

Torino 2006: What Kind of Olympic Winter Games Were They?

A Preliminary Account From an Organizational and Economic Perspective

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Citius, Altius, Fortius! To what extent does the motto of the Olympics relate to Torino 2006? Has the XXth edition of the Olympic Winter Games (OWG) continued the positive trend whereby each edition, with only a few exceptions, surpasses the one before? In which areas have there been improvements, if any? To what extent have the targets set by the bid promoters and the organizers been achieved, or missed? Finally, on what foundations and from which perspectives have Turin and its surrounding Olympic valleys managed to plan, and how are they preparing to make the most of the heritage of the Games, which is now the main reason that drives a city (and a country) to bear the expensive challenge of their organization? — In this essay, primarily from an economic point of view, we will attempt to respond to these questions, in the knowledge that more complete answers will come at a later stage.



What Kind of Olympic Winter Games Were Those of Torino 2006?

Organizational Aspects and Their Perceived Qualities

Let us start with some general information (Table 1), which compares Torino 2006 to the seven previous editions of the OWG.¹ As we can see, many statistics for Torino 2006 show an increase compared to previous editions: the number of events, the number of national Olympic teams, the number of athletes, and the number of media operators all increased compared to the previous Games, and more than doubled compared to Lake Placid in 1980.² The increase in media coverage of the Turin Games was even greater; more than 200 countries were represented, guaranteeing coverage rivalling that of the more recent editions of the Summer Olympics. Indeed, it was more than four times greater than the coverage of the Games in Lake Placid 1980. Unchanged, however, are the duration (16 days – except for Salt Lake which staged its Games over 17 days) and the number of sports (still 7).

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In the Piedmont, however, in two cases the figures, compared to Salt Lake City, show a reduction (although moderate). This is the case for spectators (although the figure is not yet official) – approximately 1.5 million. There were 100,000 more at Salt Lake City 2002. It is also the case for volunteers (20,000, compared to 22,000 at Salt Lake City 2002, and 32,579 at Nagano 1998). In both cases, the reduction, while not an automatic indication of failure, may nevertheless show that something about the organization was less than optimal. For spectators at Torino's various Olympic venues, attendance, especially by Italians, and for certain sports, was lower than forecast, due not only to the delay by the Italian media in announcing and publicizing Torino 2006 (we will return to this subject later), but also to certain errors in ticketing procedures. For example, tickets sold online, which were not available for a long time, appeared as available just before the event. And finally, the high cost of admission, which discouraged spectators with lower incomes, was somewhat counterbalanced by the last minute sale of tickets at highly discounted prices. Approximately 900,000 tickets were sold in all, or 90% of those available.

Table 1: The Last Eight OWG at a Glance

| | Lake Placid 1980 | Sarajevo 1984 | Calgary 1988 | Albertville 1992 | Lillehammer 1994 | Nagano 1998 | Salt Lake City 2002 | Turin 2006 |
|--|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------|------------------------|---------------|
| Population | 2,700 | 448,000 | 640,000 | 20,000 | 24,000 | 362,000 | 852,000 | 2,214,934 |
| Region/ State | New York | Bosnia | Alberta | Savoy | Oppland | Nagano | Utah | Piedmont |
| Country | U.S.A. | (then) Yugoslavia | Canada | France | Norway | Japan | U.S.A. | Italy |
| Duration (days) | 12 | 12 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 16 |
| Events | 39 | 40 | 46 | 57 | 61 | 68 | 78 | 84 |
| Sports | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| Nations | 37 | 49 | 57 | 64 | 67 | 72 | 77 | 80 |
| Athletes | 1,072 | 1,278 | 1,445 | 1,808 | 1,737 | 2,305 | 2,399 | 2,500 |
| Media | 3,983 | 7,852 | 7,124 | 7,407 | 8,145 | 10,376 | 8,730 | 10,000 |
| Volun- teers | 6,703 | 10,450 | 9,498 | 8,647 | 9,054 | 32,579 | 22,000 | 20,000 |
| Spectators (in 1000) | 433 | 434 | 1,339 | 942 | 1,208 | 1,276 | 1,600 | 1,500 |
| Total value of TV rights ^a | 21 | 103 | 325 | 292 | 353 | 513 | 748 | 832 |

^a US \$ million, constant year 2000 prices

The reduction of 21,000 in the number of volunteers compared to the previous two editions, and also compared to the forecasts by TOROC (Torino Olympic Games Organizing Committee), did not reveal obvious malfunctions in the hospitality machine at Torino 2006, thanks to the dedication of the staff who

helped to organize the event by providing services that fully reflected the expected quality standards, albeit at the expense of personal stress. Organizing Committee staff at both the Sydney and Salt Lake City Games resulted from far larger application pools than Turin enjoyed. Staff in the Torino Games was derived from sixty-one percent of the total number of applications. Turin staff totals reflected low involvement (15% of the total) of people from Italian regions other than the Piedmont. The presence of non-Italian staff, however, was a trifle higher, 18%. This is certainly a reflection on the uncertainties and delays in publicizing Torino 2006 at the national level, which we have already mentioned,³ while the limited participation of employed adults (less than 20% of the total), in contrast with the availability declared in previous surveys,⁴ is the probable result of the commitment required (at least 10 days out of the 16 days of the Olympics), which many people obviously felt was too heavy and restrictive.

Another aspect that characterized Torino 2006 was the location, geographical, and topographical characteristics of the competition and training venues. The competition venues were distributed between Turin (a city of approximately 900,000 inhabitants and the main city in the province of the same name) and the greater Piedmont region. Turin hosted the ice competitions (except for curling), the opening and closing ceremonies, and most of the medal ceremonies, held in the central Piazza Castello, renamed Medals Plaza, which became one of the signature showcases of the XXth OWG. Turin also established villages for the athletes, the Olympic Family, media, and media centres. Pinerolo (the venue for curling), Torre Pellice (for hockey training), and six districts in the Susa and Chisone Valleys (for snow sports, with two Olympic villages) completed the Olympic competition/training matrix of facilities. This decision, deliberately taken by promoters of the Turin bid, involved: (1) fitting out a very large area during the run-up to the Games, (2) solving the complex problems of coordinating and managing multiple institutions due to the various public bodies involved,⁵ and (3) solving the tricky logistics issues during the Games themselves.⁶ In this way the success of Torino 2006, perhaps definitively, confirmed the prevalence of a model that makes it possible to award the OWG to medium and large European cities located close to, but not within, mountainous areas. In a certain sense, we could say that this is Torino 2006's legacy to the Olympic Movement and the IOC, which represents it worldwide.

The figures we have presented and commented on describe some of the structural features of the XXth OWG, which are certainly positive on the whole. However, they do not reveal the balance sheet of Torino 2006 in terms of quality. Leaving aside the strictly sports-related aspects relating to the athletes' performance and spectacular elements, especially in relation to the intrinsic and perceived quality of the choreography of the ceremonies,⁷ we will limit ourselves to considering some of the opinions expressed about the organization of the Games and the areas which hosted them. Some of these are part of a systematic

survey of local public opinion about Torino 2006. These surveys were conducted each year from 2002 onward by the OMERO Centre (Olympics and Mega Events Research Observatory), at the initiative of the city and province of Turin. The surveys focussed on separate representative samples of inhabitants of Turin and the surrounding Olympic valleys.⁸ Before the Games were held, and during the run-up, despite the inevitable inconveniences caused by the large number of construction works in progress and ecological concerns, especially in the valleys, support for staging of the Games was extremely high, and grew over time. In Turin, in the spring of 2005, support was shown by 93% of the sample (84% very much in favor, and 9% quite in favor).⁹ Even in the valleys, support was by and large the norm, and grew over time, although with slightly smaller percentages – in 2005, 76% of those interviewed were in favor of the Games, and a further 14% were somewhat in favor. Naturally, the support comes from a consideration of the benefits expected from the XXth Olympic Winter Games. In the 2005 survey, for example, those residents of Turin who were interviewed expressed support because of: (1) visibility abroad (82%), (2) development of tourism (79%), (3) the construction of infrastructure (78%), (4) the construction of sports facilities that would not have been built otherwise (77%), (5) enhancement of the natural environment (57%), (6) the opportunity for new jobs (57%), and (7) an opportunity for private investment (48%). It can be seen that most of the reasons focus attention on the issue of the legacy.¹⁰

Some two months after the Games ended, the surveys were repeated.¹¹ The main findings from the 903 people interviewed in Turin touch on many aspects, from which we have taken the following samples:

1. *Satisfaction for the Games that have just ended.* The faith already placed in the Olympic event has been fully confirmed, and the supporters have increased from 84%, in the 2005 sample, to almost all of the interviewees-98%.
2. *The city's image.* This was “very positive” for 58%, and “positive” for 41%, giving a total figure of 99%; most of all there was an “unexpected” result – no less than 62% replied that “they expected worse,” while 35% expected “this result.”
3. *Positive impact on the city.* The interviews highlight two kinds of main effects: on the one hand, the international profile of Turin and its prospects for tourist development: both values are placed at 93%, while the previous surveys did not exceed 80%. On the other hand, we find support for the new infrastructures (63%), and the new sports facilities (83%).
4. *Problems and inconvenience related to the Games.* All the fears voiced before the Olympics were drastically reduced after the Games, exactly as shown in the surveys for past Olympics, both Summer and Winter. The concerns almost halved. One of the emerging problems is the re-use of the facilities and the possibility of converting them, a problem that is “very much” felt by 16% and “quite a lot” by 36%. The fear of “corruption,” which is very apparent in

the previous surveys (no less than 75% of replies), now resulted in 12% of “very much” answers, with 31% “quite a lot.” The problem now appears on a very different scale.

5. *Positive impact for the local area.* The Games will have a “positive effect” on Turin (76%), or a “very positive effect” (20%) – 96% in all, with an increase of 15% compared to previous surveys.
6. *What mark does Turin deserve?* Confirmation of the optimism of Turin’s inhabitants comes from the final mark given to Turin (8.7 in 2006, compared to 7.7 in 2005, on a scale of 0 to 10). This is a “projective” analysis, which has recorded a slight growth over past years and which now, after the Games, has increased by one point.¹²

From a survey carried out in the valleys in April 2006, the results of which largely reflect those for Turin, we can see the feelings (at the end of the Games) toward Torino 2006.¹³ They are extremely positive concerning pride in its success – 71% responded “a great deal,” and 25% “quite a lot.” Concerning the shared feeling of euphoria, 38% answered “very much,” and 50% “quite a lot.” The result is a widespread appreciation of the organizers of the Games, which were given an average score of 8.8 (Municipality of Turin), 8.3 (Province of Turin) and 8.0 (TOROC).¹⁴

The extremely positive assessment of the Games and their general organization is not only the feeling expressed by residents of the Olympic areas. A survey carried out via direct interviews to 86 journalists from the general press, half of them foreign, at the Media Centre set up for them in the city centre, shows the clear prevalence of “positive” and “highly positive” opinions on the overall organization of the Games. Over 80% were supportive. For the transport system, which was a potentially critical aspect, over 60% were supportive, while the hotel network also received positive responses.¹⁵

Finally, on the TOROC website, OMERO presented the results of a study which surveyed “sponsors’ guests” at the Games. The results reflected both criticisms and compliments (670 people replied, of whom 246 were Italian and 424 foreign, including 112 from the USA, 69 from Canada, and 141 from European countries). The majority of those surveyed revealed a great enjoyment of Torino 2006. For example, in terms of the main feelings they experienced: (1) 52% of foreigners (and 26% of Italians) used the word (or equivalent) “enthusiastic;” (2) 32% (and 27%) the word “happy;” (3) 26% (and 17%) “magnificent;” (4) 22% (and 29%) “enchanted;” (5) 19% (and 16%) “interested;” (6) 16% (and 21%) “a fairy tale;” and (7) 9% (and 8%) “entertained.”¹⁶

Moreover, the survey showed that 93% of Italians and 71% of foreigners intend to return to Turin in the future. Turin exceeded the expectations of 72% of foreigners and 84% of Italians. Thus, it appears, that until it is the subject of publicity or becomes a first-hand experience, expectations are lower. After the event, public expression is extremely positive. Almost all Italians and 84% of

foreigners responded that they would recommend Turin to their friends. Slightly lower, yet still very high, was the success of the Alpine valleys, where 89% of Italians and 77% of foreigners would similarly recommend.

So what was most appreciated about the city? To a question open to any reply, the most frequently heard responses referred to the city itself, its buildings, streets and history. It is a general impression, unrelated to individual places or attractions. The people also made a very good impression. Again ... it can no longer be said that the people of the Piedmont are anti-social! The best things about Turin were said to be its history, city views, the people in the street, chocolate and a 'syndrome' of elegance, order, industriousness and organization ... The Alps were noted for the appeal of their extensive scenery and their accessibility. It is the overall vision that counts ... in other words the Alpine landscape, as priceless as it is delicate. However, a few critical points were raised by a small number of people, points related to the transport networks and a few unattractive and badly-placed buildings ... In conclusion, considering the short duration of the visits of the sponsors' guests during the Olympics, Turin and its valleys genuinely managed to convey a fresh, positive image of itself to a difficult section of the public.¹⁷

Economic Aspects¹⁸

From an economic standpoint, was Torino 2006 an “expensive,” or “cheap,” edition of the Olympic Winter Games?¹⁹ In other words, was it an edition requiring extensive investment for the construction or refurbishment of competition facilities, construction and improvement of transport and communication infrastructure, and accommodation for the athletes, the Olympic Family, and the media? Or was it a “cheap” edition, because the infrastructure was by and large already available and required only slight alterations and expenditure strictly necessary to run the Games?

The organizational model of any Olympic Games is a mirror of the objectives that the host city desires to achieve,²⁰ especially the characteristics of the host city, and more generally, the Olympic areas as a whole. As we will see below, and as is usual for many candidate cities,²¹ the main objective of Turin's bid can be seen as the willingness to accelerate a process of transformation of the city that had originated well before the hosting bid was mounted. Further, the promotion of tourism, both in Turin itself and in the Olympic valleys, was an objective. As far as the characteristics of the city and the Olympic areas are concerned, we should remember that Turin is located approximately 70-80 kilometers from the mountain venues. Therefore, Turin itself could host only (indoor) ice events,²² the facilities for which had to be built from scratch. As a consequence, other venues had to be located outside the city, thus generating (high) costs for road construction and improvement, for building state-of-the-art communication networks, for managing the transportation system, and for construction

of two Olympic Villages in the valleys. For these reasons, there is no doubt that Torino 2006 will qualify as “expensive” Games.

Table 2: Expenditure Items of Agenzia Torino 2006 (by Type and Source of Funding)²⁶

| | L.285/2000^a | Other Sources | Total Cost |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------|
| Infrastructure | 479 | 544 | 1023 |
| Housing, Offices, Commercial Sites | 308 | 215 | 523 |
| Sports Facilities | 631 | 23 | 654 |
| Environmental Infrastructure | 7 | 1 | 8 |
| Total | 1425 | 768 | 2207 |

^a US \$ Million at constant 2000 prices

The Italian government was mainly responsible for financing the investments²³ through Law 285/00, where three appendices list, respectively, the competition venues, the building infrastructures, and the planned road works. The Law also provided for the construction of so-called “connected public works” (works “connected” to the staging of the Olympics). The major aim of these “connected works” was a general redevelopment of the “Olympic territories” that makes it possible to use the Games as a unique opportunity for developing and promoting tourism, even long after the mega event. According to this aim, several lines of intervention were identified. They encompassed development of the winter tourist areas, road infrastructure, sewer systems, aqueducts, sanitary systems, and so forth. The cost of the “connected” public works totalled US \$429 million, of which US \$273 million was financed by the government under Law 285/00. Moreover, the Piedmont Region, in an attempt to extend a positive spin-off from the Games to those greater regional areas not directly involved, adopted the “Regional Programme of Tourist and Sport Infrastructures – Piedmont 2006” (Art. 21 of the Regional Law 166/02). This initiative was called “Accompanying Public Works” (*Opere di accompagnamento*), for which US \$388 million was allocated. Of that figure, US \$202 million was financed by the central government and the remaining US \$186 million by the Piedmont Region from its own budget.²⁴ Other allocations came from the Government Budgets in 2001, 2002, and 2003, and from the local public authorities.²⁵ Table 2 shows the total value of the Olympic works for Torino 2006, divided by type and funding source, expressed in US \$, equated to purchasing power as of the year 2000.

The above should lead us to consider that Torino 2006 represented a catalyst for external resources, not only for the city of Turin, but also for the Olympic areas as a whole, and to a lesser extent, for the entire Piedmont Region. This places the city in a favorable position in terms of post-Olympic development.

What expenses did TOROC incur for the organization and management of the XXth Games? How were they financed? How does this compare to editions of the OWG prior to Torino 2006? The data, in financial terms, was made comparable by converting original figures into US dollars at constant 2000 prices, excluding the value of investments of Lake Placid 1980 and Sarajevo 1984.

Table 3: OCOG Costs, Revenues, and Financial Balance Sheets, OWG 1980-2006²⁷

| | Lake Placid 1980 | Sarajevo 1984 | Calgary 1988 | Albertville 1992 | Lillehammer 1994 | Nagano 1998 | Salt Lake City 2002 | Torino 2006 |
|------------------|---------------------|------------------|-----------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------|------------------------|----------------|
| Revenues | 97.6 ^a | 277.81 | 626 | 800 | 525 | 1,050 | 1,264 | 1,300 |
| Cost | 115.36 | 72.93 | 590 | 859 | 868 | 1,002 | 1,317 | 1,333 |
| Profit / Loss | -177.6 | 204.87 | 36 | -59 | -343 | 48 | -54 | -33 |

^a US \$ million at 2000 constant prices

The value of investments made confirms that Torino 2006 was a record edition of the OWG. They were more expensive than any of the preceding Olympic Winter Games. The increase in costs compared to Salt Lake City 2002 is nevertheless limited – approximately 1.2%. Torino 2006 was more than 11 times more expensive than Lake Placid 1980, and 18 times more expensive than Sarajevo 1984. The figures also show that, more often than not, the Winter Games OCOGs ran a deficit, although modest (except Lillehammer 1994). This deficit was covered in different ways in the different countries by public authority, both at the central and local level. Torino 2006 was not an exception in this regard, with a final deficit of US \$33 million (at constant 2000 prices),²⁸ corresponding to 2.48% of the costs incurred. The result, not unique in financial terms, although comparatively speaking no worse than the result obtained in other cases, marks the end of a long and difficult affair that involved (and sometimes upset) the executives of TOROC and its relations (often openly hostile) with the Italian government and local authorities, who, making the most of a difficult situation, nevertheless intervened with sponsorships and by accepting responsibility for some of the works that had originally been assigned to TOROC.²⁹

A Study of the Economic Impact of Torino 2006: A Critical Reading

City politicians see hallmark events as a means of promoting economic growth. As a result, when arriving at decisions to use significant amounts of public money to promote a mega event (and the OWG are mega events), studies are conducted in order to estimate the overall impact on the economic system. It is

often the case that, especially if these studies are conducted directly or indirectly by the event promoters or parties with an interest in staging the event, they end up by representing a “technical” justification for the event itself, magnifying the positive effects for society and the economy. With respect to the XXth OWG, the *Unione Industriale di Torino*, in collaboration with TOROC, conducted a study in 2005,³⁰ estimating the impact on added value and employment of the total expenditure allocated for Torino 2006. The estimates were made using the IDEM model (Italy Demographic Economic Model) of Italy’s General Accounting Office, the *Ragioneria Generale dello Stato*, similar to the RIMS II model of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, used to assess the economic impact of the Atlanta 1996 Games. It is broken down by region, on an annual basis, and considers 24 sectors. There are two elements to the model: (1) a demographic component which, based on the likely development of the natural trend in population and emigration/immigration, calculates the demographic forecasts required for the employment estimates, and (2) an economic element in the form of an open-structured, multi-regional intersectorial table, summarizing the existing links between the various branches and regions of the Italian economy and the links between Italy’s economy and the rest of the world. The study considers the impact for the economy and jobs in the Piedmont, and in Italy as a whole, for the five-year period 2005-2009, not only for all the “Olympic” investments (Olympic “connected” and “accompanying” works), but also all the costs relating to the main infrastructure works affecting the urban area of Turin, including the high-capacity Turin-Milan rail link; the underground; Turin’s railway stations; significant public works such as the new civic library and theatre; investments designed to develop tourism in the Olympic areas, including initiatives funded by the regional law 18/99 for tourist accommodation; and the promotion, communication and publicity borne by local authorities and sponsors of the Games.³¹ The total value of this input comes to approximately US \$16 billion.

The results are a forecast of the average annual increase in GDP of just under 3% for the Piedmont and 0.2% for Italy. These results are particularly significant given the low rate of growth in Italy’s economy over the past few years. For every million Euros spent, approximately 21 full time jobs should be created in the Piedmont each year, projecting an approximate average total of 54,000 new jobs per year and an increase in employment of 2.8%.³² Gaining the greatest benefits, in terms of jobs and added value, should be (in descending order) the construction, commerce, and hotel and restaurant sectors.

The results obtained appear to be fully consistent with the methodology and specific hypotheses used.³³ However, the limits of economic impact studies have been discussed in literature for some time now. There is a tendency to suggest cost-benefit analysis as an alternative,³⁴ which considers the factors of production used as costs (in terms of opportunity costs), and measures only the consumers’ net surplus. In addition, the cost-benefit analysis also considers the “ex-

ternalities” (e.g. the environmental costs), the distribution-related aspects of the expenditure and financing,³⁵ and, in general, all the costs and benefits that affect the local community that the market does not recognize in monetary terms, such as the costs of congestion and increased security measures. In the light of these considerations, it is clear to see why the promoters of events that involve the use of public funds prefer an analysis based on added value, which generally gives more favorable results than a cost-benefit analysis.

Another debatable aspect of the study in question concerns the decision to include investments in the model which go far beyond those for simply Olympic infrastructure, including the “connected” and “accompanying” works, which form part of the works identified in the strategic plan to improve access to the city of Turin. Considering that “Olympic works,” in the strict sense, represent 4%, and in the “broad” sense, approximately 16-17% of the works considered by the Unione Industriale,³⁶ one might conclude that the economic impact of the XXth Games should be reassessed in a similar way. Finally, the strong stimulus on the local economy highlighted by the Unione Industriale di Torino seems to conflict, as far as the construction industry is concerned, with the information gleaned from the data of Agenzia Torino 2006.³⁷ This information shows that businesses from the Piedmont were “awarded” the Olympic works for only approximately 25% of their total value. This information also highlights that Torino 2006 should have been an opportunity, one only partly seized by the local economy, to create works that were significant in terms of technological innovation (a feature of some of the facilities) and speed of construction, characteristics that are not common in Italy.

Torino 2006 and the Roads Leading to a Suitable Legacy

The Reasons Behind the Bid and Their Connections With the Changes in Turin

The reasons that led Turin to bid for the XXth OWG, and therefore the objectives set for the bid (inevitably projected into the post-Games period) did not arise from a vacuum, but were rooted in the city’s recent history. Turin, the city that started the movement that led to political unity in Italy 145 years ago in 1861, is not a static city. Many times during its recent history, it has radically re-invented its role and its vocation.³⁸ It can well be likened to a beating heart,³⁹ expanding and contracting. Following this metaphor, the heartbeat pulsation was represented by its role as the capital city of the new Kingdom of Italy (1861). This was followed by a profound crisis after the capital was moved to Florence (1865) and then to Rome (1870). After a long quiescent period, the city found a new life in the form of a manufacturing industry, which led to it becoming one of Italy’s prime industrial centres in the early 20th century. In effect, it reinvented itself as a “city-factory.” Industry found Turin to be an ideal location, settling and expanding by forming an extensive network of interdependent enterprises. The

subsequent growth of FIAT, and adoption of the system of organization originally developed by America's Henry Ford, were decisive factors in supporting a process of large-scale immigration and population growth, in fact higher than that of any other Italian city. This process took the city from just over 700,000 inhabitants in 1951 to one million in 1961. This rapid, overpowering expansion was accompanied by acute social problems and a widespread sense of "urban unease," reflected in the city's "overpolarization" characterised by an extremely limited class of bourgeoisie industrialists and a huge volume of blue-collar workers.⁴⁰ Periods of expansion alternated with periods of decline. Crises were followed by periods of growth (both following on and departing from previous trends). Severe industrial crises at the end of the 1970s gave rise to independent enterprises, each with its own strategy. One of them, the supply industry, became Turin's second great industry behind FIAT.⁴¹

For Turin, the decade 1975-1985 was a time of serious decline caused by the economic crisis and depression that affected Italy from 1975 onward. Widespread worker redundancy at that time (particularly by FIAT and its outsourcers) marked the end of the centralization of industry and prompted the beginning of the "neo-industrial" era, a change from mass production to production based on advanced technology, and a transformation from a one-company town to a technocity. However, Turin was still a "difficult city," "incomplete," without great attractions for privileged social groups.^{42 43} Yet, once again, Turin accepted the new challenge and began to think of its future in a new light. For the first time, measures were taken to begin sponsoring events, and to redevelop the city and improve its international networks.⁴⁴ These measures included the idea of putting the city forward as a candidate to host the XXth OWG.

However, other important events were to mark the 1990s. The first was the approval of the city's new urban planning scheme, drawn-up by the firm Gregotti & Cagnardi in 1995. The scheme regulated and launched a process of far-reaching urban redevelopment, one that revolved around an underground system for the railway which had previously divided the city into two poorly-linked halves, and re-using the large, abandoned industrial sites for new developments in manufacturing, residential areas, and services.⁴⁵ The second event was the city's initiative (the first in Italy) to begin a systematic consideration of its future. For this purpose, the specially-formed association *Torino Internazionale* was organized to help gather the information and energies forthcoming from local cultural, economic, and social institutions. On February 29, 2000, the first Strategic Plan was signed. It is articulated into 6 strategic lines, 20 objectives and 84 actions.⁴⁶ Objective 5.7 of this plan related to the XXth OWG, which were defined as an "engine for growth and international promotion." This would meet two basic requirements: (1) the integrated development of elements that would represent great attractions for the public, both Italian and international, and

(2) the resulting need to expand infrastructure, marketing and staff training in the tourist industry.

*International Media Coverage, Tourism Development, and
Original Objectives of Turin's Bid – To What Extent Were They Achieved?*

The dossier for Turin's bid reads as follows: "The Olympic Winter Games are a great opportunity for Turin and for Piedmont. The idea of Turin's candidature stems from the conviction – which is shared by all the local authorities – that the city and the region should let the world know how much the area has got to offer to tourists."⁴⁷

What we can now do, a few months after the Games, is to establish whether the goal of "letting the world know how much the area has got to offer to tourists" was achieved. At the same time, it is, however, impossible to state whether satisfactory results have been attained in terms of new tourist flows.⁴⁸ On the first point, the factors already mentioned about the public's reactions to the Games suggest that the message given by the city and the Olympic valleys, taking advantage of the extraordinary media stage provided by the OWG in general, was successful on the whole – although certain important points must be mentioned. Summing up the studies carried out so far,⁴⁹ a typically Italian paradox emerges. The space granted to Torino 2006 during the months leading up to the Games, as well as during the event itself, was far greater on the television channels of other countries and in the foreign press than it was on Italian television and in leading Italian newspapers. As far as Italian public television was concerned, the extreme lack of coverage given throughout the entire run-up to the Games is shocking and difficult to explain in rational terms.⁵⁰ In addition, there was the quality of the transmissions during the Games, often judged to be poor,⁵¹ as well as the large percentage of event competition broadcasts that were in themselves judged to be "unviewable."⁵² On the other hand, the focus on Torino 2006 by foreign TV stations was extremely broad. During the event, approximately 800 hours of coverage were broadcast each day (plus Internet broadcasts).⁵³

The reporting policy with regard to Torino 2006 by three leading Italian newspapers: *Il Corriere della sera*, *La Repubblica* and *La Stampa* (the last is based in Turin and owned by FIAT), was similar and mostly low-profile. The event was often confined to the "local news" pages with attention mainly being given to negative points, especially during the early years of the run-up to the Games.⁵⁴ During the second half of 2005, attention gradually increased. However, and again paradoxically, even though the outcome was not entirely unfavorable, the attention given by the three Italian newspapers during the Games was less than that of *Le Monde* and the *New York Times*, each of which dedicated at least twice as many articles to the XXth Games in February 2006 compared to Italian newspapers.⁵⁵ As a result of this, thanks to the Games, Turin is:

by far the most frequently-mentioned Italian city abroad, with twice the number of articles compared to Rome, and three times as many compared to Milan. Compared to the same month in the previous year, the number of articles about Turin rose more than sevenfold.⁵⁶

The tone of the articles and news about Turin during the Olympics, even in the Italian press, tended toward the positive, with “peaks of enthusiasm.”

On the second point – the intention to use the Games to develop tourism in Turin, the Olympic valleys and the Region of Piedmont – we limit ourselves to establishing whether this objective was plausible in view of the trends emerging from the years leading up to Torino 2006. Traditionally, the Region of Piedmont, in general, and Turin, in particular, does not reflect a well-developed tourist industry. Tourism in the Olympic valleys has traditionally been limited to snow sports, with a high degree of seasonality characterized by the widespread phenomenon of second homes (typical of neighbourhood tourism). In economic terms, tourism provides a contribution to the Italian GDP, which has fluctuated between 5 % and 6 % in recent years, compared to a quota of about 2% in the Region of Piedmont.⁵⁷ Recently, in relation to the success of the XXth Games, the Region’s executive council hypothesized that tourism’s contribution to the area’s GDP should increase from 2.2% to 4.8%.⁵⁸ A study of the trend in the tourist industry shows a highly dynamic element, far higher than the Italian average. In 2005, tourist presence in the region surpassed 10 million, the best result since 1990. A medium-term increase of 26% (2005 over 2000), and tourist arrivals of over 3.3 million, broke the record for the last 15 years. For Turin, the attraction represented by the upcoming Games was considered to be the driving force behind the record increase (25.5%) recorded from tourist visits for the previous year as well as the excellent tourist performance recorded in the Olympic mountain areas in the same period (16.4%). The region’s accommodation capacity increased by approximately 15% between 2000 and 2005, with approximately 162,000 beds – 16% in 1 or 2 star establishments; 36% in 4 star hotels; 217% in five-star hotels, which themselves increased from 4 in number to 7; 62% in agritourisms; and as much as 820% in B&Bs, which in number increased from 239 to 3,126 beds in 2005.⁵⁹

With specific regard to the city of Turin during the three-year period 2003-2005, tourist accommodation increased by 7% in terms of the number of establishments (325 compared to 305), yet remained largely unchanged in terms of beds (just over 14,200). The supply of hotel beds increased by 72%, of which 4.8% were in 5 star hotels, 35.3% in 4 star hotels, and 43.2% in 3 star hotels. Tourist arrivals reflected impressive increases, from 574,078 in 2002 to 849,276 in 2005, an increase of approximately 48%. This was accompanied by a smaller though significant increase in “stay-overs,” some 37%, from 1,818,833 in 2002 to 2,493,669 in 2005. There was, however, a reduction in the average stay, down from 3.1 to 2.9 nights.⁶⁰ Over the four-year period, the increase in the presence of

foreign tourists was extremely high, progressing from 574,078 in 2002 to 849,276 in 2005.

For Turin, these figures, relative to the increased number of foreign tourists, show that the Games as a whole form part of a medium-term trend that is clearly moving upwards. Unlike the past, when tourism related largely to trade fairs associated with FIAT and automobile-related industries,⁶¹ new and varied tourist destinations were established. The presence of families increased, as well as weekend stays.⁶² Room occupation rates for hotels have increased from the barely profitable 34.6% in 2003 to a more acceptable 42.05% in 2005.⁶³ All this seems to mark a positive indicator for the Olympic legacy.

With respect to the mountain communities that hosted the competition venues during the XXth OWG, including the town of Pinerolo that hosted the curling competitions, the figures provided do not show such favorable trends, nor are they equal for each district. Looking at the trends over a 15-year period (1991 to 2005), one can see that the number of Italian tourists has decreased, and that foreign tourism reflected only slight importance. In the first instance, this performance can reasonably be attributed to the fierce competition from other ski resorts, especially those located along the Italian/French border, each of which usually have higher snowfall and better facilities. They are also easier to reach, thanks in large measure to better road links. The lack of foreign tourists suggests that tourism in the Olympic valleys is mainly local, and therefore demonstrates how it was necessary to promote and redevelop the area to make it more attractive than its ski-centre competitors.

Between 1999 and 2005, there was a general increase in the arrivals of foreign and Italian tourists, with the exceptions of Claviere and Pragelato, each of which experienced decreases. Sauze d'Oulx remained steady, perhaps due to the effect of the announcement of the XXth Olympic Winter Games. With reference to more recent years, the comparison between 2005 and 2002 shows,⁶⁴ that for the group of seven municipalities in question (2002 values made equal to 100):

- in terms of the potential supply, there are now 114 establishments, with a standard deviation of 25 (the most significant exception toward the top is Pinerolo, which records a value of 172, on figures which are however limited: from 11 to 19) and 107 beds, with a standard deviation of 15.5 (they have fallen sharply in Pragelato and Claviere);
- in terms of the services actually supplied, the total arrivals increased by 33% on average, but in Pragelato, their index number fell to 62, and to 72 in Sauze d'Oulx. In Bardonecchia, the index number is 186, in Sestriere 177, and in Claviere 161; stays have increased by an average of 54% (Sauze d'Oulx is in sharp contrast to this trend, its index number falling to 82, while toward the top, Bardonecchia is above average with 234, as well as

Sestriere, with 229). This shows a strong recovery with regard to the positions lost in previous years.

An elaboration of the data suggest that the Games provided a fresh impulse to the tourist industry in the Olympic areas, well demonstrated by the increase in both Italian and foreign visitor flows during the period between the year in which the Games were awarded, and the staging of the event. For the future:

*the challenge is to exploit the international attention given to the Games in order to build market awareness and interest, and then to convert that awareness and interest into a visit. Once the Games are over, new strategies and tactics need to be developed to capitalize on what was gained in the years leading up to the Games.*⁶⁵

The Legacies of Torino 2006

The issue of the legacy of the Olympic Games, as already mentioned, is certainly a major reason prompting a prospective host city and nation to make a bid to bear the burden of organizing an Olympic event. The growing cost of the OWG has gradually increased this burden, which for Turin in 2006 and for Salt Lake City in 2002 seems to be in line with the financial cost incurred in 1996 with the organization of the Summer Games in Atlanta.⁶⁶ The issue of the legacy is therefore among the foremost issues studied by scholars and experts,⁶⁷ and also by local bodies involved. Looking beyond the specific declarations stated in the dossier for Torino's bid, which, as we have seen, focussed on the goal of publicizing the "new" tourist potential of the city and the surrounding Alpine competition venues, we must ask ourselves to what extent the legacy issue has been considered, and which plans have been discussed, agreed on, and then gradually implemented.

Turin's awareness of how important the subject of legacy was reached consensus among the community's intellectual elite and key political and economic figures. With respect to an international exhibition held in Turin in 1961, a warning was circulated: "don't do the same as Italy '61."⁶⁸ Due to a lack of planning, many of the buildings and facilities built to host the event were either not used or were used inappropriately, resulting in high costs and lack of "legacy" benefits for the city. This consideration, of which the promoters were already aware, was developed more thoroughly in 2001. A group of scholars from both the University and Polytechnic of Turin (the city's two public universities), with the backing of *Torino Incontra* (Congress Centre of the local Chamber of Commerce), organized an international convention with the theme: "*How a city can win or lose the Olympics.*" The same group then carried out research based on two main elements: (1) public expectations toward the Olympics in Turin and the Olympic valleys, and (2) the relationship between the Olympic legacy and local development, studied on the basis of several models of interpretation. The

development of these general issues was the subject of elaboration and discussion at three subsequent conventions held in Turin in June 2003, and in February and June 2005.⁶⁹ In the meantime, other groups and research centres in Turin worked on the same issues, making them the subject of their research.⁷⁰

Below, we summarize what we consider to be the main issues and standpoints in the debate. We also include a few personal observations.

Several Cases of Recognized Legacy: Durable and not so Durable

First of all, there is agreement on the fact that, if taken individually, specific aspects of the Olympic legacy, both tangible and intangible, merit a positive assessment. The list of such positive aspects is rather long and tends to include: (1) new or improved transport infrastructures,⁷¹ (2) cabling to Alpine districts, (3) improvements to hotels, and (4) innovative measures put in place to ensure sustainability of the Olympic works environment.⁷² These measures are not only features of the technical aspect and content of the works, but can also be found on a procedural level in the form of innovative methods that are likely to be reproduced in other situations.⁷³ Equally innovative and potentially positive are the “compensatory” measures: (1) the EMAS system for environmental management and auditing of the venues, (2) the ecological sponsorship campaign that awarded a logo to sponsors who manufacture in compliance with predetermined environmental sustainability criteria, and (3) the campaigns to distribute the Ecolabel among hotels and to prompt purchases of eco-friendly products.⁷⁴ Also innovative, and with only a few partial precedents in Italy, were the governance procedures adopted for construction of the Olympic works which, in general, were built within the expected timeframe, standards, and costs.⁷⁵

On the whole, the Olympic organizational machine provided by TOROC worked well, despite the periodic financial difficulties that brought about changes at the top levels of administration and raised friction between TOROC’s chairman and the Italian government during the run-up to the Games.⁷⁶ Even the organizational models of TOROC, Agenzia Torino 2006, and the other organizations⁷⁷ which made a positive contribution to organizing the Games, models which certainly owed much to both IOC procedures and the traditional industrial culture of Turin familiar with implementing complex policies and measures in a systemic way, are potential forms of intangible heritage for Turin and its Olympic areas. The good results are due not only to the type of organizational model implemented, but also to the quality of the staff available to TOROC. During the Games, TOROC reached its maximum size of 1,828 employees, 63% of whom were graduates of secondary or post-secondary educational institutions and 93% of whom were under 50 years of age.⁷⁸ Five months after the Paralympics ended on 20 March 2006, in line with forecasts, the remaining TOROC work force is now less than 200. They are charged with the task of

solving the problems that remain unanswered, such as those related to financial difficulties and the completion of a final report on Torino 2006.

We conclude that the desire to avoid excessive pressure (especially on local authorities) to employ an economically incompatible number of staff from TOROC prevailed over the desire to use, as part of post-Olympic program operations, part of the Olympic workforce, with higher qualifications and more experience. The result was that a large part of the professional skills accumulated with Torino 2006 have been lost and are no longer available to the city and the Olympic areas for other mega events, and, in effect, to manage its legacy. Similar considerations and a similar risk apply to the loss of the expertise of 20,000 Torino 2006 volunteers, individuals who gave an excellent account of themselves at the various venues. Among the elements of intangible legacy that are harder to measure but no less important, and at risk of dissolving rapidly, we should mention the extraordinary sense of security that was felt in the city and the entire Olympic area during the Games. As well, the work at providing unprecedented cleanliness to the city's streets and squares has now unfortunately been discontinued. The security success was certainly due to the widespread presence of police forces; their presence discouraged "minor" crime and crime-related illegal behaviour, including the sale of drugs in public places and automobile drivers being subjected to small-scale extortion by illegal and sometimes violent parking lot attendants. The impression is that all these negative phenomena have reappeared, as they were apparent before the Games. The level of cleanliness, for which the City incurred extraordinary expenditure in the removal of widespread graffiti disfiguring the historic buildings and rows of arcades that distinguished Turin's traditional and much-appreciated architectural features, is once again at risk due to the uncensored behaviour of many vandals and anti-social negligent "law-abiding citizens." For example, as they no longer feel that the "eyes of the world are upon them," they soon stopped the good habit of using the ashtrays provided in the city and have again started to use the city's streets and squares to deposit their cigarette butts.

After the XXth Olympic Winter Games, Now What? The Search for a Strategic Vision

The subject certainly does not end with the list of phenomena and situations that can be linked to the legacy of the XXth OWG. Indeed, we still need to discuss the overall project with regard to the basis for planning and implementing the legacy of the XXth Games. Below, we will refer on the one hand to certain general ideas that have been put forward with reference to varying degrees of follow-up and further study and, on the other hand, we will conclude by assessing the logic behind the decisions and policy actions already taken or under discussion.

In two recent essays,⁷⁹ Egidio Dansero, a political and economic geographer, and Alfredo Mela, an environmental and territorial sociologist, both members of OMERO, presented three scenarios for the post-Olympic period from the perspective of a territorial analysis.⁸⁰ They begin with the consideration that a large event such as the OWG always involves a process of redefining, and in a certain sense reinventing, an area. In this sense, the impact of the event itself has to be viewed as a metabolical and dynamic process, one which requires stakeholders to activate concrete plans so that the legacy becomes an asset on which to build future paths of development. With this in mind, three possible scenarios are defined in order to make the most of the Olympic legacy.⁸¹

The first scenario, which is the simplest, but also the least satisfactory in terms of its outcome and the path toward its achievement, involves the possibility of simply continuing the current trend. This can be characterized as follows: (1) no global vision for the Olympic territories, (2) re-use of existing facilities by each single local community through governance limited to the local level, and (3) a territorial structure that foresees competition among mountain districts and Turin districts as single spatial actors. No special policy is needed to implement this scenario.

The second and third alternative visions are potentially complimentary. Both envisage a dynamic, project-based management of the legacy. The second scenario is based on forming a network of top-level resorts and strengthening the network of former and new high-level assets, such as Turin's museums, historical monuments, Alpine tourism and so forth, to meet international demand. To achieve this a focused governance is needed, one that involves only the main stakeholders. The areas involved are the Upper Susa Valley and Pragelato in the mountains, and the city of Turin, with its historical sites, museums, exhibition facilities, and sports facilities. In order to implement that policy, the creation of an agency for the management of top-level facilities is recommended.

The third scenario, named "creative maturity," derives from a vision that is extended to the entire Olympic district. This scenario involves providing a diversified supply of facilities, including those of a sporting, cultural, leisure, and "relaxed" tourism nature, in accord with demand prompted not only from abroad, but also from the enlarged region itself. Realization of this scenario means involving every part of the Olympic territory, not only Turin and the Olympic venues in the Upper Susa and Chisone Valleys, but also the so-called "middle-earths," i.e. those areas located on the road leading from Turin to the mountain venues. Its realization requires forms of extended governance both at a local and non-local level, that is, multiple stakeholders. This will occur only if a strategic plan of the Olympic territory is defined and both local and non-local policies are formulated.

Another model for interpretation, different yet compatible with the second and third visions referred to above, is based on the idea that one of the legacies could be the launch of one or more cultural districts in the areas that hosted the Games.⁸² To put it simply, the cultural district is an outgrowth of the Marshallian industrial district,⁸³ where the advantages of large-scale production can also be achieved by clustering a large number of small producers into a limited territorial district, as well as from the work of a few large firms. The synergies between these small firms (the external economies) guarantee the system's efficiency. As the recent yet extensive literature on the topic has recognized,⁸⁴ there are in fact several types of cultural districts.⁸⁵ Although they are very different, they represent models of sustainable local growth, all strongly characterized by the compact nature of the conditions required to achieve them. There are currently two embryonic proposals that have been put forward: one concerns the city of Turin, while the other relates to the entire Olympic area, including the "middle earths." For Turin, in particular, the investigation has considered the possibility of constructing a museum district, specifically in relation to the "cultural product" of the Savoy collections and buildings. This is a possibility that would include a new section of the National Mountain Museum, "Duca degli Abruzzi," dedicated to the memory of Torino 2006. Such an entity would have found an exceptional opportunity for media coverage during the Games. For the Olympic areas, and beyond, the investigation has dealt with the possibility of building a kind of Olympic Park, a district centred on the joint use of the new ice facilities built for the Games in Torino, Pinerolo and Torre Pellice, as well as the new and advanced facilities in the valleys, including those for the so-called "difficult" sports: trampolene, bobsled, luge, and skeleton. This could be a remarkable attraction, one that could coordinate an international schedule of competitive-level sports with the use of facilities, facilities that in Europe, at least, represent state-of-the-art venues for perhaps another decade. The leisure activities and rich traditions of culture, both tangible and intangible, that Turin, the Olympic valleys, and the "middle earths" represent have been rediscovered in the meantime, and individuals are gradually making the most of them.

*What Has Been Done up to Now, and
What Remains to Be Done: An Outline*

There is not enough space here for a specific examination of what has actually been done so far to give a practical content to the legacy of the XXth OWG. It should be enough to mention that:

- General hypotheses about the re-use of the Olympic facilities have been formulated, but in many cases economic and organizational feasibility studies are still ongoing.
- Hypotheses concerning the use of the facilities, supported by economic feasibility studies, have been developed on at least two occasions – firstly in

2003 at the request of TOROC⁸⁶ by a specialised agency, and later in 2006 at the initiative of the Region of Piedmont.⁸⁷

- The Region of Piedmont has approved Regional Law No. 21, dated 16 June 2006, which established the “Fondazione 20 marzo 2006,” with the aim of “administering the legacy of investments and buildings comprising the assets constructed, expanded or refurbished for the XXth Olympic Winter Games Torino 2006 and the IX Paralympic Winter Games and which were given to the Foundation, to encourage their use and enjoyment” (Article 2, Subsection 2).⁸⁸
- The association “Torino, città delle Alpi” was formed and recently began operating as a Foundation. It works to strengthen the bond between Turin and the Alpine chain, a context that incorporates those projects that, if nothing else, are at least coordinated actions for the management of the legacy of Torino 2006.⁸⁹
- Varied actions and interventions for immediate use of some of the facilities in the Alpine areas. For example, during the summer, initiatives were taken to begin ski jumping on the Olympic facilities at Pragelato for young members of Piedmont ski clubs. And further, to continue to convey the image of Turin as an Olympic city by exploiting the successful slogan, “Passion lives here,” emblazoned on crimson civic banners.

As we can see, there is no shortage of initiatives; many of them are certainly significant and bode well for the future. However, these initiatives are currently not part of a complex strategic framework, one yet to be fully defined but which is required in order to give a solid foundation to effective policy measures.

Final Observations

The IOC’s rhetoric aside, we cannot categorically state that Torino 2006 were “the best Games ever,” but it was certainly a good edition of the OWG, one that honored the Olympic spirit. They were not contaminated by significant episodes of either attempted or actual sporting fraud.⁹⁰ As early as 2002, public opinion in Turin and the valleys demonstrated that there was faith in the Games and their prospect for success. In the rest of Italy, beyond the Region of Piedmont, this faith was not universal for quite some time. Nor was there strong emotional involvement during the run-up to the event, due to a widespread and unjustifiably lukewarm response from the national media led by the government-owned radio and television channels. Greater Italian media failure to fully recognize the XXth OWG’s national character, or to give the event the high profile that it deserved, prevailed right up to the eve of the opening ceremonies. Far more attention and “warm” approach was adopted by media from other countries, led especially by the USA and Canada. This helped to convey a positive image of Turin and the Olympic areas to the rest of the world.

The goal declared at the time of the bid – to contribute to an international awareness of Turin and the Region of Piedmont in order to make them better known across the world – seems, on one hand, to have been achieved in full, thanks to the success of media coverage. In addition, the victorious bid and organization of the XXth OWG took place during a period of profound changes for Turin, a city that is attempting to change its identity, a new image, if you will, to replace the now obsolete profile of a Ford-style, “one company town.” This process is taking place despite the fact that the car industry, which suffered a profound and seemingly irreversible crisis only a few years ago and subsequently heavily downsized, is now well on the way to recovery.

In a context such as this, the question of the legacy of the XXth OWG is both simple and complex for Turin and the Olympic areas. It is simple in that it pertains to the certainly positive contribution of individual works that characterised the run-up to the Games. The completion of these works was driven by Olympic deadlines. Imposed deadlines acted as a driving force and acceleration for an overall plan some four or five times greater than its original form. Vital in the end were the investments made in transforming the face of the city and finally modernizing its system of transport links, which previously had greatly penalized the economy of Turin and Piedmont. A virtue of the XXth OWG, then, similar to what happened in Barcelona 1992, was that the Games were organized bearing in mind the recommendations of Ferran Brunet, among which the most important was to “maximize the investments attracted, minimise the costs of organization, maximize private funding, and minimize the cost for taxpayers.”⁹¹ In other words, many works were completed, but not all of them were associated exclusively with preparation for the Games. In the end, much of the impetus for various works accomplished was assessed and designed far previous to February 2006.

However, the question of the legacy of Torino 2006 is complex and still unresolved with regard to the detailed definition of the overall strategic plan. This includes the legacy use of the “difficult” Olympic facilities, a question that not only concerns Turin, but also the other Olympic districts. Many ideas have been put forward supported by various studies, some more elaborate than others. It would certainly have been an advantage to elaborate a strategy prior to the Games because it would have enabled use of the media springboard to communicate the plan to the world. In particular, it remains to be seen whether the Olympic areas can form the basis for an overall project that involves all of them – or whether they are destined to the same fate as the island of Ferdinanda:

after its sudden appearance on 5 July 1831 following an earthquake between Pantelleria and Sciacca, it quickly started a heated dispute between those who laid claim to it (Bourbons, English and French). It was given various names, Sciacca, Nertita, Corrao, Hotham, Giulia, Graham, Ferdinanda, only to disappear a few months later.⁹²

To understand the fate of the Olympic areas of Torino 2006, we will have to wait a while longer. Not too long, we hope, particularly if the policy-makers do not forget how quickly time flies in today's globalized world.

As this essay is being published, news has been announced of the merger of two large Italian banks, the Turin-based San Paolo IMI and Banca Intesa of Milan. They will form Italy's second largest banking group, willing and able to compete at the European level. The comments and assessments from economic and political spheres are all supportive of the move, although they differ on the benefits that could result for the rival cities. Whatever the outcome on this matter, we would like to end with this quotation from a perceptive reporter in Turin's daily newspaper,⁹³ that we feel encapsulates an important aspect of the legacy of Torino 2006:

It is a very different Turin that welcomes the news of the agreement between San Paolo and Banca Intesa. A new Turin, in which the knee-jerk response of "mugging" is no longer triggered, that old complaint about treasures being torn away from the city... A Turin that, after the recovery of Fiat, feels that its traditional industrial matrix has been strengthened and that after the Olympics, it can line up new, different resources alongside its traditional vocation."

Endnotes

- 1 For an overview of significant aspects of recent OWG, see Jean-Loup Chappelet, "From Lake Placid to Salt Lake City: The Incredible Growth of the Olympic Winter Games Since 1980," *European Journal of Sport Science* 2 (2002), pp. 1-21.
- 2 The source of this information is TOROC (Torino Olympic Games Organizing Committee). Some of the interpretations offered reflect those expressed by Luca Davico and Silvia Crivello, in *Giochi aperti. 2006 settimo rapporto annuale su Torino*, L'Eau vive-Giorgio Rota Committee (Milan: Guerini, 2006), chapter 8, "Olimpiadi."
- 3 A year before the start of the Games, roughly half of Italians knew about Torino 2006: L'Eau vive-Giorgio Rota Committee, *L'immagine del cambiamento* (Milan: Guerini, 2005).
- 4 Chito Guala (ed.), *Sondaggio su atteggiamenti, aspettative e problemi della popolazione torinese in vista dei Giochi Olimpici Invernali di Torino 2006* (Turin: Città di Torino - Centro OMERO, 2003).
- 5 Apart from the city of Turin, which signed the host city contract with the IOC and CONI (Italian National Olympic Committee), the organization of the Games, and the construction of the Olympic works in particular, involved the

following in essential cooperative decisions and actions: (1) the Italian government, (2) the Region of Piedmont, (3) the Province of Turin, (4) the municipal competition venues (Pinerolo, Pragelato, Sestriere, Cesana, Oulx, Bardonecchia), and (5) two mountain communities in the Upper Susa Valley, Chisone and Germanasca. This coordination, driven by the rigid Olympic deadlines and the joint aim of staging a successful edition of the OWG, was made possible by setting up the *Struttura Torino 2006* in the Region of Piedmont, which incorporated an executive committee with members from the management of all the institutions involved. The department performed an important, delicate, and effective procedural task involving hundreds of meetings held almost daily) with the participation of all parties involved, effectively resolving problems as they arose (Giuliana Bottero, director of *Struttura Torino 2006*, personal interview, April 27, 2006; information at <http://www.regione.piemonte.it/to2006>).

- 6 The transport system provided for the Games was generally found to be efficient and suitable for requirements. See L'Eau Vive-Giorgio Rota Committee, *Giochi aperti*, pp. 188-189. In particular, 80 kilometers of restricted routes were set up in Turin, including the city's streets, interchange parking lots, and improvements to the city's public transport network which included the first section of the underground that opened on the eve of the Games with trams and buses linking the main attractions as well as offering considerable fare reductions. Even the links to the mountains worked according to plan, although there were exceptions as highlighted in the surveys referred to above. One of the authors can also confirm that there were problems in getting to Pragelato from Turin using the train and shuttle bus route. With improvements having been made to the road and motorway network, still subject to single-lane traffic along the route to Pinerolo-Pragelato (the venues for the cross-country skiing and ski jump events), the network relied on the interchange between trains, private cars, and public transport shuttle buses for access to the competition venues. Interchange parking lots and filters were provided for private traffic reserved for the Olympic Family and residents. According to TOROC, 60% of all spectators reached the mountain venues on public transport, compared to 18% who chose the car/shuttle/bus option. The overall efficiency of the transport model, the first of its kind in the Region of Piedmont and, indeed, in Italy, is potentially an important legacy for Italy.
- 7 The spectacular aspects of the XXth OWG refer to the usual opening and closing ceremonies held in the Olympic Stadium in Turin, and also the medal ceremonies held each evening in the Medals Plaza where a musical show featuring international stars accompanied the celebration of athletes. There was also the rich program of the Cultural Olympiad that began in 2003 and culminated in the event "Impressionists and Snow" (November 2004 - May 2005), witnessed by over 300,000 spectators. November 2005 marked the opening of *Italyart - Cultural Olympiad*, a program of 70 days of shows and performances that was staged until June 2006, reflecting 55 main events and 120 initiatives promoted by local organizations. During the Games, an all-night event was planned in Turin with the opening of museums, theatres, and shops, an event

that was later repeated not only in Turin but also in other towns and mountain areas due to its great success.

- 8 These surveys, due to the intervals at which they were carried out, the size of the samples (8,000 people were interviewed, 4,500 of whom were residents of Turin), and the number of issues surveyed, are a peculiarity of Torino 2006 compared to other host cities. For a comparative overview and results during the years leading up to the Games concerning residents of Turin, see Chito Guala, "Guardare avanti. Problemi, fiducia e attese nella popolazione di Torino," in *Olimpiadi, oltre il 2006. Torino 2006: secondo rapporto sui territori olimpici*, ed. Piervincenzo Bondonio, Egidio Dansero and Alfredo Mela, (Rome: Carocci, 2006), pp. 235-257. For a similar survey of residents in the Olympic valleys, see Sergio Scamuzzi and Gian Luca Bo, "Le aspettative dei residenti nelle valli olimpiche verso i XX Giochi. L'indagine del gennaio 2005," *ibid.*, pp. 259-277.
- 9 The clearly critical area corresponds to 14% of those interviewed in 2002, and decreases to 7% in 2005.
- 10 Chito Guala, "Guardare avanti," in *Olimpiadi, oltre il 2006*, ed. Bondonio, Dansero, and Mela, 2006, p. 244.
- 11 For Turin, see Chito Guala, Flavio Bonifacio, and Gian Luca Bo, *Quinta indagine sulle Olimpiadi Invernali 2006. I Torinesi e l'esperienza dei Giochi: un bilancio post-evento. Indagine marzo 2006 e comparazione con i dati 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005* (Turin: OMERO Centre and City of Turin, June 2006, mimeo). For the Olympic valleys, see Sergio Scamuzzi, and Gian Luca Bo, *Le aspettative postolimpiche nelle Valli olimpiche. Indagine Aprile 2006* (Turin: OMERO Centre and Province of Turin, June 2006, mimeo).
- 12 Guala, Bonifacio, and Bo, *ibid.*, 2006, p. 2. The authors are aware that a certain "halo effect" may well have been present at the time of the post-Games survey being taken, the Games having been completed only some two months previous.
- 13 Scamuzzi and Bo, *ibid.*, 2006, pp. 6-7.
- 14 Given its active role, especially in the Alpine valleys, the Province of Turin was added to the survey along with the Municipality of Turin and TOROC.
- 15 The survey was conducted by the communications department of the Municipality of Turin in collaboration with L'Eau Vive and Giorgio Rota Committee. The results can be found in L'Eau Vive–Giorgio Rota Committee, *Giochi aperti*, pp. 204-205 and 249-251.
- 16 The source is a personal email from Sergio Scamuzzi (OMERO) to the author, 23 March, 2006.
- 17 Sergio Scamuzzi (OMERO), *ibid.*
- 18 TOROC's final Report to the IOC is not yet ready. It has two years to complete it. The information on the organizational costs has been taken from the *Preliminary Balance*, and the more detailed *Games Budget 01/02/2006*, both unpublished documents kindly given by Marco San Pietro, Finance & Legal Managing Director, TOROC.

- 19 Holger Preuß, “University Lecture on the Olympics” (Centre d’Estudis Olímpics, Barcelona, 2002).
- 20 Ferran Brunet i Cid, “An Economic Analysis of the Barcelona ’92 Olympic Games: Resources, Financing and Impacts,” in *The Keys to Success. The Social, Sporting, Economic and Communications Impact of Barcelona ’92*, ed. Miquel de Moragas and Miquel Botella (Bellaterra: Servei de Publicacions de la universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2002).
- 21 Holger Preuß, *The Economics of Staging the Olympics. A Comparison of the Games 1972-2008* (Cheltenham-Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2004).
- 22 In actual fact, the promoting committee chose not to host all the ice sports in Turin. They located the curling event at nearby Pinerolo, 30 kilometers distant.
- 23 Construction of the works was entrusted to *Agenzia Torino 2006*, a public body with the dual function of acting as general contractor for all the planned works and bearing responsibility for their timely completion.
- 24 Information taken from an unpublished document given by Giuliana Bottero, director of *Struttura Torino 2006* of the Region of Piedmont.
- 25 See Matteo Filippi, and Franco Mellano, ed., *Agenzia per lo svolgimento dei XX giochi olimpici invernali: Torino 2006. 2 Cantieri e opere* (Milan: Mondadori, 2006), p. 280.
- 26 This is the authors’ elaboration on data from *Agenzia Torino 2006*.
- 27 The formula used to transform data originally expressed in current local currency is as follows: Data at constant price = Data at current local currency prices * Exchange rate * Constant Price Index 2000. Exchange rates used are: 1 US \$ (1984) = 94 Yugoslav dinars; 1 US \$ (1988) = 1.30 Canadian \$; 1 US \$ (1992) = 6 French francs; 1 US \$ (1994) = 6 Norwegian kroners; 1 US \$ (1998) = 115 yen; 1 US \$ (2006) = 0.83 Euros. Constant Price Index = (100/ US Consumer Price Index): 1980 = 2.09; 1984 = 1.66; 1988 = 1.46; 1992 = 1.23; 1994 = 1.16; 1998 = 1.06; 2000 = 1.00; 2002 = 0.96; 2006 = 0.89 (estimated with autoregressive model AR(1)). More precisely, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the series has a unit root and the data are well fitted by random walk with drift). US Consumer Price Index data are from United Nations Statistics Division. This is the authors’ elaboration on data from Jean-Loup Chappelet, “From Lake Placid to Salt Lake City,” 2002, pp. 1-21; Lake Placid OCOG, *Official Olympic Report*, vol. 1, 1980, and Sarajevo OCOG, *Official Olympic Report. TOROC, Preliminary balance*, 2006. Further, it must be understood that the figures noted in Chappelet’s data reflect only the OCOG revenues and costs, and should not be construed to describe the total cost associated with staging the Games, the greater portion of which is provided by governmental authority in the form of “public monies.”
- 28 The calculations were made on the data from TOROC’s *Preliminary balance* (May 2006).
- 29 The financial affairs of TOROC and its relations with institutions have been extensively analysed in L’Eau Vive-Giorgio Rota Committee, *Giochi aperti*,

- pp. 213-214, and in Piervincenzo Bondonio, and Nadia Campaniello, "Torino 2006: An Organisational and Economic Overview," *European Sport Management Quarterly*, 2006. Forthcoming.
- 30 Unione Industriale di Torino-Torino 2006, *Valutazione degli effetti economici dei Giochi Olimpici Invernali di Torino 2006* (Turin: Unione industriale di Torino, 2005). The study in question was preceded by two editions with the same title, published in 2002 and 2003, which assessed, respectively, the impact of expenditure for Olympic works, the operations of TOROC, and the forecast spending by tourists and visitors during the Games. As well, the investment costs which included the connected and accompanying works were examined. In neither case do the previous editions of the study go beyond 2007. Compared to the period 2001-2004, the two studies estimate that the expenditure corresponding to €2.1 billion would produce an increase in GDP in the Region of Piedmont of €1.57 billion, growth in regional employment of 4-5,000 new jobs, 60% of them in the construction industry and, to a lesser extent, the commercial sector, public services, and "other saleable services."
 - 31 Unione Industriale di Torino, *Valutazione degli effetti economici*, 2005, p. 11.
 - 32 At the national level, for every million euros spent, approximately 22 full-time jobs should be created each year, giving an approximate average total of 57,000 new jobs and an increase in employment of 0.2% per annum.
 - 33 For the methods used in the impact analyses and their application to the Olympic Games, see Holger Preuß, *The Economics of Staging the Olympics*, 2004, ch. 5, "Techniques of Measuring the Economic Impact of Olympic Games," pp. 35-45.
 - 34 Among the many contributions on this issue, see: Alan Clarke, "Evaluating Mega Events: A Critical Review," Third De Haan Tourism Management Conference: *The Impact and Management of Tourism-Related Events* (Nottingham: Nottingham University Business School, 2004); Larry Dwyer, and Trevor Mules, "Public Sector Support for Sport Tourism Events: The Role of Cost-benefits Analysis," *Sport in Society* 8 (2005), pp. 338-355; Alan Greer, Celine Mauboules, and Marvin Shaffer, *Olympic Costs & Benefits. A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Proposed Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games* (Vancouver: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, B.C. Office, 2003), <http://www.lib.sfu.ca/researchhelp>; and Stefan Kesenne, "Do We Need an Economic Impact Study Or a Cost-Benefit Analysis of a Sports Event?" *European Sport Management Quarterly* 5 (2005), pp 133-142.
 - 35 Stefan Kesenne, "Miscalculations and Misinterpretation in Economic Impact Analysis," in *The Economic Impact of Sport Events*, ed. Claude Jeanrenaud (Neuchatel: Editions CIES, 1999), p. 31.
 - 36 Sonia Catalano, and Domenico Arresta, "La trasformazione materiale e immateriale del territorio. Lo stato dell'arte a un anno dai Giochi," in *Olimpiadi, oltre il 2006*, ed. Bondonio, Dansero, and Mela, pp. 65-102.
 - 37 Paolo Perico, Director of Finance, Administration and Contracts, Agenzia Torino 2006, personal email, June 28, 2006.

- 38 For a more detailed description, see Sonia Catalano, and Domenico Arresta, *La trasformazione materiale e immateriale del territorio in vista dei Giochi Olimpici Invernali di Torino 2006. Lo stato dell'arte a un anno dai Giochi* (Turin: OMERO, working paper n. 2/2005), <http://ww.omero.unito.it>, pp. 2-4.
- 39 Filippo Barbano, *Torino, una città incompleta* (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1992).
- 40 Arnaldo Bagnasco, *Torino: un profilo sociologico* (Turin: Einaudi, 1986), and Luca Davico, Angelo Detragiache, and Alfredo Mela, *Torino: mobilità residenziale e struttura urbana dal boom economico agli anni '90* (Turin: CELID, 1997).
- 41 Arnaldo Bagnasco, *La città dopo Ford: il caso di Torino* (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1990).
- 42 See Filippo Barbano, *ibid.*, 1992.
- 43 Moreover, it has become apparent that the people of Turin were ambivalent, initially showing distracted pride, followed by nostalgia or self-pity about the capacity to innovate and open new ways forward, followed by an inability to develop and maintain the new businesses which might well fail or move sooner or later. This happened for fashion, radio and television, cinema, telephones, information technology and motor shows. All sectors started in Turin or the surrounding areas and are now located elsewhere. However, there is a general indicator of Turin's recovery, thanks to the large number of specialized festivals, some on an international scale (see <http://www.Turinifest.org>). For activities at the Museo Nazionale del Cinema located in the Mole Antonelliana, the city's symbolic monument visited by almost 400,000 people in 2005, see <http://www.museocinema.it>. For initiatives of the Film Commission for Turin and Piedmont to attract TV and cinema productions from Italy and abroad, see <http://www.filmcommTurinpiemonte.it>. The Film Commission has regained a significant standing on the national and international scene as a global services centre for the film industry.
- 44 The international convention on urban marketing marks a turning point. For Turin, this was intended "to stimulate the debate on urban planning and provide suggestions to create effective cooperation between institutions, business, and citizens capable of successfully combining economic growth and improvements in the quality of life" (Gastone Ave, and Franco Corsico, ed., *Marketing urbano in Europa*, Turin: Torino Incontra, 1994).
- 45 Turin is not the only Italian city that is planning new uses for its abandoned industrial sites, but it is certainly the city in which most of such sites are found in strategic zones with attractive prospects for alternative uses. See: Andrea Bondonio, Guido Callegari, Cristina Franco, and Luca Gibello, eds., *Stop & Go. Il riuso delle aree industriali dismesse in Italia. Trenta casi* (Florence: Alinea editrice, 2005).
- 46 Torino Internazionale, *Il piano strategico della città* (Turin: Torino Internazionale, 2000). Recently, the association launched its second strategic plan: *Secondo piano strategico dell'area metropolitana. Direzioni e Obiettivi* (Turin: Torino Internazionale, 2006). Documentary, preparatory, and supplementary materials can be viewed on the website: <http://www.Turin-internazionale.org>.

- 47 *Dossier 1 of candidature*, 42, unpublished document given by Marco Boccino, adviser to Ufficio Torino 2006, personal interview, May 15, 2006.
- 48 It will obviously take longer than a few months after the event to establish whether there is a stable increase in tourist flows. During this time, newspaper articles and first-hand reports both show significant increases in incoming visitors and stays, especially in the city of Turin. Far less was recorded in the valleys. An objective indicator in this sense, given the unavailability of official figures on total flows, comes from the increase in visits to the city's network of museums. Between December 2005 and April 2006, the system recorded 1,237,818 visitors, an increase of 29.9% compared to the same period for the previous year. Source: Piedmont Cultural Observatory, statistical report presented at the convention *Quali nuove sfide? Bilanci e prospettive per il sistema museale metropolitano e regionale nel dopo Olimpiadi*, Turin, 19 July 2006 (retrieved from the website <http://www.ocp.piemonte.it>).
- 49 See L'Eau Vive – Giorgio Rota Committee, *Giochi aperti*, Pp. 194-205, which features the press survey conducted for TOROC by the agency Cohn & Wolf Media Intelligence, Turin, 2006, unpublished document.
- 50 Current explanations refer to the “bias” toward Rome of Italy's national broadcaster, RAI, to alleged political directions from the government (centre-right, while the Municipality and Province of Turin were governed by centre-left coalitions: yet the Region of Piedmont, which played an active part in organizing the Games, was also directed by a centre-right coalition), or even the undeclared hostility toward Turin of the two cities with the greatest influence in the halls of Italian television (Milan as well as Rome), cities whose recent Olympic bids had been unsuccessful.
- 51 “The RAI ignored the Olympics for a long time, negating public awareness and pressure support for the Games. Practically on the eve of the Games, they jumped on the bandwagon when they discovered that even curling attracts viewers. RAI then chased the latest skater for interviews, boring even the most well-disposed of viewers with endless chat and platitudes.” See Aldo Grasso, *Corriere della Sera*, February 27, 2006, quoted in L'Eau Vive – Giorgio Rota Committee, *Giochi aperti*, p. 198.
- 52 This is the case for all ice sports which are not popular in Italy, partly because of the traditional lack of interest shown toward them by the media. Curling, in particular, generated television success that amazed everyone.
- 53 L'Eau Vive – Giorgio Rota Committee, *Giochi aperti*, p. 194.
- 54 Anna Segre, “Informazione ed Olimpiadi. I Giochi del 2006 e la stampa italiana,” in *Aspettando le Olimpiadi. Torino 2006: primo rapporto sui territori olimpici*, ed. Anna Segre, and Sergio Scamuzzi, (Rome: Carocci, 2004), pp. 165-179.
- 55 L'Eau Vive – Giorgio Rota Committee, *Giochi aperti*, p. 199.
- 56 L'Eau Vive – Giorgio Rota Committee, *ibid.*, 2006, p. 200. During the year leading up to the Games, the two foreign newspapers referred to, as well as

- El Pais* and *The Times*, mentioned Turin 1,200 times. In 38% of those cases, citations were related to the XXth OWG (202).
- 57 In 2001, total expenditure by tourists in Region of Piedmont represented 3.3% of total expenditure in Italy, compared, for example, to 13.5% in Veneto, 11.4% in Lazio, and 10.7% in Tuscany. Touring Club Italiano, *Annuario del turismo 2003* (Rome: Touring Club Italiano, 2004).
- 58 *Piemonte pressway on line*, June 20, 2006.
- 59 All the information on tourism in the Region of Piedmont has been taken from annual publications (*Dati statistici sul turismo in Piemonte*, the 4th edition of which was published in 2006) of the Regional Tourism Observatory (the reports can be downloaded at the following web address: <http://www.regione.piemonte.it/turismo/osservatorio/flussi.html>). No information is as yet available concerning tourist arrivals and stays during 2006.
- 60 Information taken from the website of the Municipality of Turin (<http://www.comune.Turin.it/statistica/osservatorio/numerato/en/index.html>). The figures for 2005, not yet published, were provided by Massimo Omedè, Director of the Municipality of Turin's Socioeconomic Observatory, in an email dated 25 August 2006.
- 61 On the persistent difficulties in the trade fair industry, see L'Eau Vive – Giorgio Rota Committee, *Giochi aperti*, pp. 174-175.
- 62 Bernardino Garetto, Chairman of Federalberghi, the hoteliers' federation of the Province of Turin, personal interview, June 12, 2006.
- 63 During 2004, the average annual room occupation rate in Italian hotels was approximately 31%, partly a reflection of the seasonal opening of many establishments, and partly because of the precarious state of health of Italy's hotel industry in general. Elaborated from data of Federalberghi, *Relazione sull'attività di Federalberghi nell'anno 2004* (Rome: Edizioni ISTA, 2005), pp. 13-14.
- 64 Elaborations on analytical data relating to all the municipalities in Piedmont are derived from the Regional Tourism Observatory, *Rapporto annuale sul turismo in Piemonte*, published from 2003 onward, with figures for 2002, the latest edition, released in May 2006. It contains the figures for 2005, available online at the following address: <http://www.regione.piemonte.it/turismo/osservatorio/flussi.htm>.
- 65 Laurence Chalip, "Using the Olympics to Optimize Tourism Benefits" (University lecture on the Olympics, 2002), p. 13, <http://olympicstudies.uab.es/lectures>.
- 66 Expressed in US \$ at purchasing power from the year 2000, the cost incurred for organizing the Summer Olympics in Atlanta 1996, excluding all the investment costs, was \$1.346 billion. See Preuß, *Economics of Staging the Olympics*, p. 195. The cost incurred by TOROC for Torino 2006 was \$1.333 billion, and for Salt Lake City 2002 was \$1.317 billion. See Chappelet, "From Lake Placid to Salt Lake City," 2002; Piervincenzo Bondonio, and Nadia Campaniello, "Torino 2006," 2006. The two subsequent editions of the Summer Olympic were approximately 80% more expensive: \$2,434 billion for Sydney 2000, and \$2.404 billion for Athens 2004. But, for Beijing 2008 costs

- of only \$786 million are forecast, which would be 1/3 lower and just over half of the last two editions of the OWG (Preuß, *Economics of Staging the Olympics*, p. 195).
- 67 The issue of the OG legacy was the subject of an international symposium held at the IOC, with contributions from experts of all fields related to the Olympics. See Miquel de Moragas, Cristofer Kennett and Nuria Puig, eds., *The Legacy of the Olympic Games 1984-2000. International Symposium, Lausanne, 2002* (Lausanne: International Olympic Committee, 2003). For an overview of the economic aspects, see Preuß, *Economics of Staging the Olympics*.
- 68 International exhibition held in Turin in 1961, lasting 6 months, to celebrate the centenary of Italian unity. Its story was recently related again in comparison with Torino 2006. See L'Eau Vive – Giorgio Rota Committee, *Giochi aperti*, pp. 222-225.
- 69 The proceedings for the 2001 convention have now been published in Luigi Bobbio and Chito Guala, eds., *Olimpiadi e grandi eventi. Verso Torino 2006* (Rome: Carocci, 2002). Those for the 2003 convention can be seen in Anna Segre and Sergio Scamuzzi eds., *Aspettando le Olimpiadi* (2004), and those for the 2005 convention, in Piervincenzo Bondonio, Egidio Dansero and Alfredo Mela, eds., *Olimpiadi oltre il 2006* (2006). In 2003, the same group of scholars decided to continue its work by founding OMERO (Olympics and Mega Event Research Observatory), Interdepartmental Research Centre at the University of Turin, of which the authors of this essay are members.
- 70 Other than OMERO, there are three research and study groups active in Turin concerning the economic and social profiles of the XXth OWG and which often deal with the issue of Olympic legacies. The four research centres, who signed a collaboration agreement for research, evaluations and feasibility studies on the Olympic legacy and the organization of mega events in July 2006, are:
- IRES Piemonte, the public institute for economic and social research in Piedmont (www.ires.piemonte.it) from which we should mention: Silvie Ocelli, *Le olimpiadi del 2006: un evento speciale per favorire l'innovazione del sistema Piemonte*. IRES Working Paper no.144/2000, and A. Demagistris, "Considerazioni sull'impatto socioeconomico e territoriale dei Giochi del 2006," in Paolo Buran ed., *Scenari per il Piemonte del duemila. Secondo rapporto triennale*, IRES vol. 6 (Turin: Ires, 2004).
 - SiTI – Higher Institute for Territorial Innovation Systems (<http://www.siti.polito.it>), founded in September 2002 by the Turin Polytechnic and the Compagnia di San Paolo as a non-profit organization producing research and training aimed at sustainable innovation and socio-economic growth. In recent years, SiTI has carried out strategic environmental assessments (SEAs), *ex ante*, *in itinere*, and *ex post*, concerning the Olympic works and infrastructures. It is currently monitoring the effects of the Olympic program on the local area, and carrying out an *ex post* assessment of the Olympic heritage. Apart from a number of essays on methodological aspects and the results of the strategic environmental

- assessment, we should mention Roberto Gambino, Giulio Mondini, and Attilia Peano, *Le Olimpiadi per il Territorio* (Milan: Il Sole24Ore, 2005).
- L'Eau Vive – Giorgio Rota Committee (<http://www.eauvive.it>), formed in 1986 as an association of businessmen, managers and freelancers, united by their civic commitment and a desire to contribute to the growth of Turin with studies and proposals. We should mention, apart from the considerations devoted to Torino 2006 in the annual report on Turin (express references were already made in the 2005 and 2006 versions), Luca Davico, “*Olimpiadi. Di corsa ai Giochi*,” L'Eau Vive – Giorgio Rota Committee, *Voglia di cambiare. Terzo rapporto annuale sulla Grande Torino* (Milan: Guerini, 2002), and Luca Davico, “*Olimpiadi. L'anno dei cantieri*,” in *Count Down. Quarto rapporto annuale sulla Grande Torino*, L'Eau Vive – Giorgio Rota Committee (Milan: Guerini, 2003).
- 71 Possible exceptions are some of the road building schemes in the Susa Valley, which environmental movements have grouped together with criticisms of the highly controversial high-speed rail link between Turin and Lyon. Local opposition to the Games which, as seen, was not well represented in the opinion polls conducted between 2002-2006, is argued in *Il libro nero delle olimpiadi di Torino 2006* by Stefano Bertone and Luca Degiorgis, (Genova: Fratelli Frilli editori, 2004). For a discussion (and rebuttal) of some of the economically-grounded objections to Torino 2006, see Bondonio and Campaniello, “Torino 2006: An Organisational and Economic Overview,” forthcoming.
- 72 Adoption of a SEA at Torino 2006 is the first case in Italy, and was achieved on the initiative of the Region of Piedmont. For the methodological aspects of the SEA, see Roberto Gambino, “La VAS come strumento di progetto,” in *Olimpiadi e grandi eventi*, ed. Bobbio and Guala, 2002, pp. 175-182; Grazia Brunetta, “Valutazione ambientale strategica e grandi eventi,” in *Il territorio dei grandi eventi. Riflessioni e ricerche, guardando a Torino 2006*, ed. Egidio Dansero and Anna Segre, special edition of the *Bollettino della Società Geografica Italiana*, series XII, no. 4 (2004), pp. 913-932; and Grazia Brunetta and Attilia Peano, *Valutazione ambientale strategica. Aspetti metodologici, procedurali, criticità* (Milan: Il Sole-24 Ore, 2004).
- 73 In this sense, they represent a legacy of Torino 2006. For a description and initial critical evaluation, see Domenico De Leonardis, “Olimpiadi: ambiente, conflitti, consenso e partecipazione,” in *Olimpiadi, oltre il 2006*, Bondonio, Dansero and Mela, ed., *Olimpiadi, oltre il 2006*, 2006, pp. 313-330. The innovations in the approach used include: (1) the strategic and procedural scope, (2) exposure to forms of public consultation, (3) adoption of inter-institutional governance mechanisms, and (4) provision of social accountability mechanisms, of which the following TOROC documents are proof: *Bilancio ambientale 2001/02* (Turin: TOROC, 2003), *Sustainability Report 2003* (Turin: TOROC, 2004), and *Sustainability Report 2004/05* (Turin: TOROC, 2005). A crucial role was played by the Environmental Directorate of TOROC, which the SEA charged with responsibility for drafting, in conjunction with local authorities, the various sectorial plans required for site

- safety, prevention of natural risks, water, aggregates, sustainable mobility, landscape and environmental issues. See Domenico De Leonardis, "Olimpiadi, pp. 320-321.
- 74 Roberto Giordano, ed., *La valutazione ambientale strategica dei XX Giochi Olimpici Invernali di Torino 2006* (Monfalcone: Edicom Edizioni, 2005).
- 75 For an early analysis of governance mechanisms focusing on the role of the stakeholders and the effectiveness of the coordination procedures, see Bondonio and Campaniello, "Torino 2006: An Organizational and Economic Overview."
- 76 The issue of TOROC's financial difficulties and possible management-level crises, ultimately leading to a change of the director and vice-director general, and the subsequent membership of Deputy Minister Matteo Pescante on the TOROC board, was one of the most widely discussed issues in Italy's national press, an issue that reached the foreign press between the end of 2004 and mid-2005.
- 77 In the first place, the Municipality of Turin, which signed the host city contract (along with CONI), and the Province of Turin which did much, especially in the Alpine valleys, and the Region of Piedmont, which intervened with considerable support in both financial and organizational terms (see note 7).
- 78 L'Eau Vive – Giorgio Rota Committee, *Giochi aperti*, pp. 230-33.
- 79 Egidio Dansero, and Alfredo Mela, "Eredità olimpiche e patrimonio territoriale: un' esplorazione di scenari," in *Olimpiadi, oltre il 2006*, Bondonio, Dansero, and Mela, ed., 2006, pp. 331-355; Silvia Crivello, Egidio Dansero, and Alfredo Mela, "Turin, the Valleys and the Olympic Legacy: Exploring the Scenarios," in *From Chamonix to Turin. The Winter Games in the Scope of Olympic Research*, ed. Norbert Müller, Manfred Messing, and Holger Preuß (Kassel: Agon Sportverlag, 2006), pp. 377-393.
- 80 The line of reasoning developed in the articles mentioned was further extended, with an emphasis on the theoretical aspects, in Egidio Dansero, and Domenico De Leonardis, "Torino 2006, la territorializzazione olimpica e la sfida dell'eredità," *Bollettino della Società Geografica Italiana*. Forthcoming.
- 81 The three scenarios, with adaptations and developments, were taken from those envisaged for the entire economy of the Piedmont by Paolo Buran, *I motori del rilancio. Secondo rapporto triennale sugli scenari evolutivi del Piemonte*, Iresscenari no. 15 (Turin: IRES Piemonte, 2004).
- 82 This theory was the common interpretation adopted in several studies carried out as part of the project, "Per un distretto culturale del territorio olimpico," completed by OMERO in 2004-2005 with the support of Torino Incontra, which involved several young researchers coordinated by Piervincenzo Bondonio. The results obtained, in a suitably abbreviated form (the full version of the contributions is freely available on the website, <http://www.omerounito.it>) are now the first part of the volume *Olimpiadi, oltre il 2006*, Bondonio, Dansero, and Mela, ed., 2006, pp. 27-233. The text limits itself to including, in purely qualitative terms, the main results given in Piervincenzo Bondonio,

- and Luisa Debernardi, “Torino, le valli olimpiche e l’eredità dei XX Giochi invernali. Una prospettiva,” *ibid.*, pp. 27-64 (a version in English, “Turin, the Olympic valleys and the legacy. A perspective,” can be found in *From Chamonix to Turin*, ed. Müller, Messing, and Preuß, 2005, pp. 395-417.
- 83 Alfred Marshall, and Mary Paley Marshall, *The Economics of Industry* (London: Macmillan, 1886).
- 84 Walter Santagata, *Cultural Districts and Economic Development*, working paper, no.1/2004 (Turin: Ebla Center, www.eblacenter.unito.it).
- 85 For a survey and a proposal in relation to a cultural museum district in Turin, see Silvia Santagata, *I distretti culturali mussali. Le collezioni sabaude di Torino*, working paper no. 8/2002 (Turin: Ebla center, www.eblacenter.unito.it).
- 86 Krono s.a.s., *La qualificazione e il consolidamento competitivo nel medio-lungo periodo dell’offerta turistico-sportiva del territorio interessato alla XX olimpiadi invernali – Torino 2006* (Trento: Krono, unofficial document, March 2003).
- 87 Region of Piedmont, *Progetto post-olimpico. Presentazione finale* (Turin: Region of Piedmont, undated but 2006, unofficial document given by Giuliana Bottero, personal interview, April 27, 2006).
- 88 The law follows a bill for a regional law presented during the previous legislation and not approved, entitled “Piemonte 2011.” For an assessment, see Domenico Arresta, and Alberto Rossetto, “Per un distretto degli sport, del loisir e delle culture nelle valli olimpiche,” in *Olimpiadi, oltre il 2006*, ed. Bondonio, Dansero, and Mela (2006), pp. 130-133. At the end of August 2006, when this article was going to print, the national press published news of a further delay in appointing the directors of the Fondazione 20 marzo 2006, whose operational activity is therefore delayed once again.
- 89 See Rinaldo Bontempi, Enrico Capanni, Roberto Gambino, and Daniele Jalla, *Torino Città delle Alpi* (Turin: TOROC, 2002), a book that is almost the association’s founding manifesto. For an assessment, Sandro Baraggioli, “Le forme di governance nelle valli olimpiche,” in *Olimpiadi, oltre il 2006*, ed. Bondonio, Dansero, and Mela (2006), especially pp. 221-225.
- 90 This is certainly also due to the perceived seriousness with which antidoping tests were prepared by TOROC.
- 91 Ferran Brunet i Cid, “Dinamica dell’impatto economico e dell’eredità dei Giochi olimpici: il modello Barcellona,” Italian translation in *Aspettando le Olimpiadi*, ed. Segre and Scamuzzi, 2004, pp. 154-164. Of the four recommendations, only the third is still far from being fully realized.
- 92 We again mention the unusual but successful metaphor of Egidio Dansero, and Domenico De Leonardis, “Torino 2006, la territorializzazione,” Forthcoming.
- 93 Luigi La Spina, “Prime prove di Megalopoli,” *La Stampa*, vol. 140, no. 232, August 25, 2006.