

LIGHTS! CAMERA! LITTLE ACTION: TELEVISION, AVERY BRUNDAGE, AND THE 1956 MELBOURNE OLYMPICS¹

**Stephen R Wenn
Wilfrid Laurier University**

A great deal could be written of the negotiations between the Organising Committee in Melbourne [1956] and the proprietors of television networks and cinema newsreel companies. To write such a history would probably not be profitable, because at the end of writing one would have to come to the conclusion that the whole operation was handled extraordinarily badly by both sides of the argument (Lewis Luxton, Deputy Chairman, Melbourne Organising Committee, 13 May 1957).²

In recent years, staggering sums of money have been channelled to Olympic Organising Committees and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) through the sale of US network television rights. The 1988 Seoul and Calgary Olympic Games attracted successful bids from US corporations which totalled \$609 million. For the 1992 Olympic Games the total exceeded \$644 million. This figure was increased in 1994 and 1996 when the Lillehammer Organising Committee and the Atlanta Organising Committee, in conjunction with IOC negotiators, secured US television contracts for \$300 and \$456 million respectively. It is widely accepted that the revenue and world-wide exposure provided by television since the initial marketing of television rights in 1960 has had a significant impact on the quadrennial Olympic tradition.³

This article argues that the debate between television executives and the Melbourne Organising Committee (MOC), concerning the transmission rights for the 1956 Olympics, contributed importantly to the expanded publicity for and marketing of the Games. The Australian episode acted

as a springboard for the revision of Rule 49 (Publicity), the IOC's initial legislative effort regarding the marketing of television rights.⁴ Curiously, the Melbourne television scenario has received cursory historical treatment.⁵ The television problem surrounding the Melbourne Games provided an important chapter in the history of the Olympic movement. It resulted in the gravitation of the IOC towards the marketing of television rights. In the process, it led to an important debate about the extent to which the Games should be viewed as a news event or an entertainment package.

The above statement of MOC Deputy Chairman, Lewis Luxton accurately reflected the problems involved in arrangements to gain television rights to the 1956 Summer Olympic Games. The breakdown and subsequent failure of the dialogue between the MOC and the networks was significant. The refusal of international television networks and cinema newsreel companies to pay royalties, for the privilege of showing Olympic newsfilm on a delayed basis, caused a wide-ranging boycott of the Melbourne Games by these organisations. Consequently, newsreel coverage of the Melbourne festival was limited. Although IOC President, Avery Brundage, was aware of the stalemate between the Australian organisers and the networks, he elected to remain aloof, though the threat of commercialism with the sale of television rights and necessary involvement of advertisers troubled him. A second element of this study involves Brundage's changing attitude towards television and the Olympic movement.

By the mid-1950s, a number of IOC members began to recognise the financial windfall that television could provide if television rights were marketed for a fee. In 1955, Lord Killanin of Ireland, broached the subject of potential television revenues to Brundage. A staunch opponent of commercial intrusion upon the Olympic movement during his twenty-year Presidency, Brundage was wary of this initiative. Nevertheless, his business acumen dictated that he should consider the advantages of pursuing television revenues. Brundage recognised the benefit of additional

funds as the money would enable the IOC to expand its staff, and he coveted the opportunity to more effectively spread 'Olympism' throughout the world.⁶ He summarised his views on the matter in a letter to the IOC Executive Board:

The International Olympic Committee has always kept itself free from financial entanglements, so free, in fact that it has never had enough money to do the useful work it could be doing if it had a larger staff. I am not sure that we should ever get into 'business', but on the other hand we should not give millions of dollars away.

On the negative side of the ledger, Brundage surmised that television potentially posed a source of friction between the IOC and future Organising Committees. He also indicated some anxiety as to what philosophical course the Olympic movement might follow in the event of adopting such a strategy. Brundage added cautiously: 'If one adds to the intangible benefits which accrue to the organisers of the Games, a huge bonus from TV rights, one can readily imagine the complications and dangers that may arise.'⁷

Brundage's circumspect approach to the television question reflected his devotion to the ideals of Pierre de Coubertin. All members of the IOC were sworn to promote, guard and preserve the Olympic movement according to the principles espoused by de Coubertin.⁸ The *renovateur* had taken a dim view of the potential infiltration of commercialism into amateur sport. De Coubertin had identified Greek athletics and medieval chivalry as two significant sporting movements which had been sullied by 'the commercial spirit'.⁹ He had sought to protect amateur sport and the Olympic movement from descending 'into the slough of commercialism'.¹⁰ Brundage, true to his predecessor's beliefs, regarded commercialism as a threat to the sanctity of the Olympic movement.

The Melbourne Scenario

The MOC began to investigate the question of television and film coverage of the Games in 1954. The Australians were informed by the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) that the United States networks would not be interested in undertaking a large-scale reproduction in that country because of technical difficulties due to distance involved. Similarly, a proposed series of short entertainment films drew limited interest from the networks because of the three-day flight time between Melbourne and New York.¹¹ The MOC chose to pursue other channels in order to recoup a portion of expenses.

In 1955, Luxton and the MOC reached a tentative agreement with Associated Re-Diffusion, a London-based company, for exclusive film rights to the Games.¹² The decision elicited a swift response from the international television networks. Executives asserted that no single company should retain exclusive rights. According to the industry representatives, the Olympic Games was a news event, not an entertainment package. Although these organisations were not interested in acquiring live television rights, they still desired access to cover the Games as a news event. The networks maintained that all television networks and cinema newsreel companies should enjoy equal access to the Games.¹³ The Chairman of the MOC became a prime target for criticism.

MOC Chairman, Wilfred S Kent-Hughes, was confronted by an agitated Australian media that lobbied him aggressively to grant television and newsfilm coverage free of charge, to publicise Australia. A number of media representatives insinuated that it would be detrimental to his political career if he failed to heed their overtures.¹⁴ The MOC desired a compromise fearing that free film access would threaten the viability of the Committee's official Olympic film targeted for commercial distribution following the Games.

The determination of the newsfilm industry to secure free and equal access was considerable. In January 1956, representatives of a number of the television networks and cinema newsreel companies assembled to discuss the issue. Administrative officers from the Australian Broadcasting Commission, the British Broadcasting Corporation, Fox-Movietone News, Cinesound Review Newsreel, NBC and United Press attended the meeting. A proposal which drew unanimous support was forwarded to the MOC. Newsreel access to the Games, it bluntly stated, should be free to all, distinct from those companies contracted to complete an official film.¹⁵ Subsequent meetings in Great Britain and the United States produced similar results.¹⁶ They demanded the same access to Olympic events enjoyed by print journalists and still photographers.

It is understandable that the MOC was agitated by the extent of the discussion between the network officials. Henry Lawrenson of Australian Movietone News and Ken G Hall of Cinesound Review Newsreel had reminded Kent-Hughes in April of the resolve of the newsfilm companies to see the issue through on their terms. The MOC would not receive money for news coverage of the Games. Lawrenson and Hall counselled Kent-Hughes:

We trust that you and the members of the Committee will understand very clearly that a matter of definite principle is at stake – i.e. no payment for news coverage of anything – and we finally deplore any suggestion that there has been any ganging up.¹⁷

The news divisions of the networks and the cinema companies attempted to convince Kent-Hughes that they were not in a position to receive extra revenue from delayed daily coverage. Generally speaking news services were funded twelve months in advance. As the MOC's position represented an unplanned budgetary expenditure, this practice reduced the availability of funds for the Melbourne Olympic Games.¹⁸ Pleadings were also made to Avery Brundage.

NBC News Director, William R McAndrew, informed Brundage that many people had a false perception of the wealth of television stations. The popular belief that they were awash with money was, 'a most unfortunate and untrue canard', with the large salaries accorded to television stars such as Bob Hope, Mary Martin and Milton Berle the cause of such an erroneous view. News departments and newsreel companies conducted their business with smaller budgets. McAndrew added that sizeable royalties paid by networks to telecast events such as the World Series of baseball and major boxing events were contingent upon 'live exclusivity'. Newsreel coverage on a delayed basis did not possess comparable market value.¹⁹ Brundage's reply to the McAndrew missive indicated the careful consideration he gave the matter.

News versus entertainment

Brundage enquired whether there was any type of daily limit on the number of minutes of Olympic film telecast on news programs. Specifically, he desired to know the point at which news coverage became entertainment. What guarantee did the MOC have that the news organisations would not seek to edit film creating some form of commercial project?²⁰ It is important to recognise that the IOC had no intention of intervening in the affairs of the MOC at the 1956 Games, rather its priority was to establish policy for the 1960 Games.

NBC's McAndrew thought that a reasonable time limit on daily news coverage could be established. A show would be deemed entertainment if it had been specifically scheduled for the purpose of displaying Olympic material. All Olympic footage would be shown on regularly scheduled newscasts. In addition, McAndrew stated that newsreel companies would not consider a commercial product without the permission of the IOC.²¹ The foundation for an agreement seemed evident.

Dialogue between the MOC and newsreel negotiators resumed in April, seven months before the Games. Executives from the BBC, Australian Movietone and Cinesound Review Newsreel—these organisations had been entrusted to carry out negotiations on behalf of the US networks—approached the MOC. They proposed that all newsreel companies and television network news divisions be allowed access to three minutes of newsfilm per day. The MOC was favourably disposed to the initiative, but delayed consummating a final agreement until arrangements pertaining to the commercial (official) Olympic film were completed.²² A three month delay ensued during which both sides gave further thought to the issue.

Impasse in negotiations

In July, Kent-Hughes and MOC's recently-appointed chief negotiator, Paul Talbot of Fremantle Overseas Radio, convened with the representatives of the cinema newsreel groups to approve the terms of the previous proposal. The negotiators agreed to the royalty-free allotment of three minutes of daily newsfilm. With difficulties seemingly resolved, Kent-Hughes and Talbot huddled with the executives from the television news divisions later in the day. Much to their chagrin, the position of the television stations had changed. As network television delivered three newscasts per day, negotiators pressed for nine minutes of Olympic film to be equally distributed over the news programs, using three different Olympic clips. Kent-Hughes was not conciliatory, while Talbot stated that the demand would only receive consideration by the MOC if guarantees were given that any added exposure would not diminish the potential income from the commercially-distributed Olympic film.²³

Additional television exposure, the MOC was advised, would limit the profit potential of the Olympic film, especially in the lucrative US market.²⁴ Peter Whitchurch, the film maker in charge of the Olympic project, later told Brundage: 'If the newsreels had been allowed their requested 9 minutes per day for 15 days, their total output would have been

2 hours and 15 minutes.’ The commercial film, he said, designed for viewing by theatre patrons was of shorter duration.²⁵ Differences about the daily minute allotment was ‘the rock upon which the ship foundered’, MOC’s Luxton later reported to Brundage.²⁶

J P Meroz, General Director of the Société Suisse de Radio Diffusion, charged the MOC with failing to honour an agreement for equal access to the nine minutes of news film per day.²⁷ His view, expressed in a communiqué to IOC Chancellor Otto Mayer, was echoed by a *New York Herald-Tribune* writer who quoted a network executive, ‘we had a firm arrangement to use nine minutes of film and we feel that they reneged’.²⁸ George Griffith Jr, of Melbourne Hoyts Theatres Ltd, described the negotiations as ‘fruitless’, and criticised the ‘onerous restrictions’ imposed by the MOC.²⁹ Apparently, the MOC also desired editorial control. Such an arrangement would have resulted in American, European, Australian and Canadian newscasts showing identical footage rather than film clips tailored to the respective interests of national audiences.³⁰ Media representatives assumed that continued pressure would force the MOC to retreat from its position.³¹

Newsreel companies were confident that the MOC would eventually accept the nine minute condition, and remove its demand for editorial control from the negotiating table. In fact, these organisations initiated a world-wide publicity campaign highlighting the upcoming Olympic Games coverage. The MOC refused to capitulate and a stalemate ensued. MOC members viewed any form of concession as compromising the negotiating positions of subsequent organising committees.³²

Melbourne boycott

The resulting boycott of the Melbourne Games by newsreel companies and international television networks was responsible for the limited publicity Australia received. ‘The Olympic Games as an institution, Australia as a nation and television as a medium of the free world,’ Jack Gould of the *New York Times* acknowledged, ‘all have suffered from the

consequences of the extensive blackout.³³The sense of regret was widespread within the MOC and the television and cinema news industries.

Although both sides recognised the tragic nature of the absence of television and cinema news industries from Melbourne, neither was willing to accept responsibility for its occurrence. Harry Robert, sports editor of *Tele-news*, was angered by the discriminatory treatment accorded to television on the assumption that it had money to pay for rights. He advised Brundage: 'There is no significance in saying newsfilm is supported by commercial sponsors until you can point out the newspapers that run without advertising.' Robert was indignant about what he regarded as the hypocritical actions of the MOC, and the IOC, which provided tacit approval through non-intervention. The IOC and National Olympic Committees' enforced the tenets of amateurism, he maintained, in order to prevent athletes from exploiting their obvious skills for profit. He found the situation offensive as the opposition had attempted to, 'put these skills to work for great financial gain for their own tills. You cannot be flesh to one group and fish to another.'³⁴George Griffith Jr stated succinctly that the problem would not have arisen if the television industry had been granted the same rights as print journalists and still photographers.³⁵The Games came and went with virtually no television coverage.

Following the Melbourne Games, the paramount concern of the newsfilm industry was to rectify the situation prior to the 1960 Winter and Summer Games. It aggressively lobbied for a nine minute daily allowance of Olympic coverage. Both Brundage and Chancellor Mayer were hesitant. **They favoured partial protection of the Organising Committees through the establishment of a six minute time limit.**³⁶Brundage was stupefied by the rigidity of the newsreel companies' position. He observed:

Everyone reads about these huge sums which are paid for television rights to football games and wonders why television companies seem unwilling to pay for the rights to the greatest sports spectacle of all, which is moreover practically always operated at a loss.³⁷

Robert again attempted to pacify Brundage by assuring him that the commercial value of the live coverage rights in European countries would be significant. The US market was even more promising.³⁸ Robert advocated the separation of commercial and newsfilm coverage rights in any future IOC legislation.

Following extensive discussion with television and newsreel company leaders, the IOC accepted a significant expansion of Rule 49 on Publicity. The major principle of the modified Rule 49 was the distinction between news coverage and live television rights (entertainment). The Rule specified that Organising Committees were responsible for concluding arrangements for live television coverage of the Games. The money was to be distributed according to the wishes of the IOC.³⁹ In actuality, the international body did not formulate an official distribution policy until 1966.⁴⁰ The changes to Rule 49 showed Brundage and the IOC acquiescing on the time limit pertaining to news clips. The IOC publicity policy in 1958 was a brief one page statement. A generation, and billions of dollars later, IOC policies for publicity were recorded within a manual separate from the Olympic Charter.

Conclusions

The Melbourne newsfilm controversy represented an important episode in the history of the involvement of television in the Olympic Games. Prior to the festival, representatives of international television networks and newsreel companies argued that television was an emerging arm of the world's media. The industry deserved equal and free access to cover the Olympic Games as a news event, they maintained. Negotiations between the MOC and various media interests proved unsatisfactory to all parties concerned. The problem did not lie with the MOC. Rather discussions stalled because of a changing order in world media. Since 1958, the rise in sport spectatorship through the medium of television, and advances in technology, have made live coverage of the Games dominant.

The multi-million dollar contracts with television networks throughout the world indicate that advertisers and sporting enthusiasts remain fascinated by the Olympic spectacle.

Importantly, the enormous sums of money offered by the US networks for Olympic television rights in the 1980s and 1990s did not become possible until the upsurge in the popularity of sports television in the 1970s. Nevertheless, the IOC's movement toward the marketing of television rights following the Melbourne fiasco was acritical development. The US television rights to the Games to Squaw Valley and Rome (1960) were sold to CBS for a total of \$444 000. Brundage was not satisfied with the amount of money offered as he considered the Olympics to be the pre-eminent sporting spectacle in the world. And yet, Brundage may not have been any more satisfied with the \$456 million US television contract negotiated by the IOC and the Atlanta Organising Committee.

It is interesting to note that the Olympic supremo, and long-term soldier of anti-commercial Olympism, Avery Brundage, had ambivalent feelings about the issues raised during the Melbourne controversy. While he was aware that too much commercialism had the potential to destroy the amateur ethos of the Olympics, he was attracted by the potential windfall profits from publicity which would further elevate the Olympic festivals as spectacles. By the end of his Presidential term in 1972, Brundage was disturbed by the IOC's financial dependence upon television revenue and the effects of commercialism upon the Olympic movement. 'Distressed and disillusioned', commented Allen Guttman, 'Brundage watched as the IOC first adopted the financial procedures and then the fiscal attitudes of a modern corporation.'⁴¹ However, his clarion call for the IOC to reduce drastically its financial involvement with television fell upon deaf ears.⁴² During the 1960s, leaders of the International Sport Federations, National Olympic Committees and Brundage's colleagues on the IOC developed a marked appreciation of available television revenue and regarded the money as critical to the execution of their mandates.⁴³

NOTES

1. I wish to thank Professor Ronald A Smith, Pennsylvania State University, for a number of valuable suggestions in the preparation of this article.
2. Lewis Luxton to Avery Brundage, President of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), 13 May 1957, *Avery Brundage Collection 1908-1975 (ABC)*, Box 114. (All further correspondence is from Box 114 unless otherwise noted). The original collection is located at the University of Illinois (Champaign-Urbana). The bulk of the research material for this paper was collected from the microfilm copy of the collection housed in the Special Collection Room, D B Weldon Library, University of Western Ontario, London. Supplementary material was gathered from the microfilm copy of the collection located in the Microforms Section of the Pattee Library, Pennsylvania State University.
3. The first US network coverage of the Olympic Games occurred in 1960. The live coverage for the Squaw Valley Winter Games were obtained for the fee of \$50 000. The rights to the Summer Games in Rome were purchased for \$394 940. Richard Z Lawrence (with Jeffrey D Pellegrum), 'Fool's Gold: How America Pays to Lose in the Olympics', *Brookings Review*, vol. 7, no. 4, 1989, p. 6. A number of authors have attempted to illustrate the growing dependency of the Olympic movement upon television revenues. See Richard K Alaskiewicz, 'Television and the Olympics: Nature of the Relationship', MA thesis, University of Calgary, 1986; Willi Daume, 'Every Spectacle has its Price', *Olympic Message*, vol. 8, Dec. 1984, p. 13; Denis Echard, 'Television: Inventory for the New OCOGs', *Olympic Review*, vols. 235-6, May-June 1987, p. 268; Robert Joseph Lucas, 'A Descriptive History of the Interdependence of Television and Sports in the Summer Olympic Games, 1956-1984', MA thesis, San Diego State University, 1984. Others have stressed the conduit for publicising Olympism that the television medium has provided to the IOC. See Monique Berlioux, 'A Marriage of Reason', *Olympic Message*, vol. 8, Dec. 1984, p. 29; Berlioux, 'The Olympic Games and the Escalation of the Audio-Visual', *Report of the Twenty-Second Session of the International Olympic Academy at the Ancient Olympia, 1982*, IOC, Lausanne, 1985, p. 199; Bruce Kidd, 'The Olympic Movement and the Sports-Media Complex', in Roger Jackson and Thomas McPhail, eds, *The Olympic Movement and the Mass Media: Past, Present and Future Issues*, Hurford Enterprises Ltd, Calgary, 1989, pp. 1-5; Richard S Perelman, 'Olympic Broadcasters: Dragons or Saints?', in Jackson and McPhail, *The Olympic Movement*, pp. 5-27; and Henri Pouret, 'Audio-Visual Environment of the Olympic Athlete', *Report of the Twelfth Session of the International Olympic Academy at Ancient Olympia, 1972*, Hellenic Olympic Committee, Athens, 1972, p. 184.
4. Previously, Rule 49 merely detailed the Organising Committee's responsibility to commission a company to film the Olympic Games for the IOC Archives. Organising Committees had been permitted to sell copies of the film to offset expenditures incurred in hosting the Olympics. Rule 49 had required the Organising Committee to arrange for newsreel coverage at a reasonable cost (this clause was added in 1956) and to limit the interference of cameramen with Olympic events.
5. Alaskiewicz, 'Television and the Olympics', p. 70; Richard K Alaskiewicz and Thomas L McPhail, 'Olympic Television Rights', *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, vol. 21, nos. 2-3, 1986, p. 213; Lucas, 'A Descriptive History', pp. 11-14.

6. While President of the United States Olympic Committee (USOC), Brundage considered television as a viable source of funds for the organisation. Prior to the 1948 London Games, Brundage attempted unsuccessfully to negotiate a contract for the sale of television rights to the 1948 US Olympic Trials. He was an avid supporter of the Olympic Telethon hosted by Bing Crosby and Bob Hope that was staged to raise funds for USOC in 1952. Brundage also offered to negotiate a US television contract for the 1952 Helsinki Organising Committee in exchange for a share of the proceeds payable to USOC. A US television contract did not materialise. Brundage's early thoughts on television funds have been detailed in Stephen R Wenn, 'A History of the International Olympic Committee and Television, 1936-1980', PhD thesis, Pennsylvania State University, 1993, pp. 12-41.
The frequently cited term 'Olympism' requires some explanation. An idealised view has been suggested by Seagrave and Chu: 'Olympism is an overall philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a balanced whole the qualities of body, will, and mind. Olympism sets out to create a way of life based on the joy of effort, the educational values of good example and respect for universal fundamental ethical perspectives. It has, as a goal, to place sport at the service of the harmonious development of humankind, with the object of creating a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity.' Jeffrey O Seagrave and Donald Chu, *The Olympic Games in Transition*, Human Kinetics Press, p. 151.
7. Avery Brundage to the IOC Executive Board (Armand Massard, David Lord Burghley, S A R The Prince Axel of Denmark, Mohammed Taher, Dr Miguel A Moenck and Count Paolo de Revel), 3 Aug. 1955. The initial involvement of television and the Olympic movement occurred in Berlin (1936). A closed circuit telecast was shown in the Berlin area. In 1948, the exclusive film rights to the London Games were given to the J Arthur Rank Company for a fee of £25 000. Alaskiewicz and McPhail, 'Olympic Television Rights', p. 213. In 1952, NBC attempted to obtain the exclusive newsreel rights to the Helsinki Games, however, the resulting uproar from competitors hampered the plans of the network. All networks received free and equal access to cover the Games as a news event. See Henry Lawrenson (Managing Editor of Australian Movietone News) and Ken G Hall (Managing Editor of Cinesound Review Newsreel) to W S Kent-Hughes (Chairman of MOC), 5 April 1956. The networks used approximately two minutes of film per day. It is important to note that some events from the 1956 Games were telecast live by three recently established television stations in Melbourne. A small fee was supplied to the Melbourne Organising Committee. See W S Kent-Hughes, 'Report on Television and Films – Olympic Games 1956', 25 March 1957; and Lewis Luxton to Avery Brundage, 13 May 1957. The respective Organising Committees received revenues from the film and television coverage.
8. The IOC member oath was introduced in 1955. Monique Berlioux, 'The History of the International Olympic Committee', in Lord Killanin and John Rodda, *The Olympic Games: 80 Years of People, Events and Records*, Collier Books, New York, 1976, p. 12.
9. 'Speech by Baron de Coubertin', an Address delivered at the Opening Meeting of the XVIIIth Plenary Session of the IOC, Antwerp, 17 Aug. 1920. Pierre de Coubertin, *The Olympic Idea – Discourses and Essays*, Verlag Karl Hoffman, Schorndorf, 1967, p. 83.

10. 'Athletics in the Modern World and the Olympic Games', an analysis and extracts from a lecture by de Coubertin to the Parnassus Club, Athens, 1894. de Coubertin, *The Olympic Idea*, p. 9.
11. Kent-Hughes, 'Report on Television and Films'.
12. Kent-Hughes, 'Report on Television and Films'.
13. See John Day (Director of News, Columbia Broadcasting System) to Avery Brundage, 23 Jan. 1956; Roger Tartarian (European News Manager, United Press International) to Avery Brundage, 23 Jan. 1956; Jack E Muth (European News Manager, Movietone News Inc.) to Avery Brundage, 24 Jan. 1956; Henry Lawrenson and Ken G Hall to Avery Brundage, 5 April 1956; and William R McAndrew (Director of News, NBC) to Avery Brundage, 6 April 1956.
14. Kent-Hughes, 'Report on Television and Films'. Kent-Hughes was a Liberal MP in the Menzies Government, He held the posts of Minister for the Interior and Minister for Works and Housing from May 1951 to Jan. 1956. Toohey has provided an interesting and insightful assessment of the uneasy and sometimes turbulent personal relationship between Kent-Hughes and Menzies and the intrusion of world politics on the Melbourne Games. See Kristine Margaret Toohey, 'The Politics of Australian Elite Sport: 1949-1983', PhD dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1990, pp. 33-59.
15. Kent-Hughes, 'Report on Television and Films'.
16. Jack E Muth to Avery Brundage, 24 Jan. 1956; and Frank Donghi (Assignment Editor, CBS News) to Avery Brundage, 31 March 1956.
17. Henry Lawrenson and Ken G Hall to Avery Brundage, 5 April 1956.
18. Lawrenson and Hall to Brundage, 5 April 1956.
19. William R McAndrew to Avery Brundage, 6 April 1956.
20. Avery Brundage to William R McAndrew, 28 April 1956.
21. William R McAndrew to Avery Brundage, 3 May 1956.
22. W S Kent-Hughes, 'Report on Television and Films'.
23. W S Kent-Hughes, 'Report on Television and Films'.
24. W S Kent-Hughes, 'Report on Television and Films'. See also Lewis Luxton to Avery Brundage, 13 May 1957.
25. Peter Whitchurch (Director, Official Olympic Film – 1956) to Avery Brundage, 15 Sept. 1959.
26. Lewis Luxton to Avery Brundage, 13 May 1957.
27. J P Meroz to Otto Mayer, 29 Oct. 1956. For further evidence of dissatisfaction with Talbot, see Harry Robert (Sports Editor, *Tele-news*), Frank F Donghi (Assignment Editor, CBS News) and Leonard Allen (Television News Editor, NBC) to Avery Brundage, 13 Feb. 1957.
28. *New York Herald-Tribune*, 21 Sept. 1956. My research efforts have not been able to confirm this claim.
29. George Griffith Jr to Avery Brundage, 6 Dec. 1956.
30. *New York Times*, 9 Dec. 1956.
31. W S Kent-Hughes, 'Report on Television and Film'.
32. *The Official Report of the Organising Committee for the Games of the XVI Olympiad Melbourne 1956*, Melbourne, Organising Committee for the Games, c 1957, p. 157.

33. *New York Times*, 9 Dec. 1956. In Australia, live television coverage of the Games was seen over a number of television channels in Melbourne. Delayed coverage was seen in Sydney. These television stations, owned by the Australian Broadcasting Commission, had recently initiated operations. In the United States, a small number of independent stations carried six thirty minute delayed programs prepared by the Fremantle Overseas Radio. The MOC received a small fee for both services. Lucas, 'A Descriptive History', pp. 11-13.
34. Harry Robert, Frank F Donghi and Leonard Allen to Avery Brundage, 13 Feb. 1957. Robert wrote the letter on behalf of Donghi and Allen who were colleagues from CBS and NBC respectively.
35. George Griffith Jr to Avery Brundage, 6 Dec. 1956.
36. Otto Mayer to Avery Brundage, 21 Dec. 1957.
37. Avery Brundage to Harry Robert, 11 April 1957.
38. Harry Robert to Avery Brundage, 24 May 1957.
39. See the series of Rule 49 drafts located in ABC Box 114.
40. The International Federations shared Olympic television money for the first time in 1964 after some leaders had raised the issue in the late 1950s. The National Olympic Committees did not receive television money until 1972, as a result of the 1966 formula, mentioned below. However, individuals such as Giulio Onesti, along with Armand Massard, had championed this cause since the early 1960s. The distribution policy dictated that the IOC would receive the first million dollars as well as two thirds of the second million dollars from the negotiated rights fee. The organisation would also collect one third of any additional millions of dollars. For the Winter Games, the figure \$200 000 was substituted for \$1 million. *Meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC*, Rome, 21-4 April 1966, pp. 7-9, International Olympic Committee Archives (IOCA), Lausanne, Switzerland. Brundage's efforts to secure IOC autonomy over the distribution of the 1960 Olympic television revenue failed because both Organising Committees complained that Rule 49 had been modified after the Games had been awarded to their communities in 1955. Alan E Bartholemy (Executive Director, Squaw Valley Organising Committee) to Otto Mayer, 10 July, ABC Box 165; *Minutes of the 53rd Session of the International Olympic Committee*, Sofia, 23-8 Sept., 1957, p. 8, IOCA; Giulio Onesti (President, Rome Organising Committee) to Avery Brundage, 6 May 1960, ABC Box 168; and *Minutes Rome Session 1960 Executive Board Meeting*, Rome, 19, 24 Aug. 1960, p. 4, IOCA. The Rome Organising Committee did grant the IOC \$50 000. With respect to the 1964 Games of Tokyo and Innsbruck, the IOC's efforts were more successful. The IOC requested a pre-paid, but small, portion of the television receipts. The Tokyo Organising Committee transferred \$130 000 to the IOC, which in turn divided the proceeds with the International Federations governing Olympic sports on the summer program. The Japanese subsequently consummated an agreement for world-wide television rights with the Japanese network NHK for \$1 577 778. The Innsbruck Organising Committee was requested to send \$20 000 to the IOC. The Winter Sport Federations received half the sum. The Austrians sold the international television rights to the 1964 Winter Games for a total of \$936 667. *IOC General Session Minutes Volume IV 1956-1 988*, Summaries and translations by Wolf Lyberg, former General Secretary of the Swedish Olympic Committee, 1991, p. 55, Centre for Olympic Studies, University of Western Ontario, Canada; 'Droits de Television

Verses par les Organismes de Television pour les Jeux d'Olympiade (en dollars US)', IOCA. The 1968 Mexico City Organising Committee benefited from the advances in satellite transmission as reflected in television receipts in excess of \$9.7 million. Pressure mounted on Brundage to broker an agreement with the NOCs that had not received any television money since 1960, and the International Federations that desired more than the allotted \$150 540 from the Mexico Organising Committee via the IOC. The result of IOC deliberations was the aforementioned formula devised in 1966.

41. Allen Guttman, *The Games Must Go On: Avery Brundage and the Olympic Movement*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1984, p. 219.
42. 'Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board', Lausanne, 27-30 May 1972, p. 8.
43. Wenn, 'History of the International Olympic Committee and Television,' pp. 318-29.