

‘LIKE FLEAS ON A DOG’: EMERGING NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OVER NEW ZEALAND RUGBY TIES WITH SOUTH AFRICA, 1965-74

John Nauright
Department of Human Movement Studies
University of Queensland

International moves to isolate South Africa in sport have been documented by many researchers in the past twenty years.¹ Many of these studies of apartheid sport and international boycotts were written to advocate fuller application of sporting sanctions. Despite this apparent wealth of literature, an accurate assessment of the relative impact of sporting sanctions on white South Africans does not yet exist. It is clear that the sports boycott movement as a whole has been an important element of international pressure on white South Africans. However, most of the work on sports sanctions and South Africa has not given sufficient primacy to rugby, the dominant sport of the elite (white males) in South African society.² In particular, the rugby relationship between South Africa and New Zealand has not received much international attention except in the context of the boycott of the Montreal Olympics by over twenty African countries and the subsequent Gleneagles Agreement on sporting contact with South Africa. This article argues that a historical understanding of the links between South Africa and New Zealand in international rugby is essential to analyse the effects of sporting sanctions on the target group of whites in South Africa. It was during the period from the mid- 1960s to the cancellation of the 1973 rugby tour of South Africa to New Zealand that the issue of New Zealand-South African rugby became central in both the apartheid state’s international sport strategy and in the boycott movement’s attempts to isolate South Africa in sport. This was true especially after

South Africa was prevented from participating in the 1964 and 1968 Olympic Games and then ousted from the international Olympic movement in 1970. From that time onwards, the South African state focused on the maintenance of sporting ties with 'traditional' opponents from the British Isles, France, Australia and New Zealand.

In the late 1980s, and especially since South African President F. W. de Klerk launched his reform initiative on 2 February 1990, several studies have examined the relative effectiveness of international sanctions and boycotts on the decision of the National Party (NP) elite in South Africa to dismantle most apartheid laws.³ While international relations specialists have been reluctant to give primacy to sporting sanctions, sport scholars have been less tentative in their analyses.⁴

The use of sport in the South African whites' referendum reform campaign of March 1992 suggests that those who advocated South Africa's isolation from international sport were right in their assumptions about the potential effects of barring white South Africa from international sport as long as apartheid was practised there. As early as 1971, Peter Hain noted the impact boycotts had on white South Africa. He argued that as pressure increased, the South African government and sporting officials would be forced to make concessions. Hain noted then that the South African government had made no changes in policy as a result of the maintenance of close contact and continued sporting relations the South African government had made no policy changes.⁵

While scholars are beginning to be more assertive about the relative effectiveness of cultural sanctions in general, and sporting sanctions in particular, most have concentrated on broad international organisations, in particular, the Olympic movement. Though the Olympic movement includes many of the most significant and wide-ranging international sporting organisations, South Africa's expulsion from the movement was not the most crucial event in the attempt to isolate South Africa in sport. Rather, the campaigns to eliminate South Africa from international rugby were more significant when assessed in terms of influencing the target group of white South Africans.

Rugby is the 'national' sport of white South Africans, especially the ruling elite groups of Afrikaner males. Since early this century, the South African national rugby team, the Springboks, has been one of the top rugby teams in the world along with New Zealand. In particular, rugby links with New Zealand became the key battle ground for both the international anti-apartheid sports movement and the South African state. It is only through a historical understanding of the significance of rugby to New Zealanders and white South Africans, especially males, that the impact of the loss of international rugby competition can be gauged.

Rugby and the Construction of "National Identity" in South Africa and New Zealand

New Zealand and South Africa shared similar historical experiences as white-dominated settler societies within the British Empire. In both cases European immigrants expropriated the majority of land from indigenous peoples. Within the Empire close relations were reinforced through sporting and other cultural links.

Rugby was first played in South Africa in the late 1860s and in New Zealand from 1870. By the 1890s, rugby was played by most white males, and some males from the indigenous populations, in both countries. The central position of rugby within both societies was ensured by successes in their first official international tours to the British Isles, New Zealand touring there in 1905 and South Africa in 1906. The 1905 New Zealand All Blacks won thirty-two matches, lost one, and outscored their opponents 839-32.⁶ The South African Springboks lost only two matches and drew with England, but soundly beat Wales, the only team which had defeated New Zealand.

Both tours came close on the heels of crises, specifically for whites, in emerging national identity. After much debate, New Zealand decided not to join the Australian Federation, forged in 1901, becoming a separate dominion in 1907. The 1905 tour was a central event in the formation of

a distinct New Zealand identity. The South African War of 1899-1902 pitted the troops of the British Empire and many white men of the Cape Colony and Natal against the Afrikaner settlers of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. In order to help forge greater unity among the erstwhile combatants, the 1906 rugby selectors chose an Afrikaner captain and a vice-captain of British descent.⁷

From these early tours of the British Isles, immediate comparisons between the rugby teams of both countries were made in the British press. However, South Africa and New Zealand were not able to play against each other before World War I. Since then, New Zealand and South Africa have played test series against each other in 1921, 1928, 1937, 1949, 1956, 1960, 1965, 1970, 1976 and 1981. Planned series were cancelled in 1967, 1973 and 1985. While the first two series were drawn, South Africa subsequently won five series and New Zealand three. New Zealand also won the single test played between the two countries in 1992.

New Zealand sociologist and activist Richard Thompson summed up the passion for rugby in both South Africa and New Zealand in *Retreat From Apartheid* (1975). South Africa and New Zealand, he asserted, shared 'not merely a passion for rugby, but a similar approach to the game, and the rugby rivalry is felt to be distinctive ... [In both countries] Rugby is a man's game, not a game for girls and cissies, and to play it the hard way is to play it the man's way.' He added that 'a defeat reflects unfavourably on the quality of New Zealand manhood and its way of life'. The famous South African author and former Liberal Party leader, Alan Paton, stated that 'white South Africans are madly enthusiastic about rugby, and especially about playing New Zealand'.⁸ And Donald Woods, former South African newspaper editor and confidante of Steve Biko, recalled from his childhood that:

Springbok-All Black rugby was full of tradition and lore. For us it was the greatest of international rivalries, and during World War Two whenever South African and New Zealand troops encountered each other, whether in a Cairo street or a London pub, they would scrum down on the spot.⁹

For much of this century rugby was compulsory for white boys in South African schools and the only winter sport offered in many New Zealand schools before the 1970s.¹⁰This has meant that most members of the dominant group in both societies shared a common cultural practice – rugby.

New Zealand and the South African Sports Boycott Issue

The New Zealand parliament is dominated by the conservative National Party and the more liberal Labour Party. During most of the 1960s, the National Party, led by Sir Keith Holyoake, was in power. National's official policy regarding sporting contact with South Africa was that there should be no interference with the right of New Zealand sports people to participate with whomever they pleased. In general, National's policy on South Africa in the 1960s rejected sanctions or other formal protest actions as 'it would do no good sniping at South Africa from the outside'.¹¹ Acting Minister of External Affairs, J A Hanan, reiterated this position in July 1965 during the Springbok tour of New Zealand that year. He stated that:

the New Zealand attitude to South Africa is governed by the desire to see a change of heart and policy induced by peaceful means in the belief that moderation, not coercion, holds the best hope of influencing the Government of South Africa towards a change in policy and the least danger of provoking violence and racial conflict within the Republic.¹²

Hanan went on to argue that the closer contacts New Zealand had with South Africa, the better the chances 'of influencing them some day perhaps to a change of policy'.¹³

The National Party government of the 1960s and early 1970s had little sympathy with those who protested against sporting contacts with South Africa. Hanan, in his capacity as Minister of Maori Affairs, spoke at a reception for the Springboks at Gisborne that was attended by many Maoris.¹⁴ He complained about 'a minority of people with "peculiar ideas" whom he suggested were not making the Springboks welcome. Hanan sparked a controversy when he stated: 'I have said in the past that in a democracy you have to have these people. Well, I suppose you do – in the sense that a dog has fleas.'¹⁵ Hanan made his view, and that of his party, clear: 'What a monstrous thing, to attempt to deny the right of a citizen of this country to go to a football match, to exhort him to boycott a football match.'¹⁶

During the 1965 South African tour of New Zealand, the question arose as to whether Maoris would be allowed into South Africa as members of a New Zealand rugby side for the proposed 1967 tour to South Africa. Maoris had not been chosen for the All Blacks' 1960 tour of South Africa despite the protests of over 162 000 petitioners. Both political parties agreed, however, that Maoris should not be excluded from future tours as it was New Zealand policy to avoid open discrimination based on racial grounds. Dr Danie Craven, President of the South African Rugby Board (SARB), assured New Zealand Rugby Football Union (NZRFU) officials and the government, that Maoris would be allowed to tour. Prime Minister Hendrick Verwoerd, the architect of apartheid, chose to keep quiet during the lead-up to the 1965 Springbok tour of New Zealand refusing to comment on whether Maoris would be excluded from future tours to South Africa. But prior to the last international match in 1965, he stated that all future teams touring South Africa would have to abide by South Africa's 'local custom'. It was clear to New Zealanders that this meant no Maoris. Prime Minister Holyoake subsequently announced the Government's view in Parliament. He stated that 'as we are one people we cannot be fully and truly represented

by a team chosen on racial lines'.¹⁷ In order to avoid Government embarrassment, the NZRFU postponed the proposed All Black tour of 1967.

Despite Holyoake's statements, there were few politicians who called for a sports boycott of South Africa in the 1960s. Matiu Rata, Labour Party member for Northern Maori and future Minister for Maori Affairs, was one of the most outspoken in calling for a total boycott in June 1965.¹⁸ On the other end of the spectrum, there were always several National MPs who were openly pro-apartheid, like W S Goosman, who supported South Africa in 1960. Goosman argued that because whites had developed the country they had the right to stay there.¹⁹

International Pressure and South African Politics 1966-70

The New Zealand-South African political climate changed marginally in 1966 when Verwoerd was assassinated and the more reformist, or *verligte* (enlightened) John Vorster became Prime Minister. Vorster attempted to gain South African readmission to the Olympic Games through slight modifications to existing sport policy in 1967.²⁰ In 1968 Vorster made a dramatic decision allowing the NZRFU to send Maoris on upcoming tours (behind the scenes, however, it was reported that the South Africans intimated to the NZRFU that there should not be too many Maoris and that they should not be too dark).²¹ This move by Vorster was the first real attempt by the South African government to alleviate international pressure in the sports arena and heralded a myriad of reformist measures over the next twenty years. It was clear that future cancellation of New Zealand rugby tours was too high a price to pay for the continuation of total apartheid in sport.²² Vorster's decision to allow Maoris into South Africa as members of an All Black team contributed to a split in the NP and the secret Afrikaner male elite organisation, the Broederbond.²³ Several MPs in the Party refused to tolerate any erosion of apartheid.²⁴

S J M Steyn, opposition United Party (UP) MP for Yeoville, a Johannesburg suburb, reflected the growing official South African awareness of the impact of international sporting sanctions. In 1967 he argued that:

Now we find that South Africa's participation in international sport is becoming a constant source of embarrassment to South Africa ... We find that the field in which we are permitted to participate in international sport is narrowing. Last year, when we looked forward ... to meeting the other great rugby playing nation of the world in test matches, the All Black tour of South Africa had to be cancelled because of a statement made at Cabinet level that the New Zealanders would not be allowed to come to South Africa if their team included a Maori or two. And so we are denied the privilege of rugby tests against New Zealand.²⁵

Steyn lamented about the effect of NP policy on South Africa's international reputation. Later, he quoted Dirk Richards, editor of *Dagbreek*, of which Vorster was the chairperson, 'Why should a Maori or two stop us from playing rugby against New Zealand? It does not make sense.'²⁶ Steyn, and his United Party, clearly wanted to change government policy, although it was not interested in ending racial segregation. The UP called for an end to government interference in sport so that sporting bodies could choose whom to invite from overseas.

Both the NP and UP viewed the general campaign to isolate South Africa in international sport and the specific controversies – such as the admission of Maoris and the Basil D'Oliveira cricket affair – as different matters.²⁷ United Party MP, D J Marais, pointed out that the international campaign to isolate South Africa in sport, particularly from Olympic sports, had been led by 'the Afro-Asian and communist countries'.²⁸ What both leading South African political parties really wanted to avoid was a full-scale onslaught from its traditional sporting allies. Marais warned the

Government that total isolation might result unless the government acted. In 1969, South African Minister of Transport, Ben Schoeman, affirmed the government's intention to concentrate on the maintenance of traditional sporting ties with New Zealand, Britain, Australia and France.²⁹ These countries, along with South Africa, were the leading rugby-playing nations and full members of the International Rugby Board which governs international rugby.

In order to achieve the objective of maintaining close trading and cultural ties with 'traditional allies', Vorster's government launched major propaganda programs in those countries. As part of this strategy, Vorster sent one of his most senior diplomats, P H Philip, to New Zealand to serve as Consul-General in 1969. Philip distributed pro-apartheid information on South Africa, wrote numerous letters to newspapers, and spoke to countless groups during his tenure, which lasted until 1976. He also held numerous parties and dinners to which many All Blacks and National Party MPs, including Cabinet ministers, were invited. One such gathering was a cocktail party for the 1970 All Blacks prior to their departure for South Africa.³⁰

Commentators noted at the time that Philip was a very senior diplomat to be sent to a country with whom South Africa's economic relations (and strategic ties) were 'insignificant'.³¹ Vorster's government clearly thought the maintenance of rugby, and other sporting, links with New Zealand were important both for white support at home, and from the standpoint of international relations, to combat the growing sanctions movement. Vorster's plan was successful, at least initially, as sporting contact between South Africa and New Zealand actually increased between 1968 and 1972 at a time when South Africa was pushed out of many international competitions and organisations.

Sport and the South African Question in New Zealand 1967-70

Once Vorster cleared the way for Maori participation, the SARB invited the NZRFU to tour in 1970. The NZRFU eventually sent a team which included three Maoris and one Polynesian. Despite Vorster's concession to New Zealand, protests against the 1970 tour continued. Members of the protest organisations, Citizens' Association for Racial Equality (CARE) and Halt All Racist Tours (HART), raised the stakes and worked for the elimination of all sporting contact with South Africa so long as it practised apartheid in sport. Both groups harnessed support from academics, trade union leaders and church officials in the main cities (and rugby test match venues) of Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin.

The origins of CARE were rooted in the controversy surrounding the 1960 tour of South Africa by the 'All White All Blacks' as Richard Thompson dubbed the NZRFU tourists.³² The 1959-60 protests raised awareness of racial issues among a number of white New Zealanders. In 1964 a small group of Aucklanders held meetings which led to the formation of CARE in October.³³ CARE became involved in domestic and international racial issues, but the media chose to focus on its protests against playing rugby with South Africa. HART was formed in 1969 primarily by student leaders to stop New Zealand sporting contact with South Africa. As an organisation, HART did not involve itself in wider issues taken up by CARE.

HART and CARE actively protested against the 1970 tour of South Africa by the All Blacks. Although it was clear that Maoris would be accepted as members of a New Zealand team, it was argued that the tour would reward white South Africa. In addition, the granting of 'honorary white' status to Maori tourists and supporters reflected the refusal of the Vorster regime to reform any of the main pillars of apartheid law.

Added to the protests of HART and CARE were a number of actions of more extreme groups and individuals. On 27 March seven people were arrested inside the building which housed the Auckland Rugby Union offices. Police apprehended the protesters after they broke windows to gain entry into the building.³⁴ early June, some people opposed to the tour sawed down a goal post at Lancaster Park in Christchurch the night before a leading rugby match.³⁵ HART, which later came under much public criticism for advocating an activist approach to protest, distanced itself from break-ins stating that such actions went beyond the use of democratic means to stop the tour.³⁶

Although CARE and HART launched a campaign to prevent the proposed 1970 tour of South Africa, the Holyoake government was satisfied that once Maoris had been accepted by the South African government it would not stop the tour taking place. The New Zealand print media was divided on the issue with some, like the *Dominion* in Wellington, supporting tours based on merit selection. Others, like the *New Zealand Listener*, opposed South African exchanges. In 'Sport Within the Laager', the *Listener*, citing Vorster's political handling of the Basil D'Oliveira affair, openly criticised any contact which would bolster the South African regime.³⁷ Newspaper coverage of anti-tour protests and statements of HART and CARE varied. Generally, anti-tour protests were buried on inside pages. Such was the case with a story in the *New Zealand Herald* (Auckland) covering a march commemorating the tenth anniversary of the Sharpeville Massacre in South Africa. On 21 March 1970, about 1000 people in Auckland marched in a HART-organised protest against the proposed All Black tour of South Africa. The *Herald* deemed this as worthy only of a short story buried on page five.³⁸ By contrast, when New Zealand Chief Justice, Sir Richard Wild, addressed the Wellington Rugby Football Club's Centenary Dinner stating that the All Blacks must go to South Africa, the *Herald* and the *Dominion* provided front-page coverage.³⁹

Official Maori groups were divided on the issue, with the conservative Maori Council voting to support the tour after assurances from Philip that Maori and white rugby supporters would receive equal treatment in South Africa. Matiu Rata publicly opposed the Council's decision and led parliamentary attacks on National's position on tours.⁴⁰ The other three Maori representatives in Parliament also opposed the tour. The government and pro-tour groups frequently cited the Maori Council as representative of Maori opinion. Yet, the Council was an appointed body with positions often filled with defeated National Maori candidates. The four Maori MPs won large majorities in the 1969 election and probably better reflected majority opinion among Maoris about sporting relations with South Africa.⁴¹

HART and CARE continued to organise protests until the All Blacks left for South Africa. The largest rallies were organised on 21 March 1970, the tenth anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre when South African police shot and killed sixty-nine peaceful protesters. The largest gathering in Auckland drew over 1000 people to a march down Queen Street, with a few hundred additional people at rallies in Hamilton, Wellington and Christchurch. On 11 June several hundred protesters marched on Parliament where an official government farewell to the All Blacks was held. Flour and paint bombs were thrown at those arriving to attend the farewell and the police arrested seven demonstrators.⁴² The next day, over 1000 protesters sat down in a busy Wellington street disrupting traffic for seventy minutes and then marched towards Government House, but police blocked their way. The protesters moved on to the Grand Hotel where a farewell dinner was held for the All Blacks, but police intervened again, arresting thirty-four demonstrators.⁴³ These protests underlined the resolve of tour opponents providing a preview of what a government could expect if a South African rugby team came to New Zealand in 1973 as the NZRFU planned.

HART and CARE also drew on the international boycott movement and arranged for Dennis Brutus, exiled leader of the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee, based in London, to come to New Zealand twice during 1969 and 1970 and speak against sporting contact with South Africa.⁴⁴ Brutus tried to meet with the NZRFU, as HART and CARE leaders had attempted, but the Rugby Union refused to meet him.⁴⁵ Part of the motivation behind HART's and CARE's intensification of protests during the 1970s was due to the NZRFU's repeated refusal to meet with those who opposed rugby contacts with South Africa. Unfavourable media coverage and government intransigence also strengthened the resolve of the anti-apartheid movement. The anti-apartheid movement in New Zealand concentrated on the sporting contact issue, as former HART leader Trevor Richards stated, 'not because of any dislike of sport, but because South Africa's sporting contacts with New Zealand are probably more important than with any other single country'. Richards argued that campaigns in other countries had focused on economic sanctions which were difficult to win and enforce, lacking the emotional appeal and publicity of calls for sporting boycotts.⁴⁶

The New Zealand governments of the 1960s and early 1970s clearly did not wish to pressure South Africa towards serious reform. Several National MPs reaffirmed their support for apartheid as the best solution for South Africa. They tried to claim that separate development was what black South Africans actually wanted and that the South African government was doing much to improve the lives of blacks in South Africa. Obviously Vorster's propaganda strategy had an effect on a number of New Zealanders. National's leadership tried to downplay such comments and Holyoake and his successors, Jack Marshall and Robert Muldoon, publicly stated their opposition to apartheid many times. Even into the 1980s, National struggled to distance itself from pro-tour comments made by members of its parliamentary caucus.

There was no likelihood of any successful legal challenge to the 1970 tour given the position of leading justices. Chief Justice Wild told those gathered at the centenary dinner of the Wellington Rugby Club that the All Blacks were definitely going to South Africa. He also praised the leadership of the NZRFU for their handling of the tour issue.⁴⁷In a last-ditch effort to stop the tour, R G Parsons, a Wellington bookseller, tried to obtain a writ to restrain the team from leaving New Zealand. The courts rejected this plea on the eve of the All Blacks' departure.⁴⁸While connections between government and rugby officials were not as formalised as in South Africa, it is clear that the New Zealand establishment viewed rugby as a very central element in the national culture of the 1960s. This power elite faced difficulty both within the country, and internationally, as opposition to apartheid increased.

Sport, the Commonwealth and the South African Question

By the late 1960s the face of the British Commonwealth had changed. Nearly all the former colonies of the British Empire had been granted independence and accepted as full members of the new Commonwealth of nations. African nations threatened to boycott the 1968 Mexican Olympic Games if South Africa was allowed to participate and, with the help of the Soviet Union, succeeded in obtaining South Africa's exclusion from the Games and its expulsion from the Olympic Movement in 1970. By the late 1960s, it became clear that the Commonwealth Games might suffer if the British, Australian and New Zealand teams continued sporting links with white South Africans.

In December 1969, K S Duncan, Secretary of the British Commonwealth Games Federation, reported on a visit he had made to Christchurch and Melbourne, the two cities bidding to host the 1974 Commonwealth Games. He reported that African actions like those taken in 1968 were 'intensified after individuals/teams from the United Kingdom and New Zealand competed in the South African Games in Bloemfontein

this year'. In addition, African countries might try to exclude New Zealand from participation in the 1970 Edinburgh Commonwealth Games because of a New Zealand Amateur Athletic Association (NZAAA) invitation to South African athletes to participate in the New Zealand championships.⁴⁹ The NZAAA withdrew the invitation in response to these concerns. Subsequently, Christchurch was awarded the 1974 Commonwealth Games.

The discussion in New Zealand, once Christchurch won the right to host the Games, centred on the possible effect of the proposed All Black rugby tour to South Africa on the Games. It soon became clear that most African Commonwealth countries, along with several Caribbean and Asian countries, would boycott if the tour went ahead. New Zealand became the chief target of both the international boycott movement and the South African government from 1970-3. The latter was desperate to maintain rugby relations with their traditional rivals especially as sporting contact with Britain and Australia was severely threatened between 1969 and 1971.⁵⁰

Rugby versus the Commonwealth Games, 1970-4

On 18 February 1970 the NZRFU invited a Springbok rugby team to tour New Zealand in 1973. Six days later Christchurch was officially awarded the 1974 Commonwealth Games. As a result of these two announcements, Dr Abraham Ordia, President of the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa, announced that if the 1973 Springbok tour took place, none of the affiliated African nations would participate in the Commonwealth Games. An obstinate Danie Craven pronounced that the Springboks would go to New Zealand despite threats of demonstrations.⁵¹

New Zealanders witnessed the growing resolve of African opposition to apartheid in sport first hand in March 1970, when two visiting Kenyan athletes were barred by their government from participating in races against New Zealanders who had run in South African events. At the time, the New Zealand media and government officials criticised the Kenyan

action for bringing politics into sport, and many New Zealanders did not fully comprehend the stand of African Commonwealth countries on the issue of apartheid.⁵² Many more were shocked by the level of protest generated during the 1971 Springbok rugby tour of Australia.

Prime Minister Jack Marshall kept quiet on the tour issue until 7 March 1972 when he released a statement suggesting that his government did 'not intend to prohibit sports teams from South Africa coming to New Zealand, or New Zealand sporting teams going to South Africa ... It is better to build bridges between nations – not walls'. The temporary South African Consul, G C Nel, was 'delighted' by Marshall's statement stressing South Africa's need to continue 'communication' with other nations.⁵³ Opposition Leader, Norman Kirk, questioned the timing and motivation of Marshall's statements which came out on the eve of a National Development Conference. It was reported there that New Zealand had slipped in world rankings from fifth to fourteenth in their standard of living. Kirk accused Marshall of using the whole race relations issue as a ploy to draw attention away from government failures.⁵⁴ The tour issue was a difficult one for Kirk. While opposed to racism in sport and other arenas, Kirk faced opinion polls suggesting that 70 per cent of the population thought the Springbok tour should take place. He also wanted to fight a general election on vital economic issues.⁵⁵

Opinion polls and government policy did not affect the commitment of anti-apartheid groups in New Zealand. HART made its position on the proposed tour very clear. While in London meeting with leaders of the South African non-racial sports movement and international leaders in the campaign to isolate South African racist sport, HART chairperson, Trevor Richards, announced that HART would, 'make it physically impossible for the Springboks to have a good night's sleep, to travel without traffic jams, without buses going missing, or having tyres let down'.⁵⁶ HART's commitment to action led them to publish a *Protesters' Guidebook* in 1971 to provide guidance in non-violent protest methods to be used at any

sporting event, including those involving racially-selected South African teams.⁵⁷ HART and CARE members were encouraged by the cancellation of a South African cricket tour and a women's hockey tour in 1971, although other South African teams did tour New Zealand that year.⁵⁸

As Richards' visit to London suggested, HART and CARE joined with the growing international movement to isolate South Africa. In March 1972 the groups sent a delegation to the United Nations consisting of Richards, CARE leader Tom Newnham, and Dr Pat Hohepa, Chairperson of the Auckland District Maori Council, to explain the position in New Zealand. Newnham reported that the visit was valuable as it strengthened international contacts between protest movements, received great media coverage in New Zealand, and alerted Norman Kirk to the 'full international implications' of New Zealand's perceived support for apartheid.⁵⁹

In late 1972 New Zealanders elected a Labour Government, led by Kirk, with a large majority. Late in the election campaign, the National Party tried to reverse their sagging position in the polls by capitalising on Labour's opposition to rugby links with South Africa. Just prior to the election the Party took out full-page advertisements under the banner headline: 'National will not be blackmailed into cancelling the Springbok tour . . . Not by the Federation of Labour . . . Not by HART and CARE.'⁶⁰ National's last-minute strategy failed, but the Party was right in its portrayal of connections between Labour Party leaders and anti-tour groups. Three of Kirk's Cabinet members were also members of CARE.

Kirk, however, dealt with the issue of the proposed 1973 Springbok tour subtly. Before the election he stated several times that while he opposed the tour, he would not interfere with decisions of sporting bodies. After assuming power, he commissioned reports from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Police on possible consequences of a tour. The police reported that 10 000 demonstrators could be mustered in the major centres of Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch and would 'engender the greatest eruption of violence the country has ever known'.⁶¹ This

report, combined with threats from many Commonwealth countries to boycott the 1974 Christchurch Commonwealth Games together with a growing awareness of international implications of allowing the tour, eventually forced Kirk's hand. The Commonwealth Games organisers warned National before the election that African, and some other Commonwealth countries, would boycott the Games if the tour went ahead. However, National had not made the report available to Kirk.⁶²

The NZRFU, for its part, left it to the Prime Minister to determine the fate of the tour, calculating that he (and not they) would be stigmatised by a decision to cancel. Kirk advised the NZXFU that a Springbok tour would not be in 'the larger interests' of New Zealand and cautioned the Rugby Union as to the potential for violence if the tour went ahead. Unlike 1967, the NZRFU did not accept government advice and refused to call off the tour. HART and CARE national leaders, Trevor Richards and Professor Keith Sorrenson respectively, condemned the 'selfish' and 'narrow' decision of the NZRFU Council.⁶³

An attempt by the South African Rugby Board to include token blacks in the tour party was exposed on the eve of the tour, and Kirk was finally forced to call it off. Subsequently, in 1974, he stated that any team representative of any sporting organisation which practised apartheid at any level would not be welcome in New Zealand. As a result of Kirk's action, an African led boycott of the 1974 Commonwealth Games was averted and South Africa did not tour New Zealand until the NZRFU invited them to tour in 1981. National returned to power in 1975 and promised not to interfere with the right of sporting bodies to play against any team. In 1976 New Zealand toured South Africa as Africans began to openly revolt against apartheid.

Conclusions

The period from 1967 through 1974 was crucial in the history of moves to isolate South African sport and in international protest against apartheid. South Africa faced expulsion from the Olympic Games, the Olympic movement, cancellation of cricket and rugby tours and, most crucially, threats to Springbok-All Black rugby tours. The significance of South African and New Zealand rugby links should not be underestimated in either the international movement to isolate apartheid sport, or the effectiveness of international pressure in extracting reforms from the South African government. Rather than face the possible permanent cancellation of All Black rugby tours to South Africa, Vorster made one of the first in a long line of concessions aimed at the maintenance of international sporting contact with white South Africa's traditional rivals.

From the evidence it is clear that the South African government did not make concessions on apartheid in sport until it was pressured to do so from the outside. Vorster's decision to allow Maoris to tour as members of the All Blacks in 1970 was clearly motivated by the cancellation of the 1967 All Black tour. The issue of sport in South African international relations became a central focus of the Ministry of Sport which for most of the 1970s was led by key NP and Broederbond leaders, Piet Koornhof, Gerrit Viljoen and F. W. de Klerk.

In the 1970s, the government developed a new 'multi-national' sports policy which extended NP plans for 'separate development' to sports fields. According to apartheid policy developed under Verwoerd, South Africa was to consist of several nations. Under this policy then, only whites could represent South Africa, whereas Africans were to represent their own 'nations' based on NP policy of 'tribal' homelands, or 'bantustans', for Africans. Each African was assigned a 'tribe' and citizenship for them was to be changed to bantustans such as the Transkei. No other country accepted the bantustan policy and when 'independence' came for four bantustans between 1976 and 1981, South Africa was the only country to

recognise them. The separate development policy was even more difficult to work in the case of mixed-race South Africans, or 'Coloureds', and for the descendants of Indian migrant labourers, who came to work on the Natal sugar plantations from the 1860s. Neither of these groups could be assigned to a 'homeland', although separate townships were set aside for each group in the major cities.

The history of South Africa's reforms in sport has been well-documented. What is important to note here is how these changes related to the maintenance of rugby ties with New Zealand and other countries. As stated, the admission of Maori All Blacks was the first major concession made by the South African state which allowed them to resume regular sporting contact. Any concession on apartheid policy was short-lived, however, as the NP refused to make any further alterations to apartheid regulations until after the cancellation of the 1973 Springbok tour of New Zealand. It became clear, given the strongly anti-apartheid stance of the Australian and New Zealand Labour parties, and the success of British protesters in disrupting tours, that regular international rugby and contact in other sports would be virtually impossible without some changes. While Olympic and other forms of international isolation could be justified to white South Africans as part of the communist plot against South Africa, the cancellation of rugby tours against traditional rivals could not be explained on the same grounds. In addition, rugby was too important in the lives of too many white South Africans to be sacrificed completely. The government was aware of the changing international situation and sought to placate government and sporting officials in the white-dominated countries of the Commonwealth, and France, by making minor reforms in order to retain sporting contacts in general, and rugby tours in particular. The African National Congress (ANC) journal *Sechaba* noted in 1974 that the election of Labour governments in Australia and New Zealand changed the foreign policies of both countries from 'very direct collaborators and supporters of South Africa at the UN and the Commonwealth' to

virtually the reverse position.⁶⁴ As a result of increased pressure, the issue of sporting boycotts came down to a struggle between South Africa's willingness to maintain all aspects of apartheid versus increasing internal pressure and international condemnation of apartheid. Boycotts began to affect traditional white South African sporting relations along with other areas of South Africa's international relations. By the 1980s South African sporting and political officials acknowledged the impact of sporting isolation and searched for solutions which would restore international sporting links.

NOTES

1. Some of the most well-known and frequently cited accounts are, Richard Lapchick, *The Politics of Race and International Sport: The Case of South Africa*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Ct, 1975; Peter Hain, *Don't Play With Apartheid: The Background to the Stop the Seventy Tour Campaign*, London, 1971, and Richard Thompson, *Race and Sport*, OUP, London, 1964.
2. The most recent example is Adrian Guelke, 'Sport and the End of Apartheid', in Lincoln Allison, ed., *The Changing Politics of Sport*, MUP, Manchester, 1993, pp. 151-70. Guelke focuses primarily on cricket as do a number of British sources over the past twenty-five years.
3. See Margaret Doxey, *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective*, London, 1987; Anthony Payne, 'The International Politics of the Gleneagles Agreement', *Round Table*, 320, 1990; David R Black, 'Australian, Canadian, and Swedish Policies Toward Southern Africa: A Comparative Study of "Middle Power Internationalism"', unpub. PhD thesis, Dalhousie University, 1992.
4. For example, see Donald MacIntosh, Donna Greenhorn and David Black, 'Canadian Diplomacy and the 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth Games', *Journal of Sport History*, vol. 19, no. 1, Spring 1992, pp. 26-55; Bruce Kidd, 'The Campaign Against Sport in South Africa', *International Journal*, vol. 63, no. 4, Autumn, 1988; John Nauright and David Black, 'It's Rugby That Really Matters: New Zealand-South Africa Rugby Relations and the Moves to Isolate South Africa 1956-1992', unpub. paper, 'Sport in the Global Village' ISCPES Conference, Houston, June 1992; Gordon Olafson, 'Human Rights, Apartheid, and Sport Sanctions: Canadian Policies and the Prospect for Social Change', unpub. paper, 'Sport in the Global Village' Conference, June 1992; Guelke, 'Sport and the End of Apartheid'. Douglas Booth, 'The South African Way of Life: A Study in Race, Politics, and Sport', PhD thesis, Macquarie University, 1993.
5. Hain, *Don't Play With Apartheid*, pp. 84-5.
6. The name 'All Blacks', was coined by a reporter during New Zealand's first official tour to the British Isles in 1905. He thought that the New Zealanders were so fast that they appeared to be 'all backs'. The editor thought he meant to refer to their uniforms which were all black and so the name 'All Blacks' was invented.

7. For a detailed discussion of these tours, see John Nauright, 'Sport, Manhood and Empire: British Responses to the 1905 New Zealand Rugby Tour', *International Journal of the History of Sport*, vol. 8, Sept. 1991, pp. 239-55; and 'Sport and the Image of Colonial Manhood in the British Mind: British Physical Deterioration Debates and Colonial Sporting Tours, 1878-1912', *Canadian Journal of History of Sport* Dec. 1992, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 54-7 1.; Lappe Laubscher and Gideon Nieman, *The Carolin Papers: A Diary of the 1906-07 Springbok Tour*, Rugbyana Publishers, Pretoria, 1990.
8. Richard Thompson, *Retreat From Apartheid: New Zealand's Sporting Contacts with South Africa*, OUP, Auckland, 1975.
9. Donald Woods, *Black and White*, Ward River Press, Dublin, 1981, p. 43.
10. For a recent discussion of compulsory rugby in South African schools, see Jenni Evans, 'Time to Kick Compulsory Rugby into Touch?', *Personality*, vol. 16, July 1990.
11. *New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (NZPD) [NZ Hansard]*, vol. 342, 27 May-8 July 1965, 23 June 1965, p. 701.
12. *NZPD*, 1 July 1965, p. 926.
13. *NZPD*, 1 July 1965, p. 928.
14. Maori refers to the original Polynesian migrants who went to Aotearoa/New Zealand in several waves between AD 800 and 1200. After surviving dispossession, disease and war brought on by European settlement, Maoris recovered to constitute about 12 per cent of the population by the 1960s.
15. *Dominion* (Wellington), 30 June 1965. Hanan's statement caused a row in Parliament, see *NZPD*, vol. 342, 1 July 1965, pp. 964-8.
16. *NZPD*, vol. 342, 1 July 1965, p. 965.
17. *NZPD*, vol. 344, 7 Sept. 1965, p. 2527.
18. *NZPD*, vol. 342, 23 June 1965, p. 701.
19. *NZPD*, vol. 323, 2 Aug. 1960, pp. 1135-6.
20. See Booth, 'The South African Way of Life', pp. 159-60.
21. Thompson recounts the story in *Retreat from Apartheid*, p. 52. He stated that 'Distinctions were made between those of "Maori blood" who were welcome and the "full-blooded", "black" or "very dark" Maoris who were not ... between an All Black team with one or two players of "Maori blood" which would be allowed into South Africa and an All Black team with "five Black Maoris" which would not.' The story originated from Dennis Brutus who could never prove his allegations. Interview with Tom Newnham, 15 Oct. 1992, Auckland.
22. Possible loss of rugby ties because of the Maori issue was debated in the South African House of Assembly from 1967 onwards. See *Republic of South Africa House of Assembly Debates (SA Hansard)*, vol. 19, 1967, 8 Feb. 1967, pp. 927-30.
23. The Afrikaner Broederbond is a secret organisation of Afrikaner men founded in 1918 to advance the cause of Afrikaners in economic, cultural and political spheres. Since the 1930s, the Broederbond has been closely aligned with NP. For a full discussion on the history and operation of the Broederbond up to the late 1970s, see Ivor Wilkins and Hans Strydom, *The Broederbond*, Paddington Press, New York and London, 1979.
24. See Wilkins and Strydom, *The Broederbond*, pp. 239-40.
25. *SA Hansard*, vol. 19, 1967, 8 Feb. 1967, pp. 924-5.
26. *SA Hansard*, vol. 19, 1967, 8 Feb. 1967, p. 927.

27. Basil D'Oliveira was born in South Africa and was classified as 'Coloured' which meant that he could not represent South Africa in international sport. D'Oliveira was a cricketer who moved to England in the early 1960s to further his career. He qualified to play for England and became the centre of a controversy over the question of his possible selection for the proposed English tour of South Africa in 1968. See Basil D'Oliveira, *The D' Oliveira Affair*, Collins, London, 1969.
28. *SA Hansard*, vol. 19, 1967, 8 Feb. 1967, p. 936.
29. *Dominion*, 4 Oct. 1969.
30. *New Zealand Herald* (Auckland), 13 June 1970.
31. MPK Sorrenson, 'Uneasy Bedfellows: A Survey of New Zealand's Relations with South Africa', *New Zealand, South Africa and Sport: Background Papers*, New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, 1976, pp. 46-9.
32. See Thompson, *Retreat From Apartheid*, pp. 12-26.
33. Citizens' Association for Racial Equality, *Ten Years of CARE*, Auckland, 1974, p. 3.
34. *New Zealand Herald*, 28 March 1970.
35. *New Zealand Herald*, 2 June 1970.
36. *New Zealand Herald*, 28 March 1970.
37. *New Zealand Listener*, Oct. 1968, reprinted in CARE, *Letters Concerning Proposed All Black Tour*, CARE, Auckland, 1969.
38. *New Zealand Herald*, 21 March 1970.
39. *Dominion*; *New Zealand Herald*, 28 March 1970.
40. *Zealandia* (Auckland), 27 March 1969, reprinted in CARE, *Letters Concerning Proposed All Black Tour*.
41. *Dominion*; *New Zealand Herald*, 28 March 1970.
42. *New Zealand Herald*, 12 June 1970.
43. *Dominion*, 13 June 1970.
44. *New Zealand Herald*, 2 March 1970. For a report on a New Zealand television interview with Brutus, see *Dominion*, 28 March 1970.
45. *Dominion*, 31 March 1970.
46. Trevor Richards, 'Implications of the Springbok Tour: An Opponent's View', in Graham Bush, ed., *New Zealand - A Nation Divided?: Edited Versions of the Nine Papers Presented at the 1982 Winter Lectures, University of Auckland*, Auckland, 1982, p. 31.
47. *Dominion*, 30 March 1970.
48. *Dominion*, 11 June 1970.
49. New Zealand Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association Archives, Wellington: K S Duncan, Hon. Sec. of the British Commonwealth Games Federation to British Commonwealth Games Councils within the British Isles, 17 Dec. 1969.
50. For more on tour protest in Britain and Australia, see Hain, *Don't Play with Apartheid* and Stewart Harris, *Political Football: The Springbok Tour of Australia*, Gold Star Publications, Melbourne, 1971.
51. Reported in Margaret Hayward, *Diary of the KirkYears*, A H and A W Reed, Wellington, 1981, pp. 7, 11-12. Hayward was private secretary to Norman Kirk when he was Leader of the Opposition and Prime Minister.
52. See *Dominion*, 19, 20 March 1970.
53. *Dominion*, 8 March 1972. Nel replaced Philip as consul for a time during 1972.

54. Hayward, *Diary of the Kirk Years*, p. 16.
55. Hayward, *Diary of the Kirk Years*, pp. 29, 58. A National Research Bureau poll released on 29 Aug. 1972 indicated that 70 per cent of New Zealanders thought the tour should go ahead.
56. Quoted in Hayward, *Diary of the Kirk Years*, p. 30.
57. Halt All Racist Tours Movement, *Protesters' Guidebook*, HART, Christchurch, 1971, p. 2.
58. For reports on specific tours and protests in this period CARE leader see Tom Newnham, *Apartheid is Not a Game*, Auckland, 1975.
59. Newnham, *Apartheid is Not a Game*, pp. 63-5.
60. A copy of the advertisement is reprinted in Newnham, *Apartheid is Not a Game*, p. 74.
61. New Zealand Government White Paper, Feb. 1973, p. 5; Sorrenson, 'Uneasy Bedfellows', p. 61.
62. *Star* (Johannesburg), 8 Feb. 1973, reporting on New Zealand threats to the 1973 tour.
63. *New Zealand Herald*, 6 Feb. 1973.
64. *Sechaba*, 8 March 1974.