

**Globalization is not a Dinner Party:
He Zhenliang and China's 30-Year Struggle for Recognition
by the International Olympic Committee[†]**

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A revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous. A revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows another. -- Chairman Mao, "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan" (March 1927) (Mao 1968: 17).

Around 1907, Chinese and Korean YMCAs began a campaign linking physical education with national pride, which had three questions as its guiding slogans. The final question asked when China would be able to host an Olympic Games. This question has reverberated throughout Chinese sport history for nearly a century and is often recalled in the context of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games (Morris 2004: 1-2; Ma and Qin 2001: 20-21). The answer, of course, will come exactly one hundred years after it was asked, in 2008.

The organizers of this conference posed the question, "Are we now living in one world under Nike and Rupert Murdoch, or is the new age a multi-cultural cornucopia of mutually

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respectful cultures, sharing their best with one another?” and stated, “Our conference proposes to examine how we got to this point and what that history can tell us about the present moment.”

This paper is a preliminary exploration of what history can tell us about the present moment in which Beijing is poised to host the 2008 Olympic Games. This paper deals with one segment of the 100 year-long answer to this question, and that is the period from China’s withdrawal from the Olympic Movement in 1958 to its readmission to the International Olympic Committee (I.O.C.) in 1979. This is a preliminary summary of research that I have just begun. The goal of this research is to describe this period of exclusion from the mainland Chinese point of view, which until now has largely been absent in the English-language literature. This essay is based on two main primary sources. The first is the biography of the first I.O.C. member in the People’s Republic of China, He Zhenliang, written by his wife, journalist Liang Lijuan, which I am translating from Chinese into English. This book was first published in 2000 under the title *He Zhenliang yu Aolinpike [He Zhenliang and Olympism]* and a revised and updated version was published in 2005 under the title *He Zhenliang, wu huan zhi lu [He Zhenliang and the Road of the Five Rings]*. The tentative English title is *He Zhenliang and China’s Olympic Dream*. My second source is the official records of the I.O.C., including minutes of Executive Board meetings and General Sessions, audiotapes of the 1979 Executive Board meeting and Session at which readmission of China was nearly accomplished,¹ letters, and other documents. This essay highlights the ways in which this period was viewed through the eyes of He Zhenliang, the mainland Chinese diplomat who was a key figure throughout the entire process.

¹ The audiotapes are a valuable research tool because they are much more detailed than the I.O.C. minutes. The “discussion” of agenda items, where much of the interesting exchange took place, was not recorded in the minutes.

This narrative illustrates that the globalization of sports in this period was not an inevitable and faceless movement toward increasing global linkages, but rather it was grounded in shifts in the global balance of power that were fought out on the ground in heated political struggles by committed individuals. Particularly relevant to China's struggle for political recognition are the collapse of colonial empires and the increase in the numbers of Asian and African postcolonial sovereign states in international sports organizations, Japan's return to power after the end of World War II, and the assertion of independence from the West by Indonesia and Iran. Secondly, after rejoining the Olympic Games in 1952, the Soviet Union offered some support to China's cause, but in fact this support from their "Soviet Elder Brother" was never very great. In the mainland Chinese view of this history, as will be seen, the Soviet Union was not as independent from the West as it should have been.

I chose to begin this essay with a paraphrase of the famous quotation by Chairman Mao to make the point that the globalization of sports since World War II has, in fact, been a kind of revolution in which parts of the world first fought for their political sovereignty and independence from the Western powers, and then, having achieved it, still had to fight for several more decades to achieve a voice in the international organizations over which the West had a "death-grip." Half a century after decolonization and nearly twenty years after the end of the Cold War, it is still not clear that the situation of Western dominance over international organizations has changed much. The International Olympic Committee is a case in point.

"The Great Crucible of the Revolution"

When the conclusion of World War II ended the Japanese occupation of Northeast China in 1945, war between the ruling Nationalist party and the rebel Communist Party broke out in earnest. The Communists declared the founding of the People's Republic of China on October 1,

1949 and the Nationalists, under Chiang Kai-Shek, fled to Taiwan, taking the name of the Republic of China with them. Each government claimed to be the sole legitimate government of all of China. Thus was the political problem created that was known as the “two Chinas problem” in the West and the “one China principle” in Mainland China. In China, the phrase “two Chinas” is unacceptable because it implies the existence of two separate Chinas, a violation of official policy.

He Zhenliang was born in Shanghai in 1929 and, after participating in the student underground Communist Party in Shanghai, was recruited to join the new central government of the People’s Republic of China soon after its establishment. In April 1950 he was transferred to the New Democratic Youth League in Beijing. Liang Lijuan’s account of the early days of the new nation captures the youthful optimism felt by these young people who believed a new day had dawned for China. Liang was also a member of the Shanghai underground and had also moved to Beijing to work for the new government, and so she wrote about this enthusiasm first hand:

From his small world of school and family, Zhenliang had come to the Youth League Central Committee, this high-level leading organ – had come to the great crucible of the revolution with a galaxy of outstandingly talented people, experiencing a world that was changing by leaps and bounds. He fervently loved this revolutionary collective. Before leaving Shanghai, he had been a little worried about following his fortune alone in the strange surroundings of Beijing, far from his family, but these unnecessary concerns were quickly swept away. It was as if he had walked out of a narrow, pitch-black alley and suddenly found himself in a broad and bright new world with too many things for the eye to take in. If only he could multiply his time and energy ten times, a hundred times, to

learn it all, to embrace it all. He lived each day to the fullest, and strategized about how to live it even more fully (Liang 2005: 15-16).

In summer of 1951, the Youth League Central Committee sent a youth delegation, which included a sports team, to the Third World Youth Festival of Peace and Friendship in Berlin, Germany. This was the largest delegation sent out since Liberation, and it took a ten-day train trip from Beijing through the Soviet Union and Poland before reaching Berlin. On the way through Siberia, crowds of Soviets welcomed them at every stop with flowers, postcards, and well-wishes. In a divided Berlin, the Chinese delegates joined the reconstruction teams of the Free German Youth Federation as they rebuilt the wreckage of the war while singing inspirational songs:

During this time peace and friendship truly became the most forceful sound; everyone learned how to say “peace and friendship” in many different languages, it was a useful common language. If some members of the delegations didn’t even know these words it didn’t matter, if you knew how to smile and wave your hand then you could make friends, and use your hands to make gestures of friendship. Everywhere the China youth delegation went, they received a warm welcome. Everyone had more stories about words of friendship than they could tell. (Liang 2005: 18)

On the return trip the Chinese delegation stayed in a hotel near the Kremlin at the invitation of the Komsomol, and in the evenings He stood at the window listening to the sound of the bells, “thinking back to the stories of the October Revolution that he knew from books and movies, moving him to endless reveries” (Liang 2005: 18).

These stories of the ebullient mood in the central government during the first years of the P.R.C. help to explain the bitterness with which leading Chinese figures later regarded their

exclusion and isolation by the West. Mr. He and Mrs. Liang and been driven to participate in the revolution by a desire to right the social injustices and human suffering that they observed around them, which were exacerbated and in some cases perpetrated by the corrupt Nationalist government.² After Liberation, they were naively optimistic and filled with revolutionary love of country; the West's refusal to recognize the existence of the New China and its continued support of the corrupt Nationalist regime after its retreat to the island of Taiwan was, for them, morally reprehensible. International "recognition" (*chengren*) became a national goal, a goal that encompassed diplomatic recognition by the world's nations, recognition by the United Nations, and recognition by the I.O.C.

In the last part of July 1952, He was sent to the Helsinki Olympic Games when the I.O.C. was pressured by the Soviet Union and others into issuing a last-minute invitation to China. Taiwan boycotted the competition. At that time He "had no idea of what battles had already been fought in order to participate in this Olympic Games, nor of the intensity of this struggle, nor did he even know what 'Olympic' was" (Liang 2005: 19). However, he knew that this was the first time that the national flag of the People's Republic of China had been raised at an Olympic Games, and as he stood with the team for the flag-raising ceremony in the Otaniemi Forest Olympic Village, where China was separately housed along with the U.S.S.R. and the other socialist countries,

he felt extremely proud and elated. At that moment Zhenliang absolutely did not imagine that from that point on, he would end up spending the years of his youth waging a nearly thirty-year battle with the forces within the I.O.C. that were hostile toward China, in

² Members of the Communist Student Underground risked their lives. In order to avoid discovery by the Nationalist spies, Liang Lijuan had conducted meetings under the cover of holding Christian services.

order that the red five-star flag would rightfully be raised over the Olympic Games again.” (Liang 2005: 19)

He would end up being a key player in the entire course of events from China’s withdrawal from the I.O.C. in 1958 to its readmission in 1979 and its two Olympic bids in 1993 and 2001.

The Origin of the “Two Chinas” in the I.O.C.

In the wake of World War II, the I.O.C. was faced with three divided nations: Germany, Korea and China. West Germany was recognized by the I.O.C. in 1951 and an agreement to field a joint West-East German team was signed. East Germany sought independent recognition but it was not granted until 1965. The unified German team, which had always been beset by tensions and ill will, was hailed by President Avery Brundage as a triumph of sport over politics. The unified German team was constantly held up as a model for the Chinese, despite the very important difference that, unlike the German regimes, the governments on Taiwan and the mainland had just engaged in a bloody civil war.

In 1954 the I.O.C. Session recognized the “Chinese Olympic Committee” and a letter to that effect was sent by I.O.C. Chancellor Otto Mayer to Beijing. However, Taiwan relinquished its claim to sole representation, and so the I.O.C. was left with two NOCs in what was claimed to be one national territory – a point that was used by the mainland Chinese and their supporters for the next 25 years to argue that the I.O.C. had violated its own Olympic Charter. It appears that these committees were called the “Chinese Olympic Committee having its seat in Peking” and the “Chinese Olympic Committee having its seat on Taiwan.”

At that time, Chinese diplomatic policy was to insist on “expelling the Chiang Kai-Shek Clique” and recognition of the P.R.C. as the sole representative of all of China as a precondition for membership in international organizations, and so this state of affairs was unacceptable. At

the I.O.C. Session in Paris in 1955, the Chinese delegation engaged in extensive preparations to present the case for recognizing only the P.R.C. He Zhenliang attended as the interpreter and supporter for Dong Shouyi (Shou-yi Tung). Dong, who had been active in the Tianjin Y.M.C.A. and had studied at Springfield College in the U.S., was the only one of three Chinese I.O.C. members to remain on the mainland after the Revolution. Against protocol, Dong was allowed to have an interpreter – He Zhenliang - at the I.O.C. meeting on the grounds that he had not spoken English in several decades. In those years the socialist nations convened their own meeting before the Session to discuss strategies. At that meeting, delegation head Rong Gaotang proposed to discuss their opposition to the “two Chinas,” but was discouraged by the Soviet representative Constantin Andrianov, who felt the language was too “political.” Andrianov’s caution was a response to one of Brundage’s favorite adages, namely that “politics and sport do not mix.” Brundage threatened I.O.C. members with expulsion for being too “political.” On the one hand there was some sense to this policy, in that during the Cold War the I.O.C. was operating in tense political conditions over which it had no control and could not solve, and so Executive Board members often took the position of “let the political people solve the political problems.” On the other hand, it seems that “keeping politics out of sport” was used to stifle what could have been constructive debate and to muzzle the mainland Chinese so that they were probably not as well-understood as they should have been. The level of misunderstanding of the Chinese in the I.O.C. extended to incorrectly naming it the “Democratic People’s Republic of China” in the minutes of the 1959 I.O.C. Session.

In the next day’s Executive Board meeting, Rong Gaotang angered Brundage by crossing out the name of the Taiwan Olympic Committee on the roll that was passed around. Before the Session itself, Andrianov again said to them that “yesterday they had already released a political

bombshell, and if they spoke again today perhaps it would threaten China's status within the I.O.C." (Liang 2005: 29). As Liang described the Session:

However, when the meeting discussed the admission of the Democratic Republic of Germany, [member in Taiwan] Wang Chung-Ting expressed opposition... Zhenliang and Dong were uncertain whether they should speak or not and sought Andrianov's opinion. As before, he advised them not to speak. Then the Bulgarian member, Stoichev, spoke. He was an old general and an important person in Bulgaria's United Front, but because he didn't understand the Chinese situation, he advocated simultaneously admitting two Germanies and two Chinas. This time we absolutely had to speak, and Dong Shouyi was on the verge of doing so when Andrianov again stopped him, saying that if we spoke, China's whole status would be negatively influenced: if it got much worse we would be expelled. And so all three times when we wanted to speak we were held back by the Soviet member. (Liang 2005: 29)

The Chinese delegation went home without having expressed their position, and their failure was criticized by Premier Zhou Enlai. He Zhenliang took this personally, and learned what he considered one of the most important lessons in diplomatic work in his career: "No matter when or where, the interests of the people and the nation are most important and cannot be harmed under any circumstance; nor should we always follow what Big Brother says, but at all times should stand firm that our own principles are most important" (Liang 2005: 30).

In January 1956, Zhenliang accompanied Dong Shouyi to attend the 51st I.O.C. Session at the Winter Olympic Games in Cortina d'Ampezzo.

However, no one at the meeting echoed our legitimate request. Dong Shouyi's speech was not granted a discussion and was shelved by Brundage in the name of "not talking

politics.” ...[T]he meeting gave one the feeling that it was tightly controlled by the West in all respects, while the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries each had their own plans and were not prepared to stand up for what was right, and there was no room for reason. Zhenliang had attended two IOC meetings in one year, and both times he felt very oppressed. (Liang 2005: 31)

When China’s advance group arrived at the Melbourne Olympic Games in 1956, it discovered that the Taiwan side had already entered the Olympic Village, registered under the name “Formosa, China,” and the “illegitimate national flag” of the Republic of China had been raised. The mainland Chinese declared that they were pulling out of the Games. As Liang observed, the global balance of power was too strongly tilted away from China.

The fight on the sports frontline reflected the battles in international politics. The imperialist elements who were hostile to the revolutionary victory of the new China had a bottomless bag of tricks with which they propped up the fallen Chiang Kai-shek clique, and at every stop they obstructed China’s legitimate right to recover its place on the international stage. It was like that in the United Nations, and it was like that in the international sports organizations. At the time, our enemies within the IOC were relatively strong and we were weak. More often than not the friendly troops did not come out to support us, and they had no understanding of the essence of the Taiwan problem, nor of the source of the essential difference between this problem and the problem of the two Koreas and the two Germanies. ... [Even Andrianov did not understand.] At that time there were very few Asian and African members within the IOC, and even those few were influenced by the West, to the point that some of them did not themselves belong to Asian and African countries, such as Kenya’s member,

Reginald Alexander, a white Briton who had been mayor of Nairobi and who was also a colonial plantation owner. On the contrary, more often than not they echoed the conservative, reactionary political views of the West. There was simply no reasoning within the IOC: the Charter and resolutions could all be arbitrarily tampered with, and this state of affairs could not be changed in a single day. (Liang 2005: 33).

China's Withdrawal from the I.O.C.

In 1958 there was a heated exchange of letters between Dong Shouyi and Brundage. The letters from Dong were drafted by He. On April 23, 1958, Dong wrote to Brundage:

...since you have made so many absurd comments in your letter, I am obliged here to deal with the actual facts.

I do not see your grounds for saying that "It (Taiwan) was last part of Japan and not of China." Taiwan has from ancient times been part of Chinese territory. This is a historical fact which cannot be changed by anyone. ... If you have not seriously read anything on the history of Taiwan, I believe you must have at least read such important documents as the Cairo and Postdam [sic] declarations. It is universally known, and even the United States Government cannot deny, that these two Declarations clearly stipulated that Taiwan does not belong to Japan but to China and should be restored to China. I am surprised to find that you, Mr. Brundage, being the honorable president of the I.O.C., seem to be in complete ignorance of these Declarations. Is it because you have poor memory or because you have ulterior motives?

Furthermore, you said arbitrarily that "the natives (of Taiwan) are neither Chinese nor Japanese." I must point out to you that the natives of Taiwan are Chinese just as you and your fellow countrymen are Americans. ... If, from the fact that a certain number of

national minorities reside in Taiwan, you can assert that the natives of Taiwan are not Chinese, then would not we have more reasons to say that the people living in the United States now are not Americans because the Red Indians were the original inhabitants of the American continent? Could you accept this, my dear Mr. President?

As for your remark “There is a separate [sic] Government in Taiwan”, Mr. President, you must not forget how this situation is brought about. ... That these traitors are able to survive in Taiwan until today is due to the political, economic and military aid openly given by the U.S. Government and open interference in the internal affairs of our country by the U.S. Government.

Brundage’s reply on June 1 stated:

...The I.O.C. has nothing to do with politics. It does not recognize nor deal with governments. ... Despite your obligations as a member of the International Olympic Committee, on every occasion you have attempted to introduce political questions and if you continue to violate both the letter and the spirit of our rules the only remedy will be to request your resignation.

On August 19, 1958, Dong replied:

Mr. President,

I am most indignant at your letter dated June 1. Evading the questions I raised in my letter of April 23, you continued your mean practice of reversing right and wrong, wantonly slandered [sic] and threatened the Chinese Olympic Committee (All-China Athletic Federation) and myself, and shamelessly [sic] tried to justify your reactionary acts. This fully reveals that you are a faithful menial of the U.S. imperialists bent on serving their plot of creating “two Chinas.”

A man like you, who are staining the Olympic spirit and violating the Olympic Charter, has no qualifications whatsoever to be the I.O.C. president. All who are faithful to the Olympic spirit will surely oppose your shameless acts.

I have been a colleague to other members of the I.O.C. for many years. We have jointly made contributions to the international Olympic Movement and built up a good friendship among us. I feel painful [sic], however, that the I.O.C. is today controlled by such an imperialist like you and consequently the Olympic spirit has been grossly trampled upon. To uphold the Olympic spirit and tradition, I hereby declare that I will no longer cooperate with you or have any connections with the I.O.C. while it is under your domination.

Tung Shou-yi

In 1958, China withdrew from eleven international sports federations. He Zhenliang regarded this as the beginning of a shift in global politics:

China's withdrawal dealt a heavy blow to those international sports organizations that had a death-grip on power in the sports world. Never before had there been a country that had dared to oppose their authority to rule, which annoyed them in the extreme, and so they prohibited their members from associating with us in order to isolate us.

However, these prohibitions could not prohibit the desire of athletes from many countries who wanted to have exchanges with China, and they thought up ways to get around the ban; if the national team could not come, they would organize exchanges in the form of bilateral exchanges, and send a youth organization, student group, or trade union team.

This battlefield of control and resistance to control continued up until 1962. (Liang 2005: 34)

It is interesting that even in the most heated exchanges between the mainland Chinese and Brundage the Chinese always claimed to uphold the Olympic Ideals. This was at a time when various kinds of “imperialist” and “bourgeois” ideology were denounced and attacked in China. One finds Dong writing, “I have proceeded wholly from the stand of upholding the principles and spirit of I.O.C. and safeguarding its privilege” (April 23, 1959). Brundage wrote back, “The members of the International Olympic Committee...could not understand how one of their colleagues could be so ignorant of the principles of the Olympic Movement” (June 1, 1958). Dong copied the letter to his colleagues along with one of his own that said, “His letters clearly have exposed his shameless features as one who has stained the Olympic spirit” (August 19, 1958). And finally Dong wrote that he was resigning “to uphold the Olympic spirit and tradition.” And so it is possible to detect, even at the lowest point in China-I.O.C. relations, the strong desire of Chinese people to be active players on the world stage, even if that meant embracing “Western” institutions like the Olympic Games. When I asked Liang Lijuan why China never denounced the Olympic Ideal, she replied that it wouldn’t make sense – if you want to enter the organization, why would you criticize it? I observed that one could imagine such criticism at the heights of extreme leftism (1966-69) during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), but she explained that Jiang Qing (Mao’s wife and a member of the Gang of Four that had seized power) was too busy attacking people domestically to direct her attention toward the I.O.C.

One significant piece of information about Brundage is that he had a vast collection of East Asian art, part of which he donated to the M.H. de Young Memorial Museum in Golden Gate Park in 1959, which resulted in the building of a new wing, completed in 1966. At its dedication, he expressed his hope that “it will help San Francisco and the Bay Area become one of the world's greatest centers of Oriental culture.” He made a second gift in 1969, and

bequeathed the rest of his collection in 1975. His collection was one of the greatest in America and the Asian Art Museum (renamed in 1972) was the first one in the United States devoted exclusively to the arts of Asia. Today the Avery Brundage Collection represents approximately 65% of its holdings and consists of almost 7,800 pieces of priceless Asian art valued at \$60 million (<http://www.asianart.org/history>). This seems significant for two reasons: first, Brundage obviously had a strong interest in Chinese culture, but to date no one has explored how this might have affected his handling of the Taiwan-China problem. Dong Shouyi recalled that in a meeting with Brundage before the 51st Session in 1956, he showed Brundage a letter that outlined the history of the China-Taiwan problem and presented him with an art book and a collection of photos. Brundage took out a pencil and crossed out sections of the letter, stating “you can talk about this,” “you can’t talk about this” – forbidding him to discuss politics. Then he pointed to the art book and the photos and said, “We are interested in those, we don’t discuss politics” (Hua 1993: 142).

Second, in the mainland Chinese opinion, Taiwan has used bribery over the years to influence international decision-makers. It can be assumed that Brundage did not acquire his Chinese art on the mainland because there was no open art market during these years, and surely much of it was acquired in Taiwan (the Nationalists took the Imperial Collection of 100,000 items with them when they fled to Taiwan). With Brundage having such a huge financial investment in Asian art, there was certainly also a huge potential for corruption. So far as I know, this has never been investigated.

Expulsion of Taiwan from the I.O.C. and Brundage’s Subterfuge

In the minutes of 55th Session in 1959, it is reported that the U.S.S.R. submitted a proposition that “the O.C. having its seat in Taiwan be no longer allowed to control the sport of

continental China.” Brundage “thinks that we should advise Taiwan that we can no longer continue to recognize it as N.O.C. of Nationalist China since it does not control Chinese sport of the whole territory of china [sic]. If an application for recognition is made under a different name, it will be considered by the I.O.C. and it will be authorized to participate in the Olympic Games.” The minutes also state that Andrianov “suggest [sic] that the name of the N.O.C. for Nationalist China be removed from the Bulletin.”

By a vote of 48 to 7 the following resolution was approved by the Session:

The Chinese National Olympic Committee having its seat in Taipei (Taiwan) will be notified by the International Olympic Committee chancellor that it cannot continue to be recognized under that name since it does not control sport in the country of China, and its name will be removed from the official list.

If an application for recognition under a different name is made it will be considered by the International Olympic Committee. (Minutes of 55th I.O.C. Session, May 25-2, 5).

This unleashed a torrent of negative media coverage in the U.S. and reactions from the U.S. Congress, State Department, President Eisenhower, and U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. The Taiwan Olympic Committee proposed to change its name to Republic of China Olympic Committee and Brundage issued a communiqué claiming that the I.O.C. vote had “neither EVICTED nor EXPELLED the Nationalist Chinese Committee from the Olympic Movement, and we deplore this error of interpretation...” (Schantz 1995:191). The Executive Board meeting in October 1959 confirmed his version of the story when it approved the motion from the French I.O.C. Vice President Massard that there should be no further discussion since Taiwan had never been expelled.

It seems clear from the wording of the resolution that the intention was that the Taiwan Olympic Committee's name would be removed from the list of approved Olympic Committees and it would undergo the normal process for approval of a new name not containing the word "China;" since the normal approval process required a vote by the Session, it should be expected that the new name required Session approval. On this basis, for the next 24 years the mainland Chinese argued that Brundage had brazenly bypassed the ratification process without passing it through the approval of the Session, and this breach of protocol had been ignored by the I.O.C. In the 1979 Executive Board meeting that led to China's readmission to the I.O.C., President Killanin, who had spoken in China's favor at the 1959 Session, supported the mainland Chinese version of history, noting, "We cannot trace at any time this recognition being minuted. But we do find that this committee did not call itself the Chinese Olympic Committee but endeavored to be called the Republic of China Olympic Committee" (audiotape of Executive Board Meeting, Lausanne, March 10, 1979).

Asian Sport Starts to Come into its Own

With China's withdrawal from the I.O.C., its diplomatic efforts turned toward Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The First Asian Games had been held in New Delhi in 1951 as a celebration of India's independence from Great Britain (1947). The Fourth Asian Games in 1962 were scheduled to be held in Indonesia, which needed international support in recovering the West Irian Islands, and was therefore eager neither to offend China nor Taiwan's supporters. It vacillated publicly for several months on allowing Taiwan to compete while assuring the mainland Chinese privately that they would not. As related by Liang:

In the end Indonesia used identity cards as the reason for not allowing the Chiang Kai-shek clique's sport organization to take part; to this day the course of events is a mystery.

The host countries of large-scale international sports events all mail out identity cards to the participating countries ahead of time, which can be used in place of visas to enter the host country to take part in the games. All of the identity cards inside the package received by Taiwan were blank paper. Taiwan sent a telegram to the host country pressing them for an explanation. The host said that the package mailed to Taiwan was a normal one containing cards like the identity cards sent to all the other members, and that this was a problem of the Taiwan post office for which Indonesia could not be responsible. When Taiwan saw this discouraging turn of events they sent their sports leader, Gunsun Hoh, to put on the team uniform of Thailand with the intention of infiltrating the Thai team and entering DDjakarta. After we received news of this we notified Indonesia. They then arranged to surround Gunsun Hoh by force, seize him and deport him, and furthermore they issued a statement that since Taiwan had violated Indonesia's laws for entering the country, no Taiwan personnel would be allowed to enter the country. (Liang 2005: 55).

The I.O.C., under Brundage, objected to these actions and threatened to withdraw recognition of the Asian Games and the Indonesian Olympic Committee, which angered Indonesian President Sukarno. Inspired by the success of the Bandung Conference, he initiated establishment of the Games of the New Emerging Forces. The Bandung Conference was a meeting of representatives of 29 African and Asian nations held at Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955. The aim was to promote economic and cultural cooperation and to oppose colonialism. It ultimately led to the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961. A plane carrying mainland Chinese and East European journalists to the conference had crashed when a bomb detonated, which was

attributed to a Nationalist Chinese attempt to assassinate Premier Zhou, who was not actually on the plane.

He Zhenliang participated in the first meeting of the GANEFO preparatory committee in 1963. Over ten nations were invited, including the Soviet Union, which was in a delicate position because it wanted to support the Non-aligned Movement, but it did not want to be expelled from the I.O.C.. The Chinese delegates opposed the Soviet proposal to write the aims of the I.O.C. into the mission statement of the GANEFO and present it as a supplement to the Olympic Games because they felt this served the West, but supported writing both the Olympic ideals and the Bandung ideals into the mission statement. Ultimately the First GANEFO in Djakarta in 1963 attracted 48 nations. It was China's first full-scale participation in a major, international, multi-sport event. Because of the fears of Nationalist attack, the majority of the mainland Chinese delegation went to Djakarta by top-secret sea routes. The Soviet Union only dared to send a second-tier team that participated under the labels of Youth and Students. The I.O.C. and some international sport federations proposed a 12-month ban on Olympic participation for those athletes who took part in the GANEFO. It accepted Indonesian and North Korean participation in the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games under the condition that no athlete who had taken part in GANEFO would be allowed to compete. Indonesia and North Korea sent athletes that had attended GANEFO to Japan in hopes the I.O.C. would change its mind, but they were not allowed to compete and North Korea withdrew its entire team. The I.O.C. sanctions against some countries initiated other Emerging Forces events in swimming, wrestling, and other sports.

An Asian GANEFO was held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in 1966 and the next GANEFO were set for 1967, but Sukarno's replacement by General Suharto in a military coup and the start of the Cultural Revolution in China prevented it.

The GANEFO initiated a phase in international sports diplomacy during which the socialist, developing, and non-Western nations that were frustrated by the West's "death-grip" on power in the major international sports organizations began to form alternate organizations.

Liang writes,

Now there are some people who consider the GANEFO as a product of "leftist" thinking. Zhenliang disagrees with this view, feeling that the GANEFO were an inevitable result as history progressed to a certain stage; they reflected the intense desires of the numerous countries that had achieved national independence and liberation after World War II as they demanded control of their own fates. It was not until after that fierce attack that the international sport organizations, including the I.O.C., gradually paid attention to the voices of the developing nations and changed their own courses toward democratic management and the genuine meaning of "universalism." Although the GANEFO only bloomed once, their effects were indispensable. (Liang 2005: 59-60)

He Zhenliang returned from the Phnom Penh Asian GANEFO to find that a rebel faction had seized control in the State Sports Commission and the former leaders were sidelined. Dong Shouyi was labeled as an "ox-ghost snake-spirit" and sent down to do hard labor from 1968-1972. He's wife, Liang Lijuan, was labelled a traitor and spy and was imprisoned in the "cowshed."³ He Zhenliang was denounced as a "revisionist sprout" and "counter-revolutionary

³ *Niupeng*, the Cultural Revolution practice in which rebel factions within organizations imprisoned people who had been targeted for criticism and attack in storerooms, classrooms, etc., allowing them outside only during the day to do menial labor under strict supervision.

element” and was subjected to criticism sessions in which he was beaten and kicked. From 1968 to 1970, Liang was sent down to a cadre school in the countryside. Her urban status was not fully restored until 1975. From 1969 to 1971, He was sent to a different rural cadre school for labor and their son went with him and their daughter joined Liang. “He also brought the second-hand bicycle we had bought when we were married and it went through the ‘arduous struggle’ together with him. Zhenliang often pushed it everywhere carrying a basket to collect manure as fertilizer for the fields. Jumping into the manure pit to scoop up manure became one of the frequent activities of Zhenliang and the others” (Liang 2005: 61).

He was transferred back to Beijing in order to participate in the “ping pong diplomacy” that Chairman Mao initiated from 1971 to 1973. During this time, three large international table tennis tournaments were held in Beijing: the Asia-Africa (AA), Asia (A), and Asia-Africa-Latin America (AAA) tournaments. Due to the Cultural Revolution, China had stopped taking part in international sporting events until a personal entreaty from Koji Goto, head of the Japanese Table Tennis Federation, persuaded Mao to send a team to the 31st World Cup in Table Tennis in Nagoya, Japan, in March 1971. In April, Mao decided to accept the request of the U.S. to send a table tennis delegation to China, and he invited the U.S. along with five other nations. Ping-pong diplomacy paved the way for China’s admission into the U.N. in October, 1971. Koji Goto was also the president of the Asian Table Tennis Federation and proposed to the ATTF Session that China should be admitted to the ATTF. The motion was vetoed and he resigned in protest. In May 1972, 16 countries participated in a preparatory meeting to form an alternate Asian table tennis federation, which was called the Asian Table Tennis Union. In September the First Asian Table Tennis Friendship Invitational was held in Beijing. Thirty-one nations and territories participated, and only four or five members were left in the old Asian Table Tennis

Federation. And so the International Table Tennis Federation had no choice but to shift its recognition to the new Asian Table Tennis Union. In September 1973, over 80 nations and territories, many of which did not have diplomatic relations with China, participated in the First Asia-Africa-Latin America Table Tennis Friendship Invitational in Beijing. It became a launching pad for the establishment of diplomatic relations. A contingent of Taiwanese living in the U.S. and Japan took part under the name “China, Taiwan Province, Overseas Compatriots Ping Pong team.”

In 1972, Lord Killanin took over the presidency of the I.O.C. from Avery Brundage. In 1936 Killanin had been sent as a journalist to Nanjing and Shanghai, where he observed first-hand the effects of Japan’s atrocities during the occupation. As far back as 1959 Killanin’s position toward China seems to have been friendlier than Brundage’s.

China’s Admission into the Asian Games Federation

Iran was set to host the Seventh Asian Games in 1974; in 1972 they contacted the mainland Chinese expressing a desire to use their position as host to enable China to take part. The presidency of the Asian Games Federation is occupied by the host country of the next Asian Games. Japan, which was the main power in Asian sports, also came out with a statement that only the P.R.C. had the right to represent China. At the Executive Board meeting of the Asian Games Federation in September 1972, a motion was passed recognizing the P.R.C. and revoking Taiwan’s membership. This was the first time since 1959 that China had succeeded in being admitted to a major international sport organization and having Taiwan expelled. “One can imagine Zhenliang’s excited and elated emotional state. He let out a long breath of air that had been stopped up in his chest for many years.”(Liang 2005: 74). After much diplomatic effort by China, Iran, Japan, and others, at the meeting of the Asian Games Council in November 1973,

China was admitted. China was then a member of six international sports federations, and it launched an effort to either gain admittance to others or to get an assurance that the athletes of other countries would not be suspended for competing against Chinese athletes during the Asian Games. This effort was successful with all the major federations with FINA, the most diehard, holding out until just before the swimming events started. Liang observed:

This victory reflected new changes in the structure of Asian politics. The friendly forces in Asia had already surpassed the conservative forces. From this point on China had transformed the situation of the past 20 years in which it had no choice but to withdraw from international and Asian sports federations in order to resist “two Chinas” schemes, and with its new position it began a new era of joining international sports federations. However, at the same time, as was to be expected, a few leaders in the IOC and a few international federations threatened to revoke recognition of the Asian Games. Zhenliang knew that carrying out a new round of struggles on the international level was unavoidable, but he was fully confident because, although there were still many diehard conservatives in the international sports federations, they could not oppose all of Asia.

(Liang 2005: 79)

International Developments

From the launching pad of the 1974 Asian Games, the mainland Chinese worked over the next few years to gain admission into international and Asian sports federations and to achieve Taiwan’s expulsion. The Taiwan-China problem heated up before the 1976 Montreal Olympics when Canada supported the P.R.C. and Prime Minister Trudeau declared that Taiwan could only compete under the name “Taiwan,” while the U.S. supported Taiwan and at one point threatened to withdraw from the Games. Taiwan did not accept Trudeau’s conditions and withdrew at the

last moment. These decisions should have been the I.O.C.'s to make, not Canada's, but Killanin chose to avoid conflict. President Killanin visited China in 1977, at which time he advised them to establish a politically-independent Chinese Olympic Committee and get its constitution in order. Juan Antonio Samaranch had considered a friend of China since 1975, when he was Spain's ambassador to the Soviet Union. Samaranch visited China in April, 1977, and Zhenliang accompanied him:

It was then that their mutual understanding and friendship began. As soon as Samaranch arrived in Beijing, his dislike of sightseeing revealed his "work-crazy" personality. He said he had come to work, and if necessary he would spend his entire time in China conducting negotiations and visiting sports facilities in Beijing, and let his wife visit locations outside Beijing. (Liang 2005: 105)

Meanwhile, the Cultural Revolution had officially come to an end in 1976, Chairman Mao had died, Deng Xiaoping had risen to power, and in 1978 the Era of Reform and Opening-up began. The 80th I.O.C. Session convened in Athens in 1978. "There, at the Session convened 24 years previously, the I.O.C. had decided by a vote of 23 to 21 to recognize only our Chinese Olympic Committee. However, the American president Avery Brundage later tampered with this decision. Twenty-four years later, the world had undergone a huge tectonic shift, but the I.O.C. had seemingly not noticed it" (Liang 2005: 106). There was a heated debate spearheaded by the Romanian member, Alexander Siperco. The U.S.S.R. became more assertive in China's favor than it had been, and the mainland Chinese felt that this was because in the wake of Montreal, the Soviets were afraid a boycott would mar the 1980 Moscow Olympics. Killanin assigned a three-member committee to visit China and Taiwan, consisting of New Zealand's Lance Cross, Romania's Siperco, and Jamaica's Roy Anthony Bridge. According to the

recollection of He and Liang, Killanin had assumed that Siperco would favor mainland China, Bridge would favor Taiwan, and Cross would be neutral; thus the committee would be balanced. During the visit to China, the mainland Chinese felt that Cross was particularly antagonistic. They also protested the visit of the committee to Taiwan and, as they understood it, the I.O.C. accepted this objection. When Cross and Bridge went to Taiwan anyway, the mainland Chinese perceived that Cross became even more outspoken in favor of Taiwan, and suspected that the Taiwan side had “worked” on him (Liang 2005: 108).

Siperco did not go to Taiwan, which Cross later stated in the Executive Board meeting that he considered to reveal blatant political bias inappropriate for a committee member who was supposed to be objective (audiotapes of 1979 I.O.C. Executive Board Meeting). In contrast to He Zhenliang’s understanding that Cross and Bridge did not have I.O.C. authorization to go to Taiwan, the audiotapes of the 1979 Executive Board meeting seem to indicate that Killanin had approved the trip. Siperco was not present at that meeting to speak for himself, but submitted a letter that was critical of Cross’s political bias.

Another key supporter of China was Horst Dassler, the CEO of Adidas corporation, who visited Beijing in September of 1978 and was helpful in getting China readmitted to the IAAF.

Meanwhile there was also a move within UNESCO to form an inter-governmental sports organization that would better represent the Third World Nations and bypass the established international sports organizations that were controlled by the West. He Zhenliang attended relevant meetings in 1977 and 1978. “The Third World nations hoped that through this inter-governmental sports organization they could gradually change the monopoly over world sports by the I.O.C. and others. ... Given the situation in international sports at that time, a complete change in the monopoly by large countries was not something that could be achieved overnight,

but the Intergovernmental Sports Committee might at least act as a check on their power” (Liang 2005: 109).

On January 1, 1979, China and the U.S. announced the establishment of diplomatic relations and the U.S. acknowledged the P.R.C. as the sole legitimate government of China. Taiwan was left with official diplomatic relations with only a handful of nations in the world. China also changed its official diplomatic policy toward Taiwan’s membership in international organizations, no longer insisting on the expulsion of Taiwan, but allowing Taiwan to maintain its membership so long as it was indicated as a province of China, and did not use the name Republic of China.

The I.O.C. Starts to Listen

Even though the mood within the I.O.C. had greatly shifted in China’s favor, there was still no action at the January 1979 Executive Board meeting, and intensive diplomatic efforts were carried out worldwide for many more months. Finally, at the Executive Board meeting in Lausanne on March 10, the Board drafted a resolution to take to the Session. The Japanese member Misaji Kiyokawa argued that the I.O.C. could not risk dragging the issue out any longer because it was losing authority. At that meeting, Killanin commented that in Montreal they had fought strongly for Taiwan and had won the right for them to use their anthem and flag, but they refused to change their name: “I must admit at the moment my own patience has become somewhat exhausted with them, having worked so hard, so I may be prejudiced.” He observed that the I.O.C. was faced with a practical problem created by politics over which the I.O.C. had no control, “[The Taiwanese] have internationally become a non-people.” They could not, for example, compete under their national flag and name in any of the countries of the members of the Executive Board seated around the table. He was not even sure of Taiwan’s legal status,

wondered what papers they used to travel abroad, and hypothesized that privileged Taiwanese traveled under Hong Kong passports. “It’s no good recognizing people who can’t compete internationally” (audiotapes of March 10 Executive Board meeting).

Lance Cross argued vigorously for an arrangement under which both the P.R.C. and the R.O.C. changed their names, claiming that “geographic” designations would sidestep the “political” problem: “That’s why I tried to avoid political determinations because the I.O.C. cannot be involved in a political decision. Let the political people make those decisions” (audiotapes). Cross’s lack of knowledge of China was indicated by his complaint about the Pinyin spelling of names (the spelling system used in mainland China) on the document submitted by the mainland Chinese, incorrectly stating, “They’ve gone back to an ancient spelling” (as if ancient Chinese used the English alphabet!) (audiotapes).

In preparation for receiving a delegation from China, the Executive Board considered the report submitted by Lance Cross, head of the China committee, and a draft resolution submitted by Taiwan’s I.O.C. member, Henry Hsu, to be put to a vote at the I.O.C. Session. While reading the resolution, Killanin noted with irritation, “I’m trying to look at it as fairly and objectively as possible. The Republic of China make use of politics when it’s useful to them and they say ‘We mustn’t touch politics’ when it doesn’t suit them.” However, he did state that it was unfair to ask Taiwan to change its name and allow the P.R.C. to use its own self-given name (audiotape).

The Executive Board then received the Chinese delegation. Song Zhong first read in English a written statement of their position, and then Lou Dapeng acted as the interpreter for He Zhenliang, who answered the discussion questions. This was a clever tactic to allow He time to collect his thoughts before speaking. He had begun his career as a French interpreter for top Chinese leaders and spoke fluent French, and since French was one of the two official languages

of the I.O.C., he could have dispensed with using Chinese altogether. This strategy worked as He presented very compelling arguments, and even bested Cross at his own game when Cross raised the only hostile question: “It is a fact that there are two regimes existing, both claiming control of respective areas and this has been existent for 26 years without the respective governments reaching a solution. Why is it felt that the I.O.C. should solve it?” Having mastered the I.O.C. logic that had been used against China for two decades, He replied in Chinese, and Lou translated into English, “This is an interesting question. The I.O.C. is a non-political body that considers questions from the interest of sports” (audiotape).

At that meeting, the Executive Board decided to invite Taiwan and China to roundtable talks. The China side accepted, but the Taiwan side refused. The mainland Chinese began working toward the 81st Session of the I.O.C. in Montevideo on April 6-8. After much prior diplomatic work, a private meeting with Killanin, and a meeting with the Executive Board, the mainland Chinese delegation developed a “last playing card” strategy, which they were ultimately forced to play in the presentation before the Session:

According to the spirit of the IOC regulations and the reality that there is but one China in the world, the IOC ought to recognize only one national Olympic committee in China, and that ought to be a Chinese Olympic committee located in Beijing that represents all Chinese athletes. We have already proposed a solution to the problem of how Taiwan’s athletes can take part in Olympic competitions. We are aware that right now there are people who request that the Taiwan sports organization change its name and be allowed to remain within the IOC. We feel that although this is not a final solution to the problem, in order to cooperate with the efforts of our friends in the IOC to seek a solution to the question of the right to represent China - and in consideration of the current

situation of Taiwan province - as a temporary measure, after restoring China's rightful place in the IOC, we can give special permission to the Taiwan provincial sports organization to remain in the IOC under the name of Chinese Olympic Committee, Taiwan, which would be a local Chinese organization. The prerequisite would be that it could not use the written words 'Republic of Taiwan,' nor the word 'Taiwan' alone, nor could it use the so-called 'national flag,' 'national anthem,' nor any symbol whatsoever representing the so-called 'Republic of China.' (Liang 2005: 119).

Liang notes, "This was the first time in an IOC meeting that the Chinese Olympic Committee had proposed in clear and definite language a plan to deal with the Taiwan problem. It could not but leave a deep impression on the minds and hearts of the members. They felt this was an expression of tremendous effort and magnanimity on the part of the Chinese side." However, the Session was unable to reach any resolution.

After the Session, the Executive Board continued meeting through the night into early in the morning of April 7, when they proposed to offer to the Session a draft resolution. The draft resolved:

"1. to reintegrate the Chinese Olympic Committee

"2. to maintain recognition of the Olympic Committee whose headquarters are located in Taipeh [Taipei].

"All matters pertaining to name, anthem and flag will be the subject of studies and agreements which will have to be completed as soon as possible."⁴

In the Session, this proposal ran into heated opposition from the members sympathetic to Taiwan. They suggested revisions to the Executive Board's draft resolution. It was changed to:

⁴ Annex 49, "Executive Board's Resolution on China," in the minutes of the 81st Session of the I.O.C., Montevideo, 7 April 1979, p. 118.

“1. to recognise the Chinese Olympic Committee located in Peking.

“2. to maintain recognition of the Chinese Olympic Committee located in Taipeh.

“All matters pertaining to names, anthems, flags and constitutions will be the subject of studies and agreements which will have to be completed as soon as possible.”⁵

The amended resolution passed the session by 36 to 30 votes, with President Killanin opposing it. The debate in the session lasted eleven hours from beginning to end.

The mainland Chinese issued a statement that they could not accept this resolution, but were willing to engage in further discussions with the I.O.C. According to Liang, in a meeting with the Chinese delegation Killanin said, “Even though I have worked very hard, I still suffered defeat – apparently Taiwan has bought off more than a few people. But I will not accept defeat - there is still one year left before I will be relieved as president, and I still want to continue the struggle” (Liang 2005: 121).

The Montevideo Session had elected a new Executive Board in which the balance of power was more in China’s favor. In June the Executive Board appointed a three-person working group consisting of First Vice President Mzali as the head, and including Siperco and Cross. Siperco was in charge of drawing up a draft resolution:

“1. To confirm the recognition of the Olympic committee located in Peking under the name of ‘Chinese Olympic Committee.’

“2. To maintain the recognition of the Olympic committee located in Taipeh under the name of ‘Chinese Taipeh Olympic Committee,’ on the condition that the latter adopts an

⁵ “Decisions,” page 39 of the minutes of the 81st Session of the I.O.C., Montevideo, 7 April 1979.

anthem and a flag which are different from those of the ‘Republic of China; used until now.’⁶

Because of Cross’s opposition, the Executive Board decided to wait until the October meeting of the Executive Board in Nagoya to confirm it. Then by means of a postal vote it would submit it to the entire membership for approval. At that point the Chinese Olympic Committee agreed to the resolution, but the Taiwan side refused, claiming the Executive Board had overturned the decision of the Session, and opposing the use of a postal vote. They filed suit against the I.O.C. in a Swiss law court and mobilized 120 members of the U.S. Congress to write a letter to Killanin, requesting that he not allow himself to be influenced by politics. Killanin said to reporters: “Professional American politicians do not want me to be influenced by politics – isn’t that a joke?” (Liang 2005: 125).

At the Nagoya meeting, the Executive Board passed this resolution:

“The Resolution of the Executive Board is:

The People’s Republic of China:

Name: Chinese Olympic Committee

NOC anthem, flag and emblem: Flag and anthem of the People’s Republic of China. The emblem submitted to and approved by the Executive Board.

Constitution: In order.

Committee based in Taipei:

Name: Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee

⁶ Minutes of the Executive Board meeting in San Juan, Puerto Rico, 18 June 1979, p. 33.

NOC anthem, flag and emblem: Other than those used at present and which must be approved by the Executive Board of the I.O.C..

Constitution: To be amended in conformity with I.O.C. Rules by 1st January 1980.”⁷
This was sent to the I.O.C. membership for a postal vote and it passed by a vote of 62 to 17, with one abstention.

Afterwards this “Olympic formula” was used to settle the question of the use of national symbols in other organizations and international settings. Liang writes, “It was a tremendous victory with profound significance for us in international sports organizations. Beginning in 1951 with the preparations to participate in the 1952 Helsinki Olympic Games, this fight to maintain China’s legitimate rights in the world of international sports, and uphold state sovereignty and territorial integrity, was fought for fully 28 years” (Liang 2005: 126).

Liang summarizes He Zhenliang’s emotions about the course of events from the preparations for Helsinki in 1951 to the admission of the People’s Republic of China in 1979:

When he looks at all the documents and letters that he had a hand in drafting over those many years, the negotiations and conversations that he carried on, it is as if they accumulated drip by drip and drop by drop, gradually flowing from a slowly trickling stream into a great surging river. First under the leadership of Zhou Enlai, and later when Premier Zhou’s unfinished task was handed on to Comrade Deng Xiaoping, this great river gained momentum from the improved situation at home and abroad, until it finally broke through the bitterly-defended embankment of the stubborn conservative members inside the I.O.C., and rushed a thousand miles onward. The leadership of the I.O.C. finally corrected the mistakes of their predecessors, and in 1979 rightly restored China’s

⁷ Minutes of the Executive Board meeting, Nagoya, Japan, 23-25 October 1979, p. 103.

legitimate seat. International sports entered a new phase. From now on, there would no longer be any power that could fetter China's hands and feet: China would be a presence with voice and color on the stage of international sports, devoting all its strength to the development of sports and the friendship between the peoples of the world. (Liang 2005: 127).

Dong Shouyi died in 1978 at the age of 83, one year short of seeing China readmitted to the I.O.C. (Hua 1993: 208).

Globalization is not a Dinner Party

In working through the primary sources upon which this paper is based, I have been struck by the inadequacy of the vision conjured up by the word "globalization." It tends to conjure up an image of the world as one happy "global village," which obscures some harsh political realities. As I hope I have conveyed, China's emergence as a world sports power was built on the backs of individual people who worked very hard to achieve goals that had great personal meaning for them. They had suffered war and poverty under the Nationalist regime and risked their lives for the cause of the Communist revolution. They cultivated personal networks of support among Asian, African, and socialist nations in order to contest the monopoly over world sports by the Western powers. This was a very human process. If one speaks only of global forces in the abstract, one loses sight of the very personal nature of the politics involved.

In the lead-up to Beijing 2008, I am especially concerned about the growing media frenzy and superficial academic interest in "China's emergence as a world sports power," which dehumanizes Chinese sports as a kind of state-run machine. That is why I have undertaken this translation project; I want to make sure that the voices of real Chinese people are heard.

The second point that emerges from this account is how imperative it is that we academics do not misrecognize globalization as a process of equal participation. We must remain critical of the West's domination of global politics. "Globalization" is a generic word that implies equal participation and erases the determinative role of the West. The account of China's relationship with the I.O.C. reveals the nature of the Western domination of international sports organizations throughout the Cold War and the difficult struggles that finally diminished Western power. But how much was it actually diminished? As intellectuals, we should be alert to the inequalities of power inherent in globalization and not delude ourselves that globalization in itself will automatically reduce them.

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