postcards: The Rhetorical Dimensions of Narrative Form in ABC News Coverage of Terrorism," *Western Journal of Communication*, Vol. 56, No. 2, 1992, pp. 143-160; and E. Steuter, "Understanding the Media/Terrorism Relationship: An Analysis of Ideology and the News in Time Magazine," *Political Communication and Persuasion*. Vol. 7, No. 4, 1990, pp. 257-278.
 32. R. Williams, *Marxism and Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).
 33. S. Lenart and H. Targ, "The Media War Against Nicaragua," *Peace Review*, Vol. 7, Nos. 3-4, 1995, pp. 347-353.
 34. S. Iyengar, "Framing Responsibility for Political Issues," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 546, 1996, pp. 59-70. Far from arguing that terrorist acts are 'democratic' or even 'civilized', our sociological position here is that acts of terrorism, as with other acts of violence, tend to be rational and purposeful rather than random and meaningless.
 35. B. Simmons and D. Lowry, 1990.
 36. S. Kingston, "Terrorism, the Media, and the Northern Ireland Conflict," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1995, pp. 203-231; H. Munkler, "Terrorism as Communication Strategy: The Message of September 11," *Internationale Politik*, Vol. 56, No. 12, 2001, pp. 11-18.
 37. Y. Kamalipour, "The TV Terrorist: Media Images of Middle Easterners," *Global Dialogue*, Vol. 2, 4, 2000, pp. 89-96.
 38. H. Giroux, "Terrorism and the Fate of Democracy after September 11," *Cultural Studies - Critical Methodologies*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2002, pp. 9-14.
 39. K. Young, 1986; P. Murphy, E. Dunning and J. Williams, 'Soccer Crowd Disorder and the Press,' *Theory, Culture and Society*, Vol. 5, 1988, pp. 645-693; K. Young, 2000, 2002; J. Bryant and D. Zillmann, "Sports Violence and the Media," in *Sports Violence*, J. H. Goldstein, ed. (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1983), pp. 195-208; K. Young and M.D. Smith, "Mass Media Treatment of Violence in Sport and its Effects," *Current Psychology: Research and Reviews*, Vol. 7, No. 4, 1988/89, pp. 298-312; and J. Gillett, P. White and K. Young, "The Prime Minister of Saturday Night: Don Cherry, the CBC, and the Cultural Production of Intolerance," in *Seeing Ourselves in Canada: Media Power and Policy*, H. Holmes and D. Taras, eds. (Toronto: Harcourt Brace, 1996), pp. 59-72.

40. For example, while much of the sociological research on the sport/violence/media nexus has demonstrated that the media tend to play an amplifying or 'legitimizing' role in violence (J. Bryant and D. Zillmann, 1983; M. Smith, 1983; N. Theberge, "A Feminist Analysis of Responses to Sports Violence: Media Coverage of the 1987 World Junior Hockey Championship," *Sociology of Sport Journal*, Vol. 6, 1989, pp. 247-256; and K. Young, 1990), cases have also been made for processes of de-amplification or alarm-reduction that may occur in perceptions of threat offered by a given behaviour through media coverage. The study by Murphy et al (P. Murphy, J. Williams and E. Dunning, *Football on Trial: Spectator Violence and Development in the Football World* (London: Routledge, 1990) of some aspects of football hooliganism coverage in the British press and Young's (2002) account of North American sports crowd disorder are cases in point. No such trend was identified in the present study.
41. M. Vigh, "Feds Promise SLC Heads Up," *The Salt Lake Tribune*, January 19, 2002, p. C10.
42. In the wake of previous episodes of political violence at the Olympic Games, and threats of terrorist attacks during the 2000 Sydney Games, we had already started gathering data on this project some time before the events of September 11, 2001 in the U.S.. Clearly, since that time, the amount of media attention paid to terrorist acts occurring at sports events has spiralled. We draw on only a portion of this overall coverage in this paper.
43. B. Glaser and A. Strauss, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research* (Chicago: Aldine, 1967).
44. P. Foy, "Salt Lake Chief Envisions Tighter Security," *The Detroit News*, October 30, 2001, p. G3.
45. The 'Skate-Gate' controversy at the Salt Lake Games centred around the apparent inconsistencies in judging during the last evening of the pairs figure skating competition. While Canadian pairs skaters Jamie Sale and David Pelletier performed what many viewed as a technically flawless routine in their final skate (which would have secured them first place in the contest), the gold medal was given to Elena Berezhnaya and Anton Sikharulidze of Russia. Following an immediate public outcry, allegations of contest-rigging were launched against Marie Reine le Gougne of France, who became accused of 'trading votes' with Russian judges in the pairs ice-dancing competition. In a sport plagued by lingering allegations of jury-tampering at international competitions like the Olympics, 'Skate-Gate' drew much (unwanted) public attention to pairs figure skating. Sale and Pelletier were eventually awarded co-gold medals with the Russian skaters, and le Gougne's judging credentials were suspended (C. Harasta, "Olympic Miracle: Everyone was Safe," *The Dallas Morning News*, February 25, 2002, p. C2; R. Sheppard, "Skating with the Mob," *Maclean's*, August 12, 2002, p. 56).
46. E. Goffman, 1974; S. Lenart and H. Targ, 1995.

47. J. Benton, "A Show of Force in the Name of Security," *The Dallas Morning News*, February 9, 2002, p. C6; R. Vospeka, "Olympic Security Planners Finally Relax," *Vancouver Sun*, February 25, 2002, p. H7.
48. J. Stearns and T. Dunn, "Salt Lake City Ready for Anything," *Reno Gazette-Journal*, February 7, 2002, p. B3.
49. C. Harasta, 2002, p. C2.
50. "Olympic Security Unprecedented in History of Sport," *The New York Times*, February 8, 2002, p. D3.
51. J. Reaves, "Olympic Security: How Far Should it Go?" Posted on www.time.com, January 30.
52. J. Benton, 2002; S. Wilson, "Olympics Chief: 'Games Will Go On' in Salt Lake," *Chicago Sun-Times*, September 21, 2001, p. E2.
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