

SOUTH AFRICA'S 'AUTONOMOUS SPORT' STRATEGY: DESEGREGATION APARTHEID STYLE

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Since the mid-1970s South Africa has confronted continual political crises caused by the contradictions of apartheid policy, notably the need for a stable black¹ urban labour force. To preserve power and the social structure of accumulation on which that power is based, the ruling National Party was forced into a process of reform; an attempt to resolve the contradictions unleashed by its own policies. Reform refers to the restructuring of ideology, policies and institutions. A key element of reform has been the deracialisation of aspects of social life. This meant that some social amenities such as cinemas, hotels, parks and beaches, once reserved for whites, were opened to all races. According to the government, blacks now have access to a variety of social relationships which were previously denied them.

But is this really true? Focusing on sport this paper evaluates the government's claim. It examines the constraints upon deracialising one social practice while others remain racialised. (In this sense reform may be said to be a dual process of deracialisation and racialisation.)

In South Africa sport trails the dominant ideological and political practices. Sports policy has reflected the dictates of the ruling National Party since 1948 and analysis of that policy reveals two distinct tendencies: segregated sport and autonomous sport. Segregated sport, which lasted until the early 1980s, was characterised by unequivocal opposition to multiracial contact. Even in the face of intense pressure, including international isolation, the government held firm to the principle of racial segregation in sport.² Autonomous

sport first emerged in the late 1970s, slowly gaining momentum until it became one of the government's most important expressions of reform and an integral element of deracialisation.

The Autonomous Sport Policy

The government's strategy of autonomous sport was announced in 1979.³ Autonomous sport meant the conferring on sports organisations the right to administer their own affairs although the absolute freedom to do so was constrained by the Minister of Sport, FW De Klerk, who warned sportspersons that autonomy was 'conditional' on the preservation of 'good order' and the 'general laws of the land'.⁴

Autonomous sport was a strategic manoeuvre which must be understood in the context of shifts in National Party policy in the late 1970s. These shifts were part of a co-ordinated program known as 'total strategy' which aimed to buttress the National Party alliance against a resurgence of black militancy and intensifying international pressures. 'Total strategy' held that 'the resolution of conflict ... demands interdependent and co-ordinated action in all fields - military, psychological, economic, political, sociological, technological, diplomatic, ideological, cultural, etc ...'.⁵ Autonomous sport, then, was an attempt to depoliticise sport for the benefit of local and international critics and to co-opt specific groups of urban blacks and nullify their political demands.

South African sport can be neither depoliticised nor easily deracialised. This is true at both the conceptual and practical level. The concept of an autonomous social practice such as sport assumes a structuralist position. In this sense all social practices are autonomous, that is they have a specific structure and object. But autonomy is relative since the contents of each practice - the time,

direction and limits of its transformation - are subject to the structuring effects of the particular social formation. In South Africa apartheid policy has shaped the social formation on the basis of race: the content of social practices are determined by racial criteria. The notion of autonomous sport as integrated sport is, then, as incongruous as the autonomy of employment or of education. There is simply no escape from the racial structure. Moreover, structuralism as a theoretical concept precludes consideration of human agency. Human actors, individuals and groups, cannot influence the social structure: men do not make history just as they please.

At the practical level, one example of how sport cannot be depoliticised will suffice at this point. The shortfall in capital requirements for sport in 1979/80 was calculated by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) to be R1,417.7 million⁶ (A\$708.35 million).⁷ Since then the amount has increased. Mr Alan Bush, an Assistant Director of the Social Services Branch (SSB) of the Department of Education and Training (DET) (currently responsible for sport in African townships outside the bantustans) claims that: 'The shortage of sporting facilities will never be overcome. At present even essential maintenance has become a luxury'.⁸ Overcoming this problem would require central government funding but such intervention would contradict efforts to depoliticise sport because resource provision is a political issue.

Notwithstanding these limitations the government activated its autonomous sport strategy by making changes to the administration and legislation of sport. It also encouraged sports administrators to adopt a more aggressive stance to counter international isolation.

Administrative Tactics

At the level of appearances the authenticity of depoliticisation rests with the government and sports administrators distancing themselves from each other. This was partially achieved with changes to the administration of sport. The Department of Sport and Recreation was disbanded in 1980 and sports administration passed to the Directorate of Sport Promotion in the Department of National Education (DNE). This change enabled sports administrators to effectively hide from public scrutiny their liaisons with the government. This was particularly important regarding the allocation of financial grants. For example, the South African Cricket Union has publicly distanced itself from apartheid and claims that it does not receive government funding.⁹ In the 1988/89 financial year alone it received a grant of R25,000.¹⁰

The pinnacle of the distancing process between government and sports administrators will arrive with the impending launch of the Confederation of South African Sport (CSAS). In 1986 the Minister of National Education, FW De Klerk, responding to an HSRC recommendation, asked the South African Sports Federation (SASF), the official sports umbrella body, to form a Steering Committee to investigate the inception of a new representative body. The Steering Committee subsequently recommended the formation of the CSAS to 'rationalise [sic] the provision of sporting facilities and the administration of sport'.¹¹

Exactly how the CSAS will depoliticise sport is confusing. Among the Steering Committee's recommendations are that the government must 'play a supportive role in promoting sport' and provide 'basic facilities'.¹² The Committee also justifies government interference in sport to 'maintain law and order'.¹³ Presumably this means taking action against those who call for sports boycotts!

Legislative Tactics

In the early 1980s some legislation impeding racial mixing was amended. Although segregated sport had never been controlled by specific legislation a range of laws defined social relations in terms of race and militated against interracial contact. This body of legislation included the Population Registration Act (1950), Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (1953) and Group Areas Act (1966). Sports administrators were frequently warned, however, that specific legislation would be introduced if government policy was flouted.¹⁴ Legislative amendments facilitating desegregated sport included Section 71(1) of the Liquor Amendment Act of 1981, which allowed white sports clubs to apply for 'international' status entitling them to supply liquor to black visitors, and the Group Areas Amendment Act of 1982 which removed the statutory restrictions on any person attending a bona fide sports meeting in a 'group area' belonging to another race group.

Sports administrators and the government then launched propaganda campaigns to convince critics that their demands for South Africa's readmittance to the international sports community had been satisfied. In 1983 the South African Rugby Board invited foreign journalists to 'see for themselves' and in 1984 the Minister of National Education, Gerrit Viljoen, claimed that there are 'sufficient opportunities' for interracial sport in South Africa.¹⁵

Deracialisation was also confirmed in the new constitution. The Republic of South Africa Constitution Act (1983) classifies government business as either a *general* or an *own* affair. Matters affecting only one racial group are defined as own affairs, those pertaining to more than one group are general affairs. Sport is defined as both a general and an own affair. School sport is an own affair, sport outside the jurisdiction of school is a general affair. While

the new constitution and the introduction of the tricameral parliament, with separate chambers for whites, coloureds and Indians, were upheld as evidence of the government's political reforms and its willingness to democratise society, these reforms were a dual process of deracialisation and racialisation: if general affairs deracialised society, own affairs quite clearly reinforced racialisation. This has proved particularly true of education and thus school sport.

The system of general and own affairs fragments administration, particularly at third tier government, and aggravates discrimination. Nowhere is this more true than in sport where facilities are essentially provided by participants and local authorities. The central government's contribution to the financing of sport in 1979/80 amounted to R28.8 million, or five percent of the total expenditure on sport. Of this amount only R10.6 million was for capital expenditure. Local and regional authorities on the other hand contributed 8.1 percent while participants contributed 31.1 percent.¹⁶ The result is a highly skewed distribution of resources in 'white' urban areas.

Black local authorities face dire financial constraints and sport assumes a low priority given shortages of basic needs such as housing, education, sanitation and health services. The government has committed itself to a redistribution of material resources towards blacks through the Regional Services Councils (RSCs). RSCs are responsible for general affairs at the metropolitan level. All municipalities are eligible to nominate representatives to their RSC. In this sense RSCs are a form of democratisation. It is limited democratisation, however, given that representation is on the basis of one representative for every ten percent, or part thereof, of RSC-provided services that they consume. Clearly those authorities which use the most services, that is white municipalities where

industry is located, will have the greatest say and there is little evidence to date of any substantial redistribution.¹⁷

Responsibility for both school and open sport in African townships in 'white' areas rests with the SSB, whose financial assistance to local communities is negligible. In Natal the SSB's sports grant for 1988/89 was R300,000: officials had proposed R8 million just to meet maintenance requirements.¹⁸ Donald Lee, Director of Sport in the coloured House of Representatives, calculates that it would cost R239 million to upgrade existing facilities in coloured areas. The House of Representatives voted R20 million for this task in 1988/89.¹⁹

Tactics To Counter The Sports Boycott

Government reforms failed to stave off South Africa's international sporting isolation and forced sports administrators to adopt their own resistance strategies, not against apartheid policy but against the boycotters. Enter the rebel tour - unofficial tours unsanctioned by world or foreign national controlling bodies. Rebel tours are arranged not only for the benefit of white sportspersons and to bolster sagging white morale but also to divide the international sports community on the boycott issue. As Springbok (national) cricketer Graeme Pollock has argued: 'The more disruptions we can make in world cricket the better it will be for us in the long term'.²⁰

In 1982 the South African Cricket Union hosted the first rebel tour by twelve English cricketers (labelled the 'Dirty Dozen' by the world press). They were followed in the same year by a team from Sri Lanka. Since then rebel tours to South Africa have become annual events in major and minor sports. The most publicised tours in the mid-1980s were those by Australian cricketers (two visits) and New Zealand rugby players. British rugby international Gareth Andrews

provides one reason why foreign sportspersons happily trek to South Africa.

Our welcome in South Africa has always been the best, the most hospitable in the world... cut off from international competition... they are always ready to accept teams of international standing, and look after them superbly. We stayed in the best hotels ... all expenses put down to room numbers. No one was out of pocket for whatever they did... you name it we had the very best... we agreed that everyone at home would think this extravagant.²¹

Of course, rebel tours often mean payments far in excess of expenses. The Australian cricketers each received A\$200,000 and the New Zealand rugby players NZ\$100,000.

But government contributions to rebel sport placed it in a quandary and challenged a fundamental principle of autonomy - financial self-sufficiency. As De Klerk noted in 1979: 'If we were to vote large sums of money for sport that would place a question mark over autonomy'.²² In 1983 Gerrit Viljoen said that government contributions to specific sporting events were dependent upon 'international importance and overall publicity'.²³ With regard to financial assistance for the West Indian rebel cricket tour, he said that the government would be 'sympathetic'.

... the Government profoundly appreciated the exceptional initiative displayed by the cricket chiefs in achieving this breakthrough. The tour struck an important blow not only in the sporting field but also in general against the concentrated efforts to isolate South Africa.²⁴

Reconciliation between finance for rebel tours and autonomous sport was achieved by fiscal policy in 1986 when the government provided tax concessions to sponsors of sports events.

Under the Income Tax Act of 1986, made retrospective to July 1985, sponsors may deduct up to 180 percent of expenses. Based on company tax of 50 percent this effectively provides sponsors of international events with a 90 percent rebate and those of local events with a 50 percent rebate.²⁵

The impact was immediate. By June 1986 applications for rebates totalled R200 million.²⁶ It was estimated that between R75 - 85 million would be spent on sponsorships in 1987 and sports marketing became the fastest growing branch of marketing in South Africa.²⁷ This was facilitated by the government controlled South African Broadcasting Corporation's increase in television coverage of sport from 16 hours to 30 hours per week. A licence to operate a subscription television service was also granted and the licence holder, M-Net, markets itself heavily on international sport.

Sport is used by the government to carry favour with its electorate and distort the real issues facing the country. As the Vice President of the South African Cricket Union, Geoff Dakin, said of the Australian cricket tour: '[It] has done a lot to uplift the spirit of the country enabling people to take their minds off caspirs [military vehicles], burning tyres and a rand worth only (US) 40 cents'²⁸ Rebel tours may temporarily raise white morale but the cumulative effects are beginning to show. In 1984, 2,972 foreign sportspersons visited South Africa.²⁹ By 1987 the number had dropped to 1,103 with top ranked sportspersons noticeably absent.³⁰ Ironically, good sportspersons who visit South Africa, such as Wimbledon tennis champion Pat Cash in 1987, highlight the effects of isolation by exposing the mediocrity of the majority of visitors. Moreover, they can exacerbate pressure. Cash's visit, for example, was directly responsible for the status of the South African Open Tennis tournament being downgraded by the International Tennis Federation.

Against this background of policy, strategy and tactics one issue remains - black participation. For the government autonomous sport puts the onus of desegregation on white sports administrators. Autonomous sport, the government argues, affords sports administrators the space to lay the foundations for nonracial social relationships. If that space is really available, and the brief theoretical exposition above suggests that it is not, how have white sports administrators reacted?

The role of the white sports administrator in the desegregation of South African sport can be analysed by examining the constitutions of sports associations and the methods by which controlling bodies encourage black participation. The analysis is based on a survey of government recognised national sports controlling bodies undertaken by the author.³¹ Although respondents were unanimous in their claims of having established the constitutional prerequisites for multiracial sport these need closer inspection.

Membership Eligibility and Black Participation in Sport

First, clauses in constitutions pertaining to membership are notoriously vague with the express purpose of preventing public allegations of discrimination, whether they be on the grounds of race, religion, class or sex. This was highlighted by the Director General of the Aero Club of South Africa: '[Our] constitution has no reference to race and, as such, *implies* that there is no racial bar to our membership'.³² Clauses such as, '... the committee will consider any application for membership' are calculated inclusions to create the impression that membership is unrestricted and fair. The reality may be somewhat different as the constitution of the Natal Basketball Association demonstrates:

... the committee may accept the application, or reject it, or may defer it, or accept it conditionally. In the event of rejection, no reasons need be given by the committee.³³

Second, even if the national sports body's constitution is 'in order' this is not necessarily true of affiliates. Consider the following:

... I can advise you that this organisation's constitution has never determined membership on the grounds of race. We have separate Black, Indian, coloured and White Clubs, but membership of our Association has always been open to any member, providing he was affiliated, through his club, to his Provincial Association;³⁴

and,

I would advise that bowls in South Africa is a fully integrated sport... There are 808 bowling clubs in South Africa... there are four Black, seven Coloured and two Indian clubs... and all clubs are treated on an equal basis.³⁵

These statements certainly leave no doubt as to the meaning of multi-racialism in South Africa!

Nonracial sport will arrive in South Africa only after controlling bodies rigorously evoke anti-discrimination laws against affiliates, particularly private sports clubs. Only four respondents said that they were taking positive action in this regard. The South African Ladies' Golf Union, for example, refuses championships to clubs which do not accept players of all races.

Private golf clubs remain notoriously racist and every year allegations of discrimination are made. In 1987 the Ixopo (Natal) Golf Club refused membership to an Indian golfer. In subsequent correspondence to the press a committee member said that the Ixopo Golf Club's constitution did not exclude on the basis of race or colour, rather membership was determined by an 'internal democratic process'.³⁶ Insight into this process was provided by another correspondent, 'a member of private clubs for over 50 years': 'I have no objection whatsoever to playing against any non-European but I would vote against any non-European applying for membership [sic] to the clubs to which I belong'.³⁷ As the Executive Director of South African Lifesaving candidly remarked, 'it will take a long time before sport in South Africa is desegregated at the club level'.³⁸

Several respondents claimed that their organisation's constitution had never contained explicit discriminator clauses while others said that their constitutions had been amended during the era of segregation to allow for multiracial sport. If true, these administrators would be at the fore in challenging apartheid policy. But this is not the case and a number of factors account for the apparent anomaly. First, during the era of segregation black sports associations were automatically affiliated to white associations, with the latter assuming controlling body status, and black members were directed to the relevant racial association. There was simply no need for explicitly racist constitutions. Second, in elitist sports such as cruising, ballooning and polo, where there were no separate black associations, potential black membership was limited by economics rather than race. Of course, apartheid imposes artificial class barriers which exclude blacks from expensive pastimes. Finally, the reader will recall that during the era of segregation white administrators were threatened with reprisal if they challenged government policy. There

is no record of sustained resistance on the part of white sports administrators.

Constitutions, therefore, are poor indicators of black participation as Ali Bacher, the Managing Director of the South African Cricket Union, correctly reminds us.

We drew up a new constitution in 1976 and told the world our cricket was nonracial but, in reality, that was all nonsense. There was still no effective *structure* in which a black boy from, say, Rocklands (Bloemfontein), could develop his cricket. Without coaching, facilities or *encouragement*, how could he? A piece of paper didn't help him very much.³⁹

Clearly, then, we must examine the methods by which individual sports associations foster black participation.

The Promotion of Sport Among Blacks

Here respondents are analysed according to one of three classifications:

- a. having comprehensive development programs specifically aimed at blacks;
- b. promoting their sports on the basis of racial equality in the sense that blacks are not given special attention; and
- c. making no effort to promote their sport among blacks.

Six respondents were included in category a.⁴⁰ We will focus on the South African Cricket Union (SACU) and the Squash Rackets Association of Southern Africa (SRA) whose efforts have been loudly applauded by sections of the South African media.

The SACU launched a ten year three stage development program in 1986. The first stage introduces township children to

mini-cricket, a modified game played with a scaled down unsprung bat and a soft ball. Between January 1987 and March 1988 22,000 children participated in this sport.⁴¹ An integral part of this stage is the distribution of equipment to enable children to play at home and in the streets. Multiracial mini-cricket festivals are also conducted and the first, in Johannesburg in October 1987, was attended by some 1000 children. The second stage, run concurrently with the first, provides instruction to black school teachers so that they can assume coaching roles. A national coaching academy was established and by March 1988 several thousand teachers had completed courses. Talented coaches are offered education bursaries enabling them to further their teaching careers and academic qualifications through cricket. The final stage is intensive coaching in the 'proper' game for 'those children who show potential'.

The SRA launched its Junior (primary school) Squash Program in 1983 at which time squash was unheard of in primary schools. By mid-1987 over 18,000 children were involved in the program at 450 clubs and schools around the country. The SRA has divided the country into 42 regions and appointed regional administrators whose task is to promote the game among township children. As with cricket, equipment is given to children who attend coaching clinics.

At the level of appearances these two associations have devised programs compatible with deracialisation. But appearances are not reality. Evaluation of the reality of these programs requires analysis of the philosophical assumptions and strategic logic.

The assumptions of sports development programs in South Africa are that sport is a racial and social equaliser. This philosophy is articulated through statements such as:

By taking cricket to the children in the townships we can do a great deal towards making South Africa a better place in which to live:⁴²

and

Sport is a great leveller and can transport the under privileged into new areas of opportunity.⁴³

In racially divided societies the efficacy of sport in breaking down racial barriers has a long tradition. It is regarded as axiomatic that sport encourages positive attitudes among individuals towards other cultural and racial groups. Sadly, there is no valid evidence that sport causes positive socialisation effects. On the contrary, research in Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States demonstrates that the patterns of racial discrimination found in the larger society are reflected in, and perpetuated by, sport. Sport in these societies is white controlled and blacks take the stage as players and performers, rarely as equals.⁴⁴

The assumption that sport is a vehicle of social mobility is similarly fraught with unrealistic expectations. The statistical probability of becoming a professional sportsman, let alone a successful professional, is remote while the highly publicised earnings of champions are even more isolated. Professional golf serves as a good example. Prior to the 1987/88 season the Professional Golfers Association of South Africa accepted 143 entries to the tour school which provides aspirant professionals with the opportunity of earning a card, that is, the right to play in the qualifying rounds of the domestic Sunshine Circuit. The best 30 players from the school receive a card. Of the tour school graduates for the 1986/87 season one player finished thirtieth on the money list and nine finished in the top 65 - thus earning exemption from pre-qualifying for each tournament the following season. Only four others earned any money enabling them

to retain their cards. As professional golfer John Bland notes: 'The other players are unsympathetic about your misfortunes - they're all concerned about their own games. It can be extremely demoralising'.⁴⁵

Less than ten percent of Sunshine Circuit qualifiers are black. During the 1988 season blacks boycotted five tournaments. Theo Manyama (a longstanding professional) said the issue was that black professionals do not have the same access to facilities as whites. Manyama related the story of a colleague who telephoned a golf club to request permission to practise: 'He talks like a white guy and the receptionist said, 'no problem, you are welcome'. When we arrived there she said, 'Oh, I didn't know your were black.' Manyama added, 'We do tee off (on the circuit), but where do we practise before we tee off?'.⁴⁶

A second issue is capital's sponsorship of development programs. The SACU program is aided by Bakers Biscuits (R250,000 for the 1987/88 season), Form-Scaff (R1 million over three years) and PG Wood (R150,000 over three years). The South African Executive Cricket Club was formed in 1986 and comprises prominent businessmen each of whom has pledged to raise R50,000 per annum for the next ten years. Founding members include Peter Wrighton (Premier Group), Jimmy McKenzie (First National Bank), Zac De Beer (De Beers), Eric Ellering (Elleringes), Meyer Khan (South African Breweries) and Warren Clewlow (Barlows). The SRA program is financed by Royal Beechnut and Slazenger.

Capital's attraction to sport in South Africa is motivated by tax concessions and politics. Sport sponsorships are integrated with corporate social responsibility programs to counter international pressure exerted through economic sanctions and disinvestment. Transnational companies, such as Royal Beechnut, claim to be at the fore in fighting apartheid and cite as evidence their social

responsibility. It rings hollow in the face of support for the repressive Labor Relations Amendment Act of 1988 and resistance to the Congress of South African Trade Union's living wage campaign.

Capital has also aligned with sport in South Africa to inculcate a specific ideology. Sponsorships are directed at the least politicised sectors of the community to create the illusion that sport transcends politics. The SACU and the SRA both chose the eight-to-twelve year age group under the guise of 'developing sport at the grassroots'. However, the real political agendas are not hard to find. The SRA, for example, has a five point initiative for international participation:

One - under 12 is half price travel and accommodation;
two - best age for friendships; three - nobody takes
advantage of privileges; four - international pressure
not so great; five - Defence Force support protects us
from the likes of the South African Council on Sport
etc.⁴⁷

The sentiments of the SRA and its sponsors are clear - the oppressed can play the game but they must not use it for political leverage. While capital's history of opposition to apartheid policy is considerable its position has always been based on economic considerations. Like the government, capital's notion of political rights for blacks has never developed beyond some form of consociational agreement between elites.

Finally, it is quite clear that the ultimate success of the development programs will be measured in terms of the number of champion black sportspersons produced. This means that the SACU and the SRA are introducing thousands of black children to sport only to discard them if they do not show potential for competition or if they cannot be transported to decent facilities in white areas. More effort should be given to building resources in the townships and to offering recreational sport. Of course, within the framework of autonomous

sport this is not possible. The government cannot provide the necessary infrastructure and controlling bodies are forced to turn to capital. Capital has its own logic; it is utilitarian, meritocratic and mobility orientated. The sportsperson is a commodity. These values reflect those of professional sport to the detriment of recreational sport.

Twenty associations are included in category b, organisations which promote their sports on a multiracial basis.⁴⁸ Among these the promotion of sport among blacks is typically restricted to *ad hoc* coaching clinics and the occasional travel and affiliation subsidy. Their utterances suggest they are content to simply define themselves as multiracial.

As discussed, constitutions are of little value in developing structures to encourage participation. They do however provide a useful instrument with which to apportion blame for non-participation to the non-participants, in this case blacks. This attitude came through strongly in the survey via statements such as:

- Where blacks are selected for teams they receive the same assistance as their European team mates - no difference is made;
- [There is] no direct [subsidisation or sponsorship]. Reverse discrimination is not practised formally; and,
- We are totally multiracial, there is no subsidising. All teams are treated equally.

Blaming people for their own misfortunes is a common tactic used by elites in all societies. The HSRC, for example, attributes the almost total absence of black sportswomen to their high levels of fertility compared with white women. 'Women in their reproductive years', the HSRC informs us, 'are limited in their participation in sport'.⁴⁹ The HSRC's failure to take cognisance of the sexual and racial oppression of black women hardly comes as a surprise.

Few options are available to promote sport for those sports without mass appeal or where the controlling body has neither the energy nor vision to align with capital. DNE financial grants are token totalling less than R5 million in the 1987/88 financial year.⁵⁰ Grants are determined by average allocations for the previous three years, the number of registered participants and publicity attracted by international tours. The majority of sports receive less than R8,000 per annum.⁵¹ Sports associations find themselves in a situation where they lack popular appeal to attract capital and without sponsorship they cannot market themselves. The essence of the problem, however, remains the peculiar strategy of autonomous sport which is a dictate of apartheid.

Twenty-eight associations, 54 percent of respondents, were classified as organisations making no effort to promote their sport among blacks.⁵² The common theme here was that black participation is constrained by external variables such as economic, social and biological factors.

Participation correlates strongly with exposure. Exposure to specific sports is largely a function of class position and several associations made this point with reference to world-wide participation in their sports. For example: 'the level of black participation in sport aviation anywhere in the world is in fact very low'. In South Africa, however, class and race overlap and claims such as 'ice skating does not appear to have any appeal to blacks' and 'it would appear that black people are not readily attracted to the sport of sailing', grossly distort the realities of apartheid. These realities, which include inadequate health care, bantu education, high unemployment and subsistence wages, are not conducive to participation in any sport.

More insidious were the insinuations that blacks do not participate because they are incapable of mastering technique or

because of inhibitions. For one respondent 'it is very difficult to master the pitching technique (of jukskei), thus a black person might try his hand at the game, cannot master the technique and lose heart'. The myth that blacks are better at physical rather than intellectual pursuits and therefore closer to nature and less civilised than whites obviously persists! In a similar vein I was informed that 'you won't find a black archer anywhere in the world. They have deep rooted psychological fears of bows and arrows'. This is a preposterous statement given the wide use of the bow as a hunting instrument in Africa. Such myths are used to cover blatant racism. Many sports could learn from the experience of the SACU: 'We found that people whom we thought had no aptitude for cricket in fact have the ability providing they are given the right kind of support and encouragement'.⁵³

A fourth category of national sports controlling body can also be identified in South Africa; those that continue to segregate blacks. Not surprisingly these bodies either did not respond to the survey or were silent on this issue. The category includes billiards and snooker, amateur boxing, rugby, softball and tennis although the full extent is unknown. Amateur boxing and rugby certainly remain the most overtly racist sports in South Africa and their structures provide the 'perfect mirror for the Nationalist government's notion of sporting multiracialism'.⁵⁴

Four associations administer amateur boxing with separate bodies for African, coloured, white and multiracial competitors. While the latter makes provision for multiracial contact at provincial and national championships, racial segregation remains strictly enforced at club level. According to Jack Bryant, President of the multiracial South African Amateur Boxing Federation, segregation remains necessary. Black children fight by weight because they invariably 'do not have birth certificates and therefore cannot prove

their ages'.⁵⁵ On the other hand, white parents prefer their children to fight in age divisions. Rugby is also racially segregated. Although it is not enforced as rigidly as boxing, segregation is certainly the norm at club level and justified on the grounds of 'developing the game among blacks to bring them up to white standards'.

In 1987 the white South African Rugby Board introduced a new competition to bridge standards between black and white. Teams comprising eight black and seven white players were registered as 'feeder' teams to play in select tournaments. Research into black participation in sport in the United States suggested the 'feeder' concept is no panacea for South Africa. While the proportion of blacks playing professional American football has increased they remain under-represented in crucial positions (for example, kickers, centers and quarterbacks).⁵⁶ The conclusion drawn is that blacks are systematically moved into non-leadership roles. This reinforces an earlier point that blacks rarely take the field as equals much less leaders.

Any notion of widely integrated sport in South Africa is illusionary. A study of black participation in 144 sports in Natal-Kwazulu found that black participation was proportional to the racial composition of the region in only four organisations representing two sports - boxing and soccer.⁵⁷ There is no black participation in forty sports and between less than one percent and eight percent participation in 78 sports.⁵⁸ The reasons are not difficult to find as this research and other investigations have pointed out. The HSRC, for example, concluded that 'South African sports administrators are inflexible and tradition bound'⁵⁹ while the Steering Committee investigating the rationalisation [sic] of South African sport said sports administrators 'do not have the necessary management mobility to offer equal opportunities to members of the various population groups'.⁶⁰

Conclusion

From the government's perspective autonomous sport strategy can be seen as both a success and a failure. A success because it has enabled the government to sell its dual policy of deracialisation and racialisation to the white electorate. While autonomy offers integration, and hence depoliticisation, to those sports organisations seeking readmittance to the international community, it concomitantly justifies segregated sport on the grounds of freedom of association or, in South African parlance, 'group rights'. A success because in those few instances where complete integration has been adopted it has been accompanied by the idea that sport transcends politics. This notion stems, at least in part, from sport's enforced alliance with capital. In this sense, then, desegregated sport is a form of co-optation and is consistent with the government's concept of reform which precludes power sharing. A failure because autonomous sport has been rejected internationally. A failure because South African sport continues to be isolated. South African sport is an anathema. It will continue to be rejected and isolated for as long as the government pursues policies of partial deracialisation and limited democratisation. Ironically, perhaps the greatest threat to autonomous sport is the resegregation of previously integrated facilities in Conservative Party controlled municipalities.⁶¹ Resegregation belies deracialisation reforms and is a perspicuous reminder of the carefully inculcated racial practices pervading South Africa.

NOTES

1. Terminology. The following denote the principle race groups of South Africa; Africans, coloureds, Indians and whites. Black refers to the African, coloured and Indian collective. Bantustan denotes an African tribal reserve. Multiracial has

negative connotations implying a rejection of South Africa as a unitary state. In contrast the term nonracial has colour blind connotations.

2. For a good review see, Adrian Guelke. 'The Politicisation of South African Sport', Lincoln Allison (ed), *The Politics of Sport* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986).
3. Republic of South Africa, *Hansard* (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1979), cols. 6899-6910.
4. *ibid.*, col. 6900.
5. Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply* (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1977), p. 5.
6. One Australian dollar (A\$) equals approximately two rands (R).
7. Human Sciences Research Council. *Sport in the RSA: Main Committee Report* (Pretoria: HSRC, 1982), p. 87.
8. Alan Bush, personal correspondence, 29/4/88.
9. Ali Bacher (Managing Director SACU), personal correspondence, 4/11/87.
10. Confidential source (DNE), personal correspondence, 20/12/87.
11. South African Sports Federation, *The Establishment of an Autonomous Representative Body and Provision Structure for Sport Recreation: The Confederation of South African Sport*, Main Report of the Steering Committee (Pretoria: SASF, 1987), p. 23 and 77.
12. *ibid.*, p. 20 and 24.
13. *ibid.*, p. 29.
14. Republic of South Africa, *Hansard* (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1963), col. 753.
15. 'Check facts on SA sport says Viljoen', *The Star*, 12/3/84.
16. Human Sciences Research Council, *op. cit.*, p. 98.
17. For example, the share of weighted voting on the Central Witwatersrand RSC in June 1987 was as follows: African 19.31%; coloured/Indian 5.5%; white 74.18% (totals 98.99%). See South African Institute of Race Relations, *Race Relations Survey 1987/88* (Johannesburg: SAIRR, 1988), p. 123, 217.
18. Alan Bush, *op. cit.*
19. Donald Lee, personal correspondence, 27/2/88.
20. 'South Africa needs rebel tours, says Pollock', *The Age*, 20/12/85.
21. Quoted in Sam Ramsay, *Racial Discrimination in South African Sport*, Notes and Documents, 8/80 (New York: United National Centre Against Apartheid, 1980), p. 37.
22. Republic of South Africa, *Hansard*, (1979), *op. cit.*, col. 6978.
23. Republic of South Africa, *Hansard*, (1983), *op. cit.*, col. 6149.
24. *Loc. cit.*
25. In April 1988 the 90 percent rebate was adjusted to 65% in keeping with monetarist policy.
26. 'Govt introduces guide for sponsorship relief', *Business Day*, 3/11/86.
27. 'Sport on way to R85 million cash bonanza', *Business Day*, 5/10/87.
28. 'Tour rebate confirmed by Du Plessis', *Eastern Province Herald*, 21/1/86.

29. Department of National Education, *Annual Report 1984*, RP 37-85 (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1985), p. 51.
30. Mr Theron (DNE), personal correspondence, 21/1/88.
31. A brief questionnaire was posted to 127 government recognised controlling bodies. Fifty-six replies (44 percent) were received as detailed in footnotes 40, 48 and 52.
32. The Aero Club of South Africa, questionnaire.
33. Natal Basketball Association, Constitution.
34. South African Lifesaving, questionnaire.
35. South Africa Bowling Association, questionnaire.
36. 'Golf club report "tendentious"', *The Natal Mercury*, 16/6/87.
37. 'Xopo club issue', *The Natal Mercury*, 23/6/87.
38. South African Lifesaving, *op. cit.*
39. Ali Bacher quoted in, 'The talk of the townships', *Sunday Times*, 25/10/87.
40. SA Cricket Union, SA Amateur Gymnastic Union, SA Men's Hockey Assoc., The Squash Rackets Assoc. of Southern Africa, SA Amateur Swimming Union, SA Volleyball Union.
41. Joe Pamensky (President SACU), personal correspondence, 18/4/88.
42. Mervyn King (Chairman South African Executive Cricket Club) quoted in, 'Businessmen to generate R10m for black junior cricket', *Business Day*, 24/3/87.
43. Jeff Liebesman (Chief Executive Form-Scaff) quoted in, 'Cricket coaching academy is a boost for black talent', *The Natal Mercury*, 2/10/87.
44. Colin Tatz, *Aborigines in Sport* (Bedford Park, SA: The Australian Society for Sports History, 1987); Ernest Cashmore, *Black Sportsmen* (London: Routledge and Keagan Paul, 1982); George Sage, 'Race and Sport', in George Sage (ed.), *Sport and American Society: Selected Readings* (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley); Ben Lombardo, 'The Harlem Globetrotters and the Perpetuation of the Black Stereotype', *Physical Educator*, (May 1978), p. 60-63.
45. Quoted in, 'Time of high hopes as amateurs bid for a place in the sun', *Business Day*, 13/10/87.
46. Quoted in, 'Some dark clouds over the Sunshine Circuit', *The Weekly Mail*, 21/1/88.
47. Squash Rackets Association of Southern Africa, undated circular. 'Building a Nation of Young Super C Squash Players.' The nonracial South African Council on Sport (SACOS) describes itself as the sporting wing of the liberation movement. The 'etc.' in this 'initiative' no doubt refers to the African National Congress, the South African Communist Party and the Anti-Apartheid Movement.
48. National Archery Assoc., SA Masters Athletics Assoc., SA Badminton Union, Basketball Fed. of SA, SA Bowling Assoc., SA Bridge Fed., The SA Chess Fed., SA Cycling Fed., SA Polo Assoc., SA Golf Union, the SA Ladies' Golf Union, SA Women's Hockey Assoc., SA (Lifesaving, SA Surf Lifesaving, SA Water Safety, SA Motor Sport Control, All SA Netball Union, SA Homing Union, SA Sheepdog Assoc., SA Pistol Assoc., SA Softball Assoc., SA Softball Union.
49. Human Sciences Research Council, *op. cit.*, p. 42.
50. Republic of South Africa, *Estimates of the Expenditure to be Defrayed State Revenue Account RP 2 1987/88* (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1987).

51. Confidential source, *op. cit.*
52. The Aero Club of SA, Aerobatics, Gliding, Hang Gliding, Helicopter, Hot Air Ballooning, Microlighting, Parachuting, Power Flying, The SA Biathlon Assoc., SA National Boxing Control Board, Croquet Assoc., SA Deaf Sport Fed., The SA National Pony Club; SA Amateur Fencing Assoc., SA Artificial Lure Angling Assoc., The Football Assoc. of SA, Senior Golfers' Union of SA, The Professional Golfers Assoc. of SA, SA Ice Skating Assoc., SA Jukskeiraad, SA Modern Pentathlon Assoc., Cruising Assoc. of SA, SA Yacht Racing Assoc., SA Air Rifle Assoc., The Clay Pigeon Shooting Assoc. of SA; SA Surfriders Assoc., SA Amateur Weightlifting Union.
53. Joe Pamansky, *op. cit.*
54. Gavin Evans, in 'No ring. No punch bag. No headguard. Another black gym', *The Weekly Mail*, 2/10/87.
55. Jack Bryant, personal correspondence, 11/4/88.
56. D Stanley Eitzen and David C. Sanford, 'The Segregation of Blacks by Playing Position in Football: Accident or Design.' *Social Science Quarterly*, 55, (1975) pp. 948-959. In 1987 there were only three black quarterbacks in the National Football League. See, 'Superbowl focus on "black vs epitome of a clean-cut white boy"', *The Sunday Star*, 21/1/88.
57. These are the Natal Amateur Boxing Federation; Natal Boxing Board of Control; the Natal Amateur Football Association; and, the unrecognised Natal and KwaZulu Soccer Association, a regional affiliate of the newly formed Soccer Association of South Africa.
58. Paulus Zulu and Douglas Booth, 'Black Participation in South African Sport: The Case of Natal-KwaZulu', University of Natal, Durban: Maurice Webb Race Relations Unit, 1988.
59. Human Sciences Research Council, *op. cit.*, p. 101.
60. South African Sports Federation, *op. cit.*, p. 18.
61. For example, Boksburg, Brakpan, Carltonville and Krugersdorp.